China in Africa: Chinese-Angolan relations

The International Monetary Fund has predicted that China will overtake the United States as the world’s second largest economy by 2016 (“The Age of America Ends in 2016: IMF Predicts the Year China’s Economy Will Surpass U.S.” 2013). Previous to this declaration most analysts predicted that the United States’ economic hegemony would last until at least 2020. China’s rapid expansion, that many have called an economic ‘miracle’, began in 1978 when the Communist Party of China introduced capitalist, pro-market principles to the agricultural sector (“China’s Economic Miracle” 2012). The growth China has realized has been nothing short of spectacular and the remarkable progression has left the world’s most populous country with an unquenchable thirst for natural resources, mainly, oil. This resource race has manifested onto the African continent. China has adopted a foreign policy that has led many African countries to praise Chinese influence over the United States’ purported democratic ideals to one based on friendship, mutual respect and South-South cooperation (Kenneth Allen and Eva Baguma 2013). Using a social constructivist lens to address the way in which the West’s discourse has portrayed China, this paper will focus on the inaccuracies that define China’s role in Africa which are in direct contradiction with the case study of Chinese-Angolan relations. Furthermore, does this Western portrayal of China’s role in Africa truly compare to China’s present engagement with African countries on the footing of ‘equal partners’? It is important to first note that China has been involved in Africa since the 1950s, contrary to some Western analysis and media representations, which leads you to believe that China is a relative newcomer to Africa. China has been involved on the continent since it started investing there, mostly in infrastructure, during the postcolonial era (Harry G. Broadman 2008). As African countries began to become independent in the late 1950s, Beijing (People’s Republic of China) and Taipei (Republic of China) competed for official recognition under the understanding that only one could represent ‘China’ (Deborah Brautigam 2011). The discourse from China during this time was a strongly political one, its purpose was to show support to ‘brother countries’ in their fight for freedom from colonial powers (Laura Caniglia 2011). China offered a limited amount of assistance in the form of agricultural expertise, medical teams, and some construction projects. The Communist Chinese dealt on an official and formal level mainly with the more "radical" states of Africa, while Nationalist China preferred to engage with more “moderate” states (Leon M. S. Slawecki 1963). The Communist Party of China seemed to have the following objectives: to spread the Chinese brand of the Communist world revolution, with its concomitant anti-Americanism; to secure big-power status; to gain support in the United Nations; and, perhaps least of all, to obtain some of the strategic goods lacking in China (Leon M. S. Slawecki 1963). In the wake of Deng Xiaoping’s economic liberalization, Africa and China’s relations have moved past simple ideological ties toward more meaningful economic initiatives. Moving ahead to present day relations, China has shifted its strategy to substantial aid in loans, outright grants, and technical support, on the sole condition that recipient countries recognize its one-China policy (Laura Caniglia 2011). Following this line, China made great efforts to develop friendly and cooperative relations with countries all over the world, regardless of their political or ideological orientation (Wang Jisi 2011). These aspirations with respect to Africa culminated in November 2006, when China hosted the first Sino-African Summit, the Forum on China-African Cooperation, or FOCAC. Forty-Eight African leaders gathered in Beijing, it was an unprecedented South-South diplomatic gathering between one country, China, and an entire continent. The scale of the event caused further surprise and alarm in Western countries and triggered a flood of books and articles about China in Africa. Needless to say the West was skeptical about the concession agreements and acquisitions in Africa (Laura Caniglia 2011). Regardless of the West’s position, President at the time, Hu Jintao, reiterated China’s support towards Africa winning liberation and pursuing development in various fields for Africa. China looked to strengthen its Pax-Sino-Africana ties further, in the form of new trade initiatives, agricultural cooperation, debt relief, improved cultural ties, healthcare, training and some aid (Dambisa Moyo 2012). In March 2013, newly elected President Xi Jingping visited Tanzania, where he made a major foreign policy speech on China’s relations with Africa. Ironically enough the press conference took place in a Chinese-aided convention center, in Tanzania’s capital, Dar es Salaam (Xinhua English 2013). Xi spoke to continued bilateral cooperation between China and Africa. In 2012, two-way trade was nearly 200 billion (USD), and China’s foreign direct investment topped 15 billion in the same year (Xinhua English 2013). Xi’s rhetoric included talk of a community of shared destines, and similar historical experiences, common development tasks, as well as shared strategic interests, which have all bound the two sides closer together. In addition to historical connections, Xi addressed China’s intention of growing even closer to the African continent in the future, “China will intensify, not weaken, its efforts to expand relations with Africa” (Xinhua English 2013). Concrete assurances accompanied the President’s words, China will continue to expand investment and financing cooperation with Africa, and follow through on the commitment of providing a 20-billion-U.S.