Behavioural Brain Research 251 (2013) 176–187
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Behavioural Brain Research
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/bbr
Emotions and voluntary action: What link in children with autism?
S. Vernazza-Martin a,∗ , S. Longuet b , J.M. Chamot a , M.J. Orève c
a
Centre de Recherche sur le Sport et le Mouvement EA 2931, UFR STAPS, Université Paris Ouest Nanterre La Défense, 92000, France
Ecole supérieure de biomécanique appliquée à l’ostéopathie, Osteobio, 94230 Cachan, France
c
Unité d’accueil 4047 Etudes cliniques et innovations thérapeutiques en psychiatrie, Université Versailles Saint Quentin, Centre Hospitalier de Versailles,
177 rue de Versailles, 78157 Le Chesnay Cedex, France
b
h i g h l i g h t s
•
•
•
•
•
The organization of voluntary movement involves cognitive and automatic processes.
This organization depends on the emotion conferred to the goal of the action.
A positive emotional valence promotes the cognitive processes in autism.
An aversive emotional valence blocks or disturbs it.
No emotions effect is observed on the automatic processes.
a r t i c l e
i n f o
Article history:
Received 20 November 2012
Received in revised form 23 May 2013
Accepted 25 May 2013
Available online 3 June 2013
Keywords:
Emotions
Cognitive processes
Automatic processes
Children with autism
Goal directed locomotion
a b s t r a c t
This research focuses on the impact of emotions – defined as “motivational states” – on the organization of goal directed locomotion in children with autism. Walking toward a goal involves both cognitive
processes responsible for movement planning and automatic processes linked to movement programming. To these processes, motivation leading to achieving the goal is added. For some authors, a deficit
of planning and/or programming processes is highlighted in autism. Others stand for some impairment
of the emotional system. The aim of this research is to link these two viewpoints and to determine if, in
children with autism, the organization of locomotion is affected by a positive/aversive emotion conferred
to an object to fetch. Twenty-nine children participated in the study (11 children with autism – mean age
122 months; 9 mental age-matched controls – mean age 36 months; and 9 chronological age-matched
controls – mean age 122 months). They were instructed to go and get a positive or aversive emotional
valence object located straight ahead, at 30◦ to the right or straight ahead then moved at mid-distance to
the right. Gait analysis was performed using the Vicon system. The main results suggest that a positive
emotional context promotes the cognitive processes involved in movement planning while an aversive
emotional context blocks it or disturbs it in children with autism. No emotions effect is observed on
movement programming. It is suggested that emotions triggered off and modulated movement planning
and that the deficit observed was related to a developmental impairment rather than to a developmental
delay.
© 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
The human emotional nature is complex and this probably
explains the many theories which have been elaborated so far to
try and define the emotions in their behavioral, physiological or
∗ Corresponding author at: Université Paris Ouest Nanterre La Défense, UFR STAPS,
Bât S. 200 av de la République, 92000 Nanterre, France. Tel.: +33 06 32 23 76 13.
E-mail addresses:
[email protected] (S. Vernazza-Martin),
[email protected] (S. Longuet),
[email protected]
(J.M. Chamot),
[email protected] (M.J. Orève).
0166-4328/$ – see front matter © 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.bbr.2013.05.049
cognitive and subjective components without consensus on general definition of the term “emotion” [1–4]. It is then crucial to
define what we understand by “emotions”. According to Frijda,
emotions would correspond to “motivational states”; motivation
being responsible for the release, the maintenance and the cessation of an intended behavior as well as the appetitive or aversive
value conferred on the goal of the action and/or to the elements
of the environment on which this behavior is exerted [5]. Within
this framework, the affectivo-motivational models of the behavior
indicate that these motivational states induce the approach of positive experiences and the avoidance of aversive experiences [6–8].
In this way, goal directed locomotion is a particularly interesting
S. Vernazza-Martin et al. / Behavioural Brain Research 251 (2013) 176–187
movement because it is the primary motor behavior used by many
living beings. Thus they interact with the environment by moving
their whole body in order to either reach a precise point of space
or, on the contrary, avoid it.
Goal directed locomotion and more generally voluntary movements are organized by the central nervous system in three
hierarchical steps [9–11]. The first one is movement planning. It
corresponds to cognitive processes allowing the emergence of the
act intent, the identification of the goal of the task, the decisionmaking leading to action. Moreover according to Bernstein [12]
there would exist, at higher levels of the nervous system, a “higher
engram” which would be strongly geometrical and which would
represent a very abstract motor image of space (topological and
not metric coding). Cognitive processes are therefore involved in
the representation of an abstract movement trajectory linked to an
estimate of the spatial and postural contexts on the environment
and body states. Then the second step corresponds to movement
programming. It involves automatic processes corresponding to
the motor programs. Not only do they include the movement
parameters (amplitude, duration, velocity) but also the kinematic
strategies controlling balance throughout the movement, i.e. the
balance strategies without which a movement becomes ineffective. They also include the muscles involved both in movement and
balance control. These programs profit from automatic regulations
conferring on their execution a limited flexibility of expression
according to the circumstances and the risks of the environmental
conditions. The whole of the genetically wired programs constitutes the basic repertoire available to organize motor behaviors.
