Compulsory Property Acquisition for Urban Densification

Urban land markets: improving land …, 2009

The Public Works Act of 1894 enables land to be obtained for public purposes (Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia). Acquisition usually occurs with the landowner'sagreement. If there is no agreement (or the landowner cannot be reached or deceased), the land may be obtained without their agreement (compulsoryland acquisition) (Te Tari Taiwhenua, 2015). Compulsory land acquisition under the Public Work Act is rarely used and can be controversial because it takes away privateproperty rights (Te Tari Taiwahenua, 2005). It is argued that compulsory land acquisition is a legal action which happens with compensation. Compulsory land acquisition is usually considered inefficient and notvery effective because; (1) It is usually profitable for the owners of the high-value properties; (2) there are different basis for determiningcompensation. How the amount of compensation is calculated is also argued and is critical considering the efficiency as well as the fairness of theearning (Ram Singh, 2012). For an eminent domain process to be efficient and fair, information about the costs and benefits should be available. If not, the process will be inefficient. In practice, the price for the compensation consists of the market value of the ownership plus calculating other costs such as displacement costs, disturbance, and sense of attachment. Market value of ownership is usually determined on thebasis of the value of similar land. Although, it is difficult tofind two properties which are exactly the same. Studies show that the actual compensation received by the ownersof the acquired properties is generally different from their market value (Burger and Rohan, 1967), Munch (1976), Bell and Parchomovsky (2007). Ram Singh (2012) writes " when direct and indirect costs and benefits of land transfer are considered together, regulated voluntary

There is an ongoing debate in the literature on urban policy networks about governance and, more specifically, the role of public bodies in urban policy implementation networks. This paper focuses on the specific debate in Dutch and Spanish academic and professional circles regarding property rights in land (hereafter property rights) and the need to separate development rights from property rights. The British nationalisation of development rights in 1947 is an important point of reference in these debates. This paper adds to these debates by providing empirical evidence about a land readjustment regulation that public bodies can use to modify the power relationships between public and private parties. This regulation can improve public value capturing by helping public bodies transfer the costs for public infrastructure and affordable housing to developers while capturing part of the enhanced economic value.

The Conversation, 2021

When Boris Johnson sold the 35-acre Royal Albert Docks in London to Chinese buyers in 2013, it was his biggest commercial property deal as mayor of London and one of China’s largest investments in the UK. The Greater London Authority sold off further parcels of land in the area in a bid to regenerate the Royal Docks, which had fallen into disrepair with the decline of the docklands from the 1960s. Over the past few decades, huge transfers of land from public to private ownership have occurred throughout Britain. Since Margaret Thatcher was elected prime minister in 1979, one-tenth of the entire British landmass, or about half of the land owned by all public bodies, has been privatised. This has included, for instance, dozens of former military bases on Ministry of Defence land. In our cities, one result of this land privatisation has been the long-term shift from public to private housing tenure: social rented housing declined from 31% of Britain’s total housing stock in 1981 to just 18% in 2012

"The Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Bill, 2011 has been introduced in Lok Sabha, which will replace the much criticised Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The new Bill aims to “ensure a humane, participatory, informed consultative and transparent process for land acquisition for industrialisation, development of essential infrastructural facilities and urbanisation”. It tries to comprehensively define “public purpose” and outlines various kinds of compensation which will be provided to the displaced landowners and the people dependent on the acquired land. It proposes that consent from 80% of the affected families needs to be obtained (similar to the “free, prior and informed consent” policy ideology) and “a Social Impact Assessment of proposals leading to displacement of people” to be conducted before the acquisition. The Bill wants private companies to buy land directly through “private negotiations on a ‘willing seller-willing buyer’ basis” for their private use. It is quite evident that the Bill is an attempt to gain control over the conflict and violence associated with land acquisition and respond to the resistance movements against land acquisition across India. This article examines the tropes of “humane process of land acquisition”, “just and fair compensation”, “public purpose”, “voluntary/involuntary acquisition”, “willing/ unwilling seller” which frame the normative argument of this Bill (and also the debate around land acquisition in India) vis-à-vis the demand of and/natural resources for the expansion of private capital and the demands of the people opposing such acquisitions."

This chapter focuses on the innovative public practices of capturing land value in urban development (i.e. public-value capturing). There are significant differences between England, Spain (region of Valencia) and the Netherlands. The English and especially the Spanish/Valencian public bodies manage to transfer the bill for paying and/or providing public infrastructure to property developers. Public infrastructure refers to: public roads and space, sewerage, public facilities and buildings, affordable and social housing, etc. In addition, the English and Spanish/Valencian public bodies manage to capture part of the value increase that accrues from re-zoning land. This contributes to the public budget and helps to improve the quality and quantity of public infrastructure. These differences among the countries are mainly the result of differences in their planning system: first the level of certainty about future development possibilities before negotiations between developers and local planning bodies take place; and second whether public bodies dispose of a land readjustment regulation to avoid dependence on private parties to provide the infrastructure.

Town Planning Review, 2002

Habitat International, 2001

SUMMARY Land grabbing is a term that most investors find distasteful while to the general public it could be an eye opener to the future of the land that they might be occupying. To the urban planner, it may connote inefficiency and lamed administrative machinery that has permitted greed over land. Whatever land grabbing submits itself to be, its main concern is built on the premise of holding land for the future which may be translated to speculating on land either for economic or social-status gain. Land grabbing in urban areas may be explained from the observed multitude of undeveloped land parcels in urban Tanzania amidst a cry for shortage of land for development. This paradoxical urban reality has been considered differently by scholars, those advocating horizontal expansion of cities tolerate it and subscribe to more urbanization of the peri-urban areas; while there are those that consider viable urban expansion as that which takes cognizance of intensification of all available lands before venturing out to the periphery. Urban Tanzania is fast growing and in some cities at an alarming rate of over 6.5% per annum. This has bred land pressure for housing development on one hand, but on the other provided opportunities for large scale investments in form of schools, hospitals, retail properties and hospitality industries. With escalating land prices in urban areas, individuals are taking up lands in the peri-urban areas and in some instances from land occupiers with little exposure on the latent value that sits in the land to be sold to the land seekers. With use of five carefully selected cases, this study illustrates how urban land grabbing has given cause to land conflicts thereby impairing smooth urban development. The paper demonstrates how rigid form of land registration has bred loop holes in land use planning and tenure almost crippling and ridiculing the land administration system and made the work of professional town planners less significant to the public. Urban Land Grabbing and its Implications to Urban Development, (7055) Komu Felician (Tanzania)