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European Foreign Affairs Review
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4 pages
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The Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) between Canada and the EU and its Member States is a new generation trade agreement in which the parties facilitate deep trade integration. Its corollary is a Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA), in which the parties vow to cooperate in the furtherance of their joint values, both between them and on the international scene. While CETA is in the process of ratification, it is already being applied provisionally for 90% of its provisionsexcluding notably investment protection, market access for portfolio investment and the investment court system. Thus, a new chapter in trade relations has started, thanks to a great extent to Canada. For the EU, this agreement was not easy to achieve because it is a composite actor, and this is a mixed agreement. CETA is a prime example of the difficulties of concluding mixed agreements, even after the continued advancement of European integration in recent times. On the one hand, changes in the Lisbon Treaty and the CJEU's case law have allowed the Union to better tackle modern transnational problems, such as climate change and sustainable development. On the other hand, the Union cannot do this without the support of national and regional parliaments, EU citizens and its trade partners. The EU's external policy is legally disaggregated: many areas of foreign policy competence are shared between the EU and the Member States. This situation, combined with the principle of subsidiarity, allows Member States to pursue policies of their own, resulting in inconsistencies in external action of the EU. The Treaty of Lisbon and the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) have somewhat clarified the division of powers. New explicit EU powers have been added (climate change, energy, sustainable development) and the exclusive external competence of the Union has been enlarged (investments, services etc.), allowing the EU in principle to better tackle modern-day transnational problems. However, decision-making and related procedures follow the internal division of powers of the European Union. This means that, in matters where the implementation of policies still depends on national parliaments, they have a real power
The ‘Wallonian Saga’ has illustrated a number of structural weaknesses of the European Union as an external treaty-maker in the field of EU Common Commercial Policy that concern issues of both democratic representation and effectiveness of EU multilevel governance. The legal question of competence that determines the Union’s power to conclude external commercial treaties by itself or, in the alternative, jointly with the member states will be clarified by the CJEU in its forthcoming judgement in Opinion 2/15. We provide an overview of the relevant CJEU case law and the main issues that arose during the Court’s hearing in the Opinion 2/15 procedures; discuss the law and practice of the provisional application of international treaties by the EU and legal avenues that enable the entry into force of a mixed agreement despite its rejection by an individual member state. We argue in favour of adjusting the scope of future EU trade and investment agreements to the realm of EU exclusive competences as clarified by the CJEU to remedy the functional deficiencies of EU treaty-making that were exposed in the ‘CETA-drama’. At the same time, we emphasize the need for – and outline a path towards – a qualitative change in EU and member state institutional practice that fully employs the channels of vertical political participation in the Union’s multilevel governance structures so as to strengthen the legitimacy of EU economic treaty-making.
The European Union and its Neighbours, 2006
‘Institutionalisation Beyond the Nation State’, E. Fahey (ed), Springer, May 10, 2018
This chapter provides evidence for the evolution of a new ‘legal-political equilibrium’ in EU external economic governance, which is set to materialize in a seminal change of institutional practice of EU economic treaty-making. It is argued that the development of a new balance of legal and political parameters gives considerable impetus to a reform of the architecture of EU economic treaties that is instrumental in changing procedure from ‘mixed’ to ‘EU-only’ signature and conclusion of trade agreements with third countries. The proposals of the European Commission for the signature and conclusion of the EU-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement (JEEPA) and the EU-Singapore Free Trade Agreement (EUSFTA) as well as the Commission’s draft directives for FTA negotiations with Australia and New Zealand reflect both the new architecture and the envisaged procedural shift. It is further argued here that the 2001 Laeken Council objective of enhancing EU legitimacy through ‘more democracy, transparency, and efficiency’ can only be fully accomplished if the political institutions of the Union – and the Council in particular - allow for an ‘EU-only’ modus operandi of external economic governance. Ending the traditional practice of ‘mixed’ economic treaty-making would redirect political transactions in a way that minimizes transaction costs of EU Common Commercial Policy (CCP) governance through a vast reduction of veto-points. Furthermore, it would alter the configuration of institutionalized sources of democratic legitimacy and enhance democratic representation at the same time. The Lisbon Treaty reform of the provisions governing the CCP and the delineation of the material scope of the CCP by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in Opinion 2/15 have prepared the legal ground to this end. In addition, two seemingly paradoxical phenomena incentivize the abandonment of the ‘mixed’ modus of treaty-making and the associated unanimity requirement in the Council in favor of ‘EU-only’ governance and qualified majority voting (QMV) respectively. It is the coincidence of increasing commercial and political stakes in the success of the Union’s external economic agenda, on the one hand, and the existence of a credible threat thereto in the form of member states’ frequent exercise of ‘vetocracy’ in the past, on the other hand, which have generated a fertile ground for ‘EU-only’ institutional practice. External sources of instability have further added a sense of urgency to the reform with a view to enhancing the effectiveness and credibility of the Union’s external commercial representation. Its success and sustainability, however, will greatly depend on the capacity and readiness of the European Parliament and member states’ parliaments to effectively control and legitimate EU and member states’ constitutional practice in this new era of EU multilelvel economic governance.
