Anscombe's Modern Moral Philosophy: A Millian Response

Anscombe’s “Modern Moral Philosophy”: A Millian Response Chad Kleist Marquette University Abstract: Anscombe (1958) believes her article demonstrates: (1) ethics cannot move forward without an adequate philosophical psychology (2) the emphatic sense of “ought” ought to be discarded and (3) modern moral philosophers from Sidgwick to the present exhibit very few differences. Anscombe remarks that all the modern moral philosophers use the term “ought” in such a way that it demands a lawgiver. However, none of them admit of a lawgiver. Thus, she believes they should all be rejected. Among the modern moral ethicists, she is very critical of John Stuart Mill. I argue that Mill has a fully developed philosophical psychology that explicates the importance of sympathy. From this, he is not only able to counter her charges against utilitarianism, but also escape the problem of using “ought” emphatically. This paper will lay out Anscombe’s three theses in light of her example that killing the innocent, without qualiication, is morally wrong. She wants her article to demonstrate why (1) ethics 4 Kinesis cannot move forward without an adequate philosophical psychology, (2) the emphatic sense of “ought” ought to be discarded and (3) modern moral philosophers from Sidgwick to the present have very few differences. She states that virtue ethics and a divine law ethic can account for why one should not kill the innocent, without qualiication. However, modern moral philosophers cannot account for this because their notion of “ought” requires them to use a phrase such as “is obliged.” Since this notion is derived from a divine law, but they do not want to accept a lawgiver, these theories must be rejected. Since these theories are to be rejected, the only other options are virtue ethics or divine law ethics. However, virtue ethics in its fullest sense needs a philosophical psychology. As I will show, Mill has a fully developed philosophical psychology that can account for Anscombe’s example. He believes an action must be performed (1) sympathizing with humanity, (2) maximizing utility and (3) because it is morally virtuous. Mill’s theory, I argue, should be taken as two-tiered. In the irst tier, an action must be done in order to maximize utility and thus one should not worry about one’s motives. In the second, one must perform an action with a wellcultivated conscience. From this, one will be motivated properly while still maximizing utility. Moreover, through understanding Mill’s philosophical psychology, one can see why he is not trapped by using “ought” emphatically. I G.E.M. Anscombe wrote her famous article, “Modern Moral Philosophy,” proclaiming three theses. First, she wants to see a revival in virtue ethics with “an adequate philosophical psychology.”1 Virtue ethics needs to develop a philosophical psychology in order to better explain terms such as “action, intention, pleasure, wanting” and eventually coming to better understand a term such as “virtue.”2 Through this development, one can account for why a just man ought to perform such-and-such an act. A person is good by being just.3 A just person is just by doing just acts. Thus, a person does an act because it is just and avoids acts of injustice. She concludes by saying that a person performs just acts because she wants to lourish. However, Anscombe recognizes terms such as “lourish” and “action” need further explanation if one is to adopt Volume 36 Number 1 5 such an ethic. Second, she believes that the emphatic sense of “ought” ought to be discarded. By “emphatic,” she is referring to modern moral philosophers using “ought” as meaning “is obliged” or “is bound.” Anscombe believes that this is not a problem for the virtue ethicist. When she uses the term “ought” for virtue ethics, she is not referring to one who is legally bound or obliged to do such an act. For a virtue ethicist, one should perform such an act because it is just. However, one should not perform an act because it is right or wrong since “we should no longer ask whether doing something was ‘wrong’...We should ask whether it was unjust.”4 Moreover, if one performs a number of unjust acts then that person will tend to become a bad person. Being a bad person will prevent one from lourishing. Thus, committing unjust acts is wrong. This is the way in which Anscombe sees herself escaping from the emphatic “ought.” However, she believes that modern moral philosophers cannot escape this problem. According to Anscombe, modern moral philosophy uses the term “ought” to mean “moral obligation and moral duty…[and] what is morally right and wrong.”5 Anscombe accuses modern moral philosophers for adopting the emphatic “ought” from the way in which the divine law ethic uses it. The latter ethic used the term “ought” in connection with a divine lawgiver. However, modern moral philosophers reject a divine lawgiver. Anscombe concludes that it is conceptually impossible for modern moral philosophers to use this conception of “ought” “unless you believe in God as a law-giver.”6 Finally, Anscombe believes that modern moral ethicists from Sidgwick to the present show very few differences. In addition, she argues against Butler, Hume, Kant and utilitarianism with the “brevity which their character