Traps: Intractable Conflict as a Dynamical System

Chapter 5 1 Traps: Intractable Conflict as a Dynamical System 2 3 Although uncommon, when the perfect storm of intractable conflict hits, it can undermine the security and well-being of families, communities, and societies everywhere. When viewed through the lens of dynamical systems, both the low frequency and highly destructive consequences of this perplexing phenomenon become understandable. In general terms, conflict intractability develops when social, psychological, and structural elements interact over time to promote the emergence of a stable and coherent pattern of thought and behavior organized around perceived incompatibilities. These patterns function as attractors in that they “attract” the mental and behavioral dynamics of the parties to the conflict. As the conflict becomes a primary focus of each party’s thoughts, feelings, and actions, a wide variety of events and forces—even those that seem irrelevant to the conflict—are framed in a way that intensifies or maintains the conflict. Metaphorically, the conflict acts like a gravity well into which the surrounding mental, behavioral, and social-structural landscape begins to slide. Once trapped in such a well, escape requires tremendous energy and commitment and thus becomes difficult, if not seemingly impossible. Such dynamics are today apparent in Israel/ Palestine, the Colombia/FARC conflict, and even in the current low-intensity conflict dynamics on the island of Cyprus. Our aim in this chapter is to unpack this general idea in terms of the principles and concepts introduced in the preceding chapters. We begin by describing social relations in terms of attractor dynamics, and using this perspective to illustrate how intractable conflict represents a special form of social dynamics in which basic processes line up in an unlikely but potentially destructive manner. Not all conflicts become intractable, so we discuss the dynamical processes that distinguish this potentially destructive form of social relations. The focus in particular is on the shifting balance between reinforcing and inhibiting feedback loops (relationships between variables that amplify their original states or inhibit it) in the progression from benign to malignant social relations. With this perspective in hand, we describe three lines of research designed to assess its validity and relevance to conflict in real-world contexts. First, we present empirical studies designed to illustrate the emergence and expression of conflict R.R. Vallacher et al., Attracted to Conflict: Dynamic Foundations of Destructive Social Relations, Peace Psychology Book Series, DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-35280-5_5, # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013 103 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 104 5 Traps: Intractable Conflict as a Dynamical System 52 intractability in interpersonal contexts when moral values provide the focus of interaction. We then discuss how the dynamics of intractable conflict can transform the social relationships in an entire society, and present preliminary evidence from field research in support of this scenario of spreading pervasiveness. The third line of research also focuses on the spread of conflict in social systems, but it is based on a mathematical model that is implemented in computer simulations. This model, which exemplifies the approach of dynamical minimalism, is based on a few assumptions introduced by Morton Deutsch (1973) in his Crude Law of Social Relations. The final section discusses the distinction between open and closed systems, and relates this distinction to the dynamics associated with intractable conflict. We argue that whether a social system characterized by the potential for conflict can escape the pull of intractability depends on the degree to which the system is impervious to outside influences and new circumstances (closed) or instead is capable of incorporating and adapting to influences and changing circumstances (open). We conclude the chapter on an optimistic note by suggesting that the secret to transforming intractable conflicts can be found within the very framework— dynamical systems theory—that gives rise to intractability. 53 Intractable Conflict as a Dynamical System 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 Most social conflicts are temporary and tend to be resolved without devolving into violence and destruction. Indeed, as emphasized from the outset, conflict is largely a constructive process that promotes compromise and innovation at all levels of social reality, from friendship formation and marriage to representative democracy and international relations. Still, a small proportion of conflicts—about 5–7 %— tend to become protracted and appear impervious to resolution (Coleman, 2011). Like constructive conflicts, conflicts characterized by intractability can be observed at all levels of social reality—from dysfunctional marriages to political polarization and interstate warfare. An intractable conflict seems paradoxical with respect to its dynamics. On the one hand, it is characterized by considerable dynamism, with important events unfolding on various timescales. On the other hand, an intractable conflict is characterized by long-term stability, with the parties to the relationship seemingly frozen in their mutual feelings and action orientations. The simultaneous expression of forces promoting intense dynamism and equally intense resistance to change suggests that intractable conflict can be investigated through the lens of nonlinear dynamical systems. In particular, the defining features of conflict can be recast in terms of key concepts such as self-organization, emergence, hysteresis, nonlinear transitions, and attractor dynamics. Intractable Conflict as a Dynamical System 105 Attractor Dynamics in Intractable Conflict 73 Once initiated, intractable conflicts seem to have a life of their own. Even if the specific issues that generated the conflict are resolved, the animosity between the parties to the conflict may persist or even intensify over time. A host of new issues may arise and fade in salience, but the negative perceptions, beliefs, feelings, and actions defining the relationship between the parties show little if any change. It is hard to understand such intransience in terms of the usual motivational underpinnings of social life. A conflict with no end in sight hardly serves the interests of the parties to the conflicts: to the contrary, it drains their respective resources, wastes energy, and diminishes human capital. Faced with such futility and dysfunction, a compromise that partially addresses the needs and interests of the parties should be embraced once they realize that such a compromise represents a far better deal than does maintaining a self-defeating pattern of behavior with no end in sight. The persistence of persistent negative mental and behavioral patterns can be couched in terms of attractor dynamics. An attractor, as noted in preceding chapters, is a restricted range of states toward which a dynamical system evolves over time, and to which the system returns after it has been perturbed. Attempts to move the system out of its attractor promotes forces that reinstate the system at its attractor. Viewed through this lens, intractable conflict represents the emergence of strong, stable attractors reflecting stable patterns of thought, feeling, and action on the part of group members. Such an attractor, in effect, “attracts” a wide variety of mental and behavioral states to a narrow set of negative and destructive states. 74 The Attractor Landscape 96 The attractor concept and the relevance of attractors for conflict can be represented in a simple metaphor, depicted in Fig. 5.1. The valley represents the system’s attractor and the ball represents the current state of the system. From its current position, the ball will roll down the hill and come to rest at the bottom of the valley. The system portrayed in Fig. 5.1 has two attractors (A and B), each with its own basin of attraction, which is represented by the width of each valley. Because the basin of attraction for Attractor A is wider than the basin of attraction for Attractor B, a wider range of states will evolve toward Attractor A than toward Attractor B. The two attractors also vary in their strength, which is depicted as the respective depth of each valley. Note that B is stronger than A—that is, it has a deeper valley. In terms of the gravity metaphor, a system captured by attractror B is more difficult for it to be dislodged by external influence than is a system captured by attractor A. These basis properties of attractors have clear relevance for the intractability of conflict. The width of the basin of attraction represents the range of ideas and actions that are likely to converge on the predominant mental and behavioral pattern characterizing the system. For a negative attractor with a wide basin of 97 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 106 5 Traps: Intractable Conflict as a Dynamical System Fig. 5.1 A dynamical system with two attractors (A and B) 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 141 142 143 144 145 146 147 148 149 150 151 attraction, even positive information that contradicts the negative view of another person or group is likely to be transformed by a variety of cognitive mechanisms in line with the predominant view (cf. Nowak, Vallacher, Tesser, & Borkowski, 2000). Thus, a peaceful overture or gesture by an opposing party may become reframed so that it provides evidence in support of, rather than in contradiction to, the predominant negative response tendency of the other party. The depth of an attractor, meanwhile, represents how difficult it is for the system to escape the pull of malignant thoughts and behaviors. When a system is at a deep attractor for negative relations (as in Attractor B), any attempt to resolve the conflict corresponds to pushing the ball uphill. This not only requires considerable effort, but it is also likely to be futile—once the pushing force is relaxed, the ball will roll back to the attractor. This scenario is illustrated by the experience of Poland during the transition from communism to democracy in the late 1980s. The Polish police attempted to suppress people’s expression of political opinions, economic needs, and general dissatisfaction, but their efforts proved to be ineffective. Each police action, in fact, only served to fuel opposition and the will to resist. In effect, these actions were tantamount to pushing the ball up the hill. Because the attractor for anti-government sentiment was very strong, the police actions proved to be counterproductive, as they tended to activate forces contrary to the police efforts. The gravity metaphor, however, suggests that efforts to move a system out of its attractor can prove successful if sufficient force is applied and if another attractor is available. Thus, the system depicted in Fig. 5.1 can escape Attractor B and settle in Attractor A if enough force is employed to move the ball up the hill and into the valley representing Attractor A’s basin of attraction. This simple has important implications for change in a system characterized by intractable conflict. In particular, if a system has more than one attractor, the mental, affective, and behavioral states associated with the system tend to sort themselves categorically, with each category corresponding to a different attractor. If change occurs it such a system, it is likely to occur in an abrupt, nonlinear, qualitative manner rather than in a slow, linear, and incremental fashion (cf. Latané & Nowak, 1994). This nonlinear scenario of change may be asymmetric, however, with many mechanisms aligned to maintain a protracted conflict. Once the conflict reaches a certain threshold, then, the attractor of destructive conflict is likely to be considerably stronger than any other attractor for the system. A considerably