Feyerabend’s Anarchism: A Political and Epistemological Analysis, 2022
Feyerabend famously labels his view in Against Method ‘epistemological anarchism.’ He arrives at ... more Feyerabend famously labels his view in Against Method ‘epistemological anarchism.’ He arrives at this view from engaging with scientific practice and its history. Here, he is keen to distinguish between epistemological anarchism from political anarchism and even casts doubt on the latter. The purpose of this paper is contrast thought on political anarchism with Feyerabend’s epistemological anarchism to appreciate, conceptualize, and critically discuss the political consequences Feyerabend draws from the latter. This involves understanding Feyerabend’s understanding of scientific inquiry and its place in political philosophy, society, and life.
There has been a resurgence between two closely related discussions concerning modern science fun... more There has been a resurgence between two closely related discussions concerning modern science funding policy. The first revolves around the coherence and usefulness of the distinction between basic and applied science and the second concerns whether science should be free to pursue research according to its own internal standards or pursue socially responsible research agendas that are held accountable to moral or political standards. In this paper, I argue that the distinction between basic and applied science, and the concomitant debate about freedom and social responsibility, require revision. I contend that the distinction can only be maintained in cases of urgent science. I go on to elucidate the notion of urgent science using a case study from research of the climate refugee crisis.
HOPOS: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science, 2020
The problem of the empirical basis is one of the most prominent difficulties within the Popperian... more The problem of the empirical basis is one of the most prominent difficulties within the Popperian tradition. Some claim that Popper’s anti-inductivism and antipsychologism lead to the concession that science has no empirical basis. Recent commentators have focused on this problem in Popper’s methodology. However, the problem also arises in a peculiar way in the thought of two underdiscussed members of the Popperian tradition: William Bartley and Paul Feyerabend. In this article, I aim to accomplish three primary goals. First, I argue that defenses of Popper’s solution to the problem of the empirical basis fail to address the deeper issues that have been pointed out by Popper’s critics. Second, I show how, despite Bartley’s efforts, he also succumbs to a modified version of the problem of the empirical basis. However, Bartley’s later work in evolutionary epistemology provides a more sensible response to the problem. Finally, I show how the problem arises in two distinct senses within Feyerabend’s methodology. I show how Feyerabend accidentally dissolves one sense of the problem and then provide a proposal for remedying the second version of the problem.
Bernard Williams notes how Aristotle’s doctrine of the mean, or the view that one should always p... more Bernard Williams notes how Aristotle’s doctrine of the mean, or the view that one should always pursue the mean between excess and deficiency, is an implicit endorsement of a depressingly conservative approach to life. As such, the ‘good life’ in Aristotle’s thought is bereft of existential vibrancy and colour leaving it as an unattractive theory of how we ought to live. This paper aims to show how this characterization is a misrepresentation and demonstrate how such existential concerns can be addressed within an Aristotelian framework. I will accomplish this by demonstrating how Friedrich Nietzsche’s notion of the ‘Dionysian spirit’, understood as a state of spiritual intoxication, can be reconciled with Aristotle’s framework. While the Dionysian spirit is prima facie incompatible with this framework, since it explicitly values irrational self-experimentation through the expression of instincts as opposed to rational reflection, I will argue that it can be accommodated in Aristot...
From the 1970s onwards, Feyerabend argues against the freedom of science. This will seem strange ... more From the 1970s onwards, Feyerabend argues against the freedom of science. This will seem strange to some, as his epistemological anarchism is often taken to suggest that scientists should be free of even the most basic and obvious norms of science. His argument against the freedom of science is heavily influenced by his case study of the interference of Chinese communists in mainland China during the 1950s wherein the government forced local universities to continue researching traditional Chinese medicine rather than Western medicine. Feyerabend claims this move was justifiable and, eventually, vindicated by the resulting research which was beneficial for locals and the West at large. The purpose of this paper is to provide a comprehensive overview and analysis on Feyerabend's views on the freedom of science and his social commentary on US science funding policy that follows therefrom. This proves to be exceedingly difficult because Feyerabend's writings on the subject are filled with gaps, unnoticed tensions, and cognitive dissonance. Still, I think Feyerabend's scattered insights and the contradictions that emerge lead to an interesting microcosm of the issues contained in the freedom of science debate.
International Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 2020
ABSTRACT The emerging consensus in the secondary literature on Duhem is that his notion of ‘good ... more ABSTRACT The emerging consensus in the secondary literature on Duhem is that his notion of ‘good sense’ is a virtue of individual scientists that guides them choosing between empirically equal rival theories (Stump 2007. “Pierre Duhem’s Virtue Epistemology.” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 38 (1): 149–159; Ivanova 2010. “Pierre Duhem’s Good Sense as a Guide to Theory Choice.” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 41 (1): 58–64; Fairweather 2011. “The Epistemic Value of Good Sense.” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 43 (1): 139–146; Bhakthavatsalam (2017). “Duhemian Good Sense and Agent Reliabilism.” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 64: 22–29). In this paper, I argue that good sense is irrelevant for theory choice within Duhem’s conception of scientific methodology. Theory choice, for Duhem, is either a pseudo-problem or addressed purely by empirical and formal desiderata depending on how it is understood. I go on to provide a positive interpretation of good sense as a feature of scientific communities that undergo particular forms of education that allow scientists to abandon theory pursuit. I conclude by suggesting that this interpretation entails that virtue epistemological readings of Duhem are insufficient for understanding good sense; we must employ a social epistemological perspective.
Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A, 2019
• I provide an account in which Feyerabend's critical philosophy is a sustained and developing cr... more • I provide an account in which Feyerabend's critical philosophy is a sustained and developing criticism against rationalism. • I show how rationalism is presupposed by Feyerabend'sinterlocutors and this is what Feyerabend finds objectionable about these positions • I contrast my reading of Feyerabend against Oberheim and Farrell's interpretation. Recent general characterizations of Feyerabend's philosophy suggest that it is extremely fractured. Throughout his career, he wrote on a plethora of seemingly disconnected topics and some of his own selfdescriptive remarks suggest that he could not be pinned down to a single view. Recent scholarship has suggested that this characterization cannot be correct when understanding Feyerabend's positive philosophy (Shaw, 2017). In this paper, I demonstrate that Feyerabend's critical philosophy from his first paper as a graduate student, in 1948, up until the late 1970s represents a coherent yet evolving line of argument against a position he called rationalism. I also show that my interpretation is preferable to alternative readings in the contemporary literature (Farrell, 2003; Oberheim, 2005). By showing this, I hope to identify greater coherence in Feyerabend's early to mid-work and uncover the nature of his critical philosophy. 1. Preamble And Reason, at last, joins all those other abstract monsters such as Obligation, Duty, Morality, Truth and their more concrete predecessors, the Gods, which were once used to intimidate man and restrict his free and happy development: it withers away … (Feyerabend, 1975, 180). 'Das war eine graudsame Salbe!' [That was a cruel ointment!]'-I suspect this, or some similar exclamation will spring to the lips of many readers of Paul Feyerabend (Naess, 1975, 183).
While many philosophers speak of ‘pluralism’ within philosophy of biology, there has been little ... more While many philosophers speak of ‘pluralism’ within philosophy of biology, there has been little said about what such pluralism amounts to or what its underlying assumptions are. This has provoked so me anxiety about whether pluralism is compatible with their commitment to naturalism (Cussins 1992). This paper surveys three prominent pluralist positions (Sandra Mitchell and Michael Dietrich’s (2006) ‘integrative pluralism’, and both Peter Godfrey-Smith’s (1993) and Beth Preston’s (1998) pluralist analyses of functional explanations in evolutionary biology) and demonstrates how all three are committed to a form of pragmatism. This analysis both clarifies the justification and grounding of pluralism and allows these pluralisms to avoid the criticisms of Cussins. I close by making some more general points about pluralism and its relationship to history and integration.