makes possible.”7 Let’s lay out each of her objections. According to Anscombe, Butler seems to ignore that one’s conscience can direct one to commit horriic acts. Moreover, Kant uses the emphatic “ought” as a law. However, he fails to realize that his theory needs a lawgiver. Subscribing to such an ethic is like using the notion “criminal” as if it “were to remain when criminal law and criminal courts had been abolished and forgotten.”8 Furthermore, she disagrees with Hume’s notion of 6 Kinesis “truth” since it is used “in such a way as to exclude ethical judgments.”9 She also “argues” against utilitarianism. However, her “argument” is more of a dismissal rather than an argument. She believes that utilitarianism fails from the outset to acknowledge the complexity of “pleasure.” However, she completely ignores Mill’s fully developed philosophical psychology. I will fully expose Mill’s account later in this paper in order to show that Anscombe’s charge against utilitarianism is underdeveloped. In addition to the arguments above, she believes that none of the previously mentioned philosophers could state that killing the innocent, without qualiication, is morally wrong. Anscombe believes that no modern moral philosopher can hold, without qualiication, that it “cannot be right to kill the innocent as a means to any end whatsoever.”10 In light of this example, she argues that utilitarianism (and all modern moral philosophy) cannot successfully avoid the is/ought problem. She says that “ought” should be used non-emphatically and replaced with good and bad. Her example is that a machine needs oil in order for it to run well or run at all. If the machine has no oil then it will run badly. In this example, “ought” is used only in so far as it shows how a machine cannot function properly without oil. There is no morality involved in using “ought.”11 However, she asserts that modern moral philosophers never use “ought” non-emphatically. For example, one should not kill an innocent person. Modern moral philosophers want to transition from saying that killing the innocent is wrong (factual statement) to one ought to not kill the innocent (moral statement). Anscombe notes that when modern moral philosophers use the term “ought,” it stands for “‘is obliged,’ ‘is bound,’ or ‘is required to.’”12 I have mentioned previously why Anscombe sees this usage as incompatible with the divine law ethic. This can be seen in light of her example that the innocent should never be killed. The divine law ethic believes that killing the innocent, without qualiication, is morally wrong. One should not kill the innocent because God says so. This is signiicant because one does not need to ask whether one should or should not perform the action. Rather, it is wrong because the lawgiver says it is wrong. Along with a divine law ethic, Anscombe asserts that virtue ethics can Volume 36 Number 1 7 also account for this example. She states that it is inherently unjust to kill the innocent. Therefore, under no circumstance should one commit such an act since it will prevent lourishing. Thus, I have shown the way in which I have woven Anscombe’s example in light of her three theses. II Anscombe argues that Mill could never say whether an action is right or wrong until the action is over because his theory depends on consequences. A person could not possibly foresee all the consequences that follow one’s action. Thus, one must proceed with the action and assess the consequences that have risen from the action. From this, one will be able to determine whether one’s action was right or wrong. Obviously, by the time the consequences have already played out, it is too late to decide which action one ought to have chosen because the act is already completed.13 One may have pursued the right action or not. Let’s combine Anscombe’s outlook on consequentialism with her example: killing an innocent person. One might kill an innocent person on the grounds that the consequences show that it would be best to do so. However, I am reluctant to say that Mill’s theory would allow for such an act. With the proper understanding of Mill’s philosophical psychology one can realize that he would never endorse killing the innocent. Mill, unlike virtue ethicists, has developed a philosophical psychology which enables him to answer much of what Anscombe has to leave unsaid. He considers the entire society when determining whether or not the action ought to be pursued. It is our human nature to “desire to be in unity with our fellow creatures.”14 Mill is not speaking in an abstract language such that the moral agent and humanity are two separate entities. It is only natural that everyone’s feelings are incorporated in the motivation to perform an act. For example, a person could not endorse killing the innocent and still uphold the view that everyone’s interests are equally valuable. However, the interpretation that Mill believes there is a “close connection” between the moral agent and the rest of humanity is not universally endorsed. Michael Stocker argues that there is a “moral schizophrenia” between one’s motives and reasons. What implications do the 8 Kinesis disharmony of motives and reasons have on the moral agent and humanity? In Stocker’s article, he seems to be asserting two major problems with