Papers by Charles D Allen
Military review, 2015
[ILLUSTRATION OMITTED] Our organizations will be judged by the performance of leaders serving in ... more [ILLUSTRATION OMITTED] Our organizations will be judged by the performance of leaders serving in areas where critical thinking skills are essential. We must ensure our leaders possess the ability to understand the security environment and the contributions of all elements of national power; lead effectively when faced with surprise and uncertainty; anticipate and recognize change and lead transitions; and operate on intent through trust, empowerment, and understanding. --Army Leader Development Strategy 2013 The U.S. Army finds itself once again in the familiar circumstances of uncertainty and ambiguity that seem to occur every decade or so. The recurring pattern begins with engagements in extended military operations, then restructuring of the force based on lessons learned, and then projections regarding future threats and the capabilities needed to deal with them. However, the projections have often proven to be wrong. Several senior military leaders have acknowledged the U.S. military's poor record of predicting future conflicts, as our Army has repeatedly found itself engaged in military operations in ways that it had not envisioned. (1) Comparatively recent examples of such challenging periods include the transition out of the Vietnam War in the 1970s, the resurgent Cold War rivalry with the Soviet Union in the 1980s, combat and peace operations in Iraq and the Balkans in the 1990s, and the Global War on Terror in the first decade of the twenty-first century. In each of these decades, the U.S. military was called upon by our nation to commit American service members across a range of military operations to secure U.S. interests. During these periods, successive service chiefs of staff across the Department of Defense have lamented the lack of senior leaders who understand how to sustain the force of the day while preparing to meet the demands of the future. Experience has shown that senior military officers must be as adept at advising their political masters on national policy, developing long-range military strategy to support policy, and managing the defense enterprise as they are at leading service members in actual military operations. Such senior leader competencies, apart from military skills, are even more important now in the face of inevitable fiscal reductions and ambiguous mission requirements. As a professional force, this means the military needs to assess whether it is properly developing its officers to be successful at its most senior levels. Accordingly, as the military service most commonly assigned to lead joint and combined operations, the U.S. Army must more effectively develop officers to successfully lead and manage the Army of the future--both operating and generating forces. The Army has made advances in how it fights, from using technology to developing innovative operational concepts and fighting formations, but the critical enabler remains effective leader development. The Army has achieved hard-won successes over the past decade by providing Army officers with tremendous tactical and operational experience in joint and coalition operations. However, as executive coach Marshall Goldsmith's book title asserts, What Got You Here Won't Get You There, meaning that Army leaders cannot rely on old habits for future success, especially as they gain higher-level responsibilities. (2) Moving forward to Army 2025--the future of land power within the joint force--it is essential that we select, develop, and retain leaders within the officer corps with a great potential for high levels of responsibility. A well-known statement attributed to champion hockey player Wayne Gretzky serves as a metaphor for future-oriented leader development. According to Roy MacGregor, Gretzky "liked to say he didn't skate to where the puck was, but to where it was going to be." (3) Like a hockey player who anticipates the movement of a puck and adapts quickly, the Army leader development effort must anticipate the need for vital senior leadership in the Army of 2025. …
Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per resp... more Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.
Journal of Military Ethics, 2017
ABSTRACT Readers of reports on ethical failures by four-star general officers must wonder, “Don’t... more ABSTRACT Readers of reports on ethical failures by four-star general officers must wonder, “Don’t they have staffs to ensure that the general follows ethics rules?” The Department of Defense publishes robust ethics guidance in several documents; however, a staff’s best efforts to implement this guidance may fail to make an impression on a senior leader who is susceptible to the “Bathsheba syndrome,” an allusion to the biblical account where the prophet Nathan rebuked King David for his moral failings. This paper proposes a methodology to enable senior headquarters staffs to play the role of Nathan in supporting ethical behaviors by high-level officers. It examines the mechanisms that embed ethical behavior within members of those staffs in carrying out their three principal roles of advising, scheduling, and transporting the four-star officer. The authors offer a framework based on an ethical infrastructure of organizational climate that focuses the staff’s daily efforts to mitigate risk across seven ethical “danger areas” that threaten ethical failures by senior officers.
