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Damiano Costa

Universita' della Svizzera Italiana, Institute of Philosophy, Faculty Member

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Director of the MAP - the Research Master at USI, Lugano: www.usi.ch/map

Deputy Director of the Institute of Philosophy, Lugano.

Member of eidos - the Centre in Metaphysics: http://www.eidoscentre.org

PI of the SNF Starting Grant "Temporal Existence": https://damianocosta.com/snf-starting-grant-temporal-existence/

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Papers by Damiano Costa

What is priority monism? Reply to Kovacs

Inquiry

Priority monism is the view that the cosmos is the basic concrete entity on which each of its par... more Priority monism is the view that the cosmos is the basic concrete entity on which each of its parts depend. Kovacs has recently argued that none of the classical notions of dependence could be used to spell out priority monism. I argue that four notions of dependence-namely rigid existential dependence, generic existential dependence, explanatory dependence, and generalised explanatory dependence-can indeed be used to spell out priority monism, and specify the conditions under which this is possible.

Aristotelian universals, strong immanence, and construction

Synthese

The Aristotelian view of universals, according to which each universal generically depends for it... more The Aristotelian view of universals, according to which each universal generically depends for its existence on its instantiations, has recently come under attack by a series of ground-theoretic arguments. The last such arguments, presented by Raven (2022), promises to offer several significant improvements over its predecessors, such as avoiding commitment to the transitivity of ground and offering new reasons for the metaphysical priority of universals over their instantiations. In this paper, we argue that Raven's argument does not effectively avoid said commitment and that Raven's new reasons fail. Moreover, we present a novel ground-theoretic interpretation of the Aristotelian view, referred to as strong immanence, and introduce a new argument against the Aristotelian view, intended to sidestep any commitment to the transitivity of ground.

(forth.), Fine's Monster Objection Defanged, Philosophical Quarterly

Philosophical Quarterly

The Monster objection has been often considered one of the main reasons to explore nonstandard me... more The Monster objection has been often considered one of the main reasons to explore nonstandard mereological views, such as hylomorphism. Still, it has been rarely discussed and then only in a cursory fashion. This paper fills this gap by offering the first thorough assessment of the objection. It argues that different metaphysical stances, such as presentism, three-and four-dimensionalism, provide different ways of undermining the objection.

Aquinas on the Existence of the Future: A Response to Gili

European Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 2020

I defend my paper "Aquinas, Geach, and Existence" against objections from Luca Gili, who argued t... more

Persistence in Time

Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2020

(forth.), "Mereological Endurantism Defined", Inquiry

Inquiry

I develop a definition of mereological endurantism which overcomes objections that have been prop... more

(forth.), "The Multi-location Trilemma", Erkenntnis

by Damiano Costa and Claudio Calosi

Erkenntnis

The possibility of multilocation --- of one entity having more than one exact location --- is req... more The possibility of multilocation --- of one entity having more than one exact location --- is required by several metaphysical theories such as the immanentist theory of universals and three-dimensionalism about persistence. One of the most pressing challenges for multi-location theorists is that of making sense of exact location --- in that extant definitions of exact location entail a principle called Functionality, according to which nothing can have more than one exact location. Recently in a number of promising papers, Antony Eagle has proposed and defended a definition of exact location in terms of weak location that does not entail Functionality. This paper provides the first thorough assessment of Eagle’s proposal. In particular, we argue that it cannot account for (i) location of immanent universals, (ii) multi-location of mereologically changing three-dimensional objects , (iii) multi-location of mereologically complex objects, and (iv) mereologically simple but extended objects.

(forth.), "An argument against Aristotelian universals", Synthese

Synthese

I provide an argument against the Aristotelian view of universals, according to which universals ... more I provide an argument against the Aristotelian view of universals, according to which universals depend for their existence on their exemplifiers. The argument consists in a set of five jointly inconsistent assumptions. As such, the argument can be used to argue in favour of other conclusions, such as that exemplification is no relation or that plausible principles concerning ontological dependence or grounding do not hold.

(2020), "Was Bonaventure a Four-dimensionalist?", British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 28:2

British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 2020

Bonaventure is sometimes taken to be an ante litteram champion of the four-dimensional theory of ... more

(2019), "Aquinas, Geach, and Existence", European Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 11:3, 175-195.

European Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 2019

In a series of influential publications, Peter Geach suggested that the correct semantic analysis... more In a series of influential publications, Peter Geach suggested that the correct semantic analysis of some existential propositions requires a first-order, individual, property of existence alongside with the nowadays standard, second-order, one. Moreover, Geach argues that Aquinas was well aware of this need and accepted both a first-order and a second-order property of existence-the first of which goes under the name of actus essendi. In this paper, I argue that Geach's individual existence is not Aquinas' actus essendi, for at least two crucial reasons. Geach's existence is tensed and is instantiated by present entities only, whereas in a series of works which spans throughout his corpus, Aquinas attributes a tenseless property of existence to future entities as well.