To anyone vaguely aware of Feyerabend, the title of this paper would appear as an oxymoron. For F... more To anyone vaguely aware of Feyerabend, the title of this paper would appear as an oxymoron. For Feyerabend, it is often thought, science is an anarchic practice with no discernible structure. Against this trend, I elaborate the groundwork that Feyerabend has provided for the beginnings of an approach to organizing scientific research. Specifically, I argue that Feyerabend's pluralism, once suitably modified, provides a plausible account of how to organize science. These modifications come from C.S. Peirce's account of the economics of theory pursuit, which has since been corroborated by empirical findings in the social sciences. I go on to contrast this approach with the conception of a 'well-ordered science' as outlined by Kitcher (Science, truth, and democracy, Oxford University Press, New York, 2001), Cartwright (Philos Sci 73(5):981-990, 2006), which rests on the assumption that we can predict the content of future research. I show how Feyerabend has already given us reasons to think that this model is much more limited than it is usually understood. I conclude by showing how models of resource allocation, specifically those of Kitcher (
Spontaneous Generations: A Journal for the History and Philosophy of Science, 2018
There has been a great deal of skepticism towards the value of the realism/anti-realism debate. M... more There has been a great deal of skepticism towards the value of the realism/anti-realism debate. More specifically, many have argued that plausible formulations of realism and anti-realism do not differ substantially in any way (Fine 1986; Stein 1989; Blackburn 2002). In this paper, I argue against this trend by demonstrating how a hypothetical resolution of the debate, through deeper engagement with the historical record, has important implications for our criterion of theory pursuit and science policy. I do this by revisiting Arthur Fine’s ‘small handful’ argument for realism and show how the debate centers on whether continuity (either ontological or structural) should be an indicator for the future fruitfulness of a theory. I then demonstrate how these debates work in practice by considering the case of the Human Brain Project. I close by considering some potential practical considerations of formulating meta-inductions. By doing this, I contribute three insights to the current d...
Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A, 2017
The near consensus in the secondary literature on Feyerabend is that his epistemological anarchis... more The near consensus in the secondary literature on Feyerabend is that his epistemological anarchism, characterized by the slogan 'anything goes', was not a positive proposal but the conclusion of a reductio argument against his opponents (
In this paper, we demonstrate how a systematic taxonomy of stances can help elucidate two classic... more In this paper, we demonstrate how a systematic taxonomy of stances can help elucidate two classic debates of the historical turn-the Lakatos-Feyerabend debate concerning theory rejection and the Feyerabend-Kuhn debate about pluralism during normal science. We contend that Kuhn, Feyerabend, and Lakatos were often talking at cross-purposes due to the lack of an agreed upon taxonomy of stances. Specifically, we provide three distinct stances that scientists take towards theories: acceptance of a theory as the best available description of its domain, use of a theory in practical applications, and pursuit (elaboration) of a theory. We argue that in the Lakatos-Feyerabend debate, Lakatos was concerned with acceptance whereas Feyerabend was mainly concerned with pursuit. Additionally, we show how Feyerabend and Kuhn's debate on the role of pluralism/monism in normal science involved a crucial conflation of all three stances. Finally, we outline a few general lessons concerning the process of scientific change.
The goal of this dissertation is to reconstruct, critically evaluate, and apply the pluralism of ... more The goal of this dissertation is to reconstruct, critically evaluate, and apply the pluralism of Paul Feyerabend. I conclude by suggesting future points of contact between Feyerabend’s pluralism and topics of interest in contemporary philosophy of science. I begin, in Chapter 1, by reconstructing Feyerabend’s critical philosophy. I show how his published works from 1948 until 1970 show a remarkably consistent argumentative strategy which becomes more refined and general as Feyerabend’s thought matures. Specifically, I argue that Feyerabend develops a persuasive case against rationalism, or the thesis that there exist normative and exclusive rules of scientific rationality. In Chapter 2, I reconstruct Feyerabend’s pluralism and detail its relationship to his humanitarianism and epistemological anarchism. I understand Feyerabend’s pluralism as the combination of the principles of proliferation and tenacity. I show the evolution and justification of these principles from Feyerabend’s e...
Feyerabend is infamous for his defense of pluralism, which he extends to every topic he discusses... more Feyerabend is infamous for his defense of pluralism, which he extends to every topic he discusses. Disagreement, a by-product of this pluralism, becomes a sign of flourishing critical communities. In Feyerabend’s political works, he extends this pluralism from science to democratic societies and incorporates his earlier work on scientific methodology into a procedure for designing just policy. However, a description and analysis of Feyerabend’s conception of disagreement is lacking. In this paper, I reconstruct and assess Feyerabend’s conception of disagreement, with a particular emphasis on the role of experts, and its role in the formation of science policy. I go on to assess this argument in light of recent literature on manufactured disagreement on politically contentious science policy (Oreskes and Conway in Merchants of doubt: How a handful of scientists obscured the truth on issues from tobacco smoke to global warming, Bloomsbury Publishing, Indianapolis, 2011). I conclude by suggesting some prospects and problems for de-idealizing Feyerabend’s position on disagreement to see whether it may be plausibly implemented.