Military review, 2015
[ILLUSTRATION OMITTED] Our organizations will be judged by the performance of leaders serving in ... more [ILLUSTRATION OMITTED] Our organizations will be judged by the performance of leaders serving in areas where critical thinking skills are essential. We must ensure our leaders possess the ability to understand the security environment and the contributions of all elements of national power; lead effectively when faced with surprise and uncertainty; anticipate and recognize change and lead transitions; and operate on intent through trust, empowerment, and understanding. --Army Leader Development Strategy 2013 The U.S. Army finds itself once again in the familiar circumstances of uncertainty and ambiguity that seem to occur every decade or so. The recurring pattern begins with engagements in extended military operations, then restructuring of the force based on lessons learned, and then projections regarding future threats and the capabilities needed to deal with them. However, the projections have often proven to be wrong. Several senior military leaders have acknowledged the U.S. military's poor record of predicting future conflicts, as our Army has repeatedly found itself engaged in military operations in ways that it had not envisioned. (1) Comparatively recent examples of such challenging periods include the transition out of the Vietnam War in the 1970s, the resurgent Cold War rivalry with the Soviet Union in the 1980s, combat and peace operations in Iraq and the Balkans in the 1990s, and the Global War on Terror in the first decade of the twenty-first century. In each of these decades, the U.S. military was called upon by our nation to commit American service members across a range of military operations to secure U.S. interests. During these periods, successive service chiefs of staff across the Department of Defense have lamented the lack of senior leaders who understand how to sustain the force of the day while preparing to meet the demands of the future. Experience has shown that senior military officers must be as adept at advising their political masters on national policy, developing long-range military strategy to support policy, and managing the defense enterprise as they are at leading service members in actual military operations. Such senior leader competencies, apart from military skills, are even more important now in the face of inevitable fiscal reductions and ambiguous mission requirements. As a professional force, this means the military needs to assess whether it is properly developing its officers to be successful at its most senior levels. Accordingly, as the military service most commonly assigned to lead joint and combined operations, the U.S. Army must more effectively develop officers to successfully lead and manage the Army of the future--both operating and generating forces. The Army has made advances in how it fights, from using technology to developing innovative operational concepts and fighting formations, but the critical enabler remains effective leader development. The Army has achieved hard-won successes over the past decade by providing Army officers with tremendous tactical and operational experience in joint and coalition operations. However, as executive coach Marshall Goldsmith's book title asserts, What Got You Here Won't Get You There, meaning that Army leaders cannot rely on old habits for future success, especially as they gain higher-level responsibilities. (2) Moving forward to Army 2025--the future of land power within the joint force--it is essential that we select, develop, and retain leaders within the officer corps with a great potential for high levels of responsibility. A well-known statement attributed to champion hockey player Wayne Gretzky serves as a metaphor for future-oriented leader development. According to Roy MacGregor, Gretzky "liked to say he didn't skate to where the puck was, but to where it was going to be." (3) Like a hockey player who anticipates the movement of a puck and adapts quickly, the Army leader development effort must anticipate the need for vital senior leadership in the Army of 2025. …
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per res... more Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.
I n the first decade of the 21st century, the U.S. military observed the firings or resignations ... more I n the first decade of the 21st century, the U.S. military observed the firings or resignations of the chief of staff of the Air Force, the secretaries of the Army and the Air Force, plus several general officers, including the commander of U.S. Central Command and most recently the senior American commander in Afghanistan. Why did these smart and otherwise extremely successful senior leaders lose their jobs? Is there something we can learn from their experiences to improve ourselves as leaders and better serve the nation? Assuming that we can learn more from our mistakes than our successes, we may be able to learn by studying senior leaders who have failed in this new era. We define "failed" by their outright firing, or the more euphemistic "asked to resign." The military traditionally places great emphasis on the roles of senior commanders, holding them accountable for all actions, success or failure, within their commands. While a failure can be caused by an error of a junior officer or a systemic issue that cannot be controlled by one individual, military culture holds the commander ultimately responsible. A military commander is given the power to influence events and lives of service members. It is legal authority reinforced by a professional culture. Commanding large organizations with modern weapons, contemporary generals have more military power immediately available than the great captains of history. As commanders rise in rank and responsibility, they are no longer directors of the intricate dynamics of the battle. As Eliot Cohen and John Gooch wrote in "Military Misfortunes: The Anatomy of Failure in War": "... the modern commander is much more akin to the managing director of a large conglomerate enterprise than ever he is to the warrior chief of old. He has become the head of a complex LT. COL. DONALD DRECHSLER is an Air Force pilot currently serving as the chief of Air Force's Future Concepts Division. He is a recent student at the Army War College. COL. CHARLES D. ALLEN (RET.) is a professor of cultural science and former director of leader development in the Department of Command, Leadership, and Management at the Army War College. The views expressed here are the authors' own and do not necessarily reflect those of the Army, Air Force, Defense Department or U.S. government.
