A defence of teaching general thinking skills

Journal of Philosophy of Education, Vol. 32, No. 3, 1998 A Defence of Teaching General Thinking Skills STEVEN HIGGINS AND VIVIENNE BAUMFIELD There has been developing interest in thinking skills in schools over the past decade. However in the UK the consensus seems to have been against the possibility of the very existence of general thinking skills. We present three main arguments in defence of general thinking skills which hinge upon assumptions in a priori arguments about transfer, we suggest that a clearer definition of the domains of knowledge theory is necessary for the way it is used against thinking skills and we offer a consideration of the expert/novice objections about subject or domain-specific knowledge. INTRODUCTION Interest in the teaching of thinking skills as part of the school curriculum has been growing in the last ten years. Nisbet and Davies (1990) listed 30 specific programmes and indicated that there are over 100 on the market in America. In the US authorities in some states have adopted critical thinking skills programmes for use in all schools (e.g. Vermont Department of Education, 1996). The situation in Britain reflects a more piecemeal adoption of programmes where individual schools, or even individual teachers within a school, have taken up thinking skills, often in isolation and with little support. Recently, however, interest in the teaching of thinking has been expressed by the Qualifications and Curriculum Authority (QCA) who are considering the introduction of Critical Thinking into the post-16 curriculum and in the White Paper (DfEE 1997) which recommends `the systematic teaching of thinking skills' (p. 39). One major barrier to the wholesale introduction of thinking skills has been the absence of sufficiently robust data to support the efficacy of thinking skills programmes in improving pupils' learning in other aspects of the curriculum (transfer). Advocates of thinking skills point to problems of implementation and assessment to explain the lack of evidence for transfer; critics question the viability of general thinking skills divorced from a specific body of knowledge. In general the British literature apparently accepts a philosophical consensus as reported by Fisher (1991) that the quest for identifying general thinking skills is in vain as it can be demonstrated that thinking skills cannot be generalised or transferable. A few dissenting voices can be identified (e.g. Andrews, & The Journal of the Philosophy of Education Society of Great Britain 1998. Published by Blackwell Publishers, 108 Cowley Road, Oxford OX4 1JF and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 01248, USA. 391 392 Steven Higgins and Vivienne Baum®eld 1990; Quinn, 1994). It is the intention of this article to offer a defence of thinking skills as a valid area of empirical investigation by pointing to some flaws in the case against general thinking skills. In brief, the arguments to be presented in defence of general thinking skills are: . that there are hidden dangers in a priori arguments against general thinking skills which create an apparent paradox Ð one way to resolve this paradox is to question the a priori argument itself; . that the domains theory of knowledge does not necessarily imply that if thinking is always about something then this something is therefore domain-specific; . that the strength of the novice/expert objection (deriving from the finding that expert thinkers only apply more detailed knowledge and not general principles) needs to be reassessed. OBJECTION 1: A PRIORI ARGUMENTS We think that Zeno's paradox of Achilles and the tortoise (see, for example, Salmon, 1970), perhaps the best known of the classical logical paradoxes, can offer some insights into the general thinking skills debate. We see the paradox as representing the debate about general thinking skills in two ways. First, just as it seems Achilles logically cannot overtake the tortoise but we know that in the real world he must, so, it seems to us, the logical arguments against general thinking skills cannot yet defeat the evidence for their existence. Secondly, and more broadly, the paradox is a metaphor for the inability of the current debate about the utility of thinking skills to move beyond its current impasse. Achilles and the tortoise have a race. Achilles generously gives the tortoise a head start and then sets off to catch up with where it has got to. By the time he has reached this point (where the tortoise was when he set off) the tortoise has moved on ahead. So he now has to catch up with where the tortoise has reached. He races on, but by the time he catches up with where the tortoise had got to, it has moved on ahead. In order to overtake the tortoise, Achilles always has to catch up with where it has got to, but every time he does this the tortoise has moved on a little bit further. Therefore Achilles can never catch the tortoise. Common sense says that this argument is flawed as Achilles will obviously catch and overtake the tortoise if he is running faster and has enough time. It is difficult however to articulate the precise nature of the flaw in the paradox. The story is using a frame of reference, the relative positions of the racers, that is inadequate to describe what is actually happening. It omits the aspect of time and