Martín Fleitas González
Docente/Investigador del Dpto. de Filosofía de la Práctica de la Universidad de la República, Uruguay. La mayor parte de mi producción bibliográfica remite a mis dos líneas de investigación permanente: la primera gira en torno a la evaluación de los alcances y de las limitaciones de la filosofía práctica de Immanuel Kant, mientras la segunda se propone reelaborar la noción de patología de lo social.
Dentro de la primera línea de investigación mi producción refiere a asuntos tales como el de las fuentes de la normatividad ética y jurídica (en su conjunto, lo moral) dentro del pensamiento de Immanuel Kant. He abordado los problemas del origen de la normatividad ética, de la autoridad política, y de la obligación moral dentro del pensamiento kantiano, y también he discutido las diferentes apropiaciones, objeciones y reformulaciones que este pensamiento ha tenido (y aún tiene) en la actualidad. Asimismo, tanto la reconstrucción de las discusiones anglosajonas como la evaluación de las mismas me permitió al momento visibilizar un enfoque razonable (que bien puede denominarse "constitutivista" o "performativista") que aspira a superar algunas falacias, malos entendidos, y polarizaciones surgidas entre los historiadores de la filosofía práctica de Kant.
Dentro de la segunda línea de investigación mi objeto de estudio es la relación que mantienen las patologías de lo social con ciertos ideales de autonomía y sus respectivas experiencias. Mi objetivo consiste tanto en reconstruir los rasgos básicos de la discusión en torno a las patologías de lo social, heredada de la célebre Escuela de Frankfurt, como en evaluar su relevancia para la descripción, explicación y crítica de las dinámicas sociales tardomodernas. El aporte que intento realizar consiste en reformular los rasgos tradicionales del concepto de patología de lo social para poder reutilizarlo a la hora de analizar ciertos y peculiares fenómenos de inercia social e hipoteca de diversos rasgos de la autonomía a través del trastocamiento de la experiencia, o forma de habitar el mundo, como sucede en el caso de la aceleración social que las comunidades modernas de Occidente experimentan desde hace al menos dos siglos. La incorporación de la variable de la experiencia constituye la clave de la operacionabilidad del concepto de patología de lo social que propongo, desmarcando fuertemente este enfoque de aquellos que sólo entrelazan lo social con lo intelectual o cognitivo (o autonomía de los agentes sociales).
ORCID: 0000-0001-9775-2281
Blog acerca de la vida y obra de Immanuel Kant "El alijo kantiano": https://elalijokantiano.wordpress.com/
Supervisors: Antonio Gómez-Ramos
Dentro de la primera línea de investigación mi producción refiere a asuntos tales como el de las fuentes de la normatividad ética y jurídica (en su conjunto, lo moral) dentro del pensamiento de Immanuel Kant. He abordado los problemas del origen de la normatividad ética, de la autoridad política, y de la obligación moral dentro del pensamiento kantiano, y también he discutido las diferentes apropiaciones, objeciones y reformulaciones que este pensamiento ha tenido (y aún tiene) en la actualidad. Asimismo, tanto la reconstrucción de las discusiones anglosajonas como la evaluación de las mismas me permitió al momento visibilizar un enfoque razonable (que bien puede denominarse "constitutivista" o "performativista") que aspira a superar algunas falacias, malos entendidos, y polarizaciones surgidas entre los historiadores de la filosofía práctica de Kant.
Dentro de la segunda línea de investigación mi objeto de estudio es la relación que mantienen las patologías de lo social con ciertos ideales de autonomía y sus respectivas experiencias. Mi objetivo consiste tanto en reconstruir los rasgos básicos de la discusión en torno a las patologías de lo social, heredada de la célebre Escuela de Frankfurt, como en evaluar su relevancia para la descripción, explicación y crítica de las dinámicas sociales tardomodernas. El aporte que intento realizar consiste en reformular los rasgos tradicionales del concepto de patología de lo social para poder reutilizarlo a la hora de analizar ciertos y peculiares fenómenos de inercia social e hipoteca de diversos rasgos de la autonomía a través del trastocamiento de la experiencia, o forma de habitar el mundo, como sucede en el caso de la aceleración social que las comunidades modernas de Occidente experimentan desde hace al menos dos siglos. La incorporación de la variable de la experiencia constituye la clave de la operacionabilidad del concepto de patología de lo social que propongo, desmarcando fuertemente este enfoque de aquellos que sólo entrelazan lo social con lo intelectual o cognitivo (o autonomía de los agentes sociales).