While the scientonomic workflow guiding the development of a general theory of scientific change ... more While the scientonomic workflow guiding the development of a general theory of scientific change has been practiced for nearly four years, it has yet to be formally evaluated. The goal of this paper is to fill this gap with a critical appraisal of the practice and theoretical underpinnings of the workflow currently used in scientonomy. First, we consider the traditional workflow which uses publications as the primary vehicle for substantive epistemic change and find that it fails to be sufficiently transparent or inclusive and is ambiguous at decisive points. Conversely, as we argue, the scientonomic workflow has the potential to succeed where the traditional workflow fails and thus provides a promising alternative workflow. We then go on to note a number of practical and theoretical problems that have arisen upon reflection on the scientonomic workflow and suggest some modifications to the workflow and to our practices. This paper takes the first steps in improving the workflow to ...
Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A
Well-known epistemologies of science have implications for how best to understand knowledge trans... more Well-known epistemologies of science have implications for how best to understand knowledge transfer (KT). Yet, to date, no serious attempt has been made to explicate these particular implications. This paper infers views about KT from two popular epistemologies; what we characterize as incommensurabilitist views (after Devitt, 2001; Bird, 2002, 2008; Sankey and Hoyningen-Huene 2013) and voluntarist views (after Van Fraassen, 1984; Dupré, 2001; Chakravartty, 2015). We argue views of the former sort define the methodological, ontological, and social conditions under which research operates within 'different worlds' (to use Kuhn's expression), and entail that genuine KTs under those conditions should be difficult or even impossible. By contrast, more liberal voluntarist views recognize epistemological processes that allow for transfers across different sciences even under such conditions. After outlining these antithetical positions, we identify two kinds of KTs present in well-known episodes in the history of ecology-specifically, successful model transfers from chemical kinetics and thermodynamics into areas of ecological research-which reveal significant limitations of incommensurabilitist views. We conclude by discussing how the selected examples support a pluralistic voluntarism regarding KT.
Feyerabend’s Anarchism: A Political and Epistemological Analysis, 2022
Feyerabend famously labels his view in Against Method ‘epistemological anarchism.’ He arrives at ... more Feyerabend famously labels his view in Against Method ‘epistemological anarchism.’ He arrives at this view from engaging with scientific practice and its history. Here, he is keen to distinguish between epistemological anarchism from political anarchism and even casts doubt on the latter. The purpose of this paper is contrast thought on political anarchism with Feyerabend’s epistemological anarchism to appreciate, conceptualize, and critically discuss the political consequences Feyerabend draws from the latter. This involves understanding Feyerabend’s understanding of scientific inquiry and its place in political philosophy, society, and life.
There has been a resurgence between two closely related discussions concerning modern science fun... more There has been a resurgence between two closely related discussions concerning modern science funding policy. The first revolves around the coherence and usefulness of the distinction between basic and applied science and the second concerns whether science should be free to pursue research according to its own internal standards or pursue socially responsible research agendas that are held accountable to moral or political standards. In this paper, I argue that the distinction between basic and applied science, and the concomitant debate about freedom and social responsibility, require revision. I contend that the distinction can only be maintained in cases of urgent science. I go on to elucidate the notion of urgent science using a case study from research of the climate refugee crisis.
HOPOS: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science, 2020
The problem of the empirical basis is one of the most prominent difficulties within the Popperian... more The problem of the empirical basis is one of the most prominent difficulties within the Popperian tradition. Some claim that Popper’s anti-inductivism and antipsychologism lead to the concession that science has no empirical basis. Recent commentators have focused on this problem in Popper’s methodology. However, the problem also arises in a peculiar way in the thought of two underdiscussed members of the Popperian tradition: William Bartley and Paul Feyerabend. In this article, I aim to accomplish three primary goals. First, I argue that defenses of Popper’s solution to the problem of the empirical basis fail to address the deeper issues that have been pointed out by Popper’s critics. Second, I show how, despite Bartley’s efforts, he also succumbs to a modified version of the problem of the empirical basis. However, Bartley’s later work in evolutionary epistemology provides a more sensible response to the problem. Finally, I show how the problem arises in two distinct senses within Feyerabend’s methodology. I show how Feyerabend accidentally dissolves one sense of the problem and then provide a proposal for remedying the second version of the problem.
