5
GDP, Income Distribution, and Welfare
But how did GDP per head gains affect economic well-being? Within the
existing national accounts framework, Sitglitz et al. (2009: 23–25) recommend to look at net rather than gross measures, in order to take into
account the depreciation of capital goods. Net National Disposable
Income (NNDI) measures income accruing to Spanish nationals, rather
than production in Spain, and also accounts for capital consumption.
NNDI provides, therefore, a more accurate measure of the impact of
economic growth on average incomes than GDP.
In Fig. 5.1, a long-term decline in the NNDI share of GDP is
observed. The reason is that as the stock of capital gets larger and its
composition shifts from assets with long lives but low returns (i.e. residential construction) to shorter life assets but with higher returns (i.e.
machinery), capital consumption increases. The integration of Spain into
the global economy since the last quarter of the twentieth century
accentuated this process.
Nonetheless, it can be noticed that per capita NNDI grows in parallel
with GDP per head, although at a slower pace from 1960 onwards, that
resulted in its 13-fold increase over 1850–2015, against 16-fold for per
capita GDP (Fig. 5.2 and Table 5.1).
© The Author(s) 2017
L. Prados de la Escosura, Spanish Economic Growth, 1850–2015,
Palgrave Studies in Economic History, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-58042-5_5
47
48
L. Prados de la Escosura
Fig. 5.1 Net national disposable income ratio to GDP 1850–2015 (current prices)
(%)
Fig. 5.2 Real per capita GDP and net national disposable income, 1850–2015
(2010 = 100) (logs)
5
GDP, Income Distribution, and Welfare
49
Table 5.1 Real per capita GDP, NNDI, private consumption, and Sen-welfare
growth, 1850–2015 (%) (average yearly logarithmic rates)
Per capita
GDP
1.7
Per capita
NNDI
1.5
0.7
5.3
2.5
−0.8
0.7
5.3
2.2
−1.6
0.5
5.2
2.1
−1.4
0.5
6.2
2.3
-1.6
Panel B
1850–1883
1883–1920
1920–1929
1929–1950
1950–1958
1958–1974
1974–1984
1984–1992
1992–2007
2007–2013
2013–2015
1.3
0.6
2.8
−0.9
5.0
5.5
1.4
4.2
2.4
−1.9
2.6
1.2
0.6
2.8
−1.0
5.3
5.2
1.0
4.0
2.0
−2.4
1.1
1.0
0.5
2.9
−1.2
5.3
5.1
0.9
3.9
1.9
−2.7
2.4
1.0
0.1
3.6
−1.0
8.0
5.2
1.5
4.0
1.9
−2.9
2.4
Panel C
1850–1855
1855–1866
1866–1873
1873–1883
1883–1892
1892–1901
1901–1913
1913–1918
1918–1929
1929–1935
1935–1939
1939–1944
1944–1950
2.1
0.4
2.9
0.6
0.6
0.7
0.5
−0.6
3.1
−1.5
-6.9
4.8
−1.0
2.1
0.3
2.8
0.6
0.6
0.6
0.5
−0.7
3.1
−1.8
−6.9
4.9
−1.1
1.9
0.4
2.5
0.0
0.7
0.8
−0.7
0.6
3.2
−1.0
−10.4
5.1
−0.4
3.8
0.7
2.8
−1.2
2.0
−0.6
−1.0
−2.6
4.4
0.4
−7.8
5.2
−3.2
1850–2015
Panel A
1850–1950
1950–1974
1974–2007
2007–2015
Per capita private
consumption
1.4
Sen
welfare
1.6
In their Report, Sitglitz et al. (2009) also advise focusing on household
consumption, rather than on total consumption, to capture the effect of
growth on material welfare. This way, government consumption that
50
L. Prados de la Escosura
Fig. 5.3 Real per capita GDP and private consumption, 1850–2015 (2010 = 100)
(logs)
could be deemed, in Nordhaus and Tobin (1972) words, ‘defensive’
expenditures—namely services that represent inputs for activities that
may yield utility—would be excluded.
A look at the behaviour of real private consumption per person shows
a narrow parallelism with that of GDP per head, but with a lower rate of
growth (Fig. 5.3), as reflected by its declining contribution to GDP
(Fig. 1.1), and that implied, nonetheless, multiplying 10 times its initial
level over 1850–2015. Solely during the long decade preceding World
War I, the Civil War (1936–1939), and the Great Recession (2008–
2013) did private consumption growth fall ostensibly behind that of
GDP (Table 5.1). In short, it can be suggested that the fruits of growth
were passed on to the population, so present consumption was not
sacrificed to greater future consumption and, hence, no parallelism can
be drawn with the post-1950 experience of former socialist countries in
Europe or East Asian countries (Krugman 1994; Young 1995).