Movement programming is itself dependent on the movement
planning of the higher level which selects, triggers and modulates
the motor programs. It can be considered as an interface between
movement planning and the third step: movement execution. Thus,
the goal oriented movement execution is the objective result of the
two previous steps.
The effect of emotions on the initiation of gait or during walking is beginning to be studied in the healthy adult. Indeed Stins
and Beek [13] show that this effect is especially impacted by negative emotions, thus unpleasant images caused an initial “freezing”
response and a tendency to move away from the stimuli during
whole-body movements such as voluntary stepping. On another
side a study of gait initiation toward pleasant or unpleasant images
showed that negative pictures viewing increased reaction time
(delay between the beginning of picture viewing and the beginning of the dynamic phenomena on the anteroposterior axis) and
decreased the amplitude of the early postural component associated to gait initiation. This was done without a modification of the
length of the first step [14]. Lastly, Naugle et al. [15] showed that
pollution or mutilation pictures viewing during launched locomotion led to a decrease of length and velocity of the first two steps.
Nevertheless, if these studies give us very useful information about
the effect of emotions on the initiation and/or execution of a voluntary movement, the emotional value conferred on the goal of this
action remains unclear. In fact, in daily life, voluntary movements
can be defined as movements which answer the intent linked to
the motivation to realize a goal oriented task in a specific context
[16]. Initiating a gait or walking toward a picture only corresponds
to answering the order to walk toward it, whatever its emotional
load. It is different from the realization of a goal directed locomotion
which depends on the motivation at the origin of the movement.
This motivation depends on the positive or negative emotional
value conferred on the goal of this action; “Emotion feelings constitute the primary motivational component of mental operations
and overt behaviour” [4].
But what is happening when the movement organization and
the emotional system are impaired the way it is in autism? Indeed,
autism is classically defined as a disorder characterized by a triad of
177
impairments including social difficulties, communication trouble
and restricted interests together with repetitive behavior (American Psychiatric Association, 2000). But some authors highlight a
deficit of the executive functions including the whole cognitive
processes allowing the control and the execution of finalized activities [17–20] and then movement planning [21,22]. Others point
the impairments of the movement itself, assuming a disturbance
of the automatic processes linked to a deficient movement programming [22–27]. Others still stand for an impairment of the
emotional system. Indeed, children with autism are able to feel
the four basic emotions (fear, anger, enjoyment and sadness), to
establish links between them and to identify different valence
emotions. However, they should be more sensitive to an aversive stimulus. They badly identify their own emotions and feel
more often aversive emotions than the children of the same age
[28–33]. Moreover, the children with autism have difficulties not
only as far as the perception of social-emotional signals is concerned but also with regards to the regulation of their behavior
in response to these signals [34,35]. This impairment of the emotional system allows an inability to interact in an emotional way
with other people and it would be an original cause of autism
[36,37].
If these three components of the voluntary movement organization: emotions, cognitive and automatic processes are clearly
impaired in autism, their link has never been studied. Yet,
determining if cognitive and/or automatic processes are directly
impaired in autism or if their impairment is the result of an
impaired emotional system, seems to be fundamental not only for
the diagnosis but for the therapy too. In a recent study, we showed
that planning was mainly disturbed in an emotionally negative
situation when children with autism were walking in a straight
line to retrieve a positive or aversive emotional valence object.
Movement programming was consequently impaired. Then, this
finding suggests that cognitive and/or automatic processes are not
directly impaired in autism since they are preserved in an emotionally positive situation [38]. But up to now, it only concerns a
motion toward an object located opposite the children. What is
happening if the object is not located in front of them or is being
shifted while they walk? Thus, the present study emphasizes the
link between emotional system and movement planning by analyzing the effect of a positive emotion or an aversive one conferred
to an object to fetch, object located in three different positions in
space. Each position would induce a particular locomotor trajectory, while the goal of the task remains unchanged (fetching the
object). The first corresponds to an object located opposite the
children inducing a straight line trajectory (control condition). The
second corresponds to an object located sideways inducing, from
scratch, a deflected trajectory with respect to the straight line. The
last corresponds to an object shifted while walking inducing a reorganization of movement planning in the midst of the action in
order to determine the new trajectory with respect to the moved
object.
2. Methods
This research was the subject of a collaboration between researchers in neurosciences and psychology of the laboratory “Research Centre on Sports and
Movements” of the University Paris Ouest Nanterre La Défense and some practitioners of the hospital complex Théophile Roussel, supervised by Dr. Orève, in
Montesson, France.
