Joining Multilateral Nuclear Treaties: What the Literature Says

Joining Multilateral Nuclear Treaties: What the Literature Says Prepared for the Uppsala University, Alva Myrdal Centre for Nuclear Disarmament Working Group on Nuclear Negotiations Stephen Herzog ETH Zurich, Center for Security Studies Harvard Kennedy School, Project on Managing the Atom [email protected] Working paper. Abstract Why do states join multilateral nuclear arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament treaties that limit their military capabilities? If the world is to eventually move beyond nuclear deterrence, this question is of pivotal importance for scholars and policymakers alike. Understanding why states opt to tie their hands vis-à-vis the bomb is essential for optimizing nuclear diplomacy and designing effective treaties. In this report chapter, I provide a summary of the current state of the literature regarding this topic. I identify five “camps” of scholarly explanations underlying this phenomenon. They point to national security, international pressure, global norms, treaty-contingent benefits, and domestic politics as explanatory factors. The existing research thus provides interesting insights, but further careful analysis is needed to adjudicate between contending theories. Accordingly, I highlight the role of multicausality in nuclear diplomacy and lay out directions for future research. 1 The dangers that nuclear weapons present to international security have been clear since 1945, when the United States bombed Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Approximately 210,000 people perished, and hundreds of thousands in Japan were left to live with the aftermath. This legacy is one of disfigurement, cancers, and birth defects that continues even today (Tomonaga 2019). The “Little Boy” (Hiroshima) and “Fat Man” (Nagasaki) atomic bombs had explosive yields of roughly 14 and 22 kilotons of TNT, respectively. It is not unreasonable to believe that the graphic horrors entailed in using such weapons should have prompted their abolition. Instead, nine countries now possess an estimated 12,500 nuclear arms (Kristensen, Korda, & Reynolds 2023), many of which are orders of magnitude more powerful than their early predecessors. For decades, the world’s great powers (Shaker 1980; Timerbaev 1999; Onderco 2021; Gibbons 2022; Hunt 2022) and non-aligned states (Rodríguez 2020; Herzog 2021b) have tried to prevent nuclear proliferation. The nuclear-armed states have done so at the expense of prioritizing nonproliferation over disarmament. These states have long sought to limit the size of the atomic club while relying on nuclear deterrence doctrine for their own national security. In truth, South Africa is the only state to have eliminated an indigenously developed nuclear arsenal (Egeland 2022). Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine gave up Soviet nuclear arsenals they inherited, but these states never had full operational control over the weapons (Budjeryn 2022b). There is therefore a very limited set of cases and body of evidence available to researchers seeking to better understand motivations for nuclear disarmament. While calls for nuclear disarmament are as old as the weapons themselves, two recent developments have given new impetus to the movement. First, the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) entered into force in January 2021. TPNW member states seek to 2 institute an immediate legal ban on all nuclear weapons activities, something the nuclear powers have categorically rejected (Potter 2017; Gibbons 2018; Vilmer 2022). The “nuclear haves” claim that disarmament must occur through the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and its vague and controversial provisions on the subject (Herzog, Baron, & Gibbons 2022).1 Second, Russian leaders have made quite a number of worrying nuclear threats during Moscow’s ongoing war in Ukraine (Horovitz & Stolze 2023). This rhetoric has frightened many publics (Sukin & Lanoszka 2022) and triggered national discussions about acquiring the bomb for protection (Herzog & Sukin 2022). The events of 2022 are a sobering reminder that in the age of deterrence, many of the world’s major cities could be destroyed by nuclear missiles in a matter of mere minutes (Bollfrass & Herzog 2022). That is the uncomfortable reality of nuclear deterrence, which presents much intellectual space for debating norms, morality, and international legal affairs. Ultimately, global nuclear disarmament—verifiably eliminating all of these weapons—will require remarkably challenging international negotiations. Unfortunately, most academic literature aimed at addressing these unsavory nuclear dimensions of world order essentially mirrors the priorities of the nuclear-armed states. Scholarly journals and books emphasize how to live with nuclear weapons: the conduct of deterrence and nonproliferation policy. There is accordingly no shortage of studies on nuclear strategy and the causes and costs of proliferation. Yet, comparatively little scholarship investigates the lessons from the “nuclear have-nots.” It is often forgotten that most states have actually legally forsworn 1 The text of Article VI of the NPT refers to nuclear disarmament, but its ambiguous wording has created considerable space for interpretive debate. It reads: “Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.” 