2010
Stabilirea competenţelor în cadrul Uniunii Europene reprezintă o problemă deosebit de complexă, având în vedere atât caracterul eterogen al Uniunii, cât şi modalităţile de repartizare a competenţelor între Uniunea Europeană şi statele membre. Prin modificările intervenite prin Tratatul de la Lisabona sunt introduse reglementări noi în Tratatul de funcţionare a Uniunii Europene (TFUE), se stabilesc foarte clar domeniile de competenţă exclusivă a Uniunii, domeniile de competenţă partajată şi domeniile de coordonare sau de sprijinire a acţiunii statelor membre. Dispoziţiile tratatului depăşesc neajunsul reglementărilor anterioare, care nu prezentau foarte clar domeniile de competenţă comunitară, stabilind doar caracteristicile generale ale acţiunii comunitare în raport de acţiunea statelor membre în unele domenii. Delimitarea competenţelor Uniunii are la bază principiul atribuirii. Exercitarea competenţelor Uniunii are la bază principiile subsidiarităţii şi proporţionalităţii. În temeiul principiului atribuirii, Uniunea acţionează în limitele competenţelor ce i-au fost atribuite de către statele membre în vederea atingerii obiectivelor stabilite. Orice altă competenţă neatribuită Uniunii aparţine statelor membre. În temeiul principiului subsidiarităţii, în domeniile ce nu ţin de competenţa sa exclusivă, Uniunea intervine numai şi în măsura în care obiectivele acţiunii preconizate nu pot fi atinse în mod satisfăcător de către statele membre nici la nivel central, nici la nivel regional şi local, dar pot fi, datorită dimensiunilor şi efectelor preconizate, mai bine atinse la nivelul Uniunii. Cuvinte cheie: principiului subsidiarităţii, principiul atribuirii, state memebre, competenţa exclusiva, tratat 1. Aspecte generale Stabilirea competenţelor în cadrul Abstract: Setting powers in the European Union is a particularly complex problem, given the heterogeneity of both the Union and how the sharing of the powers between the EU and its Member States. By the changes brought forth by the Treaty of Lisbon new provisions were introduced in the European Union Treaty (TFEU), clear areas of exclusive competence of EU are established, also areas of shared competence and areas of coordination and support actions of the Member States. The anterior shortcomings of the previous legislation are being surpassed by the Treaty provisions, as the previous texts did not clearly show the areas of Community competence, establishing only general characteristics of community action against Member States in some areas. The limits of Union competences are based on the allocation principle. The exercise of community competences is based on the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. Under the principle of conferral, the Union shall act within the powers assigned to it by the Member States to achieve the targets set. The competences not conferred upon the Union remain with the Member States.
EU External Relations Law and Policy in the Post-Lisbon Era , 2011
The growth of the European Union (EU) from a small regional coordinating organisation devoted to the management of coal and steel resources into a global political actor with a full range of power resources and unique responsibilities represents one of the most remarkable achievements in the history of international organisation. No other regional organisation on the planet has managed to take on so many of the traditional governing functions of its Member States while simultaneously developing its own power projection capabilities, involving trade policy, development and humanitarian aid, economic and financial sanctions, diplomacy and good offices, policing forces, and military forces. This achievement is even more remarkable when one considers the uneven and even disorganised institutional history of European integration, which involves numerous actors with a wide range of power resources, policy interests, and institutional preferences for various forms of European integration. These actors involve not just institutions in Brussels and Luxembourg, such as the Commission and the European Court of Justice, but also national governments and policymakers, private firms, academics and think-tanks, concerned citizens, and other interested players, all organised in dense webs of formal and informal networks across the EU and beyond. Despite this diffusion of actors, or perhaps because of it, European integration is critically dependent on the emergence of rules to govern the activities of these players, in the form of customs, norms, international treaties, regulations, and other laws at the EU and national levels. This system of law has been associated primarily with, and instigated by, the steady development of the single European market since the 1950s. However, as the EU's global ambitions have increased, so has its concern with the overall purpose and effectiveness of its various international activities. The EU is paying more attention than ever before to the external impact of European integration, and in areas well beyond the more traditional-for the EU-trade and economic development policy domains. This concern to improve the overall coherence of the EU's foreign policies was a major impetus behind the failed effort to
Journal of Common Market Studies, 2011
El siguiente postulado fue implantado de tal forma en el sistema educativo que a veces resulta difícil pensar en la escuela de otra manera, la finalidad de un modelo pedagógico particular se presenta de la siguiente manera. Como la única finalidad factible en la enseñanza.
Το κεφάλαιο αυτό εξετάζει τις παγκόσμιες πολιτικές, οικονομικές και πολιτισμικές αλλαγές που δημιούργησαν ένα νέο διεθνές εκπαιδευτικό περιβάλλον (Kalantzis 2002) και άλλαξαν το πολιτισμικό και θρησκευτικό προφίλ του σύγχρονου κόσμου (Cahill 2003). Από πολλούς μελετητές η παγκοσμιοποίηση θεωρείται ως ένας σημαντικός παράγοντας που επηρεάζει θετικά και αρνητικά τη διαμόρφωση και εξέλιξη των θρησκευτικών ζητημάτων στον 21ο αιώνα. Στις αρνητικές επιπτώσεις της παγκοσμιοποίησης καταγράφονται δεδομένα όπως η δημιουργία των αστικών κρατών (secular states), η επιβολή μιας παγκόσμιας κουλτούρας, η προώθηση του καταναλωτισμού και του υλισμού. Ωστόσο από την άλλη πλευρά η παγκοσμιοποίηση δημιουργεί νέες δυνατότητες επικοινωνίας σε διεθνοποιημένα θρησκευτικά δίκτυα, καθώς διεθνοποιούνται οι τοπικές κουλτούρες και εξειδικεύεται η παγκόσμια κουλτούρα (global culture). Η απάντηση των θρησκειών απέναντι στις ομογενοποιητικές δυνάμεις της παγκοσμιοποίησης και των δυνάμεων της αγοράς είναι η έμφαση ...
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