stronger force may therefore be required to escape the conflict than was required to drag the parties into the conflict. Moreover, even if a conflict appears to be resolved, the strong attractor of conflict continues to represent a latent danger that can recapture the mental, affective, and behavioral dynamics of the parties involved, creating the potential for a rapid reinstatement of the conflict. The rapid regression to a negative Intractable Conflict as a Dynamical System 107 attractor was evident, for example, in the resumption of hostilities in the Middle East after the collapse of the Oslo accords in the 1990s. 152 Manifest and Latent Attractors 154 Because a system spends most of its time in the vicinity of its current attractor, the nature of this attractor can be inferred from observation of the system’s pattern of behavior. The system’s behavior, however, may not reveal the existence of other attractors for the system’s dynamics that are currently invisible. These latent attractors, which specify an alternative range of possible behaviors for the system, become visible and define the intrinsic tendencies of the system when the system falls within their respective basins of attraction. Hence, the creation and destruction of latent attractors can prove critical in shaping how the system will respond to conditions and events that have yet to take place. The existence of a latent attractor can set the stage for dramatic and unexpected changes in social relations mired in conflict. Genocides provide an extreme example of the power of latent attractors. They are typically initiated in a very rapid fashion, but they are invariably preceded by a period of changes in inter-group attitudes and behaviors, often involving the humiliation of group members, negative stereotyping, and a denial of rights. These changes are not necessarily dramatic by themselves, so opposition to them may be fairly minimal and contained. Nonetheless, each change may create and then deepen a latent attractor that can subsequently determine the fate of inter-group relations. Once an attractor for conflict has been created, even relatively small provocations can move the system into the basin of this attractor, with the entire system dragged into full-blown destructive conflict. The assassination of Archduke Ferdinand in Sarajevo in 1914, for example, probably would not have provoked World War I if a latent attractor for intense conflict had not been created by a configuration of international interests and a series of prior events. One can also envision the converse scenario. Thus, a series of positive acts by one group toward another group may be rejected at face value and have little or no immediate effect on the relations between the groups. But such acts may set the stage for a sudden escape from a negative attractor by creating a positive latent attractor to which the system can move. Consider, for example, the Orange revolution in Ukraine, during which the relations between Poland and Ukraine changed over the course of a few weeks from fairly negative to very positive. Although the observable change was rapid, it was made possible by the positive interactions and exchanges between various groups of people that took place many years before the Orange revolution. Another example is provided by the rapid repair in relations between the U.S. and the USSR after decades of the Cold War. This transition from negative to fairly positive relations was likely fostered by a series of low-profile citizen exchanges, such as the Dartmouth conferences that occurred in the years leading up to Perestroika (Saunders, 1997). 155 153 156 157 158 159 160 161 162 163 164 165 166 167 168 169 170 171 172 173 174 175 176 177 178 179 180 181 182 183 184 185 186 187 188 189 190 191 192 108 5 Traps: Intractable Conflict as a Dynamical System 214 The potential for latent attractors has important implications for the fate of social relations characterized by long-term and seemingly intractable conflict (e.g., Coleman, Bui-Wrzosinska, Vallacher, & Nowak, 2006; Coleman, Vallacher, Nowak, & Bui-Wrzosinska, 2007; Nowak, Vallacher, Bui-Wrzosinska, & Coleman, 2007; Vallacher, Coleman, Nowak, & Bui-Wrzosinska, 2010). Factors such as objectification, dehumanization, and stereotyping of outgroup members are clearly preconditions for the development of intractable conflict (Deutsch, 1973), but they not have an immediate impact on intergroup relations. However, they may gradually create a latent attractor to which the system can abruptly switch in response to a relatively minor provocation. Conversely, attempts to resolve conflict may be ineffective in the short run but nonetheless create a latent attractor for positive intergroup relations, thereby establishing a potential relationship to which the groups can switch if other conditions permit. Even between groups with a long history of conflict, a latent positive attractor can promote a rapid de-escalation of conflict. In sum, noteworthy and relatively sudden changes in a social system correspond to changes in the attractor landscape of the system. Although a change within a basin of attraction is likely to be short-lived and resisted by the system, a change in the salience of a system’s attractors can reconfigure the ensemble of likely states that can be adopted and thus alters the forces operating within the system. Changes in a system’s attractor landscape can promote changes in behavior that are become self-sustaining and self-enhancing over time. 215 Levels of Social Reality and Attractor Dynamics 216 Because attractors represent formal properties of dynamical systems, they characterize the dynamics of systems at all levels of personal and social reality (cf. Nowak & Vallacher, 1998; Vallacher & Nowak, 2007). So although cognitive processes and inter-group relations are very different phenomena, for example, both can be described in terms of stable patterns (e.g., interpretation in cognition, social distance in inter-group relations) that provide coherence and stable platforms for action. This suggests that conflict can be characterized with attractors at different levels of social reality. Attractors at the level of the mind represent stable patterns of thought and affect concerning the parties to the conflict (e.g., oneself and another person in interpersonal conflict, the ingroup and outgroup in inter-group conflict). Attractors at the interpersonal and inter-group levels, meanwhile, represent stable patterns of relations between the parties to the conflict. There is feedback among levels in a dynamical system, so an attractor that initially develops at one level of reality is likely to forge attractors at other levels. Two groups may come into conflict over issues of resource allocation, for example, and the resultant negative interactions could promote psychological attractors (i.e., negative attitudes and feelings) that are consistent with, and serve to maintain, the interpersonal conflict. Indeed, once a psychological attractor develops, the factors that spawned the conflict (i.e., resource allocation) could be subsequently resolved 193 194 195 196 197 198 199 200 201 202 203 204 205 206 207 208 209 210 211 212 213 217 218 219 220 221 222 223 224 225 226 227 228 229 230 231 232 233 234 Intractable Conflict as a Dynamical System 109 mitigated without resolving the conflict if the attractor is strong and has a wide basin of attraction. Thus, a change in objective conditions could be interpreted in a manner that reinforces rather than undermines the negative feelings toward the other party. In conflict scenarios, then, an interpersonal or inter-group attractor is likely to promote a social judgment attractor, which then can reinforces the interpersonal attractor, and so on, in a reciprocal reinforcing feedback loop. Because of the potential for feedback among levels, a conflict initially associated with one level of reality can create the potential for overlapping and mutually reinforcing attractors that serve to anchor the conflict. Moreover, the expansion of attractors due to feedback among levels can become encoded in cultural beliefs and traditions, which adds yet another level to the conflict, thereby promoting long-term intransigence and resistance to attempts at conflict resolution. An example is provided by the annual Orange walk in Northern Ireland each July, which celebrates the Protestant victory of Prince William of Orange over King James II in 1690. This event reinforces memories and narratives of past grievances and losses associated with the protracted conflict over Ireland and thus holds potential for triggering latent psycho-social attractors for more hostile Catholic-Protestant relations. 235 The Emergence of Intractable Conflict 253 Once antagonistic relations between individuals, groups, or nations have become intractable, it is easy to appreciate how they are maintained with respect to attractor dynamics. But how do social relations get to this point in the first place? Conflict is ubiquitous and largely constructive in human experience, after all, and only a small proportion of conflicts become destructive and protracted over a long period of time. What dynamic processes transform a normally benign feature of social relations into something that is irrational and dysfunctional? 254 Dynamics of Self-Regulation 261 The development of intractable hostility in social relations can be looked upon as a breakdown in the self-regulatory mechanisms that underlie normal behavior. The capacity for monitoring, controlling, and changing one’s thoughts, feelings, and actions is widely recognized as a defining feature of human functioning (cf. Baumeister & Heatherton, 1996; Carver & Scheier, 1999; Miller, Galanter, & Pribram, 1960; Powers, 1973; Vallacher & Nowak, 1999; Vallacher & Wegner, 1987; Wegner & Pennebaker, 1993; Weiner, 1948). In the dynamical framework, the self-regulatory tendencies of a system reflect the nature of the feedback loops by which elements influence one another. Elements linked by reinforcing feedback loops bolster and amplify one another’s current state. A favorable thought about a person or group, for example, elicits other 262 236 237 238 239 240 241 242 243 244 245 246 247 248 249 250 251 252 255 256 257 258 259 260 263 264 265 266 267 268 269 270 271 272 110 273 274 275 276 277 278 279 280 281 282 283 284 285 286 287 288 289 290 291 292 293 294 295 296 297 298 299 300 301 302 303 304 305 306 307 308 309 310 311 312 313 314 315 5 Traps: Intractable Conflict as a Dynamical System favorable thoughts or transforms neutral thoughts into favorable ones, and these thoughts in turn reinforce the state of the original thought. Through repeated iterations of this feedback loop, the separate thoughts coalesce into a global judgment with positive valence. By the same token, reinforcing feedback can promote the emergence of a derogatory judgment if an unfavorable thought about a person or group recruits other unfavorable thoughts and influences neutral thoughts to take on the same valence. In contrast, elements linked by inhibiting feedback loops inhibit or reverse one another’s current state. Thus, a favorable thought about a person or group recruits unfavorable thoughts or transforms neutral thoughts into unfavorable ones, whereas an unfavorable thought recruits favorable thoughts or transforms neutral thoughts into favorable ones. Self-regulation involves both types of feedback (Vallacher & Nowak, 1999). Social judgment generated solely by reinforcing feedback loops can transform a single positive or negative thought about a person or group into a global evaluation that is highly polarized in a positive or negative direction, respectively (e.g., Tesser, 1978; Vallacher, Nowak, & Kaufman, 1994). On the other hand, if social judgment were generated solely by inhibitory feedback loops, an unequivocal evaluation of a person or group would never be attained, as every valenced thought would be contradicted by a thought with the opposite valence. Effective