3 these powerful armaments by opting into multilateral treaties like the NPT, TPNW, Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), and nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZs). The lessons of their decision-making processes should not simply be discarded; there is much for interested scholars of international negotiations to learn. The process of rejecting weapons that can help to guarantee state sovereignty and national survival fascinates me. On the one hand, it seems like a radical act. But on the other hand, it often reflects a belief that nuclear “protection” also creates vulnerability (Herzog 2022; Pelopidas 2022). Nuclear alliances implicitly or explicitly target their adversaries to provide this so-called protection, which in turn results in their members being targeted. I am unpacking the diverse rationales for why states legally forswear the bomb in an ongoing book manuscript. And in this report chapter, I will share some insights regarding the current state of the literature on this phenomenon. This chapter thus proceeds in six sections. The first five each discuss the existing scholarly “camps”—national security, international pressure, normative explanations, treaty-contingent benefits, and domestic political rationales for rejecting the bomb. I then conclude by briefly addressing “hybrid” multicausal explanations and other future research directions for scholars. Taken together, this chapter intends to provide some thoughts on new opportunities for the policy-relevant study of multilateral nuclear diplomacy. National Security Drivers Perhaps the most intuitive approach to understanding legal decisions to forswear nuclear weapons comes down to conceptions of the national interest. Many realists believe that states will not join international agreements—of any type—unless these accords are in their national 4 interest (e.g., Mearsheimer 1994/1995). Further, realist scholars like Waltz (1981) and Monteiro (2014) have argued that nuclear weapons development can protect states from serious external security threats. It is no surprise that one prominent strand in the literature holds that nuclear proliferation can often (Sagan 1996/1997) or only be understood (Debs & Monteiro 2017) by analyzing a state’s security environment. If nuclear weapons are guarantors of national sovereignty, what then might prompt a threatened state to accept a non-nuclear future? One possible answer lies in the simple idea that states will join multilateral nuclear treaties when their security environment permits it. Debs and Monteiro (2017) and Lanoszka (2018a) each suggest that it is easier for states with protection from a great power’s nuclear umbrella to sign away the bomb. Sagan (2011) notes that regional rivals often wait for one another before joining the NPT, an argument that corresponds with historical literature emphasizing the competitive dimensions of arms control (Cameron 2017; Maurer 2022). Likewise, Onderco et al. (2021) and Mathy (forthcoming) use survey experiments and quantitative analysis to demonstrate that even NPT states parties will be hesitant to join the TPNW if they feel it will weaken their security. Hence, some states may join arms control to constrain their adversaries; others may resist it due to fears of limiting their own capabilities in the face of rivals (Risse forthcoming). This school of thought would accordingly predict that states that lack existential security threats, or that have great power security assurances, will find it easier to join nuclear treaties. Regional security and threat environments, however, are prone to change. There are clear implications for treaty design. Scholars have highlighted the need for robust monitoring and verification provisions in nuclear treaties (Carnegie & Carson 2019; 5 Bollfrass 2022), a theme also seen in the international human rights (Hafner-Burton 2012) and environmental literature (Young 2011). But as Coe and Vaynman (2020) observe, overly rigorous verification regimes may deter states that seek to protect certain national security secrets. Additionally, states often legally condition the entry-into-force of nuclear treaties on their rivals’ participation, creating de facto or de jure veto player structures (Herzog 2023). Withdrawal clauses are also an important part of these agreements (Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal 2003; Koremenos and Nau 2010) because they help to mitigate uncertainty about the future (Koremenos 2005). Security-based explanations for entry into multilateral treaties are often compelling, but they are clearly not universal. They present a number of unanswered questions for scholars. For instance, why do states without serious security threats often delay joining such treaties? And what explains situations where one regional rival opts to move forward with forswearing the bomb prior to its chief adversary? International Pressure A related phenomenon deals with international pressure. States often have either allies or adversaries—or both—that maintain a high level of interest in them forswearing the bomb. Some actors exert pressure over states to join such multilateral accords because of a commitment to upholding normative values, as is often seen in the human rights domain (Wotipka & Tsutsui 2008). Others fear that nuclear-armed partner states may be emboldened and will pursue more aggressive foreign policy behaviors (Bell 2021). To date, most of the literature focuses on alliance politics and the pressures that great powers can exert over their protégés to participate in multilateral treaties. Similar arguments exist in studies on international hierarchy (Lake 2009), 6 alliance management (Crawford 2003; Weitsman 2004), and asymmetric security partnerships (Morrow 1991). The history of U.S. policy in promoting NPT membership is a case in point. A considerable body of evidence suggests that the United States leveraged its relationships with Germany (Gerzhoy 2015), South Korea, Taiwan (Hersman & Peters 2006), and other countries to obtain their membership in the regime. Authors