Naturalism and its Challenges, Edited by Gary N. Kemp, Ali Hossein Khani, Hossein Sheykh Rezaee, and Hassan Amiriara, New York: Routledge,, 2024
Categorial approaches to metaphysical issues about the mind are explained and defended, and natur... more Categorial approaches to metaphysical issues about the mind are explained and defended, and naturalistic approaches are criticized for begging categorial questions. Categorial properties are a certain kind of essential properties and are not understood terms of concepts, although categorial knowledge is necessary for thinking. The debate over materialism and dualism is reconsidered in these terms. Issues about so-called ‘category mistakes’ and Leibniz’s Law are clarified. It is shown how the approach dovetails with Saul Kripke’s approach to natural kinds, but not that of Nathan Salmon. Tyler Burge’s anxieties about the over-sophistication of such approaches are addressed and dismissed. Lastly, Moritz Schlick and Rudolf Carnap’s, categorial non-cognitivism is rejected. The conclusion is not anti-naturalist or pro-dualist, only that categorial issues are fundamental and metaphysical issues about the mind cannot be addressed without considering them.
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Papers by nick zangwill
pleasure. The modest claim is that all aesthetic pleasure is disinterested. The ambitious claim is that all and only aesthetic pleasure is disinterested. I defend only the modest claim. I initially give a basic explication of what Kant had in mind by the doctrine. I then argue that if aesthetic pleasure were not basically disinterested, judgements of taste could not make the normative (or “universal”) claims they do. Normativity is essential to judgements of taste; they would not be what they are without it. And basic disinterest is essential for normativity. Therefore, we cannot reject basic disinterestedness without rejecting judgements of taste altogether. I then distinguish various other notions of disinterest and argue that none of them allow Kant to make his ambitions claim.
pleasure. The modest claim is that all aesthetic pleasure is disinterested. The ambitious claim is that all and only aesthetic pleasure is disinterested. I defend only the modest claim. I initially give a basic explication of what Kant had in mind by the doctrine. I then argue that if aesthetic pleasure were not basically disinterested, judgements of taste could not make the normative (or “universal”) claims they do. Normativity is essential to judgements of taste; they would not be what they are without it. And basic disinterest is essential for normativity. Therefore, we cannot reject basic disinterestedness without rejecting judgements of taste altogether. I then distinguish various other notions of disinterest and argue that none of them allow Kant to make his ambitions claim.