Legitimation of massacres in Israeli school history books

Article Legitimation of massacres in Israeli school history books Discourse & Society 21(4) 377–404 © The Author(s) 2010 Reprints and permission: sagepub. co.uk/journalsPermissions.nav DOI: 10.1177/0957926510366195 http://das.sagepub.com Nurit Peled-Elhanan Hebrew University and David Yellin Teachers College, Israel Abstract This article examines reports about massacres in eight Israeli secondary school history books, published between 1998 and 2009.1 It aims to show that massacres, or rather their outcome, are legitimated in these books through a complex rhetoric that involves both verbal and visual means. The article uses theories and analytical tools of Critical Discourse Analysis, Social Semiotics and Multimodal Analysis to examine the linguistic, discursive, generic and multimodal strategies of legitimation employed in these school books. The analysis is based primarily on the works of Van Dijk (1997), Martin Rojo and Van Dijk (1997),Van Leeuwen (2000, 2007, 2008), Van Leeuwen and Wodak (1999), Hodge and Kress (1993) and Coffin (1997, 2006). The article argues that Israeli mainstream school books implicitly legitimate the killing of Palestinians as an effective tool to preserve a secure Jewish state with a Jewish majority, and suggests that this legitimation prepares Israeli youth to be good soldiers and to carry on the practices of occupation in the Palestinian Occupied Territories. Keywords discourse analysis, effect-oriented legitimation, genres, legitimation, massacre, multimodality, mythopoesis, Palestinians, racism, social semiotics, socio-semantic means, Zionism With things like these one should not lend oneself to exaggerations And one should recognize and beware: this is a matter of life and death And one might – God forbid – err in the reports. (Zach, 1996) Introduction During the 1948 war and after the establishment of the state of Israel, there were massacres both of Israeli Palestinian citizens and of Palestinian refugees in their Jordanian Corresponding author: Nurit Peled-Elhanan, Hebrew University and David Yellin Teachers College, 5b Hamitnahalim, BaHar Street, Ramat, Motza, Jerusalem, Israel 96771. Email: [email protected] 378 Discourse & Society 21(4) villages and refugee camps. Some textbooks (especially the most recent ones published in 2004, 2006 and 2009) present the massacres as routine battles or successful military operations; other books view the massacres as transgression from official plans but legitimate them by the positive outcome they have brought about – the establishment and maintenance of a coherent and secure Jewish state with a Jewish majority. By presenting the massacres as transgression, the reports legitimate the army and its code of conduct, as well as the Israeli government – which was allegedly surprised by the slaughter and denounced it – and its norms. A ‘massacre’ is defined as: 1. 2. The act or an instance of killing a number of usually helpless or unresisting human beings under circumstances of atrocity or cruelty. A cruel or wanton murder.2 Three events that involved intentional or wanton killing of helpless Palestinians are reported in some Israeli mainstream school history books: • • • The Dir Yassin massacre of 1948 The Kibya massacre of 1953 The Kaffer Kassim massacre of 1956 One event of intentional killing of Jews is also mentioned: the Altalena affair of 1948. Following are details of the massacres as they appear in ‘regular’ history books that were written for the general public, not designed for primary or secondary instruction. 1. 2. 3. The Dir Yassin massacre, 9 April 1948 (Pappe, 2006) – on this date, Dir Yassin, a village west of Jerusalem that had reached a non-aggression agreement with the Hagana,3 was attacked by troops from the ‘dissident’ underground groups Etzel and Lehi, who massacred most of its inhabitants. The number of victims – still debated today4 – was estimated at between 110 and 245. The Altalena affair, 22 June 19485 – the provisional government of the new state of Israel wished to unite all the military organizations into one army, and ordered the ‘dissident’ Etzel to cease all independent arms acquisitions. Consequently, when the ship Altalena, carrying 930 Jewish refugees and ammunition for the Etzel, arrived, PM Ben-Gurion was adamant in his demand that all the weapons should be handed over. Following Etzel’s refusal, Ben-Gurion ordered the shelling of Altalena. Although Captain Fein flew the white flag of surrender after the first shell, automatic fire continued to be directed at the unarmed passengers and at the wounded survivors swimming in the water. Sixteen Etzel members and three IDF soldiers were killed. The Kibya massacre, 13 October 1953 (Morris, 2000: 176–8) – on the night between 12 and 13 October 1953, Palestinian infiltrators from Jordan killed a woman and her two children at their home in Yahud (a former Palestinian village cleansed in 1948 and repopulated by Jewish immigrants). The infiltrators escaped to the village of Rantis, 5 km north of Kibya. In retaliation, Kibya was attacked Peled-Elhanan 4. 379 by Unit 101 headed by major Ariel Sharon: 69 people were killed and 45 houses were demolished. The Kaffer Kassim massacre, 29 October 19566 Following upon the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948, the Arab-Palestinian citizens were placed under military government, requiring permits to go in and out of their homes. Curfews were laid every night from 19:00 to 6:00 in the morning. In the lead-up to the 1956 war with Egypt, the government and the army devised a plan (Plan Mole), to divert attention from their true intentions and to ‘encourage’ Palestinians living near the border to flee to Jordan, and subsequently block their way back. On the first day of the war, the army decided to advance the daily curfew on Palestinian towns and villages from 19:00 to 17:00 but the village Mukhtars were only advised of the change half an hour before its onset so they could not notify the farmers working in the fields or outside the villages. Nevertheless, the order given by Army Colonel Shadmi was to shoot and kill anyone who would be out after 17:00. Although most junior officers decided not to obey the order, Lieutenant Gavriel Dahan, the commander at the western entrance to Kaffer Kassim, stopped the carts, bicycles and trucks that brought workers from the fields, ordered the people and their families to stand in line and instructed his soldiers to ‘cut them down’. Within an hour, 47 people were killed at the northern and western entrances and in the village itself. The bodies were hurriedly buried during the night in the neighbouring village of Jaljoulia by villagers forced to do the task. After six weeks during which the Israeli government denied the event and censored its publication, there was no alternative but to charge the soldiers with murder. The defendants claimed they had obeyed the orders of their superiors but the judge ruled they should have disobeyed a manifestly unlawful order and sentenced them to jail terms varying between 7–17 years. They were all released by December 1959 by presidential amnesty and their ranks were restored to them. In 1994, the mayor of Kaffer Kassim, Sheikh Darwish Nimer, wrote a letter to Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin requesting state recognition of the massacre but received no answer. In Israel, the massacre is remembered mainly for the unprecedented verdict, considered ‘a milestone of Israeli society that has inculcated in generations of commanders and soldiers the moral boundaries within which they have to operate’.7 The nature of legitimation: theoretical background 1. The theoretical basis of the following analysis, regarding the nature of legitimation and its various types, is founded primarily on works from the fields of social semiotics and critical discourse analysis (Martin Rojo and Van Dijk, 1997; Van Dijk, 1997; Van Leeuwen and Wodak, 1999; Van Leeuwen, 2007, 2008). Martin-Rojo and Van Dijk (1997: 560–1) define legitimation as the act of ‘attributing acceptability to social actors, actions and social relations within the normative order’, in contexts of ‘controversial actions, accusations, doubts, critique or conflict over groups relations, domination and leadership’. Van Dijk (1997: 256) maintains that legitimation is 380 Discourse & Society 21(4) related to the speech act of defending oneself which requires as one of its appropriateness conditions that the speaker is providing good reason, grounds or acceptable motivations for past or present action that has been or could be criticized by others [ … ] Institutions justify their actions when they fear disagreement or condemnation, challenge or attack. In the case of massacres, legitimation is top-down: the state legitimates its actions downward ‘using norms and values that are ostensible in the specific culture’ (Van Dijk, 1997: 255). When the actions of the rulers are compatible with cultural and traditional norms and values, and can be accounted for, they are not legitimated. For instance, Israeli cleansing actions that involved massacre but were not controversial, being committed upon the orders, or with the consent, of the official Zionist leadership and later of the government of Israel, do not undergo a process of legitimation in Israeli school books. They are legitimated a priori and are usually termed ‘operations’. Such are the cleansing operations of the Palestinian cities Lydd and Ramla in 1948, or of villages near Dir