Another major objection to GDP per head is that it takes no account
of income distribution. In fact, the conviction that averages fail to give
‘indication of how the available resources are distributed across persons or
5
GDP, Income Distribution, and Welfare
51
Fig. 5.4 Income inequality, 1850–2015: Gini coefficient. Source Prados de la
Escosura (2008), 1850–1994; Eurostat 1995–2015
households’ (Stiglitz et al. 2009: 32) recommends that average income
should be accompanied by measures of its distribution.
How have the fruits of growth been distributed in Spain? Trends in
income distribution measured by the Gini coefficient are presented in
Fig. 5.4.1 Its evolution has not followed a monotonic pattern and different phases can be observed. A long-term rise inequality is noticeable
between mid-nineteenth century and World War I reaching a peak in
1918. Then, a sustained inequality reduction took place during the
1920s and early 1930s, stabilizing in the years of the Civil War (1936–
1939) and World War II. A sharp reversal was experienced during the
late 1940s and early 1950s, with an inequality peak by 1953, similar in
size to that of 1918. Then, a dramatic fall in inequality occurred in the
late 1950s and early 1960s. Henceforth, income distribution stabilized
fluctuating within a narrow 0.30–0.35 Gini range.
A comparison of the evolution of real per capita NNDI and income
distribution (Figs. 5.2 and 5.3) shows no trade-off between inequality
and growth, by which higher living standards resulting economic growth
compensate for higher inequality and vice versa, seems to exist.
52
L. Prados de la Escosura
Moreover, there is no clear association between them over time. Thus, in
the most dynamic phases of economic performance, inequality declined
(the 1920s, the Golden Age, 1950–1974), but it also increased (1850–
1883); while in years of sluggish performance, inequality deepened
(1880–1920, the post-Civil War autarchy), although it shrank too
(during the II Republic, 1931–1936, and the transition to democracy,
1975–1984).
But how severe has been inequality in terms of well-being? Branko
Milanovic et al. (2011) proposed the concept of Inequality Extraction
Ratio, defined as the ratio between the actual Gini [G] and the maximum
feasible Gini (G*), which is obtained as
G ¼ ða
1Þ=a
ð5:1Þ
Where a = average incomes, expressed in terms of subsistence (1.9
2011 EKS dollars a day).
Thus, the Inequality Extraction Ratio (IER) measures the actual level
of inequality as a proportion of its potential maximum. The closer a
country is to the maximum potential inequality, the stronger the negative
impact of inequality on welfare.
The negative effect of inequality on welfare, as measured by the IER,
increased during the early twentieth century peaking at two-thirds of its
potential maximum by the end of World War I and, then, declined until
the mid-1980s, but for a dramatic reversal at the end of the autarchic
period, fluctuating thereafter around one-third of its potential maximum
(Fig. 5.5).
It is worth noticing that, in Spain, similar levels of inequality are
significantly different in terms of its impact on well-being. For example,
although exhibiting similar levels of inequality (around 0.35 Gini),
during 1850–1883, actual inequality oscillates around one-half of its
potential maximum, while over 1960–2015 it fluctuates around
one-third.
But can the effect of changes in income distribution on welfare be
quantified? Amartya Sen’s (1973) proposed to adjust the level of net
national disposable income for the evolution of income distribution.
Thus, I have computed the so-called Sen Welfare,
5
GDP, Income Distribution, and Welfare
53
Fig. 5.5 Inequality extraction ratio 1850–2015 Note Actual Gini as a proportion of
the maximum potential Gini
Sen Welfare ¼ Real Per capita NNDI x ð1
GiniÞ
ð5:2Þ
Figure 5.6 compares GDP per head with the Sen-Welfare measure. It
can be observed that except for the early twentieth century—especially in
the 1910s and 1920s and in the late 1940s and early mid-1950s—when
Sen-Welfare level fell behind per capita GDP, both measures exhibit
similar long-run performance.
During the 1920s and, especially, the 1950s, Sen Welfare improved
faster than real GDP per person, while this situation reversed from the
end of the nineteenth century to the end of World War I. Moreover, in
phases of income contractions such as the Civil War and its autarchic
aftermath, and the Great Recession (2008–2013), welfare worsened
more intensively than GDP per head. On the whole, Sen Welfare
increased 13-fold over 1850–2015.
To sum up, net disposable income and private consumption exhibit
similar trends to GDP but with less steep acceleration since
mid-twentieth century, while the negative impact of inequality on
54
L. Prados de la Escosura
Fig. 5.6 Real per capita GDP and Sen welfare, 1850–2015 (2010 = 100) (logs)
economic welfare was softened from 1960 onwards and inequality
decline made significant contributions to well-being in the 1920s and the
1950s. Thus, it can be concluded that in modern Spain long-run economic growth was accompanied by a substantial improvement in
material welfare.
A substantive objection to GDP per head is that it fails to incorporate
non-income dimensions of well-being. Human welfare is widely viewed
as a multidimensional phenomenon, in which per capita income (and its
distribution) is only one facet. Critics of GDP as a measure of welfare
have signalled the Human Development Index as a better alternative
(Coyle 2014). Human development has been defined as ‘a process of
enlarging people’s choices’(UNDP 1990: 10), namely enjoying a healthy
life, acquiring knowledge and achieving a decent standard of living, that
allow them to leading ‘lives they have reasons to value’ (Sen 1997).