Bernard Williams notes how Aristotle’s doctrine of the mean, or the view that one should always p... more Bernard Williams notes how Aristotle’s doctrine of the mean, or the view that one should always pursue the mean between excess and deficiency, is an implicit endorsement of a depressingly conservative approach to life. As such, the ‘good life’ in Aristotle’s thought is bereft of existential vibrancy and colour leaving it as an unattractive theory of how we ought to live. This paper aims to show how this characterization is a misrepresentation and demonstrate how such existential concerns can be addressed within an Aristotelian framework. I will accomplish this by demonstrating how Friedrich Nietzsche’s notion of the ‘Dionysian spirit’, understood as a state of spiritual intoxication, can be reconciled with Aristotle’s framework. While the Dionysian spirit is prima facie incompatible with this framework, since it explicitly values irrational self-experimentation through the expression of instincts as opposed to rational reflection, I will argue that it can be accommodated in Aristot...
From the 1970s onwards, Feyerabend argues against the freedom of science. This will seem strange ... more From the 1970s onwards, Feyerabend argues against the freedom of science. This will seem strange to some, as his epistemological anarchism is often taken to suggest that scientists should be free of even the most basic and obvious norms of science. His argument against the freedom of science is heavily influenced by his case study of the interference of Chinese communists in mainland China during the 1950s wherein the government forced local universities to continue researching traditional Chinese medicine rather than Western medicine. Feyerabend claims this move was justifiable and, eventually, vindicated by the resulting research which was beneficial for locals and the West at large. The purpose of this paper is to provide a comprehensive overview and analysis on Feyerabend's views on the freedom of science and his social commentary on US science funding policy that follows therefrom. This proves to be exceedingly difficult because Feyerabend's writings on the subject are filled with gaps, unnoticed tensions, and cognitive dissonance. Still, I think Feyerabend's scattered insights and the contradictions that emerge lead to an interesting microcosm of the issues contained in the freedom of science debate.
International Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 2020
ABSTRACT The emerging consensus in the secondary literature on Duhem is that his notion of ‘good ... more ABSTRACT The emerging consensus in the secondary literature on Duhem is that his notion of ‘good sense’ is a virtue of individual scientists that guides them choosing between empirically equal rival theories (Stump 2007. “Pierre Duhem’s Virtue Epistemology.” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 38 (1): 149–159; Ivanova 2010. “Pierre Duhem’s Good Sense as a Guide to Theory Choice.” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 41 (1): 58–64; Fairweather 2011. “The Epistemic Value of Good Sense.” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 43 (1): 139–146; Bhakthavatsalam (2017). “Duhemian Good Sense and Agent Reliabilism.” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 64: 22–29). In this paper, I argue that good sense is irrelevant for theory choice within Duhem’s conception of scientific methodology. Theory choice, for Duhem, is either a pseudo-problem or addressed purely by empirical and formal desiderata depending on how it is understood. I go on to provide a positive interpretation of good sense as a feature of scientific communities that undergo particular forms of education that allow scientists to abandon theory pursuit. I conclude by suggesting that this interpretation entails that virtue epistemological readings of Duhem are insufficient for understanding good sense; we must employ a social epistemological perspective.
Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A, 2019
• I provide an account in which Feyerabend's critical philosophy is a sustained and developing cr... more • I provide an account in which Feyerabend's critical philosophy is a sustained and developing criticism against rationalism. • I show how rationalism is presupposed by Feyerabend'sinterlocutors and this is what Feyerabend finds objectionable about these positions • I contrast my reading of Feyerabend against Oberheim and Farrell's interpretation. Recent general characterizations of Feyerabend's philosophy suggest that it is extremely fractured. Throughout his career, he wrote on a plethora of seemingly disconnected topics and some of his own selfdescriptive remarks suggest that he could not be pinned down to a single view. Recent scholarship has suggested that this characterization cannot be correct when understanding Feyerabend's positive philosophy (Shaw, 2017). In this paper, I demonstrate that Feyerabend's critical philosophy from his first paper as a graduate student, in 1948, up until the late 1970s represents a coherent yet evolving line of argument against a position he called rationalism. I also show that my interpretation is preferable to alternative readings in the contemporary literature (Farrell, 2003; Oberheim, 2005). By showing this, I hope to identify greater coherence in Feyerabend's early to mid-work and uncover the nature of his critical philosophy. 1. Preamble And Reason, at last, joins all those other abstract monsters such as Obligation, Duty, Morality, Truth and their more concrete predecessors, the Gods, which were once used to intimidate man and restrict his free and happy development: it withers away … (Feyerabend, 1975, 180). 'Das war eine graudsame Salbe!' [That was a cruel ointment!]'-I suspect this, or some similar exclamation will spring to the lips of many readers of Paul Feyerabend (Naess, 1975, 183).