contend that even the fear of sanctions was often sufficient to keep countries on the non-nuclear path (Solingen 1994; Gavin 2015; Miller 2014, 2018). This should not be unexpected. Among other tools, Washington maintained control over the supply chain for nuclear energy programs, giving it the power to “turn off the tap” to segments of countries’ economies if they moved toward developing the bomb (Gheorghe 2019; Colgan & Miller 2019; Gibbons 2020). The power of the United States has often been so pronounced that some scholars believe legally forswearing nuclear weapons was the only option for many weaker countries (Gibbons 2022; Hunt 2022). Russia, and the Soviet Union before it, has also played a notable role in getting countries to join nuclear treaties (Gibbons & Herzog 2022). Its activities are, nonetheless, considerably less documented aside from some notable exceptions (e.g., Lanoszka 2018b). Timerbaev (1999) writes about the deployment of Soviet diplomats to Warsaw Pact state capitals in order to press leaders to join the NPT, a topic covered as well by Herzog (2021a). Eastern Bloc states and today’s customers of Russian nuclear energy technology maintain the same—if not greater— vulnerabilities to coercion and other types of pressure as U.S. client states (Miller & Volpe forthcoming). There is also historical evidence chronologizing collusion by the United States and 7 the Soviet Union in order to gain more adherents to the NPT and limit the size of the nuclear club (Shaker 1980; Coe & Vaynman 2015). There are, of course, many cases in which pressure provides a compelling explanation for why certain states joined international nuclear treaties. Yet, the literature still has considerable ground to cover. It would be useful for scholars to conduct studies investigating whether pressure from adversary countries can also persuade leaders to enter such agreements. Additionally, discussions of pressure by the great powers represent a top-down approach. What about accords like the TPNW—and before the Ban, NWFZs—that nuclear-armed states have been resistant to join? Bottom-up pressure is the current approach of nuclear disarmament campaigners, so there would be real-world implications to studying its efficacy. Global Normative Values An alternative viewpoint comes from the constructivist school of thought and its emphasis on the shaping power of international norms (Ruggie 1992; Wendt 1992; Hopf 1998). In theory, normative cascades (Finnemore & Sikkink 1998) and transnational advocacy networks (Keck & Sikkink 1999) could be influential in encouraging states to sign and ratify nuclear treaties. This has certainly been the hope of activists promoting the TPNW around the globe, many of whom express the belief that only normative stigmatization of the bomb can lead to lasting changes in the nuclear order (Mekata 2018; Acheson 2021). Studies of nuclear politics have long identified international norms as a potential driving force behind nuclear policy. In his seminal work on proliferation, Sagan (1996/1997) examined Ukraine’s decision to join the NPT and return to Moscow the Soviet nuclear arsenal it had inherited. Sagan concluded that evolving norms about the acceptability of nuclear weapons 8 possession strongly motivated Kyiv to accede to the NPT in 1994. Kyiv had no interest in becoming an international pariah like Iraq and North Korea. More recent studies by Mariana Budjeryn (2022a, 2022b) and Togzhan Kassenova (2022) suggest that these considerations likely mattered for Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine. On a similar note, Rublee (2009) argues that nuclear norms of this nature may be stronger than previously believed by using a broad range of historical case studies. And Mathy (forthcoming) provides statistical analyses indicating that regional normative pressure can make countries significantly more likely to join the TPNW. Other scholars note that nuclear norms may, in fact, just be part of a broad set of international values. For this reason, Fuhrmann and Lupu (2016) maintain that states’ latent treaty commitment preferences on other areas like trade and human rights are predictive of their behavior on nuclear agreements. This implied issue linkage is certainly not without its critics (e.g., Debs 2019). It does, however, raise concerns about the evolution of state preferences in the nuclear domain. If states select into agreements that are already in line with their normative preferences, then perhaps treaties do little to constrain national ambitions (Downs, Rocke, and Barsoom 1996; Von Stein 2005). Another promising area of inquiry involves bottom-up normative stigmatization. In the preceding section, I discussed how the political dynamics surrounding the TPNW diverge from the extant literature’s coverage. The same is true regarding norms. Most of today’s multilateral nuclear arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament treaties involved negotiation and promotion by the nuclear powers. The Nuclear Ban cuts against the grain and will require improved scholarly understanding—perhaps building on historical examples in other domains— of how the “nuclear have-nots” may be able to change the normative environment of the 9 “nuclear haves.” A few scholars have already started down this road (Ritchie & Egeland 2017; Sauer & Reveraert 2018; Considine 2019; Müller & Wunderlich 2020; Egel & Ward 2022), but much work remains ahead. Treaty-Contingent Benefits The fourth camp in the literature points to the potential role of treaty-contingent benefits in encouraging decisions about joining nuclear treaties. International relations scholarship has repeatedly demonstrated that states are willing to incur sovereignty costs to receive benefits associated