2.1. Participants
Eleven children with autism (mean age: 119 months, range 78–158
months) were recruited at the Hospital Complex Théophile Roussel for this
experiment. They were selected by an experienced clinician (Hospital MD,
specialized in psychiatry), according to the criteria of ICD-10 and evaluated
by the Childhood Autism Rating Scale: CARS [39]. Total CARS scores range
from 15 to 60, with a minimum score of 30 serving as the cutoff for a
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S. Vernazza-Martin et al. / Behavioural Brain Research 251 (2013) 176–187
diagnosis of autism. So, only children with a total score higher than 30 were selected
in our study (CARS average: 41.8 ± 9). The “Psycho-Educative Profile”: PEP-R [40]
was used to determine mental age. The mean development age of the selected children was 36 ± 19 months. Children with Rett syndrome, Asperger syndrome, and
disintegrative disorders of childhood were excluded. We also recruited eighteen
normally developing children from the local community as controls and divided
them into two groups: a chronological age-matched group (CA-matched: 9 children,
mean age: 116 months, range 81–151 months) and a mental age-matched group
(MA-matched: 9 children, mean age 36 months, range 17–81 months). All children
participated in the study with their parents’ consent, according to the declaration
of Helsinki and the approval of the Ethical Committee.
2.2. Materials and procedure
Because of the specific problems which can be encountered during an experiment at a pedopsychiatric center, the experiment was divided into two steps. The
children with autism were recorded in the psychomotricity room in the Unit Misès C
within the hospital complex Théophile Roussel. Known by all the children, this room
allowed preserving a familiar environment. For practical questions, the experiment
was made during 15 consecutive days. Each child with autism was accompanied
by his “referent”, the specialized educator who was responsible for the child in the
hospital. With regard to control children, the absolute experiment replica took place
in the university laboratory. The children were accompanied by their parents. In the
psychomotricity room as well as in the laboratory, all objects or materials that could
have distracted children were removed and the curtains were closed.
Participants, individually tested, were instructed to go and get a positive or aversive emotional valence object on a desk 5 m away from themselves in three direction
conditions: first, the object was located straight ahead, second, it was positioned at
an angle of 30◦ to the right (condition: “30◦ ”) and third, the object was initially
placed straight ahead then, when the child reached a middle distance mark on the
ground, it was shifted by an experimenter located behind the desk. This shift meant
it was moved from 49◦ to the right in order to put it in the same position as the
“30◦ ” condition (condition: “moving”) (Fig. 1A). In order to homogenize the experimental conditions and not to disturb the children when the object was shifted, the
experimenter stood behind the desk on all trials.
The starting position of the locomotion was indicated by a cross. The oral instruction “go and get the object” was given to the child by an unknown experimenter so
as not to interfere with the motivation experiment.
The two objects were determined for each child by the children themselves and
their “referents” or their parents thanks to the Andrews and Whitney’s scale [41]
(Fig. 1C). This allows determined the emotional valence conferred to the object as
positive versus aversive. Unfortunately the arousal of the emotional valence conferred to the object was not taken into account due to an inability for the studied
children with autism to evaluate this aspect.
Fig. 1. (A) Experimental setup. The crosses on the desk represent the two possible object locations: straight ahead and from 30◦ to the right. With respect to the initial
position (cross between the feet), three theoretical trajectories are studied: straight ahead, deflected from 30◦ to the right with respect to the straight ahead and straight
ahead then moved at middle distance (dotted line) from 49◦ to the right in order to locate the object in the same position as the “30◦ ” condition. (B) Body reconstruction
from the markers location on the body. (C) Simplified scale with three faces from Andrews and Whitney. Children had to point out the face corresponding to their feelings
in the presence of the selected object. The chosen object was located completely to the left for aversive object or completely to the right for positive objects.
S. Vernazza-Martin et al. / Behavioural Brain Research 251 (2013) 176–187
60
30
18
60
30
18
4M–5F
1–5
6–7
8–9
Mean ± sd
CA-matched
MA-matched
36 ± 20
116 ± 23
5M–6F
Mean ± sd
Children with autism
M: male; F: female.
A significant difference between the realized and successful trials (Z test) is observed in children with autism only when the emotional valence conferred to the object is aversive (Z = 2.04, p < 0.05).