therefore the speed of the racers. (It is interesting to note that it was not until this century that Cantor's theories on infinite sets were used to solve the problem.) The paradox provides an analogy for arguments against general thinking skills which are based on the premise that thinking must always be about & The Journal of the Philosophy of Education Society of Great Britain 1998. Teaching General Thinking Skills 393 something. Andrews (1990) has drawn our attention to the different conceptualisations of general thinking skills held by philosophers and psychologists: philosophers regard thinking skills as a way of knowing whilst psychologists investigate their utility as a tool for learning. If prior learning affects subsequent behaviour then something must be `transferred'. The conflation of knowing and learning by some philosophers of education (e.g. McPeck, 1981, Gardner and Johnson, 1996) pre-empts the investigation of learning as a process and consideration of the evolution or development of thinking skills within a pupil's development. Arguments claiming that general thinking skills are a priori impossible must take account of all the information necessary to understand thinking skills if they are to be convincing, including the process of learning. The apparent paradox is that some previous learning is used in subsequent thinking and yet it is hard to identify exactly what is transferred in the same way that it is difficult to articulate exactly how Achilles catches the tortoise. OBJECTION 2: DOMAINS OF KNOWLEDGE Arguments against general thinking skills which rest on a domains theory of knowledge state that not only must thinking always be about something but this `something' is always within a specific domain with its own specific skills of thinking. There is, however, a further requirement for such a domains theory if it is to be valid against general thinking skills. There needs not just to be a domains theory of knowledge but these domains must be completely distinct (no overlap or intersection) so that all particular knowledge is domain-specific. In the area of education this is particularly true for those who equate domains with subject disciplines (e.g. McPeck, 1981). The range of possible relations between the thinking required by different domains, however, is quite extensive. This is from all types of domain-specific thinking being completely separate (all instances of knowledge are unique and particular) to no types of thinking being unique (the content differs but the epistemology is the same), with a variety of possibilities in between. We wish to consider two of these possibilities. Position 1: Entirely separate domains For the argument against general thinking skills to hold, each of the domains must be entirely distinct. It is then incumbent upon those who hold this position to demonstrate that all ways of knowing for each of the domains are different. Position 2: Domains are logically distinct but partly intersecting Examples of distinct ways of knowing between domains are not in themselves sufficient as a counter-example to those who hold this second & The Journal of the Philosophy of Education Society of Great Britain 1998. 394 Steven Higgins and Vivienne Baum®eld position. Some aspects of knowledge are domain-specific but if just one instance of a shared thinking skill can be found the quest for more general thinking skills becomes a reasonable one. This would seem to be particularly relevant to teaching in the primary sector of education where a number of general skills (e.g. observation, using evidence, being systematic, understanding proof ) are seen as overlapping a number of subjects. THINKING SKILLS AS A CATALYST McPeck (1990) argues that detailed expert knowledge is to do with handling information too complex for any general thinking skill to encompass. Even if we accept this, an argument for the importance of general thinking skills in problem-solving can be supported using the analogy of a catalyst in a chemical reaction or an enzyme in a biological organism. The catalyst or enzyme is not a constituent of the initial chemical conditions or the final product. However, its presence increases the rate of reaction by reducing the required activation energy, it is not merely contingent in that in some circumstances the reaction would not have occurred without its presence. It may be the case in some particular instances of complex domain-specific thinking that general skills are brought into play in the process although they are not required in a logical analysis of the initial conditions or end state. Occam's razor, to simplify the hypothesis and remove unnecessary complexity, may therefore not apply here. The process of Achilles overtaking the tortoise may be considered apparently impossible in the paradox outlined at the beginning of the article. Yet Achilles clearly will catch it in the race. In the same way it seems that general thinking can easily be eliminated from an analysis of complex thinking or at least replaced by more detailed descriptions of the content of the thinking. However the process of this thinking or reasoning may still involve those more general thinking skills. Furthermore thinking skills programmes in general are more about ways of learning than ways of knowing. Advocates of epistemological arguments must make a clearer claim as