The Inadequacy of Gibbard&#39;s Solution to the Frege-Geach Problem

Kwan William

The Inadequacy of Gibbard's Solution to the Frege-Geach Problem

Kwan William

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Noncognitivism is a metaethical view that moral judgments are not beliefs. This means that it is unclear how is truth conditional supposed to work since it is unclear how can we determine the meaning of complex sentences. This gives rise to the Frege-Geach problem. In response, Allan Gibbard thinks that we can sidestep the issue posed by truth-value by postulating ‘decided states’ whereby a moral proposition is deemed either ‘true’ or ‘false’ depending on whether we agree with them or not. I will argue that Gibbard’s proposal avoids the minefield created by truth-value only to create bigger ones for him, such that it is unclear whether his proposal is worth the cost. Mark Schroeder points out that noncognitivism believe that “meaning cannot be so explained and must instead be explained directly by how we use words” which means that the meanings cannot be solely determined by the words itself Mark Schroeder, Noncognitivism in Ethics (New York: Routledge), p.30. As such, there is a need for noncognitivists to provide an adequate account of how are we supposed to “construct the meanings of any kind of complex sentences from the meaning of their parts” given the meaning of individual words Ibid, p.54. Consider the following example: P1: It is morally good to finish work on time. P2: If it is morally good to finish work on time, then Bob the Builder should finish construction on time. Conclusion: Bob should finish the work on time. P2 is a material conditional in the form of PQ whereby P2 is considered false if P is true and Q is false and true in all other cases. However, critics think that noncognitivists are unable to provide the aforementioned ‘adequate account’, a requirement for truth-conditional semantics to work. The above conundrum gives rise to the Frege-Geach problem, which is a challenge to noncognitivism of “how moral words could have meanings that behave so much like the meaning of non-moral words, in terms of their contribution to the meanings of complex sentences” given that noncognitivism thinks that “moral words have a different kind of meaning from ordinary non-moral words” Ibid, p. 105. This explains why Schroeder remarks that noncognitivism is “a huge departure from the Very Big Idea of truth-conditional theories of meaning” Ibid, p.30 . In response, some noncognitivists developed alternative theories of truth to sidestep the aforementioned problem posed by the conventional conception of truth-value. One example is deflationism whereby “ ‘true’ is a word that we use to agree with something, and ‘false’ is a word that we use to disagree with it” Ibid, p.154 such that “moral sentences can [still] be true or false” Ibid, p.155. In relation to this, Gibbard thinks that moral sentence “expresses a state of mind that it is possible to agree or disagree with – and ‘true’ and ‘false’ are used to agree and disagree” Ibid, p.158 . Accordingly, Gibbard thinks that “expression of a decision”, or what he will call ‘decided state’, accounts for the validity of the conclusion rather than truth conditional Allan Gibbard, Thinking How to Live (Cambridge: Harvard University Press), p. 42 . In other words, “…to disagree with a statement is to disagree with the state of mind it expresses” Ibid, p.77 . This means that agreement and disagreement takes the place of conventional truth-value. Gibbard goes on to say that what he calls the “decided states” works the same way as the conventional truth conditional Ibid, p.46 . While Gibbard’s proposal provides an apparent ‘solution’ to the Frege-Geach problem, I will argue that it ultimately creates even more problems for noncognitivism, which threatens to undermine its overall coherence. Firstly, Gibbard’s proposal entails that the rules of standard logic is still applicable to our above example, albeit with the notion of truth-value replaced with decided states expressed in terms of agreement and disagreement. Yet, it is unclear why only morality should be governed by decided states rater than normal truth-values just like the other different fields of knowledge. Even if we grant that Gibbard is able to prove that morality is distinct thereby necessitating a distinct epistemology, Gibbard will still need to justify why this revised form of standard logic is still applicable and thus ‘valid’. Notably, the conventional conception of ‘validity’ is inapplicable under Gibbard’s proposal since it is meant to sidestep truth-value in the first place. Given that Gibbard’s attempt at justification rests ultimately on conventional conception of truth-value and thus validity, his endeavor might be self-defeating from the start. Secondly, given that Gibbard is willing to sidestep truth-value in favour of decided states, it is unclear why Gibbard do not go one step further to say that a moral argument is redundant altogether. For if P1 can be taken as a form of decided states and thus “justified” this way, Gibbard might as well derive the conclusion directly just like any other decided states. Presumably, this helps to save him much of the hassle but it also comes at a heavy cost. Since it practically sidesteps the Frege-Geach problem, this means that Gibbard is back to square one and makes no progress to account for how can noncognitivism can make truth conditionals work. Obviously, there is an easier solution, which is to simply treat moral judgment as beliefs such that truth conditionals can work normally, such that the Frege-Geach problem will not arises in the first place. Unfortunately, this is not open to Gibbard, who is after all supposed to try and defend the core position of the noncognitivism. In conclusion, while Gibbard’s proposal is certainly ingenious in sidestepping the very notion of truth-value itself, it is doubtful whether it provides a genuine solution. For one, it means that Gibbard needs to account for why morality is so distinct to warrant a different kind of epistemology and to prove that it actually ‘works’. I suspect he will even have difficulty to show whether something ‘works’ since he is supposed to work without the conventional truth conditional. Moreover, it is also unclear why we cannot derive the conclusion directly. Hence, I think it is simply easier to just abandon the position of noncognitivism. Bibliography Gibbard, Allan, Thinking How to Live (Cambridge: Harvard University Press) Schroeder, Mark, Noncognitivism in Ethics (New York: Routledge) Kwan Wei Meng William A0085765N AY 13/14 Semester 2 PH3203 Moral Philosophy Short Paper – The Inadequacy of Gibbard’s Solution to the Frege-Geach Problem 1

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