utilitarianism. First, there is a disharmony between motives and reasons. Stocker believes utilitarianism obliges one to perform an act regardless of one’s motives. One acts “if and only if it is optimiic in regard to pleasure and pain.”15 Thus, the second problem with utilitarianism is that one cannot act out of “love, friendship, affection, fellow feeling, and community,” but rather to produce pleasure.16 The utilitarian cannot act from the enumerated list since she does not value personhood. Stocker notes that the person should be valued and not the general values of the person. In other words, he does not endorse Mill because acts are done out of another’s values and not for the value of the person per se. According to Stocker, others are merely instruments to the utilitarian’s goal of maximizing utility. Although this is the way in which Stocker views utilitarian moral psychology, it is far from that put forth by Mill. Stocker is missing the point of Mill’s moral psychology. As a matter of fact, he has chosen to argue against a straw-man. The “disharmony of reasons and motives” is not an issue and the value of a person is fully realized. Moreover, Mill does not divorce the moral agent from humanity. The irst problem with Stocker is that he misses the point of what it means to say a person becomes one with fellow creatures. When a person does this “it will be… so deeply rooted in our character, and to our own consciousness as completely part of our nature.”17 Mill not only recognizes the importance of maximizing utility for everyone, but also the motivation in choosing what action to perform. When one is sympathizing with humanity one is putting oneself in the place of another. One is trying to understand what that person is going through so one can make the proper decision. A person has the best chance to make that decision if she has the correct education. People who are cultivated in the proper way understand that performing an action for humanity is morally virtuous. Just because one acts for the good of humanity does not entail giving up one’s motives. This is where I believe Stocker has gone astray. Stocker fails to notice that the disharmony charge does not apply to Mill. The reasons for partaking in a certain action are Volume 36 Number 1 9 already in accordance with the motives. Consider the following example: One will not kill an innocent person without qualiication. The reason for not killing the innocent person is if that rule were applied to everyone it would undermine the utility of society. The reason for doing this act is the correct understanding of why it is important to maximize utility. However, the proper motivation is a result of sympathizing with humanity. Thus, one performs an act because one’s motives are in line with one’s reasons. Stocker mistakes the motives for pleasure. To him, the motives for performing an act are to maximize utility and the reason for doing so is to increase pleasure. I am not denying that pleasure is increased when maximizing utility. However, to merely say “increase pleasure” is a bit supericial since Mill has a speciic account of pleasure (including that of higher and lower). This overarching theme in Mill’s philosophical psychology can be used in order to combat Anscombe’s example. Before I employ the framework just presented to analyze Anscombe’s example, I must further develop Mill’s views of the motives for performing an action. From this, one will have a better understanding of why one who adopts Mill’s theory could never fall victim to Anscombe’s charges. Mill believes that motivations (or as he calls them, sanctions) for human actions are either external or internal. Both external and internal sanctions are subjugated to the ultimate sanction of all morality—that is, “a subjective feeling in our minds…to those whose standard is utility.”18 One is moved externally in so far as one hopes to produce pleasure and avoid pain for humanity. Notice that external sanctions do not dispel nor even stray from the ultimate sanction. Inluences from the outside (either humanity or God) can play a major role in one’s life; however, that should never hinder one from seeing the importance of sympathizing with humanity. For example, an external motivation can be derived from religion. Mill realizes the importance religion can have on a person and he notes that if one believes that “general happiness is the essence, or… criterion, of good, [one] must necessarily believe that it is also that which God approves.”19 However, an external motivation must be in accord with one’s internal motivation. An internal motivation is a feeling in one’s mind, when cultivated properly, that guides one in doing the proper action. This is where one’s conscience takes 10 Kinesis over to help one do what is right. One’s conscience is developed from a number of different factors including sympathy, love, fear, self-esteem and self-abasement.20 Clearly the most important from the above list is sympathy. Putting oneself in another’s position in order to perform the correct action to maximize utility for society is an essential and selless point inherent in Mill’s theory. This point cannot be overlooked and we will be expanding on it later. Consequently, one that hopes to beneit society by choosing the proper actions becomes less