self-regulation thus involves a balance between reinforcing and inhibitory feedback loops. This balance shapes the trajectory of thought and behavior in everyday social relations—including relations characterized by benign or constructive conflict. A hostile thought about a person or group, for example, elicits other negative thoughts or transforms neutral thoughts into negative ones, and through repeated iterations of this linkage, the separate thoughts coalesce into a coherent negative judgment. In most social contexts, however, this potential for the spread of negativity and conflict escalation is restrained by inhibitory feedback among elements. A hostile action toward a person, for example, might promote feelings of regret or guilt, or perhaps a consideration of the person’s benign or positive qualities. Such thoughts effectively restrain the negative judgment and hostile impulses, establishing a tempered stance in the social relationship. Achieving an optimal balance between reinforcing and inhibiting feedback loops is not an automatic consequence of mind and action, but rather requires sufficient controlled processes—conscious, deliberative, and reflective modes of thought—to enable self-awareness, impulse control, reconsideration of judgments and conclusions, and action monitoring (e.g., Carver & Scheier, 1999; Gilbert, 1993; Vallacher & Nowak, 1999; Wegner, 1994). Nonetheless, this mode of thought and action provides a reliable foundation for personal, interpersonal, and collective behavior in most circumstances. Even in situations of potential or manifest social conflict, the dynamics of mind and action generally reflect effective self-regulatory mechanisms. People can change their mind or reverse a course of action, provided they function in accordance with controlled processes that strike a balance between reinforcing and inhibitory feedback. Intractable Conflict as a Dynamical System 111 Breakdown in Self-Regulation 316 If balanced feedback is the norm for everyday thought and behavior, what is responsible for the breakdown in self-regulatory dynamics that allows strong attractors of negative thought, emotion, and action to develop? Self-regulatory failure is actually a fairly hot topic in contemporary social psychology. Research in several different paradigms has identified a host of factors that can undermine or deplete the executive resources necessary for controlled processes (e.g., Baumeister, Vohs, & Tice, 2007; Vallacher & Nowak, 1999; Vohs & Heatherton, 2000; Wegner, 1994) and thus tip the balance in favor of reinforcing feedback at the expense of inhibitory feedback. These factors, by extension, promote polarization in mental, affective, and behavioral states by undermining people’s ability to inhibit thoughts, feelings, and actions that are biased in a particular direction. Stress is a primary factor in self-regulatory failure because it can seriously compromise controlled processes (cf. Glass & Singer, 1972). Several lines of research demonstrate that people find it hard to think clearly or correct a course of action when they are under pressure, faced with tasks that exceed their selfperceived competence, or must decide between different courses of action with unclear consequences (e.g., Tice, Bratslavsky, & Baumeister, 2001; Vohs, Baumeister, & Ciarocco, 2005). Stress also increases people’s felt need for closure, a desire to “seize” a global judgment without considering other perspectives and to “freeze” on that judgment and demonstrate strong resistance to disconfirming evidence and contrary ideas (Kruglanski & Webster, 1996). When people feel a heightened need for closure, they are not only highly defensive when exposed to contradictory judgments, they also demonstrate intolerance and antagonism toward people who express such judgments. Stress, of course, is inherent in prolonged and difficult conflict, so quite plausibly the pressures and tensions experienced in such conflicts contribute to a breakdown in normal self-regulation and promote the emergence of an attractor defined in terms of coherent and polarized thoughts, feelings, and actions. A special form of stress is associated with people’s awareness of their mortality, an existential state that is likely to have heightened salience in a situation with potential for violent conflict. According to terror management theory (TMT), people embrace the values of their culture most vigorously when they are mindful of their own death (cf. Greenberg et al., 1990). Because destructive conflicts can devolve toward violent confrontations, the death of oneself or of one’s fellow group members may be considered a very real possibility. Interestingly, research on TMT has established that when people are made mindful of death, they become more hostile to people who criticize their country (Greenberg et al., 1990), more hostile to outgroups (Dechesne, Greenberg, Arndt, & Schimel, 2000), more punitive toward those who challenge established laws and procedures (Rosenblatt, Greenberg, Solomon, Pyszczynski, & Lyon, 1989), and more reluctant to use cultural artifacts such as a country’s flag for a mundane purpose such as a table covering (Greenberg, Porteus, Simon, Pyszczynski, & Solomon, 1995). These 317 318 319 320 321 322 323 324 325 326 327 328 329 330 331 332 333 334 335 336 337 338 339 340 341 342 343 344 345 346 347 348 349 350 351 352 353 354 355 356 357 358 AU1 112 359 360 361 362 363 364 365 366 367 368 369 370 371 372 373 374 375 376 377 378 379 380 381 382 383 384 385 386 387 388 389 390 391 392 393 394 395 396 397 398 399 400 401 402 403 5 Traps: Intractable Conflict as a Dynamical System findings suggest that the emergence and maintenance of strong attractors for hostility in interpersonal and intergroup relations might be a consequence of the recognition that one’s life is at risk under conditions of intense conflict. The possibility of death associated with destructive violence, in other words, can tip the balance in self-regulation toward reinforcing feedback, which promotes global judgments with unequivocal valence. Stress is not the only source of self-regulatory failure. Simply attending to multiple sources of information or engaging in parallel activities, for example, can undermine the controlled processes necessary for effective self-regulation. Under such conditions of cognitive load, people fail to correct unwarranted evaluative judgments of others, presumably because they do not take into account factors in the situation that may have promoted the behavior in question (Gilbert, 1989). Thus, negative actions are attributed to the actor’s personality or values despite pressures or expectancies that would likely elicit the same behavior in anyone (e.g., Gilbert, Pelham, & Krull, 1988). Stereotypical beliefs, moreover, tend to predominate when judging members of outgroups if the perceiver is under cognitive load, since stereotypes are over-learned ways of thinking that do not require controlled processes of thinking (Gilbert & Hixon, 1991). Cognitive load also undermines people’s ability to suppress thoughts and feelings that are unwanted or inappropriate (cf. Wegner, 1994; Wegner, Erber, & Zanakos, 1993; Wegner, Schneider, Carter, & White, 1987). A negative characterization of a person or group, for example, may be difficult to ignore or discount, even if the characterization is unfounded and should not be considered valid or appropriate. If substantial cognitive load is experienced in the midst of a potentially destructive conflict, one might expect an uptick in shallow processing of information regarding members of an outgroup, with the balance shifted toward reinforcing feedback at the expense of inhibitory feedback. Although this possibility has not been directly tested, it seems reasonable. When a conflict begins to occupy people’s thoughts, after all, everyone must still devote mental energy to the more mundane aspects of life. Adding thoughts about conflict to the controlled processing necessary to get through daily life, then, might serve to create a level of cognitive load that undermines balanced self-regulation. If so, people consumed with conflict on top of their everyday concerns might be prone to develop polarized thoughts and action tendencies toward members of the antagonistic group. The emergence of attractor dynamics in this fashion may set the stage for intractable conflict. Self-regulatory failure may have a biological basis. Brain functions utilize a special form of glucose, called glycogen, and this “mental fuel” is burned at a particularly rapid rate when a person is engaged in the controlled processing necessary for self-regulation (Gailliot et al., 2007). Compared to participants who are given a natural sweetener that provides glycogen to the brain, for example, those who are given an artificial sweetener that lacks glycogen-producing properties are more likely to demonstrate subsequent lapses in self-regulation. Such lapses may be manifest as selfish or even immoral action, undertaken without consideration of the act’s larger meaning or long-term consequences. People who inhibit an impulse or delay gratification, for example, are subsequently inclined to act selfishly rather Intractable Conflict as a Dynamical System 113 than altruistically, and to behave dishonestly if such behavior enhances their immediate self-interest (e.g., Vohs et al., 2008). This perspective suggests that prolonged efforts at self-regulation can result in a boomerang effect, with inhibitory feedback playing a weakened role in subsequent thought and behavior (cf. Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Muraven, & Tice, 1998; Gailliot et al., 2007). For example, in tense social relations characterized by sustained pressures for compromise and perspective taking—higher-level mental activities that deplete glycogen—there may be a sudden breakdown in inhibitory feedback, with the emergence of highly polarized thoughts and feelings shaping how the respective parties respond to one another. This is clearly a speculative scenario, but one that seems worthy of exploration. If confirmed, it would suggest an ironic prediction: heightened concern with compromise and problem solving in a conflict scenario holds a risk of transforming a benign conflict into one characterized by extreme judgments and non-compromising action orientations. To this point, we have concentrated on generic factors in everyday life that can disrupt the balance between reinforcing and inhibitory feedback in thoughts, feelings, and actions. There are unique factors in social relations characterized by conflict, however, and these may hold potential for undermining self-regulation and setting parties to a conflict on the path toward intractability. Likely candidates include power symmetry versus asymmetry, the degree of confined interdependence, the level of cooperation versus competition over resources, the degree to which access to resources has a zero-sum nature, and the salience and magnitude of differences in ideology and social identity. The relation of these features of conflict to the emergence of intractability characterized by strong attractors for hostility has yet to be fully investigated. This issue, however, is front and center at several points in the following chapters. 404 A Hypothetical Scenario of the Emergence of Intractability 430 The dynamical systems framework can be made concrete by means of a hypothetical scenario in which a conflict escalates to intractability. In this scenario, the conflict might start with someone’s thoughts concerning another person that center on incompatibility with that person (however, it could also start top-down, such as when a youth is socialized into a protracted conflict from birth). A structure begins to form as separate (negative) thoughts begin to support each other. This structure grows by assimilating a growing number of other psychological processes and emotions. As a result, judgments of the person become increasingly undifferentiated and unidimensional, organized around incompatibility with the person. Eventually, hostile intentions are likely to be communicated and initiate similar processes in the other person. At this moment, two systems of conflict existing on individual levels reinforce each other and eliminate the possibility for positive interaction. The thoughts, feelings, and behaviors of both people are processed within the structure of conflict. Conflict now exists at the interpersonal level. 