While many philosophers speak of ‘pluralism’ within philosophy of biology, there has been little ... more While many philosophers speak of ‘pluralism’ within philosophy of biology, there has been little said about what such pluralism amounts to or what its underlying assumptions are. This has provoked so me anxiety about whether pluralism is compatible with their commitment to naturalism (Cussins 1992). This paper surveys three prominent pluralist positions (Sandra Mitchell and Michael Dietrich’s (2006) ‘integrative pluralism’, and both Peter Godfrey-Smith’s (1993) and Beth Preston’s (1998) pluralist analyses of functional explanations in evolutionary biology) and demonstrates how all three are committed to a form of pragmatism. This analysis both clarifies the justification and grounding of pluralism and allows these pluralisms to avoid the criticisms of Cussins. I close by making some more general points about pluralism and its relationship to history and integration.
To anyone vaguely aware of Feyerabend, the title of this paper would appear as an oxymoron. For F... more To anyone vaguely aware of Feyerabend, the title of this paper would appear as an oxymoron. For Feyerabend, it is often thought, science is an anarchic practice with no discernible structure. Against this trend, I elaborate the groundwork that Feyerabend has provided for the beginnings of an approach to organizing scientific research. Specifically, I argue that Feyerabend's pluralism, once suitably modified, provides a plausible account of how to organize science. These modifications come from C.S. Peirce's account of the economics of theory pursuit, which has since been corroborated by empirical findings in the social sciences. I go on to contrast this approach with the conception of a 'well-ordered science' as outlined by Kitcher (Science, truth, and democracy, Oxford University Press, New York, 2001), Cartwright (Philos Sci 73(5):981-990, 2006), which rests on the assumption that we can predict the content of future research. I show how Feyerabend has already given us reasons to think that this model is much more limited than it is usually understood. I conclude by showing how models of resource allocation, specifically those of Kitcher (
Spontaneous Generations: A Journal for the History and Philosophy of Science, 2018
There has been a great deal of skepticism towards the value of the realism/anti-realism debate. M... more There has been a great deal of skepticism towards the value of the realism/anti-realism debate. More specifically, many have argued that plausible formulations of realism and anti-realism do not differ substantially in any way (Fine 1986; Stein 1989; Blackburn 2002). In this paper, I argue against this trend by demonstrating how a hypothetical resolution of the debate, through deeper engagement with the historical record, has important implications for our criterion of theory pursuit and science policy. I do this by revisiting Arthur Fine’s ‘small handful’ argument for realism and show how the debate centers on whether continuity (either ontological or structural) should be an indicator for the future fruitfulness of a theory. I then demonstrate how these debates work in practice by considering the case of the Human Brain Project. I close by considering some potential practical considerations of formulating meta-inductions. By doing this, I contribute three insights to the current d...
Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A, 2017
The near consensus in the secondary literature on Feyerabend is that his epistemological anarchis... more The near consensus in the secondary literature on Feyerabend is that his epistemological anarchism, characterized by the slogan 'anything goes', was not a positive proposal but the conclusion of a reductio argument against his opponents (
In this paper, we demonstrate how a systematic taxonomy of stances can help elucidate two classic... more In this paper, we demonstrate how a systematic taxonomy of stances can help elucidate two classic debates of the historical turn-the Lakatos-Feyerabend debate concerning theory rejection and the Feyerabend-Kuhn debate about pluralism during normal science. We contend that Kuhn, Feyerabend, and Lakatos were often talking at cross-purposes due to the lack of an agreed upon taxonomy of stances. Specifically, we provide three distinct stances that scientists take towards theories: acceptance of a theory as the best available description of its domain, use of a theory in practical applications, and pursuit (elaboration) of a theory. We argue that in the Lakatos-Feyerabend debate, Lakatos was concerned with acceptance whereas Feyerabend was mainly concerned with pursuit. Additionally, we show how Feyerabend and Kuhn's debate on the role of pluralism/monism in normal science involved a crucial conflation of all three stances. Finally, we outline a few general lessons concerning the process of scientific change.