to why their validity holds for ways of coming to know or ways of learning. This objection is developed in the following section. OBJECTION 3: EXPERT/NOVICE It is argued that experts think specifically within their separate areas of expertise (e.g. Gardner and Johnson, 1996) and that they use their detailed subject-specific knowledge to solve problems. It does not follow from this that what novices need to become expert thinkers in a particular field is only more detailed specific subject knowledge. It was Plato who observed that experience not only teaches the best flute players Ð it also teaches the worst. The implication we draw from this is that it is in the process of learning that expertise develops and that such & The Journal of the Philosophy of Education Society of Great Britain 1998. Teaching General Thinking Skills 395 expertise does not depend only upon the quantity or detail of experience or information. In other words it may be a necessary condition of becoming more expert but it is not sufficient. The following possibilities offer another perspective. Possibility 1: General skills are an efficient part of the learning process In teaching and learning it could be the case that there are some general skills which are necessary for the development of efficient subjectspecific thinking skills. It would then be effective to teach the use of these skills to younger pupils to create foundations for an increasingly broad curriculum. Selecting appropriate or relevant evidence to find a solution to a specific problem could be one such general thinking skill. Deciding on the relevance of the information to bring to bear upon a specific problem is a crucial decision. Descriptions of the thought processes of expert thinkers show them bringing their detailed subject or context specific knowledge to bear on the problem. However, if their knowledge is more detailed then surely they must also be more selective in (or more efficient at) deciding what is relevant. The first of the Top Ten Thinking Tactics (Lake, 1994) in a thinking skills programme for primary school pupils is called `Pinpointing the Problem'. When expert thinkers solve a problem this may be so natural as to appear redundant in a description of what they do. Yet it is hard to see how they could not be identifying the exact nature of the problem if they were solving it. In a novice's problem-solving schema this stage is still conscious whilst in the expert's more advanced schema it is so embedded and automatic that it does not figure consciously. Possibility 2: General thinking skills are a necessary part of learning It could also be the case that all domain-specific reasoning by experts is dependent on them having used more general thinking skills or strategies at an earlier stage of their learning. These could have subsequently developed and been refined so that they are no longer considered general or transferable. This may even be what has enabled them to become experts. The organisation or structuring of their knowledge could be dependent upon principles which can be taught alongside the acquisition of specific knowledge. What distinguishes experts from others with detailed subject knowledge could be the way in which this knowledge is organised. These organisational principles will clearly not `transfer' broadly to a new situation, though they will underpin thinking about a new situation. However in this instance it will not be possible to teach these skills without teaching subject specific knowledge too. Possibility 3: General thinking skills are a desirable part of learning Whilst it may be possible to learn effectively without the conscious employment of general thinking skills, focusing on thinking and the & The Journal of the Philosophy of Education Society of Great Britain 1998. 396 Steven Higgins and Vivienne Baum®eld strategies we use may promote a disposition which is critical of the status of knowledge. If learning is seen as an active process involving the construction of meaning then learners are less likely to accept knowledge without question. If learners are made aware of this then they are also more likely to view success in learning as a consequence of selecting the appropriate strategies rather than as an indication of innate and immutable intelligence. In each case it still becomes a question of empirical discovery as to what sort of general thinking skills exist, whether they can be taught and whether they enhance the development of subsequent subject-specific skills. Unless researchers clearly identify which of the three possibilities above they claim to be testing, conclusions which support the case either for or against the existence of general thinking skills may be flawed. To pursue the analogy with Zeno's paradox, researchers may be looking to prove that Achilles must catch up with where the tortoise was when it (and he) has now moved on. We would argue that general thinking skills used by novices may well be what establish and then develop into effective expert thinking patterns. The question for researchers to ask and philosophers to explore is how prior learning can be made meaningful in a new context: that is to say, how can it be `recontextualised' (Walkerdine, 1988)? An ecological metaphor seems to be more appropriate than the notion of `transfer'. What are the conditions that foster the use of