Military Review, Sep 1, 2013
T RUST IS AT the heart of the Army Profession. As the Army transitions from an era of substantial... more T RUST IS AT the heart of the Army Profession. As the Army transitions from an era of substantial operational deployments to an era characterized by training and preparing the force for the next series of conflicts, it will face several threats to trust. An environment of reduced force structure and fiscal austerity will accompany the transition. How the Army profession fares in the coming decade will be based on the trust the institution engenders among its members (uniformed and civilian) and with the American people. The Department of the Army-directed Profession of Arms (PoA) campaign reemphasized trust as an essential characteristic of the Army Profession along with military expertise, honorable service, esprit de corps, and stewardship of the profession. 1 The PoA campaign had its official kickoff in January 2011 under the leadership of Gen. Martin Dempsey, commander of Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), and was later renamed the Army Profession (AP) Campaign. When Dempsey subsequently became the 37th chief of staff of the Army, his initial guidance to the force stressed Trust, Discipline, and Fitness as the three areas that he would discuss with commanders during visits around the Army. His successor, Gen. Ray Odierno, in his "Initial Thoughts" and "Marching Orders" communications, appropriately called trust "the bedrock of our honored Profession." 2 Trust is manifested in two interrelated but distinct realms. The campaign focused much of its effort on trust internal to the Army Profession. The other domain is external public trust, which is the trust held between the Army profession and the American people. The maintenance of internal trust among members of the profession, and between members and institution, is critical to the effectiveness of the Army. Maintenance of trust between the Army profession and the American people is critical to its legitimacy within our democratic society. While the Army profession currently enjoys a high level of public trust, that trust relationship is intensely fragile. The loss of either internal or public trust would constitute a major threat to the profession.
Choice Reviews Online, 2014
Southern Business Review, 2010
: How can America better win the hearts and minds of people from such distant civilizations and t... more : How can America better win the hearts and minds of people from such distant civilizations and traditions as Mghanistan since the use of traditional military force as hard power has not worked? Nye (2008) argued that the crisis in the Middle East points to the ineffectiveness of hard power and thus, other elements of power should be employed. Nye offered that global situations require a judicious combination of hard power that attempts to coerce and soft power that seeks to persuade. This integration becomes effectively SMARr power designed to achieve strategic goals and interests. While the U.S. expends significant time, efforts and resources on the coercive elements of national power to keep its military without peer, the nation has tended to pay less attention to the softer elements of national power, which require awareness of cultural aspects in order to have successful combat operations and for the conduct of subsequent nation-building activities. We contend that cognitive in...
Parameters, 2018
T he Life and Work of General Andrew J. Goodpaster is part of the American Warrior series from th... more T he Life and Work of General Andrew J. Goodpaster is part of the American Warrior series from the Association of the United States Army (AUSA) that examines unique historical contributions of individuals with enduring legacies. The subject of this book, Andrew Goodpaster, is an iconic military leader and exemplary national security professional who many feel has not gotten proper acknowledgment commensurate with his impact. This reviewer was understandably cautious and approached the task with healthy skepticism, given the project was sponsored by two activities for which Goodpaster was associated for more than a decade. Written as a biographical tribute, the book is published in partnership with the AUSA, the Atlantic Council, and the Eisenhower Legacy Council.
A First-Rate Madness: Uncovering the Links Between Leadership and Mental Illness by Nassir Ghaemi... more A First-Rate Madness: Uncovering the Links Between Leadership and Mental Illness by Nassir Ghaemi New York Penguin Press, 2011 340 pages $16.00 [ILLUSTRATION OMITTED] The title of the book bends the quip about an iconic American leader, President Theodore Roosevelt, who was described as "having a second-rate mind, but a first-rate temperament." Teddy Roosevelt, even with his quirkiness, seemed to have the right presence of mind to lead the nation into the changing environment and uncertainties of the dawning twentieth century. The author, Dr. Ghaemi, offers a provocative premise--individuals who experience mental illness are better suited to lead organizations, societies, and nations more so than "normal" people. He presents a counter proposition that individuals who are mentally healthy can be successful leaders in times of stability and certainty but fail during times of crisis. The author has substantial credentials as practicing psychiatrist and director of t...