(2017), "The Limit Decision Problem and Four-Dimensionalism," Vivarium, 55:1-3, 199-216.

Vivarium, 2017

I argue that medieval solutions to the limit decision problem imply four-dimensionalism, i.e. the... more I argue that medieval solutions to the limit decision problem imply four-dimensionalism, i.e. the view according to which substances that persist through time are extended through time as well as through space, and have different temporal parts at different times. Keywords Permanent and successive entities – three-and four-dimensionalism – temporal parts – limit decision problem – location Four-dimensionalism is the view according to which substances are extended through time as well as through space; just like a substance is thought to be extended through space by having different spatial parts at different places, four-dimensionalists believe that substances are extended through time by having different temporal parts at different times. Boosted by a growing battery of arguments, four-dimensionalism is presumably enjoying its Golden Age, and has forced his foes on the back foot 1. Somehow unsurprisingly, things used to be different some eight hundred years ago, when, with the possible exception of Bonaventure, the overwhelming majority of scholastic philosophers maintained the rival view – nowadays called three-dimensionalism – according to which substances persist through time without having temporal parts 2. However, it is not unusual that philosophers commit themselves to doctrines which they deny. In this paper, I argue that standard medieval accounts of change – standard solutions to the so-called limit decision problem in particular – trigger an argument that ultimately leads to the four-dimensionalist view of persistence.

(2017), "The Transcendentist Theory of Persistence," The Journal of Philosophy, 114:2, 57-75.

The Journal of Philosophy, 2017

This paper develops a endurantist theory of persistence. The theory is built around one basic ten... more This paper develops a endurantist theory of persistence. The theory is built around one basic tenet, which concerns existence at a time – the relation between an object and the times at which that object is present. According to this tenet, which I call transcendentism, for an object to exist at a time is for it to participate in events that are located at that time. I argue that transcendentism is a semantically grounded and metaphysically fruitful. It is semantically grounded, insofar as a semantic analysis of our temporal talk favors it over rivals. It is metaphysically fruitful, insofar as the theory of persistence that can be built around it – the transcendentist theory of persistence, to give it a name – requires neither temporal parts nor the problematic commitments to which all extant forms of endurantism are committed, such as the possibility of extended simples or multilocation.

Relativity and three Four-dimensionalisms

by Cody Gilmore, Claudio Calosi, and Damiano Costa

Relativity theory is often said to support something called 'the four-dimensional view of reality... more Relativity theory is often said to support something called 'the four-dimensional view of reality'. But there are at least three different views that sometimes go by this name. One is the B-theory of time, according to which the past, present, and future are all equally real and there is nothing metaphysically special about the present. A second is 'spacetime unitism' (as we call it), according to which there is a spacetime manifold, and if there are such things points of space or instants of time, these are just spacetime regions of different sorts: thus space and time are not separate manifolds. A third is perdurantism, according to which persisting material objects (rocks, trees, human beings) are made up of different temporal parts located at different times. We sketch routes from relativity to the B-theory and to unitism. We then discuss some routes to perdurantism, via the B-theory and via unitism.

(2016) “Relativity and Three Four-Dimensionalisms”, Philosophy Compass, 11:2, 102-120.

by Damiano Costa, Cody Gilmore, and Claudio Calosi

Philosophy Compass, 2016

Relativity theory is often said to support something called ‘the four-dimensional view of reality... more Relativity theory is often said to support something called ‘the four-dimensional view of reality’. But there are at least three different views that sometimes go by this name. One is the B-theory of time, according to which the past, present, and future are all equally real and there is nothing metaphysically special about the present. A second is ‘spacetime unitism’ (as we call it), according to which there is a spacetime manifold, and if there are such things points of space or instants of time, these are just spacetime regions of different sorts: thus space and time are not separate manifolds. A third is perdurantism, according to which persisting material objects (rocks, trees, human beings) are made up of different temporal parts located at different times. We sketch routes from relativity to the B-theory and to unitism. We then discuss some routes to perdurantism, via the B-theory and via unitism.

