Papers by Christopher Macleod
Freedom After Kant, 2022
The influence of 'Germano-Coleridgean' thought on Mill-philosophy he associated with nineteenth c... more The influence of 'Germano-Coleridgean' thought on Mill-philosophy he associated with nineteenth century, rather than the eighteenth century-is clearest in his practical philosophy. The ways in which Mill incorporates nineteenth century concerns into his moral, social and political philosophy are well known. Mill's utilitarianism expands beyond its Benthamite origins by focusing on the culture of the individual; his social analysis is more firmly grounded in a historical nature of society's progression; liberty becomes in his hands a means not primarily for pursuing one's interests and desires, but for their authentic development. There are corresponding changes in Mill's theoretical philosophy, though these are less often noticed. I wish, in this paper, to highlight various advances Mill made upon his British forbearers concerning the nature of agency. In particular, I will highlight Mill's attempt to account for the existence of normativity, free will, and spontaneity in the context of his associationist psychology. Each of these moves were made in response to evolving concerns of German idealists about the British empiricists' 'mechanistic' conception of mind. I will not here attempt to tell the story of the historical transmission of these concerns from German philosophy to Mill-though such a story of this sort could certainly be told. 1 Rather, I will show various ways in which Mill engaged with the problem of agency, and attempted to "elicit dynamical conclusions" from the "mechanical premises" of associationism (Letter to Carlyle, XII: 221). 2
Routledge Handbook of Autonomy
J.S. Mill does not himself often use the language of 'autonomy'. When the word does appear in his... more J.S. Mill does not himself often use the language of 'autonomy'. When the word does appear in his work, it is because he is adopting the terminology of someone else-either when reviewing or in correspondence, when he attempts to speak to interlocutors in their own terms. The word had not sufficiently migrated into Philosophical English in Mill's formative period for him to find it a natural way in which to express himself-though he does feel comfortable translating his own ideas into that idiom when necessary: [V]ous savez probablement par mon Essai sur la Liberté, dans quel sens et avec quelles limites j'entends notre principe commun, celui de l'autonomie de l'individu. Je reconnais cette autonomie comme une règle rigoureuse dans les choses qui ne regardent que l'individu lui même. (Letter to John Elliot Cairnes, XVII: -) 1
In this article, I wish to argue that J.S. Mill holds that theoretical reason is subordinate to p... more In this article, I wish to argue that J.S. Mill holds that theoretical reason is subordinate to practical reason. Ultimately, this amounts to the claim that the norms of theoretical reason -those rules governing how we ought to believe -are grounded in considerations of utility. I begin, in section , by offering an outline of Mill's account of 'Art of Life' (the body of rules governing how we should act), before turning in section , to Mill's account of the 'Art of Thinking' (the body of rules governing how we should believe). In section , I suggest that, for Mill, the Art of Thinking is subordinate to the Art of Life, and that in an important sense, therefore, theoretical reason is subordinate to practical reason.
There are rarely stark discontinuities in the history of philosophy. Philosophers are raised into... more There are rarely stark discontinuities in the history of philosophy. Philosophers are raised into traditions of thought, and even when innovative, their work must respond to recognisable issues in recognisable ways. The naturalism of the nineteenth century is therefore broadly continuous with the naturalism of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries -that of Hobbes, Locke and Hume -and inherits, from this tradition, a view of human thought and action as wholly part of a world subject to causal laws which can be understood by the methods of natural science.
One of Mill’s primary targets, throughout his work, is intuitionism. In this paper, I distinguis... more One of Mill’s primary targets, throughout his work, is intuitionism. In this paper, I distinguish two strands of intuitionism, against which Mill offers separate arguments. The first strand, ‘a priorism’ makes an epistemic claim about how we come to know norms. The second strand, ‘first principle pluralism’, makes a structural claim about how many fundamental norms there are. In this paper, I suggest that one natural reading of Mill’s argument against first principle pluralism is incompatible with the naturalism that drives his argument against a priorism. It must, therefore, be discarded. Such a reading, however, covertly attributes Mill realist commitments about the normative. These commitments are unnecessary. To the extent that Mill’s argument against first principle pluralism is taken seriously, I suggest, it is an argument that points towards Mill as having an antirealist approach to the normative.
1. Mill and the Nineteenth Century
2. Higher Pleasure and Freedom
3. The 'Proof' and Morality
During the romantic period, various authors expressed the belief that through creativity, we can ... more During the romantic period, various authors expressed the belief that through creativity, we can directly access truth. To modern ears, this claim sounds strange. In this paper, I attempt to render the position comprehensible, and to show how it came to seem plausible to the romantics. I begin by offering examples of this position as found in the work of the British romantics. Each thinks that the deepest knowledge can only be gained by an act of creativity. I suggest the belief should be seen in the context of the post-Kantian embrace of ‘intellectual intuition’. Unresolved tensions in Kant’s philosophy had encouraged a belief that creation and discovery were not distinct categories. The post-Kantians held that in certain cases of knowledge (for Fichte, knowledge of self and world; for Schelling, knowledge of the Absolute) the distinction between discovering a truth and creating that truth dissolves. In this context, the cognitive role assigned to acts of creativity is not without its own appeal.
In this paper, I examine the presumption that Mill endorses a form of metaethical non-cognitivism... more In this paper, I examine the presumption that Mill endorses a form of metaethical non-cognitivism. I argue that the evidence traditionally cited for this interpretation is not convincing, and suggest that we should instead remain open to a cognitivist reading. I begin, in Section I, by laying out the ‘received view’ of Mill on the status of practical norms, as given by Alan Ryan in the 1970s. There is, I claim in Sections II and III, no firm textual evidence for this reading of Mill: his remarks on ‘art’ and ‘science’ do not show the metaethical commitments they have been taken to. Neither is there firm textual evidence for a cognitivist reading. However, I suggest in Section IV, a non-cognitivist interpretation suffers from the fault of anachronism, and is difficult to reconcile with a clear commitment in Utilitarianism IV.3 to the possibility of evidence being given for the desirability of pleasure. A cognitivist reading would not suffer from these faults, and on that basis, I conclude that we should think further about what a cognitivist reading of Mill might amount to.
It is the purpose of this paper to offer an account of Mill’s metaethics. Expanding upon clues gi... more It is the purpose of this paper to offer an account of Mill’s metaethics. Expanding upon clues given recently by Dale Miller, and previously by John Skorupski, I suggest that when it comes to the foundations of his philosophy, Mill might share more with the intuitionists than we are accustomed to think. Common wisdom holds that Mill had no time for the normativity of intuitions. I wish to dispute, or at least temper, this dogma, by claiming that Mill’s attitude towards intuitions is far more complex and ambivalent than is generally thought. The investigation, then, centres on the question of whether, for Mill, intuitions carry normative warrant: whether, in itself, the fact that a belief is intuitional provides reason to think that belief a warranted one. I argue that, according to Mill, our belief in the reliability of inductive moves and apparent memories, as well as the desirability of pleasure, is vindicated by something akin to intuition. Although his endorsement of the normativity of these intuitions might seem to be in tension with the arguments he offers against the ‘intuitionist school’, this tension is only apparent.
An 8,000 word encyclopedia entry, outlining various philosophical and legal theoretic debates sur... more An 8,000 word encyclopedia entry, outlining various philosophical and legal theoretic debates surrounding the concept of genocide. Includes suggestions for further reading.
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Papers by Christopher Macleod