The Human Development Index (HDI), published by the United
Nations Development Programme (UNDP), has three dimensions: a
healthy life, access to knowledge and other aspects of well-being. It uses
reduced forms of these dimensions, namely life expectancy at birth as a
proxy for a healthy life, education measures (literacy, schooling) as a short
5
GDP, Income Distribution, and Welfare
55
cut for access to knowledge, and discounted per capita income (its log) as
a surrogate for other aspects of well-being (Anand and Sen 2000; UNDP
2001). These are combined into a synthetic measure using a geometric
average (UNDP 2010). Since all dimensions are considered indispensable
they are assigned equal weights.
It matters how progress in the dimensions of human development is
measured. Often social variables (life expectancy, height or literacy) are
used, either raw (Acemoglu and Johnson 2007; Becker et al. 2005;
Soares; Lindert 2004) or linearly transformed (UNDP 2010). This causes
measurement problems when a social variable has asymptotic limits. An
example would be life expectancy. Consider two improvements, one
from 30 to 40 years and another from 70 to 80 years. These increases are
identical in absolute terms, but the second is smaller in proportion to the
initial starting level. When original (or linearly transformed, as happens
in the case of the UNDP’s HDI) values are employed, identical changes
in absolute terms result in a smaller measured improvement for the
country with the higher starting point, favouring the country with the
lower initial level (Sen 1981; Kakwani 1993).
The limitations of linear measures become more evident when quality
is taken into account. Life expectancy at birth and literacy and schooling
rates are just crude proxies for the actual goals of human development: a
long and healthy life and access to knowledge. Research over the last two
decades concludes that healthy life expectancy increases in line with total
life expectancy, and as life expectancy rises, disability for the same
age-cohort falls (Salomon et al. 2012). Similarly, the quality of education,
measured in terms of cognitive skills, grows as the quantity of education
increases (Hanushek and Kimko 2000; Altinok et al. 2014). The bottom
line is that more years of life and education imply higher quality of health
and education during childhood and adolescence in both the time series
and the cross section.
My alternative to the UNDP’s conventional HDI is a historical index
of human development (HIHD) in which non-income variables are
transformed nonlinearly, rather than linearly as in the HDI, in order to
allow for two main facts: (1) increases of the same absolute size represent
greater achievements the higher the level at which they take place, and
56
L. Prados de la Escosura
Fig. 5.7 Real per capita GDP (2010 = 100) (logs) and historical index of human
development [HIHD*] (excluding income dimension), 1850–2007. Source Real per
capita GDP, see the text; human development, Prados de la Escosura (2015) and
http://espacioinvestiga.org/home-hihd/countries-hihd/hihd-esp-eng/?lang=en#
(2) quality improvements are associated with increases in quantity (see
Prados de la Escosura 2015).
When per capita GDP and Human Development (in which the
income dimension has been excluded) are compared, they exhibit similar
long-term trends (Fig. 5.7), although improvements in the Historical
Index of Human Development are more intense between 1880 and 1950
and slower thereafter (Table 5.2). A major discrepancy is observed for the
1930s and 1940s, when human development thrived, driven by
improving life expectancy at birth—a result of the epidemiological
transition related to the diffusion of the germ theory of disease—and
broadening primary education, while GDP per head contracted as consequence of the Depression and the Civil War and its autarchic
aftermath.
5
GDP, Income Distribution, and Welfare
57
Table 5.2 Real per capita GDP and human development growth, 1850–2007 (%).
(average yearly logarithmic rates)
1850–2007
Panel A
1850–1950
1950–1975
1975–2007
Panel B
1850–1880
1880–1920
1920–1929
1929–1950
1950–1960
1960–1975
1975–1985
1985–1995
1995–2007
GDP per head
1.8
HIHD*
1.9
0.7
5.2
2.6
1.8
2.2
1.9
1.3
0.6
2.8
−0.9
3.7
6.1
1.5
3.4
2.7
1.4
1.6
3.9
2.0
3.1
1.6
1.6
2.3
2.0
Source Real per capita GDP, see the text; Human Development (excluding income
dimension), Prados de la Escosura (2015) and http://espacioinvestiga.org/homehihd/countries-hihd/hihd-esp-eng/?lang=en#
All in all, it can be concluded that GDP per head captures long-run
trends in welfare in Spain, but fails to do it in the short and medium
term.
Note
1. The Gini coefficient measures the extent to which the distribution of
income (or consumption expenditure) among individuals or households
within an economy deviates from a perfectly equal distribution. A Gini of
0 represents perfect equality, while an index of 1 (100) implies perfect
inequality. This paragraph draws on Prados de la Escosura (2008).
58
L. Prados de la Escosura
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