(2016) “In Defence of Transcendentism”, Acta Analytica, 31:2, 225-234.

by Alessandro Giordani and Damiano Costa

How do objects persist through time? According to endurantism, objects persist through time and d... more How do objects persist through time? According to endurantism, objects persist through time and don't have temporal parts. According to the transcendentist version of endurantism, objects exist at times by participating in events that occur at those times. This version of transcendentism offers specific metaphysical and semantical advantages over other versions of endurantism. In this paper, we defend transcendentist endurantism against a series of criticisms that have been recently offered by Kristie Miller.

(2015) "Multilocation: Fusions and Confusions", Philosophia, 43/1: 25-33.

by Damiano Costa and Claudio Calosi

Philosophia, 2015

Barker and Dowe (2003) argue that multilocation is paradoxical. To this effect, they put forward ... more Barker and Dowe (2003) argue that multilocation is paradoxical. To this effect, they put forward three different paradoxes. The first one, especially, received a significant amount of attention in the recent literature.
In this paper, we put forward a new reply to it. Our reply is not only new but, unlike other already existing ones, is not committed to questionable metaphysical principles, such the one according to which every object has both an intrinsic and an extrinsic shape (McDaniel, 2003) or the one according to which to persist is to be temporally extended (Beebee and Rush, 2003).

(2014) "Temporal Parts and Spatial Location", in Mind, Values and Metaphysics (ed. A. Reboul). Berlin: Springer, 199-207.

(2013) "From Times to Worlds and Back Again: A Transcendentist Theory of Persistence", Thought, (2)1: 210-220.

by Damiano Costa and Alessandro Giordani

Thought, 2013

Traditionally, three conceptions of diachronic and diacosmic existence have been presented, that ... more

Books by Damiano Costa

(2018), Esistenza e Persistenza. Milan: Mimesis

Nel nostro universo, qualunque cosa, dalla più piccola particella alla più smisurata galassia, es... more Nel nostro universo, qualunque cosa, dalla più piccola particella alla più smisurata galassia, esiste in un qualche tempo e in un qualche luogo. Ma cosa significa esistere in un qualche tempo? Il fenomeno dell’esistenza temporale gioca un ruolo fondamentale nella comprensione dell’universo e di noi stessi quali creature temporali. Eppure è un fenomeno profondamente misterioso. L’esistenza temporale è da intendersi come una relazione? Che legami ha con l’esistenza dell’ontologia? L’esistenza temporale e la localizzazione spaziale sono due fenomeni essenzialmente differenti o due istanze di un’unica relazione? Tutto ciò che esiste nel tempo esiste nel tempo nello stesso modo? Tutto ciò che è nel tempo è anche nello spazio? Esistenza e persistenza contiene la prima indagine sistematica della natura dell’esistenza temporale e delle conseguenze di questa indagine per la metafisica della persistenza.

What is priority monism? Reply to Kovacs

Inquiry

Priority monism is the view that the cosmos is the basic concrete entity on which each of its par... more Priority monism is the view that the cosmos is the basic concrete entity on which each of its parts depend. Kovacs has recently argued that none of the classical notions of dependence could be used to spell out priority monism. I argue that four notions of dependence-namely rigid existential dependence, generic existential dependence, explanatory dependence, and generalised explanatory dependence-can indeed be used to spell out priority monism, and specify the conditions under which this is possible.

Aristotelian universals, strong immanence, and construction

Synthese

The Aristotelian view of universals, according to which each universal generically depends for it... more The Aristotelian view of universals, according to which each universal generically depends for its existence on its instantiations, has recently come under attack by a series of ground-theoretic arguments. The last such arguments, presented by Raven (2022), promises to offer several significant improvements over its predecessors, such as avoiding commitment to the transitivity of ground and offering new reasons for the metaphysical priority of universals over their instantiations. In this paper, we argue that Raven's argument does not effectively avoid said commitment and that Raven's new reasons fail. Moreover, we present a novel ground-theoretic interpretation of the Aristotelian view, referred to as strong immanence, and introduce a new argument against the Aristotelian view, intended to sidestep any commitment to the transitivity of ground.

(forth.), Fine's Monster Objection Defanged, Philosophical Quarterly

Philosophical Quarterly

The Monster objection has been often considered one of the main reasons to explore nonstandard me... more The Monster objection has been often considered one of the main reasons to explore nonstandard mereological views, such as hylomorphism. Still, it has been rarely discussed and then only in a cursory fashion. This paper fills this gap by offering the first thorough assessment of the objection. It argues that different metaphysical stances, such as presentism, three-and four-dimensionalism, provide different ways of undermining the objection.