431 405 406 407 408 409 410 411 412 413 414 415 416 417 418 419 420 421 422 423 424 425 426 427 428 429 432 433 434 435 436 437 438 439 440 441 442 443 444 114 445 446 447 448 449 450 451 452 453 454 455 456 457 458 459 460 461 462 463 464 465 466 467 468 469 470 471 472 473 474 475 476 477 478 479 480 481 482 483 484 485 486 487 488 489 5 Traps: Intractable Conflict as a Dynamical System As both parties seek support by recruiting other members of their respective groups, the conflict escalates on the social level, where it is sustained by links between the groups and by positive (reinforcing) feedback within each group. The sustainability of the conflict increases because even if the person who was the source of the conflict tries to disassemble the conflict structure, feedback from others in either group will reinstate the conflict. With the growth in intensity of the conflict, hostility and violence become increasingly likely as a result of the mutual feedback. The structure of conflict now permeates individuals, groups, and the whole society, recruiting almost all processes and events and thereby eliminating almost all chances of positive interactions between the opposing groups. At some point, the multitude of feedback loops within and between levels that sustain and support the conflict renders fruitless the attempt to disassemble even large parts of the conflict because the conflict would become reinstated in other parts of the structure. Protracted existence of conflict at the societal level is likely to start shaping the symbol system of those involved in the conflict. Identities are built around incompatibility. The terms used for referencing the outgroup become dehumanizing in nature and preclude positive interactions. In effect, the protracted conflict becomes embedded in the culture of the society. When this happens, the conflict acquires a new means of maintenance and spreading. Anyone adopting the culture is likely to adopt the conflict embedded within it. People who never had contact with the outgroup members are nonetheless unlikely to form sustainable positive or even neutral relationships with the members of the outgroup. In this way, conflict is passed through generations. Referring to intractable conflict as “malignant” (Coleman, 2003) is warranted because the analogy between the two terms is direct. Cancer works by penetrating the structure of the organism and enslaving essential elements of the body, which lose their original functions and begin working in service of the structure of cancer. The collapse of complexity associated with intractable conflict is visible in the same process. The multitude of psychological and social processes necessary for the maintenance of mental structures, religions, and societies become enslaved into the one-dimensional structure of conflict. Their original functions essentially vanish. As the machine of war is established and grows, it encompasses a growing number of social, economic, and political processes, focusing them all in a single issue within the conflict. In such a structure, love, friendship, or even collaboration at work between members of the opposing parties will not be seen in its true nature, but rather as collaboration with the enemy, weakness, or treason. The richness and multidimensionality of all the processes occurring in a healthy society become entrained in the structure, leaving no opportunity for positive interactions. Such structures of intractable conflict can sustain multiple states, such as attack, revenge, temporary truce, and strategic withdrawal, but not co-existence of long-term cooperation. The cost of conflict is not limited to suffering, loss, or deaths in the center of the conflict. Indeed, the most costly long-term consequences are not associated with the direct damage, but rather with the elimination of possibilities of positive events that Research on the Dynamics of Intractable Conflict 115 are necessary to the functioning of any healthy society. Conflicts dramatically diminish the social capital of a society, an effect that inevitably results in a dramatic social and economic decline. Such consequences, however, may not be observable for a considerable period of time. Thus, the ability to diagnose the sustainable states of the society is likely to provide an early measure of the potential long-term damage to the society as well indicate the potential for a peace process. Such diagnosis would also provide a measure of the effectiveness of various intervention attempts before they actually impact the visible states of the conflict, and it would allow one to estimate the damage done by aggravating events before the damage is manifest. From this perspective, the severity of intractable conflict can be characterized with respect to both structure and dynamics. Structurally, we can describe which elements are relevant and how these elements are inter-related. What is the nature of the feedback loops among elements? At what level does the structure of the conflict currently exist? What proportion of psychological and social processes are organized into the structure of conflict? What proportion remains conflict-free? Even in intense conflict, there may be some contexts and issues (e.g., sharing water resources) for which the parties are able to build relations or even find solutions independently of the conflict. The degree to which conflict permeates all psychological and social processes, thereby organizing all judgments and actions in terms of incompatibility, provides a measure of the conflict’s intensity. So while the severity of conflict may be related to the amount of violence between groups, the intractability of conflict may be defined in terms of the elimination of sustainable states of positive interaction. In dynamical terms, an intractable conflict lacks attractors for positive states. The progression, transformation, and de-escalation of intractable conflict can be described in terms of the dynamics of the ensemble of sustainable states for both positive and negative interactions—that is, in terms of the attractor landscape of the system. Attempts at conflict resolution are unlikely to succeed if they do not work toward the achievement of sustainable states. They may result in a temporary ceasefire, but not in long-term co-existence between the opposing parties. If no sustainable states exist, the first step at intervention should be directed to changing the ensemble of sustainable states. Only after such change has occurred can the system be effectively moved to a benign or positive state. Research on the Dynamics of Intractable Conflict The dynamical perspective on intractable conflict is intended to provide integrated understanding of a phenomenon that is highly diverse and seemingly idiosyncratic in its various manifestations. But for this perspective to be useful, it must be heuristic as well, generating new hypotheses that are open to verification. Accordingly, we have developed three lines of research reflecting our multi-disciplinary orientation. The first involves laboratory studies focused on moral conflicts, such as 490 491 492 493 494 495 496 497 498 499 500 501 502 503 504 505 506 507 508 509 510 511 512 513 514 515 516 517 518 519 520 521 522 523 524 525 526 527 528 529 530 116 5 Traps: Intractable Conflict as a Dynamical System 542 those over abortion and the right to take one’s own life, which have a high propensity for escalating and becoming polarized and protracted. These studies provide empirical evidence of the constructive versus destructive effects of highcomplexity versus low-complexity cognitive, emotional, and behavioral dynamics. The second approach is a conceptual model detailing the pervasive spread of negativity that is commonly observed in situations of protracted conflict. This model is illustrated with a qualitative study that examines the contagion effects in the ongoing conflict between Israelis and Palestinians. The third approach involves mathematical modeling and computer visualization of Deutsch’s Crude Law of Social Relations (Deutsch, 1973), which has been identified by scholars as a primary mechanism at the core of escalation, de-escalation, and intractability (Nowak, Deutsch, Bartkowski, & Solomon, 2010). 543 High and Low Complexity Dynamics in Moral Conflicts 544 This research program tests the central proposition of our approach, that intractable conflicts (ones that are destructive, persistent, and resistant to change) evidence attractors that are characterized by low levels of complexity (e.g., fixed-point attractors). Other scholars have found evidence of attractors for difficult social dynamics. Research on marriage and divorce by Gottman (2002) has consistently found that the relational phase-space of couples whose relationships end in divorce tend to be characterized by relatively strong, coherent attractors for negative emotions and weak attractors for positive emotions. Similarly, Losada (1999) has found that the emotional and behavioral attractors of low-functioning business strategy groups are very different from high-functioning groups. High-functioning groups tend to display relatively complex and open patterns of communication that allow for the expression of thoughts, feelings, and actions that are negative as well as positive. In marked contrast, low-functioning groups display patterns of thought, feeling, and action that are both more constrained and more negative in tone and substance. Both lines of research have begun to identify basic parameters that distinguish between attractors leading to more unfavorable and negative social outcomes versus more favorable and positive outcomes. The underlying assumption is that attractors that evidence more complexity and openness in human thinking, feeling, and acting are associated with more favorable social dynamics. The parameters characteristic of higher complexity and openness found in empirical research to date include higher ratios of positivity-to-negativity of emotions (Bales, 1950; Gottman, Markman, & Notarius, 1977), more balance between internally- and externally-focused references in groups (Losada, 1999; Losada & Heaphy, 2004), and greater balance between inquiry acts (questioning) and advocacy acts (positioning) in problem-solving groups (Losada & Heaphy, 2004). To further investigate these dynamics, we developed a laboratory paradigm that allowed us to trace the temporal trajectories of constructive versus destructive 531 532 533 534 535 536 537 538 539 540 541 545 546 547 548 549 550 551 552 553 554 555 556 557 558 559 560 561 562 563 564 565 566 567 568 569 570 571 AU2 Research on the Dynamics of Intractable Conflict 117 discussions over seemingly intractable moral issues (for a description of the study, see Kugler, Coleman, & Fuchs, 2011). We hypothesized that destructive discussions over moral conflicts would be characterized by attractors which evidenced lower levels of complexity, whereas more constructive discussions would evidence more high-complexity patterns. In the context of these studies, complexity refers to the way humans respond to a potentially complex environment (cf. Satish, 1997). It was assumed that most moral conflicts, being inherently nuanced and multi-dimensional, require more complex responses to be managed constructively and effectively. We conducted two studies. In both studies, dyads of previously unacquainted participants were brought together our lab to discuss an issue that held potential for generating an intractable conflict. In particular, the individuals comprising each dyad were matched according to