30
15
9
30
15
9
30
15
9
30
15
9
10
5
3
10
5
3
10
5
3
10
5
3
10
5
3
10
5
3
10
5
3
10
5
3
10
5
3
10
5
3
10
5
3
10
5
3
60
60
30
30
30
30
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
30
0
1
30
15
0
14
3
15
1
15
30
15
24
30
16
18
16
15
15
18
15
10
5
8
10
5
6
5
5
5
6
5
10
5
8
10
5
6
5
5
5
6
5
10
5
6
10
5
6
4
5
5
5
5
10
0
1
10
5
0
4
1
5
0
5
10
5
8
10
5
6
6
5
5
6
5
10
5
8
10
5
6
6
5
5
6
5
10
5
7
10
5
4
3
2
5
6
5
10
0
0
10
5
0
5
1
5
0
5
30
15
24
30
16
18
16
15
15
18
15
30
14
20
30
16
16
11
12
15
17
15
O−
10
0
0
10
5
0
5
1
5
1
5
10
4
7
10
6
6
4
5
5
6
5
10
5
8
10
6
6
5
5
5
6
5
10
10
60
30
48
60
32
36
32
30
30
36
30
Total R
Total S
O−
Total R
Total S
Total R
O+
O−
S trials
O+
O−
R trials
O+
O−
O+
O+
O+
S trials
R trials
S trials
R trials
O+
30◦
Straight ahead
10
5
8
10
6
6
5
5
5
6
5
31
56.5
47.5
30.5
34.5
40
42
43.5
33
53.5
48
42 ± 9
27
14
15
78
53
33
48
33
38
15
37
36 ± 19
86
158
138
118
153
104
78
120
120
106
123
119 ± 25
M
M
M
M
M
M
F
F
F
M
M
An analysis of variance (ANOVA) with repeated measures was used to
assess the effect of the factor GROUP (CA-matched/DA-matched/children with
autism), the factor VALENCE (positive vs. aversive) and the factor DIRECTION
(straight ahead/30◦ /moving). This was taken into account for each parameter except for the trajectory analysis. In this last case, the analysis took
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
Mean ± sd
2.4. Statistical analyses
Mental age
(month)
(dx2 + dy2 ) where dx: amplitude on the anteroposterior axis and dy: ampli-
Chronological
age (month)
d=
tude on the lateral axis. The amplitude, the duration and the average velocity of the
stride were normalized according to the height of the child.
- The balance strategies used during walking. They corresponded to the intersegmental coordination between the head, the shoulders and the hip in the lateral
plane and were obtained with the head, shoulder and hip anchoring index in
the lateral plane [43,44]. This index allowed comparing the stabilization of a
given segment with respect both to the external space and to the underlying
anatomical segment. It was calculated for each trial with the following formula:
IA = (Sd Rel2 − Sd Abs2 )/(Sd Rel2 + Sd Abs2 ) where Sd Abs was the absolute standard
deviation and Sd Rel was the corresponding standard deviation of the angular
distribution about the lateral axis of the segment under investigation with respect
to the underlying anatomical segment. The AI values were then normalized by the
use of transformed Z. For any given experimental condition, a positive AI value of a
given segment indicated a stabilization in space and so the use of an “articulated”
balance strategy. A negative value of the AI indicated a stabilization on the underlying anatomical segment and so the use of a “bloc” strategy. An AI value close to 0
indicated a lack of stabilization.
Gender
2.3.2. Movement programming was studied through:
- The gait parameters: the amplitude, the duration and the average velocity of
the stride (parameters between two heel contacts of the same foot determined by
the heel marker). The amplitude calculation took into account a potential movement
of the foot according to the lateral axis according the following formula:
CARS
score
d2 /N; where d was
the Euclidean distance between the real and theoretical trajectories coordinates,
and N is the number of points in the trajectory) [42]. So, results were represented in
centimeters and in terms of absolute value.
- The distance between the last position of the child (last position of the sacrum
[L5] which better represented the whole body position) and the object with respect
to the anteroposterior axis and the lateral axis. The distance was represented in
centimeters.
Table 1
Chronological age, mental age, CARS score, and number of realized (R) and successful (S) trials.
O−
2.3.1. Movement planning was studied through:
- Goal achievement, i.e. the percentage of successful trials, a trial being considered as achieved when the child catches or touches the object.
- The mean deviation between the real children trajectory (L5: sacrum segment
trajectory) and the theoretical trajectory corresponding – for each experimental
condition – to the most direct trajectory between the initial position of the child
and the object location (see Fig. 1A). The distance between the straight line and the
real trajectory was calculated thanks to the root mean square
error (RMSE): mean
O−
Moving
2.3. Coding and preliminary analysis
sums between both trajectories were added (RMSE =
60
14
21
60
31
16
25
15
30
18
30
Total S
Having no instruction concerning which of the hands would take the object,
children were allowed to get the object either with their right hand or their left one.
When fetching the object, some children with autism were initially accompanied by
their “referent”, of course without the latter directing or touching them in any way.
Children were free to go everywhere in the room, no predetermined trajectory was
fixed, and they were free not to answer the instructions.
The locomotion analysis was performed using an automatic motion analyzer
(VICON system) with six cameras having a sampling frequency of 200 Hz. The
children wore a bodysuit on which 22 spherical retroflective markers (14 mm in
diameter) were taped on the children’s back. They were placed as follows: head (3
markers), thoracic vertebras T7 and T12, lombar vertebra L5 (sacrum), right and left
acromion, elbow, iliac spine, trochanter, tibial plate, heel, external malleolus, and
fifth metatarsal joint (Fig. 1B).
Up to six sets of ten trials (one trial in each experimental condition: positive
and aversive valence in the three directions) were performed (so it meant a total
of sixty trials). The trials were randomized inside a set, in order to limit the learning and anticipating phenomenon. CA-matched controls carried out all the 60 trials.