Aquinas on the Existence of the Future: A Response to Gili

European Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 2020

I defend my paper "Aquinas, Geach, and Existence" against objections from Luca Gili, who argued t... more

Persistence in Time

Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2020

(forth.), "Mereological Endurantism Defined", Inquiry

Inquiry

I develop a definition of mereological endurantism which overcomes objections that have been prop... more

(forth.), "The Multi-location Trilemma", Erkenntnis

by Damiano Costa and Claudio Calosi

Erkenntnis

The possibility of multilocation --- of one entity having more than one exact location --- is req... more The possibility of multilocation --- of one entity having more than one exact location --- is required by several metaphysical theories such as the immanentist theory of universals and three-dimensionalism about persistence. One of the most pressing challenges for multi-location theorists is that of making sense of exact location --- in that extant definitions of exact location entail a principle called Functionality, according to which nothing can have more than one exact location. Recently in a number of promising papers, Antony Eagle has proposed and defended a definition of exact location in terms of weak location that does not entail Functionality. This paper provides the first thorough assessment of Eagle’s proposal. In particular, we argue that it cannot account for (i) location of immanent universals, (ii) multi-location of mereologically changing three-dimensional objects , (iii) multi-location of mereologically complex objects, and (iv) mereologically simple but extended objects.

(forth.), "An argument against Aristotelian universals", Synthese

Synthese

I provide an argument against the Aristotelian view of universals, according to which universals ... more I provide an argument against the Aristotelian view of universals, according to which universals depend for their existence on their exemplifiers. The argument consists in a set of five jointly inconsistent assumptions. As such, the argument can be used to argue in favour of other conclusions, such as that exemplification is no relation or that plausible principles concerning ontological dependence or grounding do not hold.

(2020), "Was Bonaventure a Four-dimensionalist?", British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 28:2

British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 2020

Bonaventure is sometimes taken to be an ante litteram champion of the four-dimensional theory of ... more

(2019), "Aquinas, Geach, and Existence", European Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 11:3, 175-195.

European Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 2019

In a series of influential publications, Peter Geach suggested that the correct semantic analysis... more In a series of influential publications, Peter Geach suggested that the correct semantic analysis of some existential propositions requires a first-order, individual, property of existence alongside with the nowadays standard, second-order, one. Moreover, Geach argues that Aquinas was well aware of this need and accepted both a first-order and a second-order property of existence-the first of which goes under the name of actus essendi. In this paper, I argue that Geach's individual existence is not Aquinas' actus essendi, for at least two crucial reasons. Geach's existence is tensed and is instantiated by present entities only, whereas in a series of works which spans throughout his corpus, Aquinas attributes a tenseless property of existence to future entities as well.

(2017), "The Limit Decision Problem and Four-Dimensionalism," Vivarium, 55:1-3, 199-216.

Vivarium, 2017

I argue that medieval solutions to the limit decision problem imply four-dimensionalism, i.e. the... more I argue that medieval solutions to the limit decision problem imply four-dimensionalism, i.e. the view according to which substances that persist through time are extended through time as well as through space, and have different temporal parts at different times. Keywords Permanent and successive entities – three-and four-dimensionalism – temporal parts – limit decision problem – location Four-dimensionalism is the view according to which substances are extended through time as well as through space; just like a substance is thought to be extended through space by having different spatial parts at different places, four-dimensionalists believe that substances are extended through time by having different temporal parts at different times. Boosted by a growing battery of arguments, four-dimensionalism is presumably enjoying its Golden Age, and has forced his foes on the back foot 1. Somehow unsurprisingly, things used to be different some eight hundred years ago, when, with the possible exception of Bonaventure, the overwhelming majority of scholastic philosophers maintained the rival view – nowadays called three-dimensionalism – according to which substances persist through time without having temporal parts 2. However, it is not unusual that philosophers commit themselves to doctrines which they deny. In this paper, I argue that standard medieval accounts of change – standard solutions to the so-called limit decision problem in particular – trigger an argument that ultimately leads to the four-dimensionalist view of persistence.

(2017), "The Transcendentist Theory of Persistence," The Journal of Philosophy, 114:2, 57-75.

The Journal of Philosophy, 2017

This paper develops a endurantist theory of persistence. The theory is built around one basic ten... more This paper develops a endurantist theory of persistence. The theory is built around one basic tenet, which concerns existence at a time – the relation between an object and the times at which that object is present. According to this tenet, which I call transcendentism, for an object to exist at a time is for it to participate in events that are located at that time. I argue that transcendentism is a semantically grounded and metaphysically fruitful. It is semantically grounded, insofar as a semantic analysis of our temporal talk favors it over rivals. It is metaphysically fruitful, insofar as the theory of persistence that can be built around it – the transcendentist theory of persistence, to give it a name – requires neither temporal parts nor the problematic commitments to which all extant forms of endurantism are committed, such as the possibility of extended simples or multilocation.