The goal of this dissertation is to reconstruct, critically evaluate, and apply the pluralism of ... more The goal of this dissertation is to reconstruct, critically evaluate, and apply the pluralism of Paul Feyerabend. I conclude by suggesting future points of contact between Feyerabend’s pluralism and topics of interest in contemporary philosophy of science. I begin, in Chapter 1, by reconstructing Feyerabend’s critical philosophy. I show how his published works from 1948 until 1970 show a remarkably consistent argumentative strategy which becomes more refined and general as Feyerabend’s thought matures. Specifically, I argue that Feyerabend develops a persuasive case against rationalism, or the thesis that there exist normative and exclusive rules of scientific rationality. In Chapter 2, I reconstruct Feyerabend’s pluralism and detail its relationship to his humanitarianism and epistemological anarchism. I understand Feyerabend’s pluralism as the combination of the principles of proliferation and tenacity. I show the evolution and justification of these principles from Feyerabend’s e...
Feyerabend is infamous for his defense of pluralism, which he extends to every topic he discusses... more Feyerabend is infamous for his defense of pluralism, which he extends to every topic he discusses. Disagreement, a by-product of this pluralism, becomes a sign of flourishing critical communities. In Feyerabend’s political works, he extends this pluralism from science to democratic societies and incorporates his earlier work on scientific methodology into a procedure for designing just policy. However, a description and analysis of Feyerabend’s conception of disagreement is lacking. In this paper, I reconstruct and assess Feyerabend’s conception of disagreement, with a particular emphasis on the role of experts, and its role in the formation of science policy. I go on to assess this argument in light of recent literature on manufactured disagreement on politically contentious science policy (Oreskes and Conway in Merchants of doubt: How a handful of scientists obscured the truth on issues from tobacco smoke to global warming, Bloomsbury Publishing, Indianapolis, 2011). I conclude by suggesting some prospects and problems for de-idealizing Feyerabend’s position on disagreement to see whether it may be plausibly implemented.
While the scientonomic workflow guiding the development of a general theory of scientific change ... more While the scientonomic workflow guiding the development of a general theory of scientific change has been practiced for nearly four years, it has yet to be formally evaluated. The goal of this paper is to fill this gap with a critical appraisal of the practice and theoretical underpinnings of the workflow currently used in scientonomy. First, we consider the traditional workflow which uses publications as the primary vehicle for substantive epistemic change and find that it fails to be sufficiently transparent or inclusive and is ambiguous at decisive points. Conversely, as we argue, the scientonomic workflow has the potential to succeed where the traditional workflow fails and thus provides a promising alternative workflow. We then go on to note a number of practical and theoretical problems that have arisen upon reflection on the scientonomic workflow and suggest some modifications to the workflow and to our practices. This paper takes the first steps in improving the workflow to ...
Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A
Well-known epistemologies of science have implications for how best to understand knowledge trans... more Well-known epistemologies of science have implications for how best to understand knowledge transfer (KT). Yet, to date, no serious attempt has been made to explicate these particular implications. This paper infers views about KT from two popular epistemologies; what we characterize as incommensurabilitist views (after Devitt, 2001; Bird, 2002, 2008; Sankey and Hoyningen-Huene 2013) and voluntarist views (after Van Fraassen, 1984; Dupré, 2001; Chakravartty, 2015). We argue views of the former sort define the methodological, ontological, and social conditions under which research operates within 'different worlds' (to use Kuhn's expression), and entail that genuine KTs under those conditions should be difficult or even impossible. By contrast, more liberal voluntarist views recognize epistemological processes that allow for transfers across different sciences even under such conditions. After outlining these antithetical positions, we identify two kinds of KTs present in well-known episodes in the history of ecology-specifically, successful model transfers from chemical kinetics and thermodynamics into areas of ecological research-which reveal significant limitations of incommensurabilitist views. We conclude by discussing how the selected examples support a pluralistic voluntarism regarding KT.
In Quantum Ontology, Peter Lewis attempts to accomplishes two tasks: provide a general and non-te... more In Quantum Ontology, Peter Lewis attempts to accomplishes two tasks: provide a general and non-technical presentation of the important discoveries and debates within the history of quantum mechanics (QM) for philosophical consumption and compare these findings to contemporary metaphysical debates. To clarify, Lewis does not attempt to show what implications quantum phenomena (QP) have for metaphysics; physical theory on its own doesn't dictate metaphysical conclusions since it may turn out to be false. Rather, this book aims to broadens the scope of metaphysical debates and shows how taking QP seriously can revise classical assumptions abound in current metaphysics.
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Papers by Jamie Shaw