Parameters, 2015
Abstract: As US news and media reports continue to expose unethical behavior within the American ... more Abstract: As US news and media reports continue to expose unethical behavior within the American profession of arms, it is important to explore how Army leaders--and their organizations--have lapsed into questionable ethical conduct. This article addresses the tension between competence and character within the Army's culture, offers lessons from the business world on ethical behavior and leadership, and critiques current Department of Defense (DoD) and Army approaches to assessing ethical climates. (1) ********** US news and media reports continue to expose unethical behavior within the American profession of arms. Some observers may claim this exposure is nothing new. Recently, however, the Army revealed 129 commanders of brigades and battalions have been relieved since 2003. (2) Of that number, 25 were relieved in combat zones. More troubling (and paradoxically reassuring) is the Army's disclosure that seven general officers were relieved and two court-martialed. In 2005,...
: The original edition of the "Strategic Leadership Primer," published in 1998, served ... more : The original edition of the "Strategic Leadership Primer," published in 1998, served the U.S. Army War College (USAWC) well as a basic overview of Strategic Leadership. Written by Dr. Rod Magee with the assistance of several other faculty members, it was intended as an orientation reading for students arriving at the USAWC whose backgrounds were primarily in the tactical and operational field environment. The Primer was useful because there was no other adequate work that described and defined strategic leadership in terms that could be understood and applied by USAWC students. A 2nd edition was published in 2004 and edited by Colonel (Ret) Steve Shambach. This 3rd edition updates significant portions of the Primer, especially Chapters 1, 2, and 3, and also adds a chapter on decision making (Chapter 5). It is not that the nature of Strategic Leadership has changed drastically, rather this edition preserves the salient features of the original editions. It is updated with...
T his article considers approaches to teaching senior military officers at the U.S. Army War Coll... more T his article considers approaches to teaching senior military officers at the U.S. Army War College (USAWC). It reviews the results of several studies and surveys from the employers of our graduates and from recent graduates themselves on how best to prepare for future assignments. It examines the tensions between theoretical and utilitarian education in strategy and concludes with a recommendation that USAWC faculty design and implement a portfolio approach to provide students with the opportunity to demonstrate the benefits of seniorlevel education.
National Defense University. Institute for National Strategic Studies, 2014
: In Edgar Allan Poe's short story The Pit and the Pendulum, an unnamed protagonist avoids a ... more : In Edgar Allan Poe's short story The Pit and the Pendulum, an unnamed protagonist avoids a fatal fall only to find himself in deadly danger from a swinging blade. Today's senior military leaders are in similar straits, though it's not their lives at risk but rather the American people's trust in their armed forces. The pit is the prospect that the U.S. military might be ill-prepared when the call comes to ward off enemies, foreign or domestic. Twice in memory this has happened; today's military leaders are haunted by the Vietnam War and the Sept. 11 attacks. The pendulum is the prospect that Congress inability to pass defense budgets will hamstring the military's ability to act effectively when need arises. In the past four years, lawmakers have managed only continuing resolutions; through this year, at least, there is the further complication of sequestration. Senior military leaders are hard-pressed to sustain a force that can safeguard U.S. security inte...
Parameters, 2016
Just War Reconsidered: Strategy, Ethics, and Theory By James M. Dubik Lexington, KV: University P... more Just War Reconsidered: Strategy, Ethics, and Theory By James M. Dubik Lexington, KV: University Press of Kentucky, 2016 225 pages $50.00 [ILLUSTRATION OMITTED] Lieutenant General (Ret.) James Dubik has written a little book with big ideas. After an extraordinary military career, he served as the Omar N. Bradley Chair of Strategic Leadership at the US Army War College, completed a PhD in philosophy, and is now Professor of Practice in the Strategic Studies Program at Georgetown University. Just War Reconsidered is an ambitious and provocative book. Dubik conducts a critical analysis of two contemporary models of civil-military relations--Peter D. Feaver's "Principal-Agent" model presented in Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations (2003) and Eliot A. Cohen's "Unequal Dialogue" illustrated in Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Readership in Wartime (2002)--against the moral framework proposed by Michael Walzer's Just and U...
Uploads
Papers by Charles D Allen