their pre-measured opposing views on a topic such as abortion, euthanasia, or the death penalty, and then were asked to discuss the topic and write a joint position statement. Throughout the course of their interaction, we gathered data about their emotions, cognitions, and behaviors. We hypothesized that conflicts leading to more tractable versus more intractable outcomes would exhibit more complex cognitive, emotional, and behavioral dynamics during the discussion. The concept of complexity was supplemented by the concept of openness to the other party’s concerns, opinions, and emotional experiences. Openness was presumed to be instrumental for gaining a more complex view of the conflict issue and a better understand the other party (e.g., Johnson & Johnson, 2006). In Study 1, we compared dyads that had concluded their discussion with tractable outcomes (those showing a mutual and elaborated joint understanding of the issue) with dyads that had ended with more intractable outcomes (those showing no or an incompatible joint understanding of the issue). The comparison supported the hypothesis that those dyads ending with tractable outcomes exhibited more complex and open dynamics. Highly complex and open dynamics were operationalized by: (1) high levels of integrative complexity (i.e., differentiation and integration of perspectives and information) as well as openness to learning new information from the other party; (2) a high ratio of positive-to-negative emotions (i.e., positive emotions are thought to broaden the momentary action and thought repertoire and are therefore allowing for more complexity, e.g., Fredrickson, 1998, 2001, 2006), as well as a higher level of emotional connectedness (indicating an openness and responsiveness to the other party, e.g., Gottman & Silver, 1999; Gottman, Swanson, & Swanson, 2002); (3) a high pro-social/pro-self ratio (pro-social motivated behaviors are related to approaching conflict situations in more complex categories, Carnevale & Probst, 1998), as well as higher levels of inquiry/advocacy ratios (inquiry exhibits openness to the other parties thinking, e.g. Losada & Heaphy, 2004). Study 2 was identical to Study 1 with one important change: We manipulated the level of integrative complexity of both members of the dyads prior to their discussion (high complexity dyads versus low complexity dyads). High versus low levels of integrative complexity was induced through two different versions of a written 572 573 AU3 574 575 576 577 578 579 580 581 582 583 584 585 586 587 588 589 590 591 592 593 AU4 594 595 596 597 598 599 600 601 602 603 604 605 606 607 AU5 608 AU6 609 610 611 612 613 614 615 616 118 5 Traps: Intractable Conflict as a Dynamical System 643 text on the specific moral issue under discussion (abortion, euthanasia, etc.): one was written according to the standards for high integrative complexity, the other according to the standards for low integrative complexity (cf. Baker-Brown et al., 1992). This manipulation had a significant impact on the conflict dynamics (cognitive, emotional, and behavioral complexity) as well as on the conflict outcomes (tractable vs. intractable). During the discussion, high-complexity dyads showed more complex thinking (higher levels of integrative complexity), and following the discussion dyads showed more complex emotions (higher positivity/negativity ratios), more complex behaviors (higher prosocial/proself ratios), and reached more tractable outcomes (a more elaborated joint position statement) than did the low complexity dyads. However, we did not find the same effects for openness that were observed in the first study. We assume that the manipulation, which deliberately influenced cognitive complexity (integrative complexity), had a stronger and more direct impact on the complexity dynamics than on the openness dynamics. Even though we assume that the level of complexity and openness are connected, their relationship does not seem to be linear or direct: enhancing complexity did not automatically lead to more openness. The two studies offer support for the proposition that constructive conflict processes over potentially intractable issues exhibit more complexity along with more openness in disputants’ experiences and behaviors. Nevertheless, much work remains to be done. First, more research is needed to verify the connection between conflict intractability and attractor dynamics (see Coleman et al., 2007; Vallacher et al., 2010b). How do these differences in conflict dynamics develop in time? How are they maintained once they are manifest? How might the combination of high and low-complexity conditions operate—for example, will dyads tend to move to the lowest or highest common denominator? 644 The Spread of Conflict into Intractability 645 Most conflicts have relatively clear boundaries that delineate what they are and are not about, who they concern and who they don’t, and when and where it is appropriate to engage in the conflict. In situations where conflicts become more intractable, the experience of threat can become so basic and intense that the negative effects of the conflict spread and become increasingly pervasive, affecting many or even all aspects of a person’s or a community’s social and political life (Coleman, 2003; Musallam, Coleman, & Nowak, 2010; Rouhana & Bar-Tal, 1998; Zartman, 2005). The core existential nature of these conflicts can impact everything from policy-making, leadership, education, the arts, and scholarly inquiry down to the most mundane decisions such as whether to shop and eat in particular public places. The totality of such experiences can feel overwhelming. Although hostilities may be most obvious at a particular level (e.g., between groups), intractable conflicts often affect and are affected by elements at multiple 617 618 619 620 621 622 623 624 625 626 627 628 629 630 631 632 633 634 635 636 637 638 639 640 641 642 646 647 648 649 650 651 652 653 654 655 656 657 AU7 Research on the Dynamics of Intractable Conflict 119 levels (from the psychological to the societal or geopolitical). These elements interact in complex ways, leading to increased chaos and confusion. Intractable conflicts also tend to attract more and more parties over time to the dispute. The original disputants then come to operate within a network of other relationships that may or may not be opposed. This can include formal and informal third parties, elites, observers, bystanders, NGOs, business organizations, etc (see Crocker, Hampson, & Aall, 1999; Diamond & McDonald, 1996; Staub, 2001). In Kashmir, for example, relations between the Indian, Pakistani, and Kashmiri leadership are dependent upon, among others, relations between the leaders and their general publics, hawks and doves within both groups, formal and informal representatives, extremist factions on both sides, the media and the public, business communities on all sides, regional neighbors, the Muslim and Hindu worlds, and the international community. In the following account, the dynamical systems perspective is employed to enhance our understanding of how negativity in protracted conflict spreads to previously neutral issues, parties, and structures, and to suggest a need for assessing how this form of contagion occurs in conflicts over time (Musallam et al., 2010). 658 Pervasiveness 675 The destructiveness of long-term geopolitical conflicts is typically assessed by their intensity in quantitative terms, which typically includes one of three sets of criteria: (1) counting the number, types, and magnitude of bombing attacks, battles, fatalities, injuries, population displacement, etc.; (2) assessing their temporal scope or how long they persist, or (3) assessing the direct consequences of conflicts, which entails the examination of the physical and psychological welfare of those caught up in the dynamics of conflict, and the damage to the social, political, economic and educational infrastructure of the society. However, in characterizing intractable conflicts, scholars such as Zartman (2005) have concluded that “intractability is a dynamic, self-reinforcing condition; digging an ever-deepening hole for itself and feeding itself like a vortex” (p. 55). In other words, the longer violent conflicts persist, the more they spread into the central fabric of societies, and therefore the longer they last. Zartman’s observation on the nature of intractability captures the essence of how conflicts become pervasive: “They [conflicts] are not static; they grow, in both degree and nature, extending and defending themselves, so that efforts to overcome them must penetrate several layers and deal with their protective dynamics [. . ..] intractability feeds on intractability and grows with the feeding [. . .] the importance of protraction lies not in its numerical duration but in that duration’s effect (2005, p. 49).” Other scholars have specified particular processes and outcomes related to the pervasive spread of negativity in conflict. For example, Rouhana and Bar-Tal (1998) described several aspects of public life that can become affected by conflict when it is highly central and “total”. They write: 676 659 660 661 662 663 664 665 666 667 668 669 670 671 672 673 674 677 678 679 680 681 682 683 684 685 686 687 688 689 690 691 692 693 694 695 696 697 698 120 5 Traps: Intractable Conflict as a Dynamical System 699 700 701 702 703 704 705 706 707 708 709 When conflicts are total] they penetrate the societal fabric of both parties and force themselves on individuals and institutions. Leaders, publics, and institutions—such as educational and cultural systems—become involved in the conflicts. At some stages of the conflicts, intellectual life and scholarly inquiry become politicized as interest in the other society originates in the motivation to “know your enemy” and inquires become guided by security needs and considerations. . . [centrality] is reflected in the group members’ preoccupation with the conflicts. Thoughts related to the conflict are highly accessible and are relevant to various discussions within each society (Bar-Tal, Raviv, & Freund, 1994). The centrality of such conflicts is further reflected in their saliency on the public agenda. The media and the political and intellectual elites are greatly preoccupied with the conflicts and their developments (p. 762). 710 718 Various conflict scholars have observed that destructive conflicts have a tendency to spread and thereby sustain their negative effects (Coleman, 2000, 2003; Gray, Coleman, & Putnam, 2007; Kriesberg, 2005; Rouhana & Bar-Tal, 1998; Zartman, 2005). Yet despite decades of research dedicated to the study of protracted conflict dynamics (see Azar, 1983, 1990; Burgess & Burgess, 1996; Coleman, 2003, 2004, 2006; Crocker & Hampson, 2004; Crocker, Hampson, & Aall, 2005; Deutsch, 1973; Druckman, 2001; Kelman, 1997; Kriesberg, 2005; Zartman, 1989), to date little is known about the basic mechanisms that account for the spread of conflict, or about the conditions that make it more or less likely to occur. 