Concerning MA-matched controls, their concentration and attention ability being
sometimes limited, the number of recorded trials varied between 30 and 60. As
for the children with autism, only two children could carry out the 60 trials; the
others stopped everything after 30 trials. For 3 children, only the trials with the
positive emotional valence objects were recorded, these children having refused to
walk in the negative emotional context. Moreover, according to the trials and independently from the emotional valence conferred to the object, some children with
autism turned around (so hiding markers from cameras), went out of the camerafields, ran or did not tolerate the markers on their bodysuit and removed them.
Because of that, the total number of analyzed trials varies between 14 and 60 (see
Table 1).
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S. Vernazza-Martin et al. / Behavioural Brain Research 251 (2013) 176–187
180
Table 2
Percentage of trials achieved under each condition.
Children with autism
O+ straight ahead
O− straight ahead
O+ 30◦
O− 30◦
O+ moving
O− moving
S1
S2
S3
S4
S5
S6
S7
S8
S9
S10
S11
100.0
80.0
87.5
100.0
100.0
100.0
80.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
0.0
0.0
100.0
0.0
80.0
100.0
100.0
20.0
16.7
100.0
100.0
100.0
75.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
80.0
100.0
100.0
83.3
100.0
100.0
0.0
12.5
100.0
0.0
100.0
80.0
100.0
20.0
0.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
87.5
100.0
66.7
100.0
50.0
100.0
40.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
0.0
0.0
100.0
0.0
100.0
83.3
100.0
20.0
0.0
100.0
Mean
sd
95.2
8.4
56.1
47.4
94.4
9.8
55.7
47.8
85.8
22.7
54.8
49.2
CA-matched
MA-matched
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
place in two steps. The first consisted in analyzing the mean deviation
trajectory in the “straight ahead” and “30◦ ” conditions. Then the analysis concerned
the “moving” condition after the shift of the object. The latter analysis allowed studying specifically the new “in line” movement planning. According to Cohen [45] the
effect size was specified by the partial eta squared (2p ). The Bonferroni tests were
used as all pairwise multiple comparison procedures and the significance level was
set at p < 0.05. The aim of this article being to evaluate the effects of the valence conferred to an object to reach according to its location in space in children with autism
compared with chronological age-matched (CA-matched) and mental age-matched
(MA-matched) control children, the results of the multiple comparison procedures
between the two control children groups will not be presented here.
The ANOVA was completed by a correlation study between the emotional
valence conferred to the object and goal achievement in each experimental condition (R).
The trials when the children ran or refused to do the task were excluded from
the analysis except for the reaching of the goal (number of successful trials).
3. Results
3.1. Movement planning
3.1.1. Successful trials
Table 2 summarizes the percentage of trials achieved under
each condition by children with autism. All control children
(CA-matched and MA-matched) having achieved the goal, their
Fig. 2. (A) Superposition of the children’s trajectories (sacrum trajectories L5) of all trials for two representative control children (an MA-matched one and a CA-matched
one) and one child with autism toward the positive and the aversive object in the straight ahead condition (left part) and 30◦ condition (right part). Note that children with
autism showed a scattered and deviant trajectory especially in the aversive emotional context, while the goal was not reached. (B) Mean deviation between the real trajectory
of the children and the theoretical trajectory (straight ahead and 30◦ conditions mixed up) in the positive emotional context (white bar chart) and the aversive (black bar
chart). **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001.
S. Vernazza-Martin et al. / Behavioural Brain Research 251 (2013) 176–187
181
Fig. 3. (A) Superposition of the children’s trajectories (sacrum trajectories L5) of all trials for two representative control children (an MA-matched one and a CA-matched
one) and one child with autism toward the positive and the aversive object in the “moving” condition. (B) Mean deviation between the children’s theoretical trajectory and
their real trajectory after the object’s shift of the three groups of children in the positive and aversive emotional context.
percentage correspond to 100% whatever the studied condition.
We can first note that the mean percentages of trials achieved
by children with autism strongly decreased when an aversive emotional valence was conferred to the object whatever its location
and secondly that this decrease was accompanied by a strong
increase of the variability of these percentages (bold, grayed out
values). Indeed, the individual results indicate that if some children with autism reached the goal in all cases, others did not
attain it systematically or never reached it. The ANOVA indicates
a GROUP effect and a VALENCE effect on goal achievement (respectively F(2,26) = 8.9, p < 0.01, 2p = 0.41 and F(2,26) = 5.4, p < 0.05,
2p = 0.17) with a interaction between the GROUP and the VALENCE
(F(2,26) = 5.8; p < 0.01, 2p = 0.31). The post test highlights first
that children with autism less often reached the goal than the
two groups of control children only when the emotional valence
conferred to the object was negative whatever the object location (p < 0.01). It also underlines the fact that children with
autism less often reached the goal when the emotional valence
conferred to the object was negative than when it was positive
(p < 0.001).