Yassin such as Kastal and Hulda, which as the books inform us, were effected ‘according to the official plan Dalet’ (Avieli-Tabibian, 2001: 313–14; Nave et al., 2009), and with the tacit consent of Prime Minister Ben Gurion (Bar-Navi, 1998). Nevertheless, details that would make the students question the orders from above, such as the fact that 426 men, women and children were indeed murdered in Lydd and Ramla, 176 of them inside the mosque, and that 50,000 people were driven out in the night, ‘stripped of their belongings’ (Pappe, 2006: 167), are omitted. The ideological basis of the legitimation of massacres in Israeli school books The inclusion of massacres in school books may have the semblance of a very courageous educational act. However, the analysis shows that although the books may denounce the actual manner of killing, all the reports use semiotic devices to build up legitimating claims that justify their outcome. Most of these claims stem from the Zionist–Israeli ideology which ‘[ … ] propelled by the myth of a pure nation state inherently harbors the possibility of ethnic cleansing in situations of mixed geography’ (Yiftachel, 2006: 60). The goal of achieving an Arab-free land is never spelled out explicitly in Israeli school books, but the crucial importance of a Jewish majority is, as in the following closing paragraph of the chapter that includes the report on Dir Yassin (Bar-Navi, 1998: 195): In the eyes of the Israelis the flight of the Arabs [enhanced by the Dir Yassin massacre] solved a horrifying demographic problem and even a moderate person such as [the first president] Weitzman spoke about it as ‘a miracle’. Ideology has two contradictory components, solidarity and power, which nevertheless ‘mingle with complex promiscuity’ (Hodge and Kress, 1993: 157). While ‘solidarity blurs differences, power exacerbates difference’. Hodge and Kress add that the ideological complex of solidarity and power provides the means of legitimation for rulers and institutions, especially where practices of discrimination are concerned. Peled-Elhanan 381 The work of ideological solidarity and power is at the base of the two levels of ethnicity in Israel (Yiftachel, 2006: 18): at the level of ethno-nationality, the Jewish ethno nation is consolidated by the blurring of differences between different Jewish ethnicities, while non-Jews as a whole are segregated and marginalized; at the level of ethno-class, members of the Jewish ethno-class are privileged while the non-Jewish ethno-classes are underprivileged.8 The Zionist–Israeli ideology, professing Jewish historical rights on the land of Israel/Palestine, Arab threat and the need to keep the regime of segregation for Jewish security, legitimates the ethnic inequality in Israel and Jewish dominance, namely racism, which is at the base of the legitimation of expulsion and massacres. Legitimating norms and laws The sign of legitimacy is the people’s consensus. (Lyotard, 1984: 30) The norm is what turns the prescription into a law. (Lyotard, 1988: 142) Martin Rojo and Van Dijk (1997) explain that legitimation is accomplished by persuasive (or manipulative) discourse, which describes actions as beneficial for the group or for society as a whole, reinterpreting these actions as being acceptable, or at least justified as morally or politically defensible in the ‘present circumstances’, namely during crisis or in the face of external threat. In legitimating controversial actions, the writer has to convince readers that the shared norms were appropriate in each particular situation, and that the event was one of the actions specified by the norms as permissible or required (Finlayson, 2005: 36–7). Hence, a decontextualized analysis of legitimation is impossible because legitimation is ‘founded on the principle of right and wrong [ . . . ] justified according to culturally specific values and norms’ (Van Leeuwen, 2007: 101). Van Leeuwen further notes that ‘Contemporary law makers increasingly believe that, if most people are doing it, it cannot be wrong, and should be legalized’. In Israel, although Palestinians – both citizens and non-citizens in the occupied territories – are discriminated against by law, many times the discriminatory practices and harsh measures precede the laws that legalize them, overriding court ruling.9 The claims legitimating their killing present the massacres as ‘norm-conformative actions’ according to norms that are both Israeli-specific and generally Western, such as war on terror or the protection of citizens. For example, ‘Infiltrators penetrated Israel to commit terror acts, and the state was forced to protect its citizens’ (Avieli-Tabibian, 2001: 331, Kibya massacre), or ‘The operations [one of which was the Kibya massacre] were also intended to strengthen the feeling of security and the morale of the citizens of Israel, who suffered from a constant threat on their lives – at home, in the fields, on the road and on excursions’ (Domka et al., 2009: 160). The Israeli-specific norms often rely on the authority of the Bible. Thus, the justification of the Kibya massacre as an ‘appropriate response’ to the murder of a Jewish mother and her two children, is highly compatible with ‘biblical’ norms such as ‘kill whosoever 382 Discourse & Society 21(4) sets out to kill you’, with its modern interpretations of deterrence, and the ‘eye-for-eye’ norm of revenge.10 Regarding Kibya and other such ‘reprisals’, Domka et al. (2009) present a newspaper from 1956 whose main headline is: ‘50 Egyptians were killed, 40 were taken prisoners – the greatest operation since the War of Independence’. Then asks: 1. 2. ‘In what way can such a headline influence the morale of Israeli citizens?’ ‘Why did Israel choose the way of “reprisals” though it involved the killing of innocent people?’ The obvious answers, according to Israeli norms, would be: revenge and deterrence, which both contribute to the morale according to Israeli norms.11 In Nave et al. (2009: 205), a question regarding these ‘reprisals’ is: do you think the reprisals were enough to deter the Arabs from acting against Israel? Types of legitimation Van Leeuwen (2007) distinguishes four key categories of legitimation: 1. 2. 3. 4. Authorization: legitimation by reference to the authority of tradition, custom and law, and of persons in whom institutional authority of some kind is vested. Moral evaluation: legitimation by reference to discourses of value or value systems, which are not made explicit and debatable but are only hinted at, by appraisals that ‘trigger a moral concept’ (2007: 97). Rationalization: legitimation ‘by reference to the goals, the uses and the effects of institutionalized social action’ (2007: 91). Mythopoesis: legitimation conveyed through narratives whose outcome rewards legitimate actions and punishes non-legitimate actions. These categories serve the legitimation of massacres in Israeli school history books. Mythopoesis In the following reports, the telling of the event (its suzjet) is governed by ‘mythological logic’, which is ‘a logical model capable of overcoming a contradiction’ (Noth, 1995: 376). The story of the massacre unfolds in such a way that the negative act is counterbalanced or even rewarded by positive consequences such as victory or rescue, and the conflict between evil and good results in the victory of good, namely in positive consequences for Israel, as per the following: Dir Yassin massacre: the slaughter of friendly Palestinians brought about the flight of other Palestinians which enabled the establishment of a coherent Jewish state (all books). Kibya massacre: the slaughter of Palestinians in their homes brought about some confidence to Jews in their homes (Avieli-Tabibian, 2001) and restored morale and dignity to the IDF (Inbar, 2004; Blank, 2006; Nave et al., 2009). Peled-Elhanan 383 Kaffer Kassim massacre: 1. A Barbaric crime brought about an enlightened verdict (Avieli-Tabibian, 2001; Domka et al., 2009; Nave et al., 2009). 2. The slaughter – enabled by the military government and its permanent situation of curfew – was the starting point of a process that ended (many years later) with the abolition of this same military government (Bar-Navi, 1998). The Altalena affair: the shelling of the ship, which involved the killing of Jewish refugees who came for help and rescue, helped Israel become a member in the club of the well-ordered states (Bar-Navi, 1998). Effect-oriented egitimation In effect-oriented legitimation ‘purposefulness is looked at from the other end, as something that turned out to exist in hindsight, rather than as something that was, or could have been, planned beforehand’ (Van Leeuwen, 2007: 103). Effect-oriented legitimation is part of instrumental rationalization, itself part of rationalization legitimation. Instrumental rationality legitimates actions ‘because they correspond to the criterion of utility, namely ‘in reference to purpose or function they serve, needs they fill’ (Van Leeuwen, 2007: 105). Instrumental rationalization is more common in legitimating massacres than theoretical rationality which legitimates practices by reference to a natural order of things, and is grounded in whether or not the action is founded on some kind of truth, on ‘the way things are’, e.g. ‘the only thing the Arabs understand is force’ (Bar-Navi and Nave, 1999: 273, Kibya massacre). Since massacres cannot be presented in school books as purposeful actions, the reasons for the killing are usually concealed and the effects foregrounded, serving as justification. For