719 A Dynamical Model of Conflict Pervasiveness 720 For the purposes of this model, conflict pervasiveness is defined as the process through which the “spread of negativity into previously independent states and activities” transpires (Musallam et al., 2010). The spread of negativity is a process in which neutral states that are previously perceived as independent of a conflict begin to be associated with the conflict and contribute to intensifying it or spreading its effects further, instead of maintaining their original neutral states. For instance, in Israel/Palestine, healthcare delivery vehicles such as ambulance were once considered constructive and necessary components of functioning society, until they began to be used to transport weapons, at which point their presence took on a qualitatively different meaning. Conflict pervasiveness is dynamical by nature; it is an evolving set of cognitive, emotional, behavioral, and/or structural elements that grow in number, connectedness, and size over time. It is similar to the spread of a fire through a forest or an epidemic through a community. Therefore, it becomes necessary to adopt a conceptual framework for studying it that can help better understand these evolving, proliferating dynamics. Biological and social models of processes such as epidemiology of diseases and contagion and diffusion of attitudes reveal the utility of using frameworks informed by complexity science, including complex systems theory, network models, and dynamical systems theory. For example, such frameworks have been fruitfully applied to the outbreak of epidemics (Morris, 2004), as well as to processes of increased stereotyping (McClelland, Rumelhart, & Hinton, 1986; Operario & Fiske, 711 712 713 714 715 716 717 721 722 723 724 725 726 727 728 729 730 731 732 733 734 735 736 737 738 739 740 AU8 AU9 AU10 Research on the Dynamics of Intractable Conflict 121 2001) and aggression (Read & Miller, 2002; Read, Vanman, & Miller, 1997; Shoda, Tiernan, & Mischel, 2002). To reiterate, dynamical systems theory concerns the study of complex systems that evolve over time. A dynamical system is defined as a set of elements that change over time as each element adjusts to the myriad influences from the other elements that make up the system. These elements can be thoughts, feelings, and actions at an individual level; people, groups and norms at a social level, or various institutions such as families, the media, religious organizations, schools, etc. at a broader level. Each element can be stimulated and perpetuated along its current path through reinforcing feedback loops between elements, where one element stimulates another along its current trajectory and this element, in turn, stimulates the first—thus making a loop. We see this when a negative act by an outgroup member links to negative memories and feelings from previous encounters and increase a general sense of animosity toward the outgroup and the likelihood that they will perceive future acts as negative. Elements can also obstruct or reverse one another via inhibiting feedback loops where one element constrains another (Coleman et al., 2006). We see this when a sense of guilt or compassion arises within us and buffers our hostile intentions or actions. As noted earlier, feedback loops can operate both within and between levels of a system. For instance, the perception of an outgroup member as “evil” by an ingroup member can be reinforced psychologically by other thoughts and feelings that are consistent with this assessment, as well as socially by other ingroup members that hold and thus reinforce similar beliefs. At a group level, individuals can mutually influence and inform each other via reinforcing feedback in a process that creates increasing attitude homogeneity within subgroups resulting in increased conformity, or they can contradict and inhibit each other (inhibiting feedback) through processes such as criticism and dissent that eventually results in increased heterogeneity of opinion within groups. Thus, the spread of malignancy (or positivity) over time in a conflict can be characterized as an increase in reinforcing feedback loops and a decrease in inhibiting feedback loops between various elements both within and between the psychological, social, and structural levels of a social system. Psychologically, loops become established between various negative conflict-related attitudes or thoughts which link with other negative emotions within an individual and begin to affect cognitions that were previously unrelated to the conflict. Under some conditions, these elements can be transformed, such as when neutral or positive thoughts about another person become consistently negative. Then, the activation of this thought by external stimuli or events will lead to the activation of other linked cognitions, thereby psychologically drawing the individual into the negativity of the conflict. Such negative cognitive-emotional clusters have the capacity to spread beyond the individual psychological level and begin to operate (and create reinforcing loops) through behaviors on the interpersonal and group levels, and ultimately in changes on a structural level. In other words, for any individual, the likelihood that thought A leads to thought B and emotion C is usually guided by linkages and loops 741 742 743 744 745 746 747 748 749 750 751 752 753 754 755 756 757 758 759 760 761 762 763 764 765 766 767 768 769 770 771 772 773 774 775 776 777 778 779 780 781 782 783 784 785 122 786 787 788 789 790 791 792 793 794 795 796 797 798 799 800 801 802 803 804 805 806 807 808 809 810 811 812 813 814 815 816 817 818 819 820 821 822 823 824 825 826 827 828 5 Traps: Intractable Conflict as a Dynamical System among cognitions and feelings available to that individual (Shoda et al., 2002), which can link to their behavioral responses to members of group D and be particularly likely within the context of situation E. What is important to emphasize is that the spread of conflict is not necessarily bottom up (individual to environment) or top down (environment to individual), but rather they can spread in either or both dir[ections and be mutually reinforcing as long as the system lacks sufficient inhibiting feedback loops to mitigate such mutual reinforcement. There is anecdotal evidence supporting the spread and displacement of aggression from one target group into other groups. Wessells (2007) noted that in Angola, a place torn by protracted civil wars, aggression became more and more acceptable as a means of solving community problems, and over time spread to other domains of life including friendships, martial relationships, and work relations. Similarly, Martin-Baro noted that during war, the slaughter of individuals, the disappearance of loved ones, and the constant threat to one’s life all come to be accepted as increasingly normal despite their extreme natures (See Martin-Baro, as citied in Aron & Corne, 1994, Chaps. 6 and 7, pp. 108–135; Comas-Dı́az, Lykes, & Alarcón, 1998). This normalization and spread of violence-related acts has been demonstrated statistically in many conflict areas. Reports such as the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) have consistently reported increased domestic violence against women (UNFPA, 2006), increases in organized and gang-related crimes such as kidnapping children (UNAMI, 2006), and increases in sexual abuse and trafficking in zones of protracted conflict (UNAMI, 2006; UNFPA, 2006). In addition to the spread of aggression, conflicts are usually characterized by contagion or “spillover” of attitudes of intolerance toward outgroups or subgroups that are not part of the ingroup with respect to a particular conflict (Shamir & SagivSchifter, 2006; Sullivan, Shamir, Walsh, & Roberts, 1985). For instance, in conflict zones there are often reports of increased intolerance towards other ethnic and religious minority groups (Shamir & Sagiv-Schifter, 2006), increased political intolerance in comparison to other peaceful societies (Sullivan, Piereson, & Marcus, 1993), and increased intolerance towards gay and lesbian communities (UNAMI, 2006). At a structural level, Rouhana and Bar-Tal (1998) have noted that in areas of intractable conflict, cultural and entertainment institutions such as theater, film, museums, and educational institutions all align together and further polarize societies. For example, educational institutions can fuel conflict by perpetuating societal beliefs and ideologies that instigate conflict (Bar-Tal, 1999) instead of keeping to their original mission of educating the general population (Bar-Tal, 1998; DeCharms & Moeller, 1962; Luke, 1988). This is achieved through the use of biased history and social studies textbooks as well as other curricular and pedagogical tools. In addition, we often observe a transformation in national history museums and art exhibits that propagate the “official” conflict narratives and often constitute collective memories for warring populations (Nets-Zehngut, 2008; Savelsberg & King, 2005). AU11 Research on the Dynamics of Intractable Conflict 123 An Exploratory Study on Pervasiveness 829 In 2009, an exploratory study was conducted in Israel-Palestine to investigate the phenomenon of conflict pervasiveness, with the goal of identifying its basic dimensions (Musallam et al., 2010). For the purposes of this study, conflict pervasiveness was defined for participants as the range of issues and social processes that are organized into the structure of the conflict versus those that are “conflict free”. The primary aim of the study was to try to distinguish those elements of day-to-day life in this setting that, at any given time, serve to drive the conflict (move people toward anger or aggression against outgroups) versus those that were perceived to be irrelevant to the conflict, or those elements that served to constrain the conflict (move people toward a sense of empathy or compassion with outgroups). At the beginning of the study, participants were asked to think about a typical day in their-life and to list those activities that were “related to the conflict” and those that were “conflict free”. Both Israelis and Palestinians found the task to be extremely challenging. For example, one of the Israeli participants argued: “When you grow up in a conflict, conflict is your reality, that is life, that is the way things are. It is so difficult for me to distinguish what is related and what is not related to the conflict”. This experience was shared by others and illustrates how “conflict saturated” both Israeli and Palestinian societies are. When participants were presented with the statement: “As the situation deteriorates and persists, more and more aspects of peoples’ daily life become affected by it and serve to trigger or perpetuate a sense of anger/resentment/contempt”, they all agreed strongly with it. All participants expressed strong emotional experiences that included a sense of helplessness, insecurity, hopelessness, frustration, anxiety, fear, and anger. For example, a sense of insecurity by Israeli participants reinforced the need to use violence against the Palestinians, whereas anger and hopelessness expressed by Palestinian participants supported the use of violent tactics against Israelis. In addition, some participants noted that as things escalated in their communities, the degree to which they participated in certain activities changed. For example, the number of times they checked news updates and the number of phone calls they made during particular days changed as a function of conflict escalation. As one of the participants put it “It is not only about what you do, but how often you do certain things and for how long they last”. Finally, both Israeli and Palestinian interviewees indicated that the degree to which they were affected by the conflict depended to a large extent on their relative physical proximity to high/low conflict intensity locations. Those residing closer to places where violence occurred experienced a much broader sense of contagion than those who lived in relatively more peaceful locations. However, Israelis viewed conflict pervasiveness as something that was more related to specific periods and incidents (e.g., when bombing attacks occurred), whereas Palestinians perceived conflict pervasiveness more consistently in their every-day experiences. In addition, for Israelis, “conflict pervasiveness” was associated mostly with 830 831 832 833 834 835 836 837 838 839 840 841 842 843 844 845 846 847 848 849 850 851 852 853 854 855 856 857 858 859 860 861 862 863 864 865 866 867 868 869 870 871 124 5 Traps: Intractable Conflict as a Dynamical System 890 psychological dimensions (e.g., decision making processes), whereas for Palestinians, conflict pervasiveness was associated with more tangible, mundane matters (e.g., the ability to go to a hospital, a store, etc.). This exploratory study revealed several important points. First, it provided some preliminary empirical support of the subjective experience of the phenomenon of pervasiveness. Second, it highlighted the difficulty experienced by participants in distinguishing between what is related and what is unrelated to conflict in situations of protracted ethnopolitical conflict. Third, it pointed to the qualitative differences in experiences expressed by distinct populations. Finally, it highlighted the importance of understanding the various interrelated aspects of conflict pervasiveness, which include behavioral, cognitive, and affective components. Although substantial amount of work has been dedicated to the development of measures for the assessment of conflict intensity, duration, and the many consequences of conflict intractability, to date no measures have been developed to assess their degree of pervasiveness. Developing such measures could have important implications for assessing long-term damage in conflict, diagnosing fragile and ripe peace processes (Coleman, 2000; Zartman, 1986, 2000, 2003), and assessing the effectiveness of interventions before applying them within conflicted societies (Coleman, 2006). 