-dollar credit line to African nations from 2013 to 2015 (Xinhua English 2013). China has become Africa’s single largest trading partner, unseating the United States, which did 86 billion (USD) in trade with African in 2009. According to Chris Alden, author of China in Africa, two-way trade between China and Africa grew from 10 billion (USD) in 2000, to 90 billion USD in 2009 (Dambisa Moyo 2012). Given China’s role as Africa’s primary trading partner, the United States has seen this development as a threat to its own plans for the region. A Wikileaks cable has revealed that US Ambassador Johnnie Carson, the Assistant Secretary of State for Africa, stated that China is ‘a very aggressive and pernicious economic competitor with no morals, China is not in Africa for altruistic reasons, China is in Africa primarily for China’ (Deborah Brautigam 2011). China seems to be unfazed by this type of Western discourse, as Premier at the time, Wen Jiabao stated in 2010 when addressing China and the United States, “our common interests far outweigh our differences” (Wang Jisi 2011). Jiabao was alluding to a particular strategy espoused by Chinese analysts that favors Deng Xiaoping’s teaching of tao guang yang hui, or keeping a low profile in international affairs. The strategy holds that China is not capable of challenging Western primacy for the time being. Therefore, keeping a low profile in the coming decades will allow China to concentrate on domestic priorities, and that as a developing country, it should concentrate on economic development (Wang Jisi 2011). Economic development and the need for energy to sustain growth is a synergy China is well aware of. In 1993 China became a net importer of oil, ending three decades of self-sufficiency (Erica S. Downs 2004). The United States Energy Information Administration states that China uses 9.8 million barrels of oil a day, compared to the United States’ estimated 18.9 million barrels per day (“U.S. Energy Information Administration” 2011). Africa has become a frontline for energy resources between the United States and the emerging world power that is China. China’s sharply accelerating domestic energy demand, combined with it own decline in domestic petroleum and insufficient coal output, has spurred Beijing to pursue overseas sources of hydrocarbon fuels (Peter Brookes and Ji Hye Shin 2006). Angola has become a major energy partner in helping China meet its growing energy needs. Angola has emerged from civil war to form sustained peace since 2002. From having one of the most protracted conflicts in Africa, Angola has within five years of civil war become one of the most successful economies in sub-Saharan Africa (Indira Campos and Alex Vines 2008). This rebound is largely due to its vast energy resources, China in turn, has looked to bolster the relationship between the two nations. Between 1983, when Chinese-Angolan diplomatic relations began and 2007, 14 senior Chinese officials have held bilateral visits to Angola (Indira Campos and Alex Vines 2008). One of the major reasons for China’s perceived success in Africa is its ability to rapidly develop African countries’ poor infrastructure, which was the case in Angola. Chinese financial and technical assistance have kick-started over 100 projects in the areas of energy, water, health, education, telecommunications, fisheries, and public works (Indira Campos and Alex Vines 2008). These examples of pragmatic and strategic assistance are at the heart of Chinese foreign direct investment. The dynamics between the two countries was put very simply by Angolan president dos Santos in June 2006, “China needs natural resources and Angola wants development” (Indira Campos and Alex Vines 2008). After the Angolan civil war, China shifted its relations with the African nation towards economic endeavors. Crude oil represents 95% of Angola’s exports and is China’s main import (“The China-Angola Partnership: A Case Study of China’s Oil Relations in Africa” 2013). There have been various oil-backed loans from China to Angola in recent years, Angola as of 2007 has a credit line of 4 billion dollars that will be put towards infrastructure projects in return for Chinese access to energy resources. By most accounts, Angola is quite content with the infrastructure for energy trade-off. The Chinese have provided post-conflict infrastructure, which, crucially, Western donors so not fund. In addition, the IMF was loath to grant a loan to Angola due to the fact that they did not comply with the conditionalities set to qualify for such a loan (Maxi Schoeman 2007). Chinese loan criteria involve better conditions than commercial loans, lower interest rates and longer repayment times. Western credit lines Angola secured in 2004 demanded higher guarantees of oil, with no grace period and have higher interest rates (Indira Campos and Alex Vines 2008). Perhaps economist and best selling author Dambisa Moyo, put China’s strategy best, “China’s aid and trade strategies alone would make it a powerful international presence, but the nation’s investment strategy-and the way it intertwines with and supports the other two elements-puts the Asian upstart in a class of its own (Dambisa Moyo 2012). To be sure, in the future Angola will need to ensure they do not depend to heavily on Chinese energy exports. In 2011, it was estimated that China imported 623,000 barrels of oil per day from Angola. Angola was only behind the energy juggernaut, Saudi Arabia, both accounting for almost one-third of China’s total crude oil imports (U.S. Energy Information Administration 2012). The Center for Strategic and International Studies has pointed out that China’s growing role in Angola has generated both debate and speculation. It’s thirst for oil has driven the prices to unprecedented heights, which has helped Angola’s own economic growth and post civil war construction (Indira Campos and Alex Vines 2008). Reliance on oil exports can be dangerous however, due to the speculative nature of the commodities market. Oil will undoubtedly remain in high demand even in the shadow of the omnipresent peak oil thesis. In the future the Angolan government will have to ensure diversification of industry to remain competitive in the global market place. China’s infrastructure for resources policy in Angola should ensure this competitiveness. In light of the success China has had in Angola, China has been portrayed in Western media as a sinister foe, one that clings to state capitalism within the larger framework of communism. The Western world, namely the United States, has long treated terms such as ‘Marxism’ and ‘Communism’ as bad words, ones that have no place in the traditional political discourse. Increased Chinese integration in the African markets has naturally been interpreted as a deep threat to global planners in Washington. Political rhetoric