ORCID: 0000-0001-9775-2281
Blog acerca de la vida y obra de Immanuel Kant "El alijo kantiano": https://elalijokantiano.wordpress.com/
Supervisors: Antonio Gómez-Ramos
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Noting the limitations that the Constructivists and Realistic approaches show to reconstruct a faithful and solvent
reading of Kantian ethics, the paper suggests an alternative line called constitutivist. This approach proposes a performative reading of Kant’s texts to defend the thesis that the Kantian normative sources lie in reflective constructions of mandates involving, at the same time, the realist assumption of the value of the idea of freedom. The moral would then stand in the self-constitution as an agent.
Understanding the central thesis that Enrique Dussel presents in 20 Theses of Politics, as the reconstruction of a historical struggle among the will-of-life of the political community and the fetishized potestas, I note that the author only investigates the characteristics of the first one, being blind to those mechanisms for which the fetishized potestas pounds its fight for reproducing the conditions of its existence colonizing the world of life. Under this blindness, and seeking to endow of certain applicability to Dussel's proposal, I will consistently introduce contributions to the ethics of the discourse to identify the phenomena of colonization of the world of life as the field of action to guide the design of public policies."
Kantian ethics is often understood as an expression that seems to put modern liberal moral issues in a distant priori, to the point of making it virtually inaccessible to the everyday human activity. In this work, far from being innovative in most points, is to illustrate the different attempts to counter this perception Kant and vitally alienating untying of its proposal, which are mostly inconclusive. However, it seeks to show how this problem was, for the philosopher of Königsberg, a concern that their intellectual productions moved to the end of his days.
El concepto de imputabilidad penal es sin duda uno de los que contemporaneamente anuda mayor gama de tensiones de poder. Una vez que se pueda determinar el factor "conciencia de la norma" será posible encarcelar individuos legítimamente. Justamente, es en este contexto que nuestro trabajo se incrusta sobre este nudo de tensiones a través de la iluminación de ciertos supuestos éticos y jurídicos. Con la intensión de elaborar un marco de teoría independiente del contexto es que se acuden a estudios de psicología social, ética normativa y filosofía del derecho, para consturir conceptos y categorías de análisis que nos posibiliten dilucidar todos aquellos factores que están estrechamente ligados a la problemática de la imputabilidad penal, y que a su vez, puedan hilar un marco que opere de trasfondo para la producción de un sólido criterio de imputabilidad penal entre el adolsecente menor de edad y el joven ciudadano."
Talks by Martín Fleitas González
Why be moral? Since Glaucon challenges Socrates to solve the mental experiment of the myth of Gyges, the question about how it is possible to establish the need for moral action through an inherent principle to the action continues to be a tough hurdle for moral philosophy. As is well known, the answer Socrates made along The Republic, and finally offers in Book X, is to observe that the clandestine realization of evil undermines the very soul, damaging the inner harmony between its parts. Thus, Plato´s Socrates inaugurates a mode of reasoning that connects the question "Why be moral?" with the development of subjectivity, or self-argumentative strategy, which can certainly be heard in the contemporary voices of Harry Frankfurt and Christine Korsgaard. However, on this matter, Aristotle develops a very different approach, while at the same time retaining many similarities, during his reflections on friendship-øιλία. In the well-known books VIII and IX of his Nicomachean Ethics, we can find the ideas of (1) øιλία is an inter-subjective time by which the virtues as a common good are realized, since (2) it allows human subjectivity to unify the parts of the soul according to the rational, that is, overcoming akrasia-ἀĸрάσία. While Aristotle seems to continue that platonic argument form that connects morality with the development of self, intersubjectivity of its approach transforms the Platonic reasoning in such a way that ends up completely rephrasing the question "Why be moral?". At this point, we could argue the thesis that Aristotle would not agree with the usual way of addressing the myth of Gyges' ring, noting that, in this case, the illegal practice of evil in itself does not harm the soul, but what actually damages the soul is trying to perform an action without being seen by others, that is, pretending to act the process of denying or forgetting intersubjective relations. The man who uses the ring of Gyges in order to hide from interrelationships undermines the conditions that enable the realization of his soul, regardless of the type of actions performed, since from the perspective of Aristotle we can only realize ourselves as virtuous men among virtuous men, that is, as individuals who have developed their selves through an unavoidable connection with their "other selves"-άλλους εαυτούς. Thus, Aristotle could say that the attempt to escape intersubjectivity is itself something of an evil man, whose realization of soul has been frustrated. These notes about a possible Aristotelian approach to the myth of Gyges are fruitful to revisit the question of why moral being, under which could help us review the individualist and atomistic terms in which has usually been approached by tradition and present.