with democratic and human rights institutions (Abbott & Snidal 2000; Vreeland 2008; Hyde 2011; Hafner-Burton, Mansfield, & Pevehouse 2015). Nuclear treaties are similar due to their contingent benefits, which usually entail unrestricted access to civilian nuclear energy markets. States agree to forswear the bomb and related nuclear activities alongside accepting often intrusive verification measures (see e.g., Roehrlich 2022). In exchange, they can secure legal guarantees for the unobstructed pursuit of atomic energy for electricity production. For example, Article IV of the NPT promises its members the “inalienable right” to “nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.”2 The Preamble to the TPNW repeats this language. This line of reasoning makes a great deal of sense. Over the years, states that have refused to become party to central agreements of the nonproliferation regime have been met with sanctions and trade bans from the multilateral Nuclear Suppliers Group, known as the NSG colloquially (Enia 2020; Koch 2022). Countries that produce and supply reactor technology and More specifically, Article IV, Paragraph 1 states: “Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of this Treaty.” 2 10 fabricate enriched-uranium fuel also have the power to grant opportunities in the nuclear market to states interested in nuclear energy production (Kroenig 2010; Fuhrmann 2012; Lanoszka 2018b; Gheorghe 2019; Gibbons 2020). However, such transactions are usually reserved for states that are parties to nuclear treaties and abide by the norms of the regime. In the NPT era, dissenters and defectors have primarily had to rely upon indigenous development, reverse engineering, secret programs, and gray and black market activities. It is no wonder that Solingen (1994) argues that nuclear proliferation presents significant risks to a country’s ability to successfully pursue a nuclear power program. Joining multilateral nuclear treaties has thus been the route most states have taken to ensure their access to the civilian nuclear marketplace. Indeed, qualitative cases in many political science studies have contended that various states joined the NPT and other treaties in order to receive these contingent benefits. Such cases cover a broad range of space and time: Egypt (Fahmy 2020), Japan (Paul 2000), and Romania (Gheorghe 2013, 2014) during various decades in the atomic age are among the exemplars. Etel Solingen (2007) even goes so far as to attribute decisions about nuclear restraint and joining the NPT across East Asia and the Middle East to these very same rationales. Yet, as compelling as the literature may seem, the explanatory power of this theoretical “camp” also has its limitations. The above authors write about cases in which national leaders viewed the NPT as a necessary condition for transacting on nuclear energy markets. But Spektor (2016) and Patti (2022) persuasively demonstrate that Brazilian officials actually saw multilateral nuclear agreements as hegemonic instruments used by the great powers to restrict energy access. The Brazilians were far from alone in this interpretation (Shaker 1980). Heterogeneous cross-national perceptions of nuclear arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament 11 agreements are characteristic of the historical record. These historical nuances can hinder attempts at developing generalizable theories of international relations. Domestic Politics The last group of studies I will focus on is those dealing with how domestic political forces may influence states to select into nuclear treaties. These sorts of arguments have established their place across the academic discipline of political science. Scholars have posited that domestic politics may often explain state negotiation posture on the global stage (Putnam 1998), territorial disputes (Huth 1994) and crisis bargaining (Milner 1997), and the development of international institutions (Moravcsik 1998). Moreover, foreign policy decision-making may create domestic audience costs for political leaders (Tomz 1997). These views contrast with several major theories that give no international weight to domestic politics (Krasner 1978; Waltz 1979; Mearsheimer 2001) and maintain that audience costs are nothing more than a figment of speculative fiction (Snyder & Borghard 2011). It is unsurprising given the scholarly record that numerous researchers have looked at the importance of political party dynamics, power brokers, and public opinion in nuclear negotiations (Solingen 2007; Hymans 2011). These sorts of explanations are also very prominent in single-case historical studies, which seek to make sense of a particular case at a particular time. It is undeniable that there are some domestic political considerations involved in nuclear negotiations. They can involve the timing of elections, leaders’ political capital, and contending legislative priorities. How these factors interact with states’ security environments, dyadic relationships with other parties, and the presence of international pressure and treatycontingent benefits requires further investigation. 