3.1.2. Trajectory in the “straight ahead” and “30◦ ” conditions
The global locomotion trajectory is represented in Fig. 2A by the
L5 trajectory. This figure shows an example of the global locomotion
trajectory in two representative control children (a MA-matched
one and a CA-matched one) and a child with autism who did not
systematically reached the goal when the object was loaded with
an aversive emotional valence. The ANOVA on the mean deviation between the children’s theoretical trajectory and their real
trajectory highlights a DIRECTION effect (F(1,23) = 5.14; p < 0.05,
2p = 0.18), all the children deflecting their trajectory more in the
“30◦ ” condition than in the “straight ahead” one. Moreover, as we
can see in Fig. 2B, a GROUP and a VALENCE effects are found with
an interaction between these two factors. According to the posttest we can note that these global statistical effects are only due
to the children with autism, who deflected their trajectory more
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S. Vernazza-Martin et al. / Behavioural Brain Research 251 (2013) 176–187
when the object to reach was associated with an aversive emotional
valence.
3.1.3. Trajectory in the “moving” condition
Fig. 3A shows an example of global locomotion trajectories
in two representative control children (a MA-matched one and
a CA-matched one) and in one child with autism who did not
achieve the goal in the “moving” condition when the emotion
was aversive. The trajectories of this child correspond to three
representative behaviors observed in children with autism when
locomotion was activated but did not reach its goal. Either the
locomotion was stopped before reaching the goal or the trajectory was deflected in order to avoid the object. A combination of
both could also occur. Fig. 3B shows the mean deviation between
the children’s theoretical trajectory and their real trajectory after
the object’s shift according to the global factors effects given by
the statistical analysis. On this figure, it is visible that the trajectories of the children with autism were more deflected than
those of the control children (MA-matched and CA-matched) in
the two valence conditions (p < 0.001). We can also notice that their
diversion was higher when the emotional valence conferred to the
object was aversive with respect to a positive emotional valence
(p < 0.001).
3.1.4. Last position of the children with respect to the object
Fig. 4 shows the distance between all children groups and the
object on the anteroposterior axis and on the lateral axis at the end
of the trajectory (respectively Fig. 4A and B).
Concerning the anteroposterior axis, the ANOVA shows a global
GROUP effect (F(2,23) = 4.73; p < 0.05, 2p = 0.19), a DIRECTION
effect (F(2,46) = 28.17; p < 0.001, 2p = 0.55) but no VALENCE effect
despite a strong statistical tendency (F(1,23) = 4.15; p = 0.053, 2p =
0.15), with an interaction between the three factors (F(4,46) = 2.91;
p < 0.05, 2p = 0.33). As it is visible on Fig. 4, this simple tendency
can be explained by a variability of this last position which strongly
increases in children with autism especially in an aversive emotional context. According to the post test, it is interesting to note
that the statistical effects are only due to the last position of the
children with autism in the “straight ahead and aversive” condition.
This position was significantly more distant from the goal than in all
the other conditions (p < 0.001) and also more distant from it than
the last position of the controls in all the other conditions (p < 0.01).
Concerning the lateral axis, the ANOVA indicates a global
GROUP effect (F(2,23) = 11.44; p < 0.001, 2p = 0.50): children with
autism stopped their movement laterally, far from the goal with
respect to both control groups. Nevertheless a statistical tendency
appears, concerning the VALENCE effect (F(1,23) = 3.23, p = 0.085,
2p = 0.12) and the interaction between GROUP and VALENCE
(F(2,23) = 3.13, p = 0.062, 2p = 0.21). The post test indicates that
this gap between children with autism and the object to reach was
increased with respect to both control groups when the object was
associated with an aversive emotional valence (p < 0.01). We can
point out that the valence effect inside the group of children with
autism is also close to the statistical significance level (p = 0.052).
This is probably due to the important standard deviation which
occurred when the object was associated with an aversive emotional valence.
3.2. Movement programming
3.2.1. Stride parameters
Fig. 5 shows the parameters of the stride according to the
global factors effects given by the ANOVA. According to the post
test, children with autism performed a shorter stride than CAmatched controls (p < 0.001), a longer stride than MA-matched
Fig. 4. Distance from the control children and children with autism to the object
according to the experimental conditions in the antero-posterior axis (A) and the
lateral axis (B) at the end of the trajectory. This value was obtained by measuring
the distance between the object and the final position of the sacrum (L5) when the
children stopped walking.
controls (p < 0.001) and then displayed a weaker mean velocity than
both control groups (respectively p < 0.01 and p < 0.05). Their stride
amplitude decreasing in the “moving” condition with respect to
the “30◦ ” condition (p < 0.05) appropriately explains the DIRECTION
effect obtained in a global way.
3.2.2. Balance strategy
Fig. 6 shows normalized anchoring indexes of the head, shoulder and hip for all children groups in each experimental condition
according to the global factors effects given by the ANOVA. The
post-test first allows us to say that the normalized anchoring index
of the shoulder decreased for all children in the “moving” condition with respect to the “30◦ ” condition whatever the emotional
valence conferred to the object. This indicates a less effective stabilization of the shoulder on space whenever the object was shifted.