instance, ‘In the months after that (= Dir Yassin massacre) the Jewish community was privileged with many military successes’ (Avieli-Tabibian, 1999: 284). The word ‘privileged’ is the same as ‘rewarded’ or ‘won a prize’ in Hebrew. By using such festive words to describe the consequences of the massacre (likewise Bar-Navi writes that the massacre did not ‘inaugurate’ the flight of the Arabs but ‘accelerated it greatly’), the reports implicitly evaluate it as a positive thing. However, the military ‘successes’ are not presented as the reason for the massacre but become its legitimating cause a posteriori. In the same line, the massacre of Kibya ‘restored the morale and dignity to the army and helped it become a deterring vigorous army whose long arm can reach the enemy deep in its own territory’ (Blank, 2006).12 The legitimating effects are never the direct results of the massacres but what they brought about, often without the knowledge of their perpetrators and without there being a ‘law-like connection’ between the actions and their consequences. Moral evaluation In all the reports studied here, morality and political utility are bound together. The reports speak of ‘moral and political implications’ or about the ‘moral and political burden’ of the military government etc. As Van Leeuwen (2007: 105) argues, ‘in contemporary discourse, moralization and rationalization keep each other at arm’s length [ … ] In the case 384 Discourse & Society 21(4) of rationalization, morality remains oblique and submerged, even though no rationalization can function as legitimation without it’. A specific form of moral evaluation used in these reports is naturalization, which in fact ‘denies morality and replaces moral and cultural orders with the “natural order” when “natural actually means justified or true”. In such cases, “morality and nature become entangled”’ (Van Leeuwen, 2007: 99). Bar-Navi (1998: 184), for instance, brings as a legitimating claim the words of Nathan Yellin Mor, the commander of the Dir Yassin killers: I know that in the heat of battle things like that happen, and I know that people do not preplan it in advance. They kill because their friends have been killed and they want an instant revenge. I know that many nations and armies do such things. Naturalization is close to what Van Leeuwen (2007: 101) terms the authority of conformity, which ‘relies on normality and is based on the knowledge that everybody does that’. In such cases, ‘the answer to the “why” question is [ … ] “because that’s what everybody else does”, or “because that’s what most people do”. And if “everybody else (or most people) is doing it, so should (or can) you”. No further argument’. In the example above, equating the murderers with ‘everyman’ or ‘every nation’ everywhere, Yellin Mor naturalizes the act of slaughter and distances it from the initial analogy he himself made with the crimes of the Nazis (‘When I remember how my mother and my sister were led to slaughter I cannot accept this massacre’); if everyone does that, it is ‘natural’ and therefore legitimate in these special circumstances. Moral legitimation is achieved by means of generalization, abstraction and evaluation or appraisal (Van Leeuwen, 2007: 99). Abstraction is a ‘way of expressing moral evaluations by referring to practices (or to one or more of their component actions or reactions) in abstract ways that “moralize” them by distilling from them a quality that links them to discourses of moral values’. Thus, the massacre of Kibya is moralized by being defined as ‘punitive action’ (Avieli-Tabibian, 2001) or as an ‘Israeli reaction to Arab hostility’ (Bar-Navi and Nave, 1999). Appraisal The system of Appraisal enables writers ‘to write in a way that their position is buried from view’ and ‘render the historian as relatively impartial, neutral arbiter of truth’ (Coffin, 2006: 140). Coffin states that Appraisals can be found in any lexico-grammatical component and is typical of genre. In the present reports, Appraisals express mainly judgement and appreciation. Judgement is the ‘institutionalization of feeling’ (Martin and White, 2005: 44), for ‘it serves to appraise human behaviour by reference to a set of institutionalized norms (an ethical framework) about how people should and should not behave’. Judgement has two sub-categories: 1. Social-esteem by which ‘normality’ (is the person’s behaviour unusual or special?), capacity (is the person competent?) and tenacity (is the person dependable, committed, daring? etc.) are valued. Peled-Elhanan 2. 385 Social sanction, by which veracity (is the person honest?) and propriety (is the person ethical, beyond reproach?) are valued (Coffin, 2006: 139–45). The reports use social sanction in cases of de-legitimation, i.e. the killers of Dir Yassin were ‘dissidents’, and the order in Kaffer Kassim was ‘unlawful’. From the category of appreciation, the reports mostly use social valuation, which may express admiration or criticism, and is sensitive to the specific institutional setting (Martin and White, 2005). Both social esteem and social valuation are used in order to depict the perpetrators of the massacres as competent and morally upright members of Israeli society, i.e. the 101 soldiers who committed the Kibya massacre ‘excelled in their audacity’ (Bar-Navi, 1998) and ‘were all volunteers’ (Avieli-Tabibian, 2001) or ‘superb warriors’ (Inbar, 2004). Legitimation through personal authority Van Leeuwen (2007: 94) explains that ‘one of the forms and contents of legitimation, is “because I say so”, where the “I” is someone in whom some kind of authority is vested’. When Yellin Mor states: ‘I know that many nations and armies do that’ without offering any example, he relies on his personal authority as a commander and an expert. When president Weitzman is quoted as saying that the flight of ‘Israel’s Arabs’ was a miracle, his authority is used to further legitimate the massacre and its consequences. Personal authority legitimation also includes commendation through role models, achieved in the reports studied here mainly through glorifying photographs and captions, which describe the actors as outstanding heroes. Hence, one could add to moral legitimation the sub-category of multimodal legitimation. Multimodal legitimation Moral values can be connoted visually or represented by visual symbols (Van Leeuwen, 2007: 107). In addition to the perpetuation of the Israeli myth of beautiful death (Zertal, 2004), the reports about massacres perpetuate the myth of ‘beautiful killers’, using visual means to show the combatants – who are the most ‘significant others’ of Israeli youth – engaged in heroic activities. Not all the killers are represented visually. Those who are not thought of as role models – like the killers of Kaffer Kassim who were border guards, considered lesser or marginal soldiers, or the killers of the Altalena affair, which is considered a blot on Zionism and Jewish solidarity – are never shown. The ‘dissident’ killers of Dir Yassin are not shown either but in their stead we see in Avieli-Tabibian (2001) the Hagana legitimate cleansers of the Palestinian village Al-Kastal, about 3 km from Dir Yassin. The Kastal operation does not need legitimation for it was a pre-planned part of the official Plan D. The photos depict the soldiers in ‘manly’ poses, with the object signs that connote excellence and heroism in Israel. One such photograph accompanies two of the reports about the Kibya massacre, depicting the 101 soldiers – headed by Ariel Sharon – with chief of staff Moshe Dayan who came to congratulate them. The soldiers wear red military berets of paratroopers, dark khaki combat garb, parachutist wings and parachutist red boots. The photograph is not only an elaboration of the verbal text – it does not just reveal who the 101 soldiers were – but a legitimatory device, for it shows the men who 386 Discourse & Society 21(4) set the high standards of the Israeli army and later rose to the highest political positions. Such heroes could not have done unjustified wrong. Van Leeuwen adds that ‘the mere fact that these role models adopt a certain kind of behaviour, or believe certain things, is enough to legitimize [their actions] and the actions of their followers’ (2007: 103). Nave et al. (2009: 204) explain that these soldiers who were endowed with ‘extraordinary courage, improvisation, perseverance in the hardest conditions, tenacity and loyalty to wounded friends, became the myth of the combatant soldier in the IDF’. In all the reports, the heroic photographs are ‘ideologically the most potent part of the communication since [they have] the status of not-in-dispute knowledge which unites participants in the communication act’ (Hodge and Kress, 1993: 165). Legitimating layout One of the means of legitimation is the arrangement of elements, which can create a legitimating reading path or story. Thus, the heroic photographs are usually grafted on or connected by vectors to glorifying songs. As a rule, ‘song and poems stabilize collective memories’ (Wertsch, 2002: 52), and turn narratives to myths (Barthes, 1957). In AvieliTabibian’s Dir Yassin report (2001), we find the song Comradeship written by Hayim Guri, the ‘poet laureate of the war of independence’, which glorifies our beautiful brave soldiers whose comradeship is sealed with blood; in Avieli-Tabibian’s Kibya report (2001), the photograph of unit 101 is grafted onto The Red Rock – a ditty immortalizing the ‘daring’ young Israeli ‘dreamers’ of the 1950s who crossed the border illegally into Jordan in order ‘to see the Red City of Petra and die’. The soldiers in the photographs are held up as the embodiment of the songs. In Bar-Navi and Nave, the heroic photograph of the 101 is strongly connected by a diagonal vector to an election poster of the governing labour party, showing a lurking Arab aiming at planes and boats bringing Jewish immigrants to the shores of Israel, with the slogan: ‘Growth against Siege!’ The soldiers are the concrete response to the threat that hovers above them, or us. In Avieli-Tabibian (1999, 2001), the Dir Yassin massacre is situated in layouts that depict respectively the hardships inflicted by Arab villagers on the Jews in besieged Jerusalem and the achievements brought about by the cleansing of these Arab villages. Layouts may include glorifying captions that differ from the main text. In one report about Kibya (Bar-Navi and Nave, 1999: 273), although the main text states very clearly that most infiltrations were ‘attempts by Arab villagers to return to their homes [and] only few of them were armed Palestinians sent to carry out intelligence and terrorist activities’, the caption under the heroic photograph of the Kibya killers claims Kibya was ‘a departure base for terrorists’, thus legitimating the massacre. Legitimating context Verbal rearrangement serves to create legitimating contexts. In Inbar (2004), the Dir Yassin report, though without visuals, uses contextual or rather co-textual legitimation. The chapter starts – in the tradition of textbooks of the 1950s – with the ‘dreadful, cruel and bloodthirsty massacres by Arabs of [Jewish] scholars, doctors and nurses, in order to counterbalance the negative impression created by the Dir Yassin episode’ (Podeh, 2002: 106). It ends with ‘1200 Jews lost their lives in the first four months of the war, half of Peled-Elhanan 387 Figure 1. ‘Chief of staff Dayan with the warriors of the 101 unit. Among the warriors: Ariel Sharon, Raphael Eitan and Meir Har-Zion’ (Avieli-Tabibian, 2001). Courtesy of IDF archives and the Centre of the Technology of Education, Tel Aviv. whom were civilians’ (p. 181), ignoring completely the Palestinian casualties. In this context, the Dir Yassin ‘affair’ or ‘episode’, as it is called, is made to seem absolutely justified according to Israeli norms of deterrence and revenge. 13 388 Discourse & Society 21(4) Means of de-legitimation To justify does not mean to ratify. It does not mean ‘this is what I would have done’, but weighing the action in terms of the agent’s goals, his beliefs (even if they were erroneous) and the circumstances he was aware of. (Dray, 1957: 124) While all the reports justify rationally the outcome of the massacres some de-legitimate the act of killing on moral grounds. De-legitimation is realized by the following categories (following Van Dijk, 1997: 259–61): • • De-legitimation of membership – the killers of Dir Yassin were ‘dissidents’ (Bar-Navi, 1998). De-legitimation of action and propriety – in Kaffer Kassim, the soldiers killed helpless, honest, hard-working farmers and their children unscrupulously. In Dir Yassin, the killers lacked veracity and ethics: they did not respect the signed agreement with the village and they ‘bragged’ about the slaughter (Bar-Navi, 1998). De-legitimation is usually extravocalized using personal and impersonal authority to make its claims; the most explicit de-legitimation of the Dir Yassin killers is quoted from their own commander; UN observers denounce the Altalena bombardment and a judge incriminates the Kaffer Kassim murderers. Negative judgement is attributed to political, religious and moral authorities as in ‘The massacre shocked the Yishuv. The Hagana, the Jewish Agency and the rabbinical authorities condemned it vigorously. The board of Directors of the Jewish Agency expressed its feelings of abhorrence and nausea regarding the barbaric way in which this operation was carried out’ (Bar-Navi, 1998: 184). This attribution of judgement authenticates the evaluation but also distances the writer from the speech act of de-legitimation and diminishes his/ her commitment to it. De-legitimation is achieved through the following discursive means: Analogy, usually with the Nazis: the analogy may be explicit, but it can also be inferred from titles such as ‘a manifestly unlawful order’ or from a sentence such as ‘They argued they had followed orders’ – both intertextualize the act and the defendants’ argument with the Nazi criminals during the Nuremberg trials. Comparison: ‘comparisons in discourse almost always have a legitimatory or de-legitimatory function’ (Van Leeuwen, 2007: 96). In some Dir Yassin and Kaffer Kassim reports (i.e. Bar-Navi, 1998; Avieli-Tabibian, 2001), loyalty, integrity, tenacity, human decency and veracity characterize the victims but are lacking in the murderers. The fluctuation between the descriptions of the criminal acts and the positive evaluations of the victims emphasizes the de-legitimation of the killers. However, in all the reports, the de-legitimation of the act or of the actors is a rhetoric phase on the way to the legitimation of the outcome of the massacre. Peled-Elhanan 389 From de-legitimation to legitimation Even when the act itself is not justified, its consequences and sometimes its actors are. In Domka et al. (2009: 164), a question regarding the Kaffer Kassim massacre creates a condoning reading position towards the killers: How were the feelings of threat and suspicion towards the Arabs that were prevalent in Israel in the 1950s, expressed in the actions of the soldiers in Kaffer Kassim? Some texts provide, following the de-legitimation of the manner of killing, a turning point where the text shifts to the legitimation of the outcome. In Bar-Navi (1998), Yellin Mor shifts his soldiers’ blame from killing to ‘bragging’ about it: ‘I know that many nations and armies do such things but who asked them to brag about it?’ Structurally, the massacre can be legitimated in a sort of exposition, where its positive effect overshadows its negative ones: The Dir Yassin massacre remained a blot on the struggle of the Hebrew Yishuv for survival and independence. In the political arena, the massacre served as a central charge in Arab propaganda against Israel. But (turning point) its most crucial effect was in the short run: Although it did not inaugurate the panic-stricken flight of Israel’s Arabs, which had commenced previously, it nevertheless accelerated it greatly (effect-oriented legitimation). (Bar-Navi, 1998: 184) The chapter ends with the quote from president Weitzman who called this effect a miracle. Another way to move from de-legitimation to legitimation is by using the sub-genre challenge (Coffin, 2006), usually used to dispel, discredit or refute opposite opinions. Example: The Altalena report in Bar Navi (1998: 189) Perhaps the feud may have been settled without bloodshed (position challenged), but the prime minister wanted to have a deterring act: there is one government in Israel and it would not bear competition (rebuttal). The Altalena affair was the ticket of Israel into the organized states club where the monopoly on physical power is kept in the hands of the legal government. (opposing argument) The discourse and genres of legitimation Justifying accounts of controversial past actions involve all levels of discourse that may positively influence the opinions of the recipients. (Antaki, 1994, quoted in Martin Rojo and Van Dijk, 1997: 549) Van Leeuwen defines the linguistic and discursive means whereby social meanings are conveyed as socio-semantic means, for although these means are part of a linguistic system, ‘meanings are cultural and not linguistic’ (2008: 24). Regarding legitimation, he 390 Discourse & Society 21(4) specifies that ‘We need to consider [ . . . ] especially the intricate interconnections between social practices and the discourses that legitimize them’ (2007: 111). Legitimation is achieved through various speech acts such as assertions and questions, various types of interrelated and sometimes contradictory discourses, and various genres, all of which transform reality into a version of this reality (Van Leeuwen, 2007: 110). Israeli history and geography school books use a mix of scientific, Zionist and biblical discourses in order to legitimate Jewish domination over the land of Israel/Palestine (Peled-Elhanan, 2009b). These are often enhanced by songs and poems glorifying the soldiers and hailing the Zionist project. The transformation of reality is realized in the reports studied here through the following discursive means. Exclusion of elements No representation of any social practice can include all there is to be represented. Selection of facts is one of the constraints of every narrative and especially of ‘ideologized’ narratives. Lyotard (1992: 90) explains that in grand narratives of emancipation (such as Zionism) ‘[ . . . ] many events go into the dustbin of history or spirit. An event will be retrieved only if it illustrates the master’s views’. The reports on massacres omit the reasons for the killing, exclude both the immediate and the long-run consequences for the victims and any verbal or visual proof of their suffering, as well as details that may raise unnecessary questions regarding the legitimacy of Israel’s actions and goals. Following is a report of the Kaffer Kassim massacre from Avieli-Tabibian (2001: 335): A Manifestly unlawful order On the day the Sinai Campaign started the curfew was brought forward to an earlier hour, 17:00. That day, workers from Kaffer Kassim returned to their homes after curfew without knowing it had been changed. The border-guard soldiers who met them at the entrance to the village ordered them to stop, recognised them as the inhabitants of the village and then shot them dead. They argued they had followed orders, to shoot and kill indiscriminately anyone found outside their homes after curfew. 