891 A Dynamical-Minimal Model of the Crude Law of Social Relations 892 900 Deutsch’s Crude Law of Social Relations (1973) is a simple theoretical generalization of the results of a research program concerning the conditions that promote cooperation versus competition and the consequences of cooperating versus competing. It is based on the observation from empirical studies that the consequences of cooperation and competition are strikingly similar to their causes. In particular, the Crude Law states that “the characteristic processes and effects elicited by a given type of social relationship (e.g., cooperative or competitive) tend also to elicit that type of social relationship; and a typical effect of any type of relationship tends to induce the other typical effects of the relationship”. 901 Basic Features of the Model 902 Following the approach of dynamical minimalism (Nowak, 2004), we attempted to model the Crude Law mathematically using the simplest possible assumptions (Nowak et al., 2010). We adopted a generic formalism of growth—the Alphabet Model (Nowak & Solomon, 2006)—which is an elaboration of the AB model of Solomon and his collaborators (Shnerb, Louzoun, Bettelheim, & Solomon, 2000). The model concentrates on the development of protracted conflict across time. Following the main factors constituting Crude Law dynamics as outlined by Deutsch (1973), the model is based on three types of elements: 872 873 874 875 876 877 878 879 880 881 882 883 884 885 886 887 888 889 893 894 895 896 897 898 899 903 904 905 906 907 908 909 Research on the Dynamics of Intractable Conflict 125 • Competitive interdependence: The extent to which the interests of parties are incompatible. • Competitive behaviors: The momentary behaviors of individuals to move against each other in order to obstruct the one another’s goal achievement. • Competitive orientations: The attitudes underlying competition. Such orientations have many components, such as low trust or negative perceptions of others. Orientations evolve on a slower time scale than do behaviors. 910 Computer Simulations of the Model 917 In our computational model, a 25  25 square grid represents the space where the conflict interactions occur. In the beginning of the simulation, a random number of competitive behaviors are assigned for each cell of the grid. Five cells (marked by the white dots in Fig. 5.2a) are randomly chosen as the places where competitive interdependence (e.g., competition over scarce resources such as water) exist. To model the progression of a conflict into intractability, the simulation starts with no elements containing competitive orientations. The starting configuration is shown in Fig. 5.2a. The simulations are based on a few simple rules that operate locally (i.e., within a single cell). All the rules represent control parameters of the model and are applied with a specific probability, which can be adjusted. Thus, with a specific probability: 918 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 911 912 913 914 915 916 919 920 921 922 923 924 925 926 927 928 929 Competitive behaviors elicit new competitive behaviors. Competitive behaviors decay with a certain rate. Competitive behaviors migrate to nearby locations. Competitive behaviors produce competitive orientations. The probability of competitive behaviors producing new competitive behaviors grows with the local (same cell) presence of elements of competitive interdependence and also elements of competitive orientations. 6. With some small probability, each negative behavior migrates to a randomly chosen neighboring cell. Competitive behaviors thus diffuse from their place of origin. 930 Thus, in the presence of competitive interdependence, competitive behaviors reproduce competitive behaviors in kind and also help foster competitive orientations, which evolve at a slower rate. Competitive orientations also facilitate the multiplication of competitive behaviors. Each process thus produces conditions facilitating its occurrence at the place where the conditions are met—a process that captures the essence of the Crude Law. The initial configuration (Fig. 5.2a), which is maintained in the early stages of the simulation (Fig. 5.2b), shows the initial random distribution of competitive interdependence and competitive behaviors. The height and color intensity of a box correspond to the number of competitive behaviors, with higher and darker colored 940 931 932 933 934 935 936 937 938 939 941 942 943 944 945 946 947 948 949 AU12 126 5 Traps: Intractable Conflict as a Dynamical System Fig. 5.2 (a–d) XXX 950 951 952 953 954 955 956 957 958 959 960 961 962 963 964 965 966 967 968 969 970 971 972 973 974 975 cells representing greater competition. As noted above, the small white dots correspond to the locations of competitive interdependence, or competing goals. The initial dynamic is dominated by the decrease in the number of competitive behaviors. In the cells with no competitive interdependence, competitive behaviors vanish at a higher rate than such behaviors are produced. However, in the locations where structures of competitive interdependence are present, the number of negative behaviors grows as each competitive behavior produces another element of competitive behavior with a high probability. Because each competitive behavior most likely produces other competitive behaviors, the growth of competitive behaviors in the cells where structures of competitive interdependence exists is exponential. The number of competitive behaviors in the locations of competitive interdependence increases dramatically over time where there exists a longer history of interaction. Because the number of locations where the growth of conflict occurs is low, a general decrease in competitive behaviors can be observed. Because of the exponential growth of competitive behaviors, after some time there is a global increase in competitive behaviors in the locations with high competitive interdependence (Fig. 5.2c). Due to the high number of competitive behaviors in the cells with competitive interdependence, competitive social orientations are eventually produced in these locations (Fig. 5.2d). Thus, islands of more destructive conflict characterized by competitive interdependence, behaviors, and orientations are established around these cells. Figure 5.2c shows the formation of pools of destructive conflict. Figure 5.2d illustrates creation of competitive social orientations, which are marked by the dark dots. Note the high concentration of negative orientations in the lower left and upper right corner of Fig. 5.2d. The elements of competitive orientations were created in the locations where competitive interdependence existed. They were AU13 Research on the Dynamics of Intractable Conflict 127 created by the high incidence of competitive behaviors, rather than directly by the competitive interdependence. 976 Reinstatement of Conflict 978 To simulate the effects of attempts at conflict resolution, in the next round of simulations the competitive behaviors were reset to the initial random configuration and the elements of competitive interdependence were eliminated. The final configuration of the previous simulation (Fig. 5.2d) was used as input. From a rational perspective, there is little reason for the conflict to exist any longer. The competitive orientations, however, were left intact. Figure 5.3a portrays the reinstatement of conflict in the area of high concentration of competitive orientations. The final simulation was run for several steps. Figure 5.3b portrays the final configuration. Note the high concentration of competitive orientations in the lower left corner. Negative orientations act as a social memory of past conflict. The conflict is reinstated only in one of the original areas where the concentration of the competitive orientations was the highest. Through a reinforcing feedback loop, competitive behaviors produce more elements of competitive orientations. At this location, the conflict is self-sustaining and growing at an accelerated rate. However, in other areas where the conflict had existed previously, it was not reinstated. This is because the intensity of negative orientations elsewhere was not sufficient to sustain the process of competitive behavior growth. The temporal evolution of the conflict, the intervention, and the reinstatement of the conflict are portrayed in Fig. 5.4 below. As we can see, the existence of competitive social orientations results in the conflict being reinstated almost immediately. Although the conflict was recreated in only one location, because of the fast exponential growth it takes only five simulation steps to reinstate a high level of competitive behaviors. The results highlight two factors that are critical to escalation of conflicts: the duration of a conflict and the local severity of competitive interdependence. Simply put, a conflict will escalate the most if competitive interdependence exists in the same location and continues for a long time. If, however, the same amount of competitive interdependence ceases to exist in one place, and after a short time reappears in another, the severity of conflicts in a society will be much smaller. This is because in each location a conflict does not have enough time to change psychological orientations in a significant way, so it is less likely to escalate to intractability. Thus, the model illustrates how conflicts tend to be recreated in places where they once existed, even after a long period of being dormant and even if competitive interdependence no longer exists. In other words, hostilities committed in a conflict create competitive orientations that reinstate the conflict in the same place. This scenario suggests that the timing of intervention is critical for transforming conflicts. In the earlier stages of a conflict, intervention needs to be focused on competitive behaviors in the few places with conflicts of interest. In later stages, 979 977 980 981 982 983 984 985 986 987 988 989 990 991 992 993 994 995 996 997 998 999 1000 1001 1002 1003 1004 1005 1006 1007 1008 1009 1010 1011 1012 1013 1014 1015 1016 1017 128 5 Traps: Intractable Conflict as a Dynamical System Fig. 5.3 (a, b) The initial and final configuration of the competitive orientations and competitive behaviors Reinstatement of Conflict 120 9000000 8000000 100 80 6000000 5000000 60 4000000 40 3000000 Orientations Behaviors and 7000000 Behaviors Orientations 2000000 20 1000000 0 0 1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31 33 35 37 39 41 43 45 47 49 Time Fig. 5.4 Time course of the creation and reinstatement of the conflict resolution of the conflict of interest still may be effective, although the conflict may have become global for the society and the levels of hostility are likely to be high. 1020 After some time, enough competitive orientations are created to sustain the conflict 1021 even in the absence of any conflict of interests. When the conflict becomes self1022 sustaining, it acquires the features of intractability. 