has largely followed this trend. However, China’s massive stores of foreign currency, which was valued at 3.66 trillion this September (Bloomberg 2013) and general economic clout cannot be matched. On a 2011 visit to Zambia, then Secretary of State, Hilary Clinton gave a speech that warned of a “new colonialism” and then went on to say, “we saw that during colonial times it was easy to come in, take out natural resources, pay off leaders and leave” then adding “I would argue that there are more lessons to learn from the US and from democracies,” than China on investment matters…”The days of having outsiders some and extract the wealth of Africa for themselves leaving nothing or very little behind should be over in the 21st century” (John C.K. Daly 2012). Although the term “outsiders” was vague, it was taken as a direct criticism of China’s policies towards Africa. Whether one sees this as typical political rhetoric or not, it expresses the increasing tensions between China and the United States that is playing out on the African continent, a so-called proxy. A 2007 report titled, “Towards a Grand Strategy in an Uncertain World” (Dr. Klaus Naumann et al. 2007) spoke of China’s economic power, “that might be tempted to deter other nations with the weapons of finance and energy resources.” The report goes on to say that non-military deterrence represents a new phenomenon that has never been part of traditional military thinking. The United States continues to be the military hegemon, but the point being that China has the potential to resort to financial means rather than military force. This understanding is similar to that of Sun Tzu’s thoughts on war, “The supreme art of war is to subdue the enemy without fighting.” The report also warns of potential damage China could inflict on the American and world economies by cashing in their huge dollar reserves (Dr. Klaus Naumann et al. 2007). At the end of July, 2013, China had stockpiled 1.2773 trillion in US government treasury bonds (“What If China Stops Buying U.S. Government Debt?” 2013). American drones or tomahawk missiles cannot counter China’s unique financial hold over the United States Through a social constructivist lens, it is quite apparent that the ongoing war of words over Chinese infractions purported by the United States is part of a larger game at hand. Following the constructivist understanding of reality, which is considered a social construction, it is understood that the most powerful countries are able to set the agenda, creating their own assumptions and meanings in the process. Although social constructivists would take issue with any assumption of commonality, the discourse regarding China in Africa as inherently antithetical to U.S. shapes their own social reality. This discourse can circulate but the “brute” facts do not change, it is all a question of interpretation. The United States is a global military hegemon, and China’s state-centered form of capitalism has led them to become an economic hegemon, both are influential actors in international relations today. When Hilary Clinton talks about the specter of ‘new colonialism’ and the United States’ self declared ‘democratic values’ it is taken at face value because she is speaking from a position of power. The public that is interested in this discourse has been socialized to take her meaning as the right meaning, over the Chinese contention, and other critical viewpoints. However, norms do change, and if African public opinion is any measuring stick than change may have already occurred. In a 2007 PEW poll, African public opinion demonstrated the fact that Chinese influence in select African countries are much more favorable than the United States. The first major point is that favorable views of China and its investments in Africa outnumbered critical judgments by at least a 2-1 majority in virtually all of the 10 countries surveyed (Ethiopia, Ivory Coast, Ghana, Kenya, Mali, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania and Uganda). Second, the survey found that in nearly all African countries surveyed, more people view China’s influence positively than the same assessment of US influence. Third, across Africa, China’s influence is seen as growing faster than America’s, and China is almost universally viewed as “having a more beneficial impact on African countries than does the United States” (Dambisa Moyo 2012). What is interesting is the question: would Africans rather have American ‘democratic’ principles or roads, railways, schools, factories, and hospitals? Given the information from this survey the latter would seem to be true. Although recent polls have shown a small decline in positive public opinion towards China’s involvement in Africa, China is looking to bolster South-South partnerships. Former Botswana president Festus Mogae stated, “I find that the Chinese treat us as equals; the West treats us as former subjects” (Cecil Sagoe 2012). Much to the dismay of Western skeptics, China is undoubtedly an economic superpower that will one day pass the United States. Africa has and will continue to be a vital market in ensuring China’s own massive economic growth continues while helping African countries own prospects for development. China’s huge amounts of surplus capital and Africa’s need for development in almost all economic sectors make association between the two a positive for both sides. However, the West, mainly the United States have taken issue with the rise of China’s role in Africa as antithetical to their own desires for the region. China’s approach towards Africa involves trade partnerships based on egalitarian dynamics that hold parties as equals among all else. The example of Angola has illustrated the benefit China has had on developing a nation that was abandoned by the United States and IMF. In the future both China and its African counterparts will need to ensure no one side is to heavily dependent on another, in order for these partnerships to be truly long lasting and beneficial for both sides. China continues to reiterate the fact that it wants to foster increased South-South ties, if this comes at the problematic and misleading indignation of the West, so be it. Works Cited Bloomberg. 2013. “China’s Biggest Reserves Jump Since 2011 Shows Inflow.” Bloomberg. 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