and less interested in one’s own interests. Let us consider this in light of Anscombe’s example. Mill would say that one may not kill the innocent because if that rule is applied to everyone, it would undermine the utility of society. In addition, killing the innocent would bring great grief to society. One may disagree with this notion and argue that although the person is legally innocent, she may be immoral and thus society is better off without her. However, could society truly be happy if innocent people are being killed? I think not. People would perform daily tasks poorly because they would constantly fear for their lives. Thus, no external factor could result in greater happiness by killing the innocent. There is also no internal motivation that would justify killing the innocent. One may not kill the innocent because one’s conscience realizes that it will “violate our standard of right.”21 But the standard of right is determined by what will maximize utility. If the standard is broken, this will result in one having great feelings of remorse. A person may be quick to object to this because she believes that Mill’s theory would not allow for one’s feelings to factor into the consequences. However, in this case the feeling of remorse is not factored into the consequence, but rather is a guide to do the right action. The correct action for this person is to not kill the innocent. I am aware that it might be the case that one’s conscience tells one that it is one’s duty to kill the innocent because society will beneit. Sadly enough, people do have these feelings. However, that does not mean they are justiied in how they feel. One should not ignore one’s feelings, but that does not mean one’s feelings cannot be immoral. I believe Mill can account for people who hold such convictions. One must explain to this person that killing the innocent produces no beneit to society because if it were made into a rule Volume 36 Number 1 11 then utility could not be maximized. It could not be maximized since members of the society would constantly fear for their lives. I have argued against killing the innocent from a societal level; the same thing can be employed at the personal level. This person should not take one’s personal gratiications into account because one’s goal is to become one with humanity. In fully achieving this goal, one will develop a level of sympathy for the rest of humanity and will not consider one’s own feeling when performing an act. However, a person cannot become one with the rest of society when one decides to kill the innocent. I believe this example has shown that feelings and maximizing utility can be at odds with one another. There is a small problem with the last example. Mill can show that killing the innocent does not maximize utility. Thus, whether or not one believes killing the innocent is morally permissible does not matter insofar as it does not maximize utility. However, one can consider a case in which one’s feelings are not in line with maximizing utility. For example, I would grant that saving a drowning person from a river will maximize utility. The person in position to save the life is an Olympic swimmer and has a 99% chance of survival. She still chooses not to save the other’s life in fear of the slight chance she may die. Clearly, the potential saver’s feelings are in conlict with maximizing utility. What should this person do? Mill would say undoubtedly that she should save the drowning person since it will maximize utility. It is dificult (or maybe nearly impossible) to ask someone to completely ignore one’s convictions (especially if one is risking one’s life) on the grounds of helping someone else. However, in this case one must give up one’s convictions. The question now becomes: Does this undermine Mill’s theory? I would have to say “no.” In the next section, I will show why I believe Mill’s theory should not be rejected even though it might be the case that one must abandon one’s feelings. What cannot be ignored is that Mill’s philosophical psychology would still never allow one to say that killing the innocent, without qualiication, is morally right. Thus, half of Anscombe’s argument has been answered. However, I have not formally addressed why the emphatic “ought” does not plague Mill. Anscombe believes that her strongest argument against Mill is the same as that against other modern moral philosophers—they 12 Kinesis cannot avoid using “ought” in the emphatic sense. She remarks that it is interesting for one to actually believe that “ought” can be used in a legalistic sense without admitting of a divine lawgiver.22 From this, Anscombe considers other options that could replace a divine lawgiver. However, according to her, none of them is satisfying. First, if one were to reject a divine lawgiver, then one could embrace the “norms” of society as the legal boundaries. Anscombe points out that it would be obviously wrong to adopt this if “one relects on what the “norms” of society can be like.”23 Then, Anscombe proposes that one might adopt the laws of nature as being the “norms” of a society. However, she also rejects this notion since this may not lead to good results either. Finally, she rejects “ought” as being contractual. In order for one to be in a contract, everyone must be