Relativity and three Four-dimensionalisms

by Cody Gilmore, Claudio Calosi, and Damiano Costa

Relativity theory is often said to support something called 'the four-dimensional view of reality... more Relativity theory is often said to support something called 'the four-dimensional view of reality'. But there are at least three different views that sometimes go by this name. One is the B-theory of time, according to which the past, present, and future are all equally real and there is nothing metaphysically special about the present. A second is 'spacetime unitism' (as we call it), according to which there is a spacetime manifold, and if there are such things points of space or instants of time, these are just spacetime regions of different sorts: thus space and time are not separate manifolds. A third is perdurantism, according to which persisting material objects (rocks, trees, human beings) are made up of different temporal parts located at different times. We sketch routes from relativity to the B-theory and to unitism. We then discuss some routes to perdurantism, via the B-theory and via unitism.

(2016) “Relativity and Three Four-Dimensionalisms”, Philosophy Compass, 11:2, 102-120.

by Damiano Costa, Cody Gilmore, and Claudio Calosi

Philosophy Compass, 2016

Relativity theory is often said to support something called ‘the four-dimensional view of reality... more Relativity theory is often said to support something called ‘the four-dimensional view of reality’. But there are at least three different views that sometimes go by this name. One is the B-theory of time, according to which the past, present, and future are all equally real and there is nothing metaphysically special about the present. A second is ‘spacetime unitism’ (as we call it), according to which there is a spacetime manifold, and if there are such things points of space or instants of time, these are just spacetime regions of different sorts: thus space and time are not separate manifolds. A third is perdurantism, according to which persisting material objects (rocks, trees, human beings) are made up of different temporal parts located at different times. We sketch routes from relativity to the B-theory and to unitism. We then discuss some routes to perdurantism, via the B-theory and via unitism.

(2016) “In Defence of Transcendentism”, Acta Analytica, 31:2, 225-234.

by Alessandro Giordani and Damiano Costa

How do objects persist through time? According to endurantism, objects persist through time and d... more How do objects persist through time? According to endurantism, objects persist through time and don't have temporal parts. According to the transcendentist version of endurantism, objects exist at times by participating in events that occur at those times. This version of transcendentism offers specific metaphysical and semantical advantages over other versions of endurantism. In this paper, we defend transcendentist endurantism against a series of criticisms that have been recently offered by Kristie Miller.

(2015) "Multilocation: Fusions and Confusions", Philosophia, 43/1: 25-33.

by Damiano Costa and Claudio Calosi

Philosophia, 2015

Barker and Dowe (2003) argue that multilocation is paradoxical. To this effect, they put forward ... more Barker and Dowe (2003) argue that multilocation is paradoxical. To this effect, they put forward three different paradoxes. The first one, especially, received a significant amount of attention in the recent literature.
In this paper, we put forward a new reply to it. Our reply is not only new but, unlike other already existing ones, is not committed to questionable metaphysical principles, such the one according to which every object has both an intrinsic and an extrinsic shape (McDaniel, 2003) or the one according to which to persist is to be temporally extended (Beebee and Rush, 2003).

(2014) "Temporal Parts and Spatial Location", in Mind, Values and Metaphysics (ed. A. Reboul). Berlin: Springer, 199-207.

(2013) "From Times to Worlds and Back Again: A Transcendentist Theory of Persistence", Thought, (2)1: 210-220.

by Damiano Costa and Alessandro Giordani

Thought, 2013

Traditionally, three conceptions of diachronic and diacosmic existence have been presented, that ... more

(2018), Esistenza e Persistenza. Milan: Mimesis

Nel nostro universo, qualunque cosa, dalla più piccola particella alla più smisurata galassia, es... more Nel nostro universo, qualunque cosa, dalla più piccola particella alla più smisurata galassia, esiste in un qualche tempo e in un qualche luogo. Ma cosa significa esistere in un qualche tempo? Il fenomeno dell’esistenza temporale gioca un ruolo fondamentale nella comprensione dell’universo e di noi stessi quali creature temporali. Eppure è un fenomeno profondamente misterioso. L’esistenza temporale è da intendersi come una relazione? Che legami ha con l’esistenza dell’ontologia? L’esistenza temporale e la localizzazione spaziale sono due fenomeni essenzialmente differenti o due istanze di un’unica relazione? Tutto ciò che esiste nel tempo esiste nel tempo nello stesso modo? Tutto ciò che è nel tempo è anche nello spazio? Esistenza e persistenza contiene la prima indagine sistematica della natura dell’esistenza temporale e delle conseguenze di questa indagine per la metafisica della persistenza.