Secondly, the hip anchoring index of the children with autism was
weaker than the one of the CA-matched controls, especially in
the “30◦ ” and “moving” conditions (p < 0.01 and p < 0.05, respectively). This fact indicates a less effective stabilization of the hip
on space in children with autism as soon as the object was not
S. Vernazza-Martin et al. / Behavioural Brain Research 251 (2013) 176–187
183
Fig. 5. Amplitude (at the top), duration (at the center) and mean velocity (bottom part) of the stride according to the ANOVA (right part). Note that there is no VALENCE
effect on all these parameters.
located straight ahead anymore. Nevertheless, the head, shoulder and hip anchoring indexes remain significant and positive
(p < 0.001) whatever the experimental condition in spite of these
statistical effects. This indicates a stabilization of all the segments
studied on space for all children in all conditions and so the use of
an “articulated” balance strategy at the three segmental levels by all
children.
4. Discussion
The aim of the present study was to determine whether locomotion planning and/or locomotion programming are affected in
children with autism by a positive or aversive emotion conferred
to an object to fetch, according to its position in space.
Our results concerning movement programming, i.e. gait parameters and balance strategy analysis highlight two main points.
The first one is that there is no valence effect on these parameters. Then, movement programming being automatic, it would
be independent from emotions. The second point is that some
differences are observed between children with autism and the
control groups, independently from the emotions’ effect. Indeed,
children with autism produced a smaller and slower stride than
CA-matched controls. These results support a number of authors
who have described an “unusual gait” and “disturbances in walking” [23,25,27,46–51]. Concerning balance strategy, children with
autism used the same “articulated” strategy as all control children,
i.e. a stabilization of the head, shoulders and hip on space, as it is
classically described in the literature for healthy children [52]. In
agreement with our previous results [22,38], children with autism
were thus able to coordinate both the propulsion of their body
and their lateral stability in the same way as the control children.
What was found was a less effective stabilization on the shoulders
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S. Vernazza-Martin et al. / Behavioural Brain Research 251 (2013) 176–187
Fig. 6. Normalized anchoring index and standard error of the head (at the top), the shoulder (at the center) and the hip (at the bottom) in the positive (right part) and
aversive (left part) emotional context, all directions mixed. We can note that – remaining positive in all cases for all children – the balance strategy used corresponded to an
“articulated strategy”.
in space when the object was shifted or a less effective stabilization on the hip in space as soon as the object was not located
straight ahead. This did not endanger balance control during
walking.
All these results seem to indicate that the emotional system
does not intervene directly at the level of locomotion programming.
The main problem encountered comes from a slight dysfunction in the accurate control of the automatic locomotor program
rather than from a disturbance of the motor program itself. This
would especially come up when the object is not located straight
ahead.
Besides these slight locomotion programming disturbances, the
main results observed in the present study concern locomotion
planning. They are in line with the executive dysfunction found in
autism [19,20,53–55] and with the results obtained by Maurer and
Damasio [25] concerning plans or strategies for adapting to changing environmental contingencies. Nevertheless these results seem
to indicate that the main deficit at the planning movement level
appears through an impaired emotional system and more specifically through a deficit in the aversive emotion management. Let
us consider goal achievement. Our results indicate that there is
no difference between children with autism and the control children when the emotional valence conferred to the object is positive
whatever the object location. The children with autism reached
the goal of the action as often as control children. Then, children
with autism were able to plan a voluntary movement according
to an instruction by clearly establishing the goal of the action and
making the decision to act independently from the object location.
S. Vernazza-Martin et al. / Behavioural Brain Research 251 (2013) 176–187
Moreover in agreement with Baron-Cohen and Rieffe et al., they
were able to feel positive emotions. On the other hand, an aversive emotional context produces a more varied range of behaviors.
Some children with autism reached the goal but for some others the
aversive emotional load blocked the movement completely, these
children refusing to walk and to take the object. For the others the
locomotion was activated but did not reach its goal. In this case,
locomotion was stopped before reaching the goal and/or the trajectory was deflected in order to avoid the object. As a result, the
mean percentage of trials achieved decreased sharply and became
more variable for children with autism when an aversive emotional valence was conferred to the object. It is of interest to note
that the children with Autism who did not reach the goal when
the objects were aversive were also the children with the higher
CARS scores. At the same time MA-matched control children always
reached the goal of the task independently from the emotional
valence conferred to the object. This result highlights the severity of the pathology as an indicator of goal achievement. This also
showed some developmental impairment rather than a developmental delay. Then, the present study allows completing the results
of Rieffe et al. [31]: children with autism felt more often aversive
emotions than the children of the same biological age, but also
than younger children too. Moreover, this allows generalizing the
hypothesis according to which the impairment of the emotional
system would produce an inability to interact in an emotional way
with other people, see [37,56] for review. Indeed, the emotionrelated difficulties in autism would not merely be a facet of social
impairments but in a more global way would produce an inability
to interact with the environment, through a voluntary movement
planning which would be not correctly triggered and/or organized
in an aversive emotional context. The lack or the decrease of the
motivation directed to the goal linked to an impaired management of aversive emotions could explain why the goal was not
reached when an aversive emotional valence was conferred to the
object.