contracted. However, she does not believe that there is enough evidence to support such a theory. As I will show, none of the objections above make Mill’s theory implausible. As a matter of fact, I will refute each of the following charges put forth on the basis of the way in which she represents the positions. Although Mill does not see himself as incompatible with religion, he certainly would not accept a divine lawgiver since it is not God who decides what act a person must perform. I would like to further expand on this point because I believe Anscombe makes a very strong claim that not only Mill, but also Kant, can refute. She says that it is “conceptually impossible” to use “ought” without a lawgiver. In other words, to say this is conceptually impossible means there is no way to arrive at a conclusion on which action to perform without God. If God is the only One who can dictate which action one ought to perform then she is dismissing one’s rationale. I believe Kant is correct when he says “human reason can, in matters of morality, be easily brought to a high degree of accuracy and precision.”24 Why can’t one’s reason guide one to do the correct act? If a person follows Mill’s theory then one’s reason will be properly cultivated to perform an act that is aligned with humanity. In doing this one will maximize utility. However, there is no need for a lawgiver when using one’s rationale to perform an act. Furthermore, Mill would never say that the norms of society ought to dictate what a person should do since they are not always compatible with that which is the greatest beneit to society. For Volume 36 Number 1 13 example, a norm of society might be that one ought to always obey one’s parents. However, the rules of a parent might include always lying in order to get whatever one wants. In this case, it would be more beneicial to society if one did not follow one’s parents. Thus, if one has parents who instill values contrary to beneiting society then society would beneit from the children not following their parents’ commands. I would also believe that Mill would not say that one is in a contract with society since not everyone understands nor adopts Mill’s theory. Thus, Mill must account for why one ought to perform an act without falling into the same trap as the rest of modern moral philosophy—namely, using “ought” emphatically. III All one needs to do is examine Mill’s philosophical psychology to understand why he believes one must perform one act instead of another. A person acts because it is “in proportion as they tend to promote happiness…[and] by happiness is intended pleasure.”25 The intended pleasure Mill is referring to is the pleasure for society. I realize the dificulty in using the terms “happiness” and “pleasure.”26 These terms are dificult to deine, but that does not mean they are unusable (as Anscombe seems to imply). There are a number of reasons one chooses to do one act instead of another. When Mill says one act must produce “more pleasure” than another, I do not believe he is referring to just any pleasure. As Mill states, “it is better to be Socrates dissatisied than a fool satisied.”27 Pleasure is a factor in determining which action to perform in so far as it maximizes utility. However, there are a couple of other factors that need to be recognized when doing an act—namely, sympathizing with humanity and performing it because it is morally virtuous. I believe there is textual evidence to support that Mill believes an act must be done (1) sympathizing with humanity, (2) maximizing utility and (3) because it is morally virtuous. I have talked at great length on the irst two, but not on the third. However, this is not as straightforward as it appears. As a matter of fact, there is evidence to support the contrary. I want to expose the problem with associating (1), (2) and (3). Mill has conlicting statements throughout Utilitarianism that I believe can be reconciled in such a way as to keep him consistent. 14 Kinesis On the one hand, Mill seems to be saying that actions, rather than motives, are the most important factor when maximizing utility. In his response to the charge that utilitarianism is too hard for humanity he says the “motive has nothing to do with the morality of the action.”28 He adds, “To speak only of actions done from the motive of duty…is a misapprehension of the utilitarian mode of thought.”29 On the other hand, he also states that being one with our fellow creatures “shall be so deeply rooted in our character.”30 Here he is expounding the importance of developing one’s conscience through proper education. From this, he believes one will be motivated to perform an act out of the right motives. Moreover, Mill states that it is important for the utilitarian doctrine to “maintain not only that virtue is to be desired, but that it is to be desired disinterestedly, for itself.”31 How does one reconcile these three propositions? I do not think there is any debate on (2). Mill is very clear that maximizing utility is essential; however, is the motive for doing this important? One way to understand Mill is to see his remarks as part of a two-tiered system. On the irst tier, one’s goal is to concern oneself with maximizing utility. The way in which one accomplishes this goal is by action. Thus, one will perform an