previously acquired knowledge in the new situation? What general thinking skills will promote the growth of expertise? To look for those precise undeveloped general thinking skills in experts is mistaken as it conflates the process of learning with the end state of being an expert, in the same way that Zeno's paradox focused only on the detail of the distance between the racers and not the development of the race. CONCLUSION The three types of logical objections offered against general thinking skills are not sufficiently convincing to render the gathering of empirical evidence redundant. First any presuppositions in a priori arguments require critical examination. A more rigorous definition of a general thinking skill is necessary, as is a description of what that general skill might look like in an expert thinker. Second, even if the domains theory of knowledge is accepted, there may still be areas within domains that are sufficiently similar or overlapping as to make general thinking skills possible, especially during the process of schooling. Third, expert thinkers may use more detailed subject-specific knowledge but this does not mean that they use only this knowledge. For those still not convinced another analogy may be persuasive. Different languages have different vocabularies but may share rules of grammar and syntax and, even where this is not the case, identification of something as a language prompts a search for items which correspond to a vocabulary, a grammar and a syntax. In this analogy domain-specific & The Journal of the Philosophy of Education Society of Great Britain 1998. Teaching General Thinking Skills 397 knowledge would be the vocabulary. The grammar and syntax, or the identification of components of language as consisting of identifiable units, would equate to general thinking skills. Finally, thinking skills programmes are concerned with the process of learning and not purely with the conditions of knowledge. If they demystify learning and make knowledge seem attainable to pupils then this alone should earn them a place in the school curriculum. It may be that further empirical investigation may reveal that general thinking skills do not exist or are unteachable or do not facilitate the growth of knowledge in new contexts. However, the quest to discover effective teaching methods may well still profitably investigate thinking skills approaches and processes. Our present knowledge does not rule out the possibility of general thinking skills and therefore attempts to identify them and appropriate methods of teaching should continue as an educational research priority. Prior experience and learning clearly alter subsequent behaviour. If the concept of transfer seems to contradict this observation then it is surely the concept which requires closer scrutiny. Dewey's (1910, p. 27) observations on the nature of education seem particularly relevant here: While it is not the business of education to prove every statement made, any more than to teach every possible item of information, it is its business to cultivate deep seated and effective habits of discriminating tested beliefs from mere assertions, guesses and opinions; to develop a lively and sincere, and open minded preference for conclusions that are properly grounded, and to ingrain into the individual's working habits methods of inquiry and reasoning appropriate to the various problems that present themselves. So do his observations on critical thinking, an echo perhaps of Plato's remarks about flute players (ibid., p. 106): If one is not able to estimate wisely what is relevant to the interpretation of a given perplexing or doubtful issue, it avails little that arduous learning has built up a large stock of concepts. For learning is not wisdom; information does not guarantee good judgment. The development of expertise and expert thinking has other components than simply the quantity of acquired knowledge. Perhaps some thinking skills programmes have overstated the case for their importance by ignoring the importance of content, as Quicke (1992) argues. However, at present, general thinking skills (in which we would include the development of metacognitive or self-regulatory practices) seem to be the most plausible candidates for use by teachers in schools to develop expert thinking in their pupils. We think that it is now time for Achilles to catch and overtake this particular tortoise and for the debate about general thinking skills to move on to establishing how an expert's knowledge is structured and how the teaching of knowledge to pupils in schools can effectively use this information. & The Journal of the Philosophy of Education Society of Great Britain 1998. 398 Steven Higgins and Vivienne Baum®eld Correspondence: Steven Higgins, Department of Education, St Thomas Street, Newcastle upon Tyne NE1 7RU, UK. e-mail: [email protected] REFERENCES Andrews, J. N. (1990) General thinking skills: are there such things? Journal of Philosophy of Education, 24, pp. 71±79. DfEE (1997) Excellence in Schools (London: HMSO). Dewey, J. (1910) How We Think (Lexington: Heath). Fisher, A. (1991) E€ective learning and the critical thinking movement, in: M. Coles and W. D. Robinson (eds) Teaching Thinking: A Survey of Programmes in Education (Bristol: Bristol Classical Press). 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