Noting the limitations that the Constructivists and Realistic approaches show to reconstruct a faithful and solvent
reading of Kantian ethics, the paper suggests an alternative line called constitutivist. This approach proposes a performative reading of Kant’s texts to defend the thesis that the Kantian normative sources lie in reflective constructions of mandates involving, at the same time, the realist assumption of the value of the idea of freedom. The moral would then stand in the self-constitution as an agent.
Understanding the central thesis that Enrique Dussel presents in 20 Theses of Politics, as the reconstruction of a historical struggle among the will-of-life of the political community and the fetishized potestas, I note that the author only investigates the characteristics of the first one, being blind to those mechanisms for which the fetishized potestas pounds its fight for reproducing the conditions of its existence colonizing the world of life. Under this blindness, and seeking to endow of certain applicability to Dussel's proposal, I will consistently introduce contributions to the ethics of the discourse to identify the phenomena of colonization of the world of life as the field of action to guide the design of public policies."
Kantian ethics is often understood as an expression that seems to put modern liberal moral issues in a distant priori, to the point of making it virtually inaccessible to the everyday human activity. In this work, far from being innovative in most points, is to illustrate the different attempts to counter this perception Kant and vitally alienating untying of its proposal, which are mostly inconclusive. However, it seeks to show how this problem was, for the philosopher of Königsberg, a concern that their intellectual productions moved to the end of his days.
El concepto de imputabilidad penal es sin duda uno de los que contemporaneamente anuda mayor gama de tensiones de poder. Una vez que se pueda determinar el factor "conciencia de la norma" será posible encarcelar individuos legítimamente. Justamente, es en este contexto que nuestro trabajo se incrusta sobre este nudo de tensiones a través de la iluminación de ciertos supuestos éticos y jurídicos. Con la intensión de elaborar un marco de teoría independiente del contexto es que se acuden a estudios de psicología social, ética normativa y filosofía del derecho, para consturir conceptos y categorías de análisis que nos posibiliten dilucidar todos aquellos factores que están estrechamente ligados a la problemática de la imputabilidad penal, y que a su vez, puedan hilar un marco que opere de trasfondo para la producción de un sólido criterio de imputabilidad penal entre el adolsecente menor de edad y el joven ciudadano."
Why be moral? Since Glaucon challenges Socrates to solve the mental experiment of the myth of Gyges, the question about how it is possible to establish the need for moral action through an inherent principle to the action continues to be a tough hurdle for moral philosophy. As is well known, the answer Socrates made along The Republic, and finally offers in Book X, is to observe that the clandestine realization of evil undermines the very soul, damaging the inner harmony between its parts. Thus, Plato´s Socrates inaugurates a mode of reasoning that connects the question "Why be moral?" with the development of subjectivity, or self-argumentative strategy, which can certainly be heard in the contemporary voices of Harry Frankfurt and Christine Korsgaard. However, on this matter, Aristotle develops a very different approach, while at the same time retaining many similarities, during his reflections on friendship-øιλία. In the well-known books VIII and IX of his Nicomachean Ethics, we can find the ideas of (1) øιλία is an inter-subjective time by which the virtues as a common good are realized, since (2) it allows human subjectivity to unify the parts of the soul according to the rational, that is, overcoming akrasia-ἀĸрάσία. While Aristotle seems to continue that platonic argument form that connects morality with the development of self, intersubjectivity of its approach transforms the Platonic reasoning in such a way that ends up completely rephrasing the question "Why be moral?". At this point, we could argue the thesis that Aristotle would not agree with the usual way of addressing the myth of Gyges' ring, noting that, in this case, the illegal practice of evil in itself does not harm the soul, but what actually damages the soul is trying to perform an action without being seen by others, that is, pretending to act the process of denying or forgetting intersubjective relations. The man who uses the ring of Gyges in order to hide from interrelationships undermines the conditions that enable the realization of his soul, regardless of the type of actions performed, since from the perspective of Aristotle we can only realize ourselves as virtuous men among virtuous men, that is, as individuals who have developed their selves through an unavoidable connection with their "other selves"-άλλους εαυτούς. Thus, Aristotle could say that the attempt to escape intersubjectivity is itself something of an evil man, whose realization of soul has been frustrated. These notes about a possible Aristotelian approach to the myth of Gyges are fruitful to revisit the question of why moral being, under which could help us review the individualist and atomistic terms in which has usually been approached by tradition and present.