action, regardless of motive, in order to produce the greatest happiness for society. Mill understands how dificult it is to maximize utility; hence he says one should concern oneself with actions and not motives. However, he is only saying this insofar as certain people cannot cultivate themselves to perform an act out of the correct motive. For example, Mill says that a person who saves a fellow creature from drowning can do so for whatever reason, which includes getting fame. He believes the action is the most important way to maximize utility and that is what this person did—namely, saving a person who is drowning. In other words, not everyone has the capability to fully understand utilitarianism and thus if one at least performs the correct act, Mill is satisied. In summary, the irst tier can be considered as act evaluation. However, there is a second tier in which this person would have performed the action with the proper motives—namely, maximizing utility in addition to embracing Mill’s moral psychology and theory of virtue. Mill spends an entire section exposing the different motives for performing an action. He says, in regards to the ultimate sanction, that it Volume 36 Number 1 15 has “no binding eficacy on those who do not possess the feelings it appeals to.”32 He is acknowledging that not everyone can adopt such a theory. It is hard enough to do the right act that maximizes utility, but when one includes a particular motive it becomes even more dificult. However, for those people who have the ability to understand Mill’s philosophy (and just as importantly his moral psychology) in its purest form one will not only maximize utility but do it with the proper motives. In the above example, one ought to save the drowning person for the right reasons. One should sympathize with that person and realize that it is a virtuous act to save another. In realizing this, one will have performed the right action with the right motive. In contrast to the irst tier, the second tier can be summed up as character evaluation. This is the heart of Mill’s utilitarianism and should be taken seriously. In addition, it is also essential to his moral psychology to understand that he is not dismissing moral virtue. Mill holds that it is a “psychological fact” that virtue is a good in itself with no end beyond it. Virtue is not an incidental good attained because of other pursuits, but rather because it is the ultimate end. The important thing that cannot be lost in this is that the virtuous action must maximize utility. This does not mean a virtuous action is a means to maximizing utility, but rather they are co-existent. Consider the following example: The virtuous action when seeing someone drowning in a pool is to save her. In doing this, one is also maximizing utility. Moreover, if one truly did it for the right reasons, then one did it because if that person had been in that situation she would want to be saved also. This example is clear, but it still seems as though maximizing utility is the end in which all others are means—including virtuous actions. Maximizing utility and virtuous actions cannot both be the ultimate end unless maximizing utility always produced a virtuous action. However, the drowning person example has demonstrated that this cannot be the case. Thus, how does one reconcile these two? I believe Robert Adams does an excellent job of shedding light on this matter. He states that “caring…about good common projects for their own sake is morally virtuous.”33 The common moral project is analogous to sympathizing with humanity. Consider the following example. A good member of a choir is one who loves 16 Kinesis to be part of the group. One may be a good singer and thus joins the choir. However, if everyone joins the choir because everyone loves the choir for itself then the project of becoming a great choir will be the best it can be. In the same way, a person becomes one with her fellow creatures for the good of doing so. The good of doing so is to maximize utility for society. Thus, the morally virtuous action for Mill entails sympathizing with humanity. Consequently, one will be maximizing utility for society. It may be the case that maximizing utility is in conlict with either sympathizing or performing a virtuous action. From this, one may even want to reject his theory; I caution anyone who chooses to pursue this route. A conlict does not entail an internal consistency. What this merely points out is that not all actions can be performed which both maximize utility and are virtuous. Mill is completely consistent in saying that maximizing utility is the goal of all actions. When one sympathizes with humanity and tries to perform the virtuous act, all one can do is try to have them be in accordance with maximizing utility. They are all interwoven in such a way to accomplish the same goal—namely, producing the greatest pleasure for society. However, as I have noted, this is not simply base pleasures. Mill is interested in the pleasures that are cultivated with the proper education. Next, one must investigate how the intended pleasure arises in one’s moral faculty. A person’s moral faculty arises out of nature through experience. One is able to discern which actions are right and wrong according to the possible outcomes. For example, it