49 citizens of the village, including women and children, were murdered. The prime minister denounced the murder. The Knesset stood a whole minute to commemorate the murdered [ . . . ]. The defendants were sentenced to prison terms of 7–17 years. The judge ruled that a manifestly unlawful order should be clear to every man who is a man. It is a moral test. ‘If the eye is not blind and the heart is not corrupt’. By de-legitimating the killers, the report legitimates the government and the Knesset, presenting the killers as marginal delinquents who acted independently of the organization that had sent them to do the task. This is achieved by providing the conditions while omitting the reasons for the massacre, so it would not seem pre-planned. The orders given to the soldiers are presented as the murderers’ argument and not as fact. Details regarding the denial of the event by the government, the killers’ early release and the Peled-Elhanan 391 PM’s acting in their favour are also omitted. Given the missing facts, we would have had the following teleological explanation: • • • Israel wanted to conceal the fact that it was going to attack Egypt and encourage an auto-transfer of its Palestinian citizens to Jordan. Israel considered that attacking Palestinian villages and killing some would divert attention away from the real war and ‘encourage’ the rest of the Palestinians to flee to Jordan. Therefore, the curfew was changed without the villagers’ knowledge and the army ordered the border guards to kill anyone who would be outside after 17:00.14 This report, given in regular history books (e.g. Rosental, 2000), has not yet found its way into textbooks, for it could shake the authority of the court and the government and harm the reputation of the IDF as a moral army, that Israeli education is so keen to propagate. Addition of elements This involves the addition of thoughts, intentions or situations that legitimate or at least exonerate the killers. For instance: ‘The loud-speaker encouraging the inhabitants of Dir Yassin to leave the village did not work [ … ] the inhabitants did not leave the village and that is the reason why the number of casualties among them was so great’ (Nave et al., 2009: 113). ‘The soldiers did not know the people were hiding in their homes’ (Inbar, 2004: 244, Kibya report). This argument is used with much less commitment in Domka et al. (2009: 162): ‘The Israeli claim was that the soldiers did not know the inhabitants were hiding in their homes and thought they were bombing empty houses’. Change of information Though Modern Times II (1999) and Building a State (2009) were co-written by the same author (Nave), in the former, Dir Yassin is described as ‘a friendly village whose inhabitants made a non-aggression agreement with the Hagana and kept it meticulously’, while in the latter it is described as ‘one of the bases of the Arab forces that kept attacking the road to Jerusalem’. This change of information contributes to the legitimation of the massacre and points to a new direction in Israeli education, manifested in Inbar (2004) and Blank (2006) as well, to present this massacre as a justified battle that had gotten out of hand due to ‘a series of mishaps’ [that] ‘turned [the battle] into a massive killing of innocent Arabs’ (Nave et al., 2009: 112–13). Abstraction and generalization These devices are very typical of the questions given at the end of some reports. In Avieli-Tabibian (2001), the question, ‘What were the achievements of the Nahshon operation?’ comes right after the report about Dir Yassin, either ignoring or including the massacre in the achievements of the large-scale official cleansing operation. Following the massacre in Kibya, Bar-Navi and Nave (1999) ask: 392 1. 2. Discourse & Society 21(4) What was the expression of Arab hostility towards Israel? Do you think Israel’s reactions to these hostile actions were effective and justified? Give reasons. These questions express the educational message of the reports: look beyond the individual (unfortunate) incident of killing at the big picture and at the long-term (positive) outcome. The reader is thus made to value the military and social achievements brought by the massacre and remember its advantages, rather than the ‘mishaps’. Modality The question in text analysis is not how true some information is, but how true it is represented, how true the sign maker wanted it to appear (Van Leeuwen, 2005). Modality has an important role in this representation (as Van Leeuwen puts it, 2005: 160). Van Leeuwen explains that authoritative texts can use the modality resources of language to impose a view of truth that is hard to counter, for ‘whoever controls modality controls which version of reality will be selected’. It is through modality that writers increase and decrease the force of their assertions (Martin and White, 2005: 13–14). Hodge and Kress (1993: 162) point out that ‘linguistic resources of modality [ … ] allow people to downgrade the truths of others’, e.g. ‘Some say the Arabs were expelled, some say they fled. Both explanations are nothing but myths’ (Bar-Navi, 1998: 195). Fairclough (2003: 219) defines modality as ‘the relationship the sentence or clause sets up between author and representations’. He distinguishes two sorts or modality: deontic modality or the modality of necessity and obligation, what writers commit themselves to; and epistemic modality or the modality of probabilities. While deontic modality is always high, probability can be high, median or low (Martin and White, 2005: 13–14). Different strategies of legitimation use different expressions of modality (Van Leeuwen, 2007: 94). As we have seen, personal authority legitimation contains forms of high obligation modality (‘I know’); conformity legitimation may contain implicit or explicit frequency modality such as usually, ‘every’ (or ‘many armies do that’). An edifying example is the following ‘question for thought’ regarding the Dir Yassin massacre (Bar-Navi and Nave, 1999: 228): What political and moral consequences might the affair of Dir Yassin have had, in your opinion? In this question, ‘modal resources, serve to introduce explicit negotiability into the proposition and hence, unlike positive declarative, do not assume or simulate solidarity between writer and reader’ (Coffin, 2006: 145). Hodge and Kress (1993: 138) observe that ‘all modals contain an element of negation in them, which is the key to their meaning [ … ]. The underlying pre-modalized form either has its source in the speaker or comes from outside and is regarded by the speaker as an “alien” meaning’. The assumption underlying the above question, or its ‘pre-modalized meaning’ – that massacres must have moral and political consequences – is negated. The question suggests that a massacre may not necessarily have either moral or political consequences and that these consequences are interrelated and negotiable. Peled-Elhanan 393 Fairclough (2003: 219) remarks in the same line that explicitly modalized statements (may, might) can be seen as intermediate between categorical assertion and denial and that they register varying degrees of commitment to truth. In the present question, the modal might pushes the assumption underlying the question closer to denial, suggesting that this massacre (renamed affair) escaped both political and moral consequences. Modality differentiates between legitimation and de-legitimation. When the killers are being either incriminated or justified in their action, their acts are represented in high deontic modality and in active mode assertions; but when the responsibility of the killers is mitigated, the reports use low modality or the modality of possibility and the passive mode: A mixed force of Unit 101 and paratroopers assaulted the village of Kibya that was known as the departure point of terrorists, and demolished 45 houses. The unit did not know that many of the villagers had hidden in the houses. 70 men, women and children were killed. (Inbar, 2004: 244) Passive with a deleted actor creates the impression of objectivity (Hodge and Kress, 1993: 134), but the switch from active to passive reflects the book’s stance that the soldiers were not entirely responsible for the people’s deaths, since they did not know that there were people in the houses they demolished that night. However, though the actors are excluded, they are assumed because ‘their exclusion leaves a trace’ (Van Leeuwen, 1996: 39) which is then evaluated as an independent phenomenon. The suppression or backgrounding of social actors can also be realized through grammatical metaphors, which turn events and processes into independent participants such as ‘In the course of the take over of the houses the people were killed’ (Inbar, 2004); ‘the attack caused the panic-stricken flight’ (Avieli-Tabibian, 2001); or ‘The border with Jordan, which had been delineated arbitrarily and separated Arab villagers from their lands, became a real line of fire’ (Bar-Navi and Nave, 1999: 273). All the reports manifest very low commitment to facts concerning the Palestinian victims or Palestinian versions. The number of Palestinian casualties may vary from one report to another and sometimes within the same report. Palestinian versions regarding the massacres are presented as probability existing only in their ‘eyes’, in their ‘sector’ or in their ‘consciousness’, e.g. ‘in the Arab sector the Kaffer Kassim massacre became the symbol of the evils of oppression’ (Bar-Navi, 1998: 121) or ‘It was argued that [in Dir Yassin] many of the people were killed not during the battle and that the Jews committed a massacre of the villagers’ (Domka et al., 2009: 87). Or ‘Dir Yassin became a myth in the Palestinian narrative [ … ] and created a horrifying negative image of the Jewish conqueror in the eyes of Israel’s Arabs’ (Nave et al., 2009: 112–13). In all these examples, the actions and their effects are presented as an argument made by the victims and not as fact. The genres of legitimation From a social semiotic point of view, the question of writers is, ‘what is it that we want to mean, and what modes and genres are best for realizing this meaning?’ (Kress, 2003: 88). Hence, in text analysis, one should look not only at what is done with words or pictures 394 Discourse & Society 21(4) but who does it, for whom, where and when, and what people do to each other by means of text (Van Leeuwen, 2005). Coffin suggests ‘viewing historical discourse – within secondary schooling – as comprising a repertoire of different types of text or “genres”, each of which enables different ways of thinking about the past’ (2006: 10). She states that ‘the discursive practice central to history is the interpretation and construction of social experience using textual forms and linguistic resources of narrative, explanation or argument as means of positioning and persuading the reader to accept interpretation as fact or “truth”’ (2006: 44). The narrative or recording genres, recount and account, are best fit for the construal of simple stories that lead the reader to accept a single perspective. Judgement in these genres is mostly woven into the structure and the lexico-grammar (Coffin, 2006: 139); therefore they are more apt for legitimation than the arguing genres which are more open for debate and where judgment is ‘laid bare’. As Habermas (1975: 71) notes, ‘the procurement of legitimation is self-defeating as soon as the mode of procurement is seen through’. Recount with its recorder voice and seemingly unintrusive style (Coffin, 2006) seems more like a chronicle, although ‘the chronicler has no knowledge of the future and the historian does’, which enables him/her to describe past events in light of subsequent ones (Ricoeur, 1983: 144). Therefore, as Coffin warns, ‘the label of recorder voice refers to reduced authorial intrusion rather than being an indicator of objectivity in any absolute sense. This style may result in a text having a factual, neutral “feel” [ … ] through the absence of direct, explicit forms of evaluation and the exclusion of competing, alternative interpretations’. The recorder voice ‘assumes or simulates reader alignment with the writer’s world view, thus minimizing the amount of explicit interpersonal work to be done, in terms of negotiating with diverse audience positionings’ (Coffin, 2006: 151–2). Following is an example of recount (Inbar, 2004: 180. Headings added): 1. 2. 3. 4. Record of events: on the night of 9 April, Dir Yassin, an Arab village west of Jerusalem, was attacked by a joint force of the Etzel and Lehi. Ground: the goal was to capture the village and eject its inhabitants. Record of events cont.: in the course of the battle that developed on the ground, between 100 and 250 persons were killed, including women and children. Consequences: the affair sparked a public debate about the norms of warfare and the ways to treat the indigenous population. Martin Rojo and Van Dijk (1997: 532) argue that socially legitimation presupposes accusations or doubts, whether the social or cultural norms, values or the moral order itself are breached by the action. This report answers these doubts by inserting a legitimate goal (the ejection of the Arab population) at the point where such questions may rise, right after mentioning the attack that was seemingly committed for no apparent reason; elaborating and justifying the ‘ejection’ explicitly would be to ‘over communicate’ (Van Leeuwen, 1996: 41), for its legitimacy has long been established in Israel and inculcated to all Jewish students. Renaming the massacre ‘battle’ and ‘affair’ is an act of judgement but typically of the recount it is not explicit. The report omits the consequences that affected the victims and their families and mentions only the moral debate it ‘sparked’ in Israel, thus legitimating the Israeli public while insinuating that some people may have thought this was the right way ‘to treat the indigenous population’. Peled-Elhanan 395 In account, ‘rather than one event merely following on from another, events may take on an agentive role and produce or cause subsequent events’ (Coffin, 2006: 58). For instance, ‘The massacre shocked the Arabs and hastened their panic-stricken flight’ (Avieli-Tabibian, 2001). The account has an appraiser voice (Coffin, 2006: 56), which makes it closer to the historical narrative, being capable of ‘explanatory effect’ (White, 1973: 30). Its social purpose is not only to record but to account for a particular sequence in which the events happened. In terms of textual mode, time is the main organizing principle of both account and recount, but in account cause becomes a text-organizing device in addition to time, and temporal conjunction may assume the function of causal link. Kress (2003: 1) explains, regarding such causality, that ‘the simple yet profound fact of temporal sequence and its effects are to orient us towards a world of causality [ … ] and the narrative is the genre that is the culturally most potent formal expression of this’. The account makes increased use of nominalization and grammatical metaphor, which makes the discourse more dense and able to construe an argument that covers long periods of time. Also, it makes the text more technical and hence more ‘scientific’ and objective, devoid of human agency. For example: Most of the raids were aimed at civilian targets, and included stake-outs and incursions deep behind the border lines. (Inbar, 2004: 244) Accounts include explanations, which are ‘a linguistic bridge between narrative and argument, used to justify the interpretation the text advocates’ (Coffin, 1997: 202–3). As Dray (1957: 124) argues, ‘Historians [ … ] recruit details to the justification of their thesis [ … ] searching warrants, weighing and evaluating causes, testing candidates for the role of causes and all these are activities of judgement’. Since legitimation does not authorize prediction but retrodiction, it recurs to consequential explanation which construes consequences as causes. Recognizing the massacre’s effects, the text infers backwards through time the antecedent necessary conditions that must have enabled, facilitated or allowed it, such as the ‘horrifying demographic problem’ that the massacre solved, and turns them into cause. These ‘determining conditions’ (Coffin, 2006: 122), ‘whose relationship to the event is expressed by conjunctions, verbs and prepositions of consequence that link them with an outcome’, answer legitimation’s question ‘why?’ Consequential explanation is able ‘to integrate long-term, structural causes with short term precipitating events [ … ] and recreate them as a system of causes to an effect, achieving thereby a logical structure where there was none, in a process by which incongruent forms of cause can be made congruent by the use of ‘led to’, ‘resulted in’, or ‘turned x into y’ (Coffin, 2006: 70–2). For instance, Bar-Navi (1998: 210), says: The 1956 war was a good turning point for Israel’s Arabs. Although it began with the Kaffer Kassim tragedy, in the long run, the crushing victory, the relative peace on the borders and the self confidence of the Jewish population turned the military government into an intolerable moral and political burden and ten years later it was abolished altogether. This pseudo-logical consequential explanation inserts the massacre (renamed tragedy) into a story with a happy ending by making it the starting point of a positive process. 