1018 1019 1023 Coping and Survival in Open Versus Closed Systems From a dynamical systems perspective, it is important to distinguish between closed and open systems. In closed systems, dynamics depend entirely on the current state 1026 of the system (i.e., the current values of variables in the system) and are not 1027 influenced by input from the external environment. They may display emergent 1028 properties, but this tendency reflects only the self-organization of intrinsic dynam1029 ics without sensitivity to external factors that might promote the emergence of 1030 different properties. Open systems, in contrast, display dynamics that are respon1031 sive to environmental influences. Self-organization occurs in such systems, but 1032 some products of self-organization are better suited to environmental demands and 1033 are selected at the expense of less well-suited products of self-organization. 1024 1025 Coping and Survival in Open Versus Closed Systems 129 Not surprisingly, open systems have far greater capacity to cope and survive, particularly in a changing external environment. The notion of complex adaptive systems (e.g., Holland, 1975, 1995), for example, refers to the capacity of systems to change their own structures and functions in order to adapt to environmental factors. This is easy to appreciate in biological systems, which must be able to capitalize on opportunities such as the availability of food and the presence versus absence of predators. A plant that did not grow in the direction of sunlight, for example, would be at a severe disadvantage in the struggle for survival. Within the lifetime of a single organism, learning is the most efficient mechanism for adaptation. At the species level, evolution—based on mutation and natural selection— provides a mechanism for adaptation on a longer time scale that improves the fitness of successive generations of organisms. In short, systems that are closed cannot adapt and lose their fitness. Eventually, they are unable to cope and survive as the external environment changes. The distinction between closed and open adaptive systems has important consequences for understanding intractable conflicts. Social groups, organizations, and societies that adapt to environmental influences have a clear advantage in coping and survival. In contrast, social systems that are inflexible in response to changing conditions are at risk for dysfunctional behavior and even extinction. The dynamical tendencies associated with intractable conflict capture the nature of closed systems. Indeed, the development of intractability may be described as the closing up of a previously open and adaptive system. Once the dynamics of a system are captured by a strong attractor, environmental events essentially represent perturbations that are actively resisted so as to maintain the system’s coherent state (i.e., pattern of thoughts, feelings, and action tendencies). Thus, a social relation characterized by intractable conflict is composed of two (or more) parties—whether individuals, groups, or nations—that react towards one another with suspicion and hostility, even if such reactions are unwarranted, counterproductive, and maladaptive. Outside interventions, too, tend to be resisted in such systems, despite the long-term self-interest that may be associated with such interventions. Even after the issues that initially triggered the conflict have been resolved (or are no longer relevant), the parties to an intractable conflict remain intransient in their beliefs, emotions, and action orientations. Intractable conflicts impair the capacity for coping and survival in other ways as well. As the conflict escalates and self-organizes into a stable attractor landscape, it enslaves an increasing number of psychological and social processes. Thus, many processes that usually serve basic needs of individuals and social groups lose their original functionality as they acquire new functionality of bringing harm to the opponent. As the system loses the functions necessary to fulfill its basic needs, it loses the capacity for coping and survival. This process is tantamount to the loss of complexity in system dynamics. Prior to the emergence of deep attractors for conflict, individuals and groups have rich, multidimensional dynamics enabling the achievement of various goals and the fulfillment of various functions. When the social relation devolves into a system of conflict, however, it absorbs other, 1034 1035 1036 1037 1038 1039 1040 1041 1042 1043 1044 1045 1046 1047 1048 1049 1050 1051 1052 1053 1054 1055 1056 1057 1058 1059 1060 1061 1062 1063 1064 1065 1066 1067 1068 1069 1070 1071 1072 1073 1074 1075 1076 1077 130 5 Traps: Intractable Conflict as a Dynamical System previously functional processes, so that the dynamics of each party become organized along a single dimension of antagonism toward the other party. 1080 This scenario can be seen at different levels of social reality. Consider marital 1081 conflict, for example. A married couple originally experiences rich dynamics 1082 organized along many dimensions, such as providing material support, caring for 1083 their children, organizing entertainment, cleaning their house, planning vacations, 1084 planning shopping, and organizing their social life. If a conflict develops that 1085 progresses toward intractability, however, these functions lose their independence 1086 and come to fuel rather than diffuse the conflict. Decisions concerning the children, 1087 for instance, may be governed by the desire to limit contact with the other parent 1088 rather than dictated by the child’s needs. When planning entertainment, meanwhile, 1089 the motive may be to limit the pleasures of the partner rather than to spend 1090 enjoyable time together. And cleaning the house may become an occasion to 1091 blame the partner for the mess and assigning motives and personality traits that 1092 justify the judgment. As an increasing number of activities become transformed and 1093 aimed at harming the partner, the original function of these activities are lost. As a 1094 result, the capacity of the couple to cope with the flux of life is likely to be 1095 dramatically reduced. 1096 International conflict that devolves into intractability can be seen in the same 1097 light. The large losses experience by warring nations to a large extent reflect a loss 1098 of functionality in each nation’s social processes and institutions. As a conflict 1099 escalates and becomes intractable, the scope of social processes and institutions 1100 relevant to the conflict increases. The educational system, for example, becomes a 1101 system of propaganda rather than one of teaching children. The priority of trans1102 portation changes from the delivery or food and supplies to the movement of 1103 soldiers and weapons. The function of the justice system changes from enforcing 1104 laws to prosecuting (and persecuting) enemies in the outgroup and members of the 1105 ingroup who are suspected of supporting the outgroup enemies. The main function 1106 of the economic system is altered to finance the machinery of war, rather than to 1107 provide the material well being of the society. As these different institutions and 1108 processes acquire new (dis)functionality related to conflict, they lose their original 1109 purpose and thus the society becomes less able to fulfill the needs of its citizens. In 1110 general, all social functions suffer as a society loses its ability to cope with the 1111 variety of social and economic challenges it faces. 1112 Yet another maladaptive consequence of intractable conflict concerns the tem1113 poral focus of the parties to the conflict. Effective adaptation requires that systems 1114 react to present events in the current state of their environment. When locked in 1115 intractable conflict, however, the parties tend often to focus on the past (e.g., past 1116 injustices and grievances, seminal events that are memoralized, the history of the 1117 relationship) rather than on the needs of the present. Fixation on the past decouples 1118 the system from its focus on the present, so that the respective parties react to events 1119 that are no longer current and cannot be changed. And when the parties fixate on the 1120 past, they are likely to ignore signals that the opposing party is ready for reconcili1121 ation, and may misinterpret peaceful overtures. This clearly limits the prospect for 1122 conflict transformation. Politicians during times of conflict often exploit the 1078 1079 References 131 tendency to fixate on the past so as to prevent reconciliation that may not serve their personal ambitions and interests. Playing on people’s fears and hatred is a good way to secure and maintain power in a time of crisis and strained international relations. So, What Can Be Done? 1123 1124 1125 1126 In our account, intractable conflict has all the hallmarks of a system that has become self-organized with respect to a strong attractor that provides a coherent way of thinking, feeling, and acting. As is the case for any dynamical system, once a deep attractor for conflict emerges in a social system, it is highly resistant to change. Rather than accommodating to new information and being sensitive to changing challenges and demands, a social system governed by a strong attractor reacts to such influences as if they were perturbations that threaten the system’s integrity. A host of cognitive and social mechanisms are employed to deflect or reinterpret such perturbations, rendering the system incapable of responding appropriately and rationally to changing circumstances or even acting in its own best long-term interests. A relationship mired in intractable conflict is inflexible and closed— hardly the characteristics of an adaptive system. The dynamical scenario of intractable conflict seems gloomy, if not hopeless. How can one possibly transform a system that has lost its complexity and openness to change, and whose sole motive is the preservation of a fixed way of seeing the world? Actually, this is far from the end of the story. Indeed, although it may seem ironic, the strategies that may prove effective in transforming intractable conflict follow from the principles of dynamical systems theory and research. 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AU2 The citation “Gottman et al. (2002) ” (original) has been changed to “Gottman (2002)”. Please check if appropriate. AU3 The citation “Coleman, Kugler, & Fuchs, 2011” (original) has been changed to “Kugler, Coleman & Fuchs 2011”. Please check if appropriate. AU4 The citation “Johnson et al., 2006” (original) has been changed to “Johnson and Johnson 2006”. Please check if appropriate. AU5 The citation “Gottman et al., 1999” (original) has been changed to “Gottman and Silver 1999”. Please check if appropriate. AU6 Please note that reference "Gottman, Swanson, & Swanson, 2002b" has been changed to "Gottman, Swanson, & Swanson, 2002". AU7 Please note that reference "Vallacher et al. (2010b)" is cited in the text but not provided in the list AU8 In this sentence “When conflicts are total]”opening parenthesis is missing here. Please check. AU9 The citation “Crocker, Hampson, & Aall, 2004” (original) has been changed to “Crocker & Hampson 2004”. Please check if appropriate. AU10 Please note that reference "Morris (2004)" is cited in the text but not provided in the list AU11 Please note that Bar-Tal (1999) is cited in the text but not provided in the list Author’s response AU12 Note that the second occurrence of “Figs. 5.1a–d, have been renumbered as Fig. 5.2a–d and Fig. 5.2a,b and Fig. 5.3 have been renumbered as Fig. 5.3a,b and Fig. 5.4 both in the text and in the legend. Please check. AU13 Please provide caption for “Fig. 5.2.” AU14 Please note that reference “Latané, Nowak, and Liu (1994)” is not cited in the text but provided in the list.