Now let us return to the trajectory analysis. The non-effect of
a positive emotional valence on the body trajectory in “straight
ahead” and “30◦ ” conditions indicates that the planning trajectory
is correct in children with autism in a positive emotional context.
Nevertheless, it is interesting to focus on the “moving” condition
which involves a new movement planning “in line”. In this condition the trajectory of children with autism became deflected after
the object shift with respect to all control children whatever the
emotional valence conferred to the object. Then, a new planning
“in line” seemed to be difficult for children with autism whatever the emotional context. Two explanations can be given. The
first one is that their new trajectory planning process was prolonged with respect to the control children. Children with autism
waited for a longer time before changing their trajectory, this delay
moving their trajectory away from the new theoretical trajectory.
The second explanation – which can be associated with the first
one – is that the new trajectory was more irregular and variable
than those of control children. In this case, the object shift would
introduce some variability or some interference in the new trajectory planning “in line” independently from the emotional context.
These explanations are in keeping with the hypothesis of Gepner
and Feron [57] granting that dynamic sensory information are too
fast to be perceived in real-time by people with autism, producing an impairment of their spatio-temporal processing and leading
to a disorder of the understanding of language and emotions, a
deficit of the imitative and executive functions and in particular
a delay in the motor answers. On another hand, our results indicate
that the trajectory’s diversion was higher in an aversive emotional context compared to a positive one in children with autism
. This led us to think that the impairment of the spatio-temporal
data processing would be increased in an aversive emotional
185
context and that emotions would contribute to maximize the
smoothness of the trajectory in the frame of the hypothesis of
kinematic parameters optimal control at the origin of trajectory
planning [58]. Added to some spatio-temporal data processing
impairment, this optimal control of the trajectory would be affected
in children with autism too.
Then, all these results seem to indicate that the emotional system would have two different functions according to two types of
cognitive processes involved in movement planning. The first type
would correspond to the cognitive processes allowing together
the emergence of the act intent, the identification of the goal of
the task and the decision-making to act. It would not be necessary to call for them once again when the object is moved during
the locomotion. Indeed, the intent to act and the goal of the task
remained unchanged, the decision to act being already made. It
would be strongly linked to the emotional system which would
trigger it. In this way, an aversive emotional context would be able
to completely block these processes or disturb them enough to
prevent goal achievement in children with autism independently
from the object location. Our results indicating that children with
autism refused to perform the task, stopping their walk before
goal achievement or avoiding the object in an aversive emotional
context but not in a positive one are consistent with this hypothesis. The second type would correspond to cognitive processes
involved in the abstract trajectory planning linked to an estimate of the spatial and postural contexts on the environment and
body states. When the object to reach is static, an aversive emotional context would interfere with these cognitive processes that
would introduce some diversion and variability of the trajectory,
more particularly when the object is located straight ahead. When
the object is moved during locomotion, these processes would
be involved in the new trajectory planning “in line” again and
would involve a spatio-temporal processing of the dynamic sensory information. This data processing would be impaired in autism
leading to a trajectory’s diversion whatever the emotional context.
But an aversive emotional context would emphasize this impairment leading to a higher trajectory’s diversion compared to what
happened with a positive one. In all cases, an aversive emotional
context increases the trajectory’s diversion and/or its variability.
This indicates that the function of the emotional system would be
to modulate these cognitive processes in order to obtain a smooth
and accurate trajectory.
To conclude, the present study shows a close link between the
sensori-motor system and the emotional system, emotions being
considered as motivational states. Our results seem to emphasize
a difficulty to manage aversive emotions in children with autism
having two main effects on movement planning. The first one is
a blocking or a disturbance of the cognitive processes at the origin of the emergence of the act intent, the identification of the
goal of the task and the decision-making to act. The second one
is a disturbance of the cognitive processes modulation leading to
an accurate and smooth trajectory. But our results emphasize the
correct behavior of these children in a positive emotional context too. The hospital staff who took part in this study were very
surprised to see “their” children walking and reaching an object
according to an instruction, changing their direction according to
the object location and repeating this action several times. In this
way, using an affectivo-motivational model based on the biphasic theory – the approach toward a pleasant stimulus or situation
and the avoidance of an aversive – could improve our knowledge on the perceptual and motor skills in children with autism
and explain some avoidances to interact observed in these children. The sensorimotor follow-up care for patients should take
into account the good effect of positive emotion on the voluntary
movement in order to encourage children with autism to interact
more.
S. Vernazza-Martin et al. / Behavioural Brain Research 251 (2013) 176–187
186
Conflict of interest statement
All authors disclose any potential sources of conflict of interest.
Acknowledgments
We would particularly like to thank the French Charity, “Fondation de France” for its financial support and the hospital staff of
the Théophile Roussel Hospital Center for their involvement in the
study.
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