396 Discourse & Society 21(4) Consequences from two different wars, nine years apart, one of which (1967) had nothing to do with Kaffer Kassim, are all condensed into one causal sequence reconstrued by the writer through a series of processes – turned into ‘things’ – that brought about a positive change for the victims. Although the relator between the different causes and the positive change is the conjunction ‘and’, it has ‘a pragmatic effect of continuation’ (Chiffrin, 1988: 130), and seems to take the place of ‘therefore’, ‘hence’ or ‘so’. The account uses legitimating and de-legitimating appraisal which can be both explicit and implicit, as in the following deduction of the Altalena affair (Bar-Navi, 1998: 189, my bold): Before the unbelieving eyes of the UN observers, the Israeli army bombed a ship that carried ammunition Israel needed like air, and killed Jewish volunteers who had come to help Israel fend off the Arab onslaught. Argument Historical argumentation is very much about establishing a particular interpretation of past events, and supporting it with proof. (Coffin, 2006: 66) Although argument as a genre is rare in the reports, the arguments that legitimate the massacre are present – more or less explicit – as their ‘high point’, namely as ‘what it all adds up to, or rather the thesis of the narrative’ (White, 1973: 11). The main logical parts of any argument (Fairclough, 2003: 81) are Ground, Warrant, optional Backings and Claim. ‘These are mostly implicit, taken for granted or assumed’ (Fairclough, 2003: 81). Fairclough argues that ‘When this is so one might consider the ideological work the text is doing’ (2003: 82). The ground is the premises of the argument. It may be a historical background or a moral ground or both. For instance, the ground for the Dir Yassin massacre in AvieliTabibian (1999) is: ‘In the heat of the Nahshon operation, a grave event occurred that would have significance in days to come’. This ground sets the massacre historically within the context of the official cleansing operation and constitutes the moral ground for its legitimation through naturalization (it is quite common that grave events occur in the heat of the battle). Also, this ground states rather explicitly that the significance of the massacre lies in what it would bring about in the future, meaning that it should be judged in terms of effect and utility. • • • Warrants justify the inference from ground to claim. For instance, in the Altalena report (Bar-Navi, 1998): ‘[ . . . ] the prime minister wanted to have a deterring act: there is one government in Israel and it would not bear competition’. Backings: optional reinforcements or support to warrants, e.g. ‘The Altalena affair was the ticket of Israel into the organized states club’. Claim: the thesis of the argument. In the reports studied here, the implicit legitimating or de-legitimating claim can be implied from titles such as ‘A manifestly unlawful order’ and ‘Israel acts against Terror’, or it may appear in the deduction. For instance, ‘This blatant tactic isolated Israel in the international arena and shattered the national consensus within Israel, but it seemed worthwhile [ . . . ]’ (Bar-Navi, 1998: 250). Peled-Elhanan 397 Though the ideology which constructs and gives value to historical arguments should normally be a complex one that takes into account both sides and weighs things up (Jenkins, 1991: 38), ‘bring difference into existence [ . . . ] and hence openness’ (Kress, 1989: 12), in school history books arguments may often be ‘a site of closure’ (Coffin, 2006: 199). As a result, the reader is persuaded to accept one perspective as having greater explanatory power or ‘truth’ than any other. This is especially true of the two arguing sub-genres challenge and exposition which introduce competing interpretations in order to overshadow or contradict them. The reports studied here recur to these subgenres and not to the sub-genre ‘discussion’ which ‘presents a more balanced range of perspectives on the past, with the purpose of reaching an interpretation based on a careful consideration of all available evidence’ (Coffin, 2006: 80). Challenge is ‘an analytical text which argues against commonly held interpretations’, while drawing attention to the fact that the event can be interpreted in different ways (Coffin, 2006: 80). The stages of the challenge are: 1. 2. 3. 4. Position challenged. Rebuttal of arguments. Marshal opposing evidence and argument. Deduction which summarizes the argument in an antithesis. This antithesis, or alternative interpretation, is then read as the logical conclusion and as a new idea. Inbar (2004) uses challenge at the end of the Kibya report: Some maintain the reprisals [ . . . ] increased Fadayun infiltrations instead of stopping them as was hoped (position challenged). However, after the 1956 war the infiltrations stopped and the feeling of personal security among Israeli citizens grew. (rebuttal + antithesis) The positive opinion regarding the effective consequences of the massacre is meant to refute or discredit the negative one. Exposition Unlike the sub-genre ‘challenge’ that rebukes competing views, exposition presents alternative interpretations without discussing or refuting them, and thus creates an impression of balance and debate, though it leads the reader to a single point of view (Coffin, 2006: 322–3). Thus, at the end of the chapter that includes the Dir Yassin massacre in Nave et al. (2009: 142), we find this exposition regarding the ‘flight’ of the Palestinians accelerated by the Dir Yassin and other massacres. For Israel, this phenomenon enabled the deployment of Jewish dominion and solved many problems such as security, housing and lack of lands, determining thereby the Jewish character of the state of Israel. By contrast, many Palestinians lost their homes, their land and the Palestinian state they could have received following UN decisions. Since the Judaization of the Land and its ‘redemption’ are the ultimate goals of the Zionist project and a Palestinian state is the most feared threat in Israel, this exposition 398 Discourse & Society 21(4) leads to the legitimation of the massacres that accelerated the Palestinian flight and enabled the establishment of a Jewish state while removing the threat of a Palestinian one. Blank (2006: 323) uses the structure of exposition as a rhetorical gimmick. Though she does not mention any of the massacres in particular, she discusses the results of cleansing Plan D presenting, structurally, two points of view, the ‘Jewish’ one and the ‘Arab’ one, regarding this series of cleansing operations. The Jewish point of view enumerates the achievements in bullet points: • • • The operations strengthened the military power of the Jewish community. They created a [Jewish] territorial sequence as a ‘strategic asset’. They had positive effects at the diplomatic level for they convinced the Americans and the Russians that the Jewish community is strong militarily and can fend for itself. Bullet points are the extreme manifestation of high deontic modality. Kress (2003: 16) explains that ‘Bullet points are, as their name indicates, bullets of information. They are “fired” at us, abrupt and challenging, not meant to be continuous and coherent, not inviting reflection and consideration, not insinuating themselves into our thinking. They are hard and direct and not to be argued with’. ‘The Arab Point of View’ is presented less systematically. It starts by stating that the Arabs, too, ‘whenever they conquered a Jewish neighbourhood or city they would expel the Jewish inhabitants, as in Gush Etzion and the Jewish quarter in Jerusalem’. Then it goes on to assert that ‘the Arabs brought it upon themselves for they fought the Jews to perdition [ . . . ] The war ended in their defeat and in hundreds of thousands [of] refugees who left their homes because of the unwillingness of the Arab-Philistinian public and its leaders to come to an agreement’. The troubled reader has to read the text several times looking for an Arab point of view. The untroubled reader probably accepts it as ‘the Arab point of view’. While this sort of mock exposition is acceptable and approved of, a ‘real’ exposition that was not meant for closure but for debate was one of the reasons the book by Domka et al. (2009) was ‘collected off the shelves’, as soon as it was published. The book presented the Palestinian version regarding the ethnic cleansing in 1948 alongside the Israeli one, as a ‘version’ and not as ‘propaganda’, using both Israeli and Palestinian sources (such as Walid Khalidi’s books). The change requested by the ministry of education was first of all to remove the Palestinian sources from the Palestinian version and to substitute it with Palestinian texts that are ‘more faithful to reality’ or with Israeli sources. The reason given was that the writers had not considered the power of the Palestinian texts and the effect they might have on the students.15 One argument was that ‘presenting Arab propaganda as equal in value to the Israeli version is like presenting the Nazi version as equal to that of the Jews regarding the Holocaust.’16 In order to have the book republished, the publishers replaced the Palestinian sources with Israeli ones in the part called The Palestinian Version and gave it a lesser weight, without changing the structure; in other words, they reproduced a ‘mock-exposition’ as in Blank (2006). This incident manifests the social importance of genre. Peled-Elhanan 399 Summary: Semiotic means of legitimation in reports about massacres The legitimation of massacres in the school books studied here is mostly based on utility. The massacre is always a departure point for positive changes to the killers’ in-group. The story of the massacre unfolds in such a way that the negative act is counterbalanced or even rewarded by positive consequences such as victory or rescue, and the conflict between evil and good results in the victory of good, namely in positive consequences for Israel. Therefore, the main types of legitimation used in the reports are mythopoesis with its mythological logic, and effect-oriented legitimation, supported by conformity to universal norms and naturalization. The victims are presented as ‘objects whose pain is neutralized’, and who have to be dealt with ‘in a rational utilitarian calculus’ (Žižek, 1989). The implicit argument is: the massacres were beneficial for Israel, and other nations and armies would have done the same under similar circumstances. Moral considerations, which play a marginal role in these reports, are usually linked with political ones. The books present the act of slaughter either as a justified battle, necessary evil, or as transgression from the official Israeli norm. However, they lead the reader to the conclusion that under the circumstances, the massacre can be legitimated for its consequences are compatible with Zionist goals and Jewish convictions. Personal and impersonal authority of distinguished public figures and role-model authority support the legitimatory claims. Genres of legitimation In order to construe a narrative governed by mythological logic and present the massacre as a departure point for positive changes, the reports use the narrative genres recount and account which create a rhetorical effect of objectivity and lead the reader to accept a single perspective as fact. The reports template includes the following stages: 1. 