does not take long for one to realize that killing the innocent, without qualiication, may have negative consequences for society. If one were to have a rule that killing the innocent, without qualiication, is morally correct then members of society would constantly fear for their lives. It would be hard to fulill daily tasks if one is worried that one’s life could be next. This is still not the motivation of why one does not perform such a horriic act. Rather, one would not kill the innocent because one has a moral obligation not to do so. Where does this moral obligation arise? Mill explains that one’s conscience has “a pure idea of duty” that can be “derived from sympathy.”34 One’s conscience directs one to perform actions that will not result in feeling remorse. Remorse comes from one realizing that one’s Volume 36 Number 1 17 conscience has been directed improperly. Mill acknowledges that the problem with a moral faculty is that it can be “cultivated in almost any direction.”35 However, the only way in which one can pursue the correct action is through education. Education allows one to cultivate one’s moral faculty to better foresee consequences in order to know which action is most beneicial to society. When Mill says one ought to perform suchand-such an act he is saying that one’s conscience recognizes a duty that will maximize the utility for society. One must develop a level of sympathy for one’s fellow creatures since humans, by nature, desire to be one with society. Mill believes there is a harmony between the feelings of an individual and that of humanity. If one ignores this harmony then one will begin to make selish decisions and ultimately harm society. It is neither the legal system nor a divine lawgiver that state which actions are right and wrong. Rather, one must act because it is beneicial to society. This means that if one does not perform the act that produces the greatest beneit for society, which is in line with one’s conscience, then one’s action is morally wrong. IV In conclusion, Anscombe’s article attempts to show why: (1) ethics are in dire need of a philosophical psychology, (2) the emphatic “ought” should be jettisoned and (3) modern moral philosophers from Sidgwick to the present display few differences. She believes that modern moral philosophers cannot say, without qualiication, that killing the innocent is morally wrong. Unlike modern moral philosophers, she believes that divine law ethics and virtue ethics have no trouble answering this example. However, the latter needs to develop a philosophical psychology in order to better explain terms such as “human action,” “lourishing,” “virtue,” and others. As I have shown, Mill has not fallen victim to Anscombe’s example. He has a fully developed philosophical psychology which explains why one ought to perform an act. In performing an act, one tries to connect oneself with humanity—through sympathy. However, when the act conlicts with one’s conscience, one feels remorse. Nowhere in Mill’s philosophy does he depend upon a lawgiver. No one ought to act because God commands it. Mill believes 18 Kinesis an action must be performed (1) sympathizing with humanity, (2) maximizing utility and (3) because it is morally virtuous. I have argued that Mill has a two-tiered system in which the irst tier is for everyone and the second for those who understand utilitarianism in its fullest sense. In the irst tier, one acts to maximize utility. In the second, one acts with the proper education. This allows one to not only have the proper motives, but also maximize utility. Finally, I have shown how he can account for why one ought to perform an act without using “ought” emphatically.36 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 G.E.M. Anscombe, “Modern Moral Philosophy,” in Ethics: History, Theory and Contemporary Issues, eds. Steven M. Cahn and Peter Markie (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 481. Ibid., 490. Anscombe does not want to entertain the idea that a just person could be otherwise. Anscombe, 486. Ibid., 481. Ibid,. 484. Ibid., 482. Ibid., 484. Ibid., 482. Ibid., 486. Cf. Charles Pigden, “Anscombe on ‘Ought,’” The Philosophical Quarterly 38 (1988): 20-41. Pigden believes that this example does not escape the “is/ought” problem. Anscombe, 484. Ibid., 488. John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism (New York: Barnes and Noble Books, 2005), 36. Michael Stocker, “The Schizophrenia of Modern Ethical Theories,” The Journal of Philosophy 73 (1976): 458. Ibid., 459. Mill, 31. Ibid., 33. Ibid., 32. Ibid. Ibid. Volume 36 Number 1 19 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 Anscombe, 489. Ibid. Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, trans. H.J. Paton (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1964), 59. Mill, 8. For further discussion of these terms, Cf. Mill, 7-13. Mill, 11. Mill, 21. Ibid. Ibid., 31. Ibid., 41. Ibid., 33. Robert Merrihew Adams, “Common Projects and Moral Virtue,” in Ethical Theory: Character and Virtue, eds. Peter A. French, Theodore E. Uehling, Jr., and Howard K. Wettstein (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988), 298. Ibid., 32. Ibid., 35. I am indebted to Nancy Snow for helpful discussions and comments on an earlier version of this paper. 20 Kinesis