12 One potentially promising avenue of inquiry is public opinion studies about multilateral nuclear treaties. If political (Chu & Recchia 2022) and military leaders (Lin-Greenberg 2021) care about public views as some study results indicate, then there is inherent value in collecting public opinion data. So far, scholars have analyzed public preferences on the Comprehensive NuclearTest-Ban Treaty (CTBT) (Herzog & Baron 2017) and the TPNW in countries ranging from Japan, to the Netherlands, to the United States (Baron, Gibbons, & Herzog 2020; Onderco et al. 2021; Herzog, Baron, & Gibbons 2022). These studies find quite high support for nuclear disarmament among a diverse set of publics, although anti-normative pushback from governments can in some cases significantly attenuate such backing. For the moment, public opinion surveys and survey experiments on nuclear treaty decision-making may pose just as many questions as they answer. Namely, if strong national majorities support nuclear disarmament, then why do the governments of nuclear-armed states continue to invest in upgrading and expanding their arsenals? Does this mean that public opinion is irrelevant, or simply that norms take time to change? Furthermore, it is noteworthy that these studies have been conducted in democratic countries. How might regime type factor into the domestic politics of nuclear agreements? Recent studies have shown that the Chinese (Egel & Hines 2021) and Russian publics (Smetana & Onderco 2022) have strong and sometimes surprising opinions on nuclear weapons issues. Surveying these publics in the future on a broader range of nuclear politics questions—including various treaties—would be a useful endeavor. Further Research Ahead Multilateral nuclear arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament treaties are of unquestionable importance. By banning the bomb and limiting activities that are central to its 13 development (e.g., nuclear explosive testing), these agreements help to reduce nuclear dangers worldwide. While there is evidence that such accords “work” at achieving their objectives (Fuhrmann & Lupu 2016; Kaplow 2022), why states join them often remains a mystery. Put simply, this phenomenon is in need of much more rigorous, data-driven theorization. In this chapter, I provided a summary of the enormous range of different viewpoints that scholars have on the topic. I did so by grouping the extant literature into “camps” associated with five main theoretical explanations: national security, international pressure, global norms, treatycontingent benefits, and domestic politics. These categories are hardly exhaustive, but they are nonetheless representative. Taken in the aggregate, they show that national decisions on forswearing the bomb may involve everything from a state’s security environment to back channel negotiations with allies, advocacy from activists, and the role of public opinion. The great variation in scholarly explanations shows just how difficult it is to pinpoint a single factor underlying complicated nuclear decisions. As in the nuclear proliferation literature (e.g., Sagan 1996/1997), it is probably best for scholars to embrace the possibility of multicausality. It is true, however, that multicausality can pose significant obstacles for creating generalizable international relations theory. Statistical analysis offers a way to examine multiple factors at once, although the studies addressing nuclear treaty decisions are few and far between. The most notable is Way and Sasikumar’s (2004) policy report concluding that states seeking security will not sign the NPT, but states seeking energy resources will. Their quantitative analysis reflects the historical record in several cases, but it also suffers from numerous shortcomings that affect its external validity. States facing serious security threats have often received nuclear assurances that gave them little 14 reason to remain outside the NPT (Debs & Monteiro 2017). Additionally, many states face challenging security environments and have opted for non-nuclear defense options. States that rely on nuclear deterrence and extended deterrence represent a minority of the world’s states, so it would be hasty to assume that seeking security implies holding out for nuclear options. Other states desired nuclear energy—like Brazil, as mentioned above—but did not want to join the treaty because they saw it as a discriminatory institution. Likewise, Karlas (2023) offers a statistical treatment of state participation in multilateral treaties that regulate weapons of mass destruction. His analysis shows that many of the factors discussed in this chapter may matter to different states, though there is often variation across space, time, and treaty type. In my own work and book manuscript in progress, I attempt to address some of the difficulties presented by multicausality and generalizability. I look at negotiators’ positions during the talks themselves and try to understand the relationship of their actions to later signature and ratification decisions. Overall, I find that there are oftentimes pronounced differences in how many leaders viewed the processes of signing and ratifying treaties that would result in legally forswearing nuclear arms. I thus theorize about the process as a whole and try to better understand how existing theoretical explanations make sense (or do not) within the framework of negotiations. Improved knowledge of the relationship between negotiation process, the availability of choices, and decision-making outcomes can help policymakers identify contextual opportunities and limitations. Scholars of nuclear politics also ought to consider what other areas of international relations literature have said about successful negotiations. For example, how might the nature and performance of potential mediators (Svensson 2009), interested international organizations 15 (Lundgren 2017), and the chair of formal talks (Tallberg 2010) affect nuclear negotiations? Admittedly, political scientists who are nuclear security specialists have often been islands unto themselves in the discipline, writing and speaking to each other only. But the scope and magnitude of the challenges entailed in achieving nuclear disarmament present one of the most difficult negotiations in human history. 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