2. 3. 4. Legitimating or de-legitimating Ground. The act of murder (legitimated or de-legitimated +/– positive evaluation of killers and victims). Legitimating Consequences. (optional) Deduction that includes a legitimating claim in the name of the big picture and the long-term consequences. This structure serves the books’ tone which is mostly authoritative and does not invite debate. Less frequently, the reports use the arguing genres challenge and exposition which are both aimed at introducing competing interpretations in order to overshadow or discard them. As in Recount and Account, these genres often include ‘deductions’ that reinforce a single interpretation and create closure. Reports for the older students use the 400 Discourse & Society 21(4) genre of Questions in order to establish a legitimating reading position mainly through abstraction, generalization and modality. Socio-semantic means used in the reports Modality differentiates between legitimation and de-legitimation and presents Palestinian versions – when they are presented – as less true than Israeli ones; it is used to lessen Israeli responsibility for the killing and suggest that massacres should not always have negative moral or political consequences. The passive mode helps suppress or background social actors and turn human action into independent objective ‘natural’ or autonomous phenomena. Grammatical metaphor enables the construction of pseudo-logical legitimating arguments covering long periods of time by condensing processes and events into nouns. In Appraisal, explicit negative social valuation and social sanction are used to delegitimate the killers or the act of slaughter and are usually realized through extra-vocalized judgement by personal and impersonal authorities such as military, religious or political leaders and institutions. Positive social esteem and social valuation serve to praise the killers and present them as people who could not have done unjustified wrong. Multimodal means are used to present the killers as role models. To sum up, in manipulating the facts and using the rhetoric of legitimation, Israeli school books present assassinations of Palestinians as effective acts, which align with the goals of Zionism and with Jewish creed, and are perfectly natural in times of war. The variety of semiotic tools used in these reports creates a semiotic closure instead of openness. Implications School history books prefer the creation of a ‘usable past’ over accuracy (Wertsch, 2002: 45). They usually command the students to forget what Ricoeur (2004) calls ‘the other drama’ – that of the victims and their circumstances – and look ahead of massacres and other catastrophes, to the favourable consequences for the nation. This way, they teach the students the discourse of power, of politicians and generals, and put at stake ‘the disciplinary politics of truth’ (Coffin, 1997: 201). Van Leeuwen (2007: 94) remarks that there is a close connection between degrees of representational truth and degrees of social obligation. The social obligation of Israeli school books is to function as a sort of ‘supreme historical court’ whose task is to decipher ‘from all the accumulated “pieces of the past” the “true” collective memories which are appropriate for inclusion in the canonical national historical narrative’ (Podeh, 2002: 3). Massacres are inserted into the Israeli–Zionist collective memory as the ‘founding crimes’ of the nation, in a digestible way that exonerates the state of Israel from all blame regarding Palestinian ongoing Naqba. The overall claim of all the reports about massacres is: positive outcome (for us) may condone or overlook evil (done to them) or: so much pain (inflicted on them) is tolerable if it prevents a much greater pain (for us). The determination of the books to justify the wrong by creating legitimating narratives can also explain why in none of the reports do we find what La Capra (2001: 125) calls emphatic unsettlement, which is ‘the response of even secondary witnesses (including Peled-Elhanan 401 historians) to traumatic events [ … ] that should register in one’s very mode of address’. In the Israeli context, empathy towards Palestinians risks resulting in the de-legitimation of the national narrative and is therefore inadmissible.17 Israeli students embark upon their military service with the conviction that empathy is race-related and has no place in the relationships between themselves and their neighbours who are given to their mercy, and that utility is the only criterion that should guide them in their conduct. This credo is manifest in the words of Yossi Bailin, one of the leaders of the Zionist left, who in pleading for the government to stop the carnage in Gaza in 2009, said: ‘It is inhuman, it is un-Jewish, but above all it is ineffective’.18 Notes 1. School books in Israel are trade books and teachers can have their choice from a large variety. However, all the books have to be authorized by the Ministry of Education. One book (Domka et al., 2009) that was authorized by the Labour ministry in July 2009 was pulped in September 2009 by the new Likkud ministry and had to undergo serious changes before its authorization was renewed. 2. From Miriam Webster online. 3. The official pre-state armed forces. 4. E. Amir, ‘Not a Dozen but a Hundred and Ten’, Haaretz, 22 May 2009. 5. Y. Lapidot, Daat – Jewish Studies. Available at: www.daat.ac.il/daat/history/al/b12 6. Sources include T. Segev, Back to Kaffer Kassim. Available at: http://www.haaretz.co.il/ hasite/pages/ShArtPE.jhtml?itemNo=779296&contrassID=2&subContrassID=13&sbSub ContrassID=0; D. Karpel, Interview with Benyamin Kol, Haaretz, 8 October 2008; and Rosental (2000). 7. Minister of Education Tamir, Haaretz, 16 February 2009. 8. See Or Kashti (Haaretz, 12 August 2009): Israel aids its needy Jewish students more than Arab counterparts. The average per-student allocation in Arab junior high schools amounts to only 20 percent of the average in Jewish junior highs. 9. A recent example is the law that permits universities to grant priority in dorm allocation to army veterans, namely to Jews. This law was enacted in reaction to a court ruling banning the norm as practised at the University of Haifa (Ynet news, 20 August 2006). The law overrode the court ruling and legalized the norm. 10. On 20 September 2007, MK Yuval Steinitz, head of the Knesset committee for security and foreign affairs, declared on Israeli radio that he supported shooting civilians in areas from which Kassam missiles are launched. Answering the legal advisor to the government who had warned against committing war crimes, he said: ‘Israel’s deterrent capacity rests upon the principle of fire for fire and horror for horror and those who denounce that forsake the security of Israeli citizens’. Available at: steinitz.likudnik.co.il 11. On 15 March 2008, actor Shlomo Vishinsky told Israeli TV that the army spokesman had called to notify him that the IDF had avenged the death of his son, killed in action in Gaza, by assassinating his killer’s ‘dispatchers’. Later, the national radio wanted to know if the assassination gave him any consolation. My eldest son, who was a soldier at the time of his sister’s murder by a Palestinian suicider from the West Bank, was egged on by his commanders to avenge her death by committing ‘reprisals’ in Lebanon. 12. This effect stated as historical fact is actually a quote from an article written by the commander of this massacre, Ariel Sharon, 39 years after the slaughter. 402 Discourse & Society 21(4) 13. For a discussion of layout as punctuation of semiosis, see Peled-Elhanan (2009a). 14. The only books that admit there was such an order are Domka et al. (2009) and Nave et al. (2009). 15. Tzafrir Goldberg (one of the writers), personal communication. 16. 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Her major ongoing studies since 1995 have been in school-based literacy, racist discourse in Israeli classrooms and textbooks, spoken and written language development at school and dialogue in multicultural classes. Her forthcoming book is Palestine in Israeli School Books: Ideology and Indoctrination (to be published by Tauris, London). Other than teaching, she speaks and writes on matters concerning the Israeli occupation of Palestine. It is for that work that she was the corecipient of the 2001 Sakharov Prize for Human Rights and the Freedom of Speech, awarded by the European Parliament, which she shared with the late Professor Izzat Gazawi from Bir Zeit University. She is a founding member of the Russell Tribunal on Palestine (Brussels, March 2009) and a member of the Parents Circle: Palestinian and Israeli Bereaved Parents for Peace and Reconciliation. She is also co-chair of the ICEO International Committee on Education under Occupation with Dr Sami Adwan from Bethlehem University, Israel.