Papers by Pietro Nicola Salemi
This article deals with the effects caused by the fiscal competition, which is analyzed both as a... more This article deals with the effects caused by the fiscal competition, which is analyzed both as a physiological and a pathological phenomenon. Firstly, it is outlined that the fiscal competition is a natural consequence of (i) competition between States and between corporations, (ii) market's globalization and (iii) State's trend to become supranational subjects. Therefore, the fiscal competition is basically a physiological phenomenon. The work underlines that the fiscal competition affects negatively some important principles: i.e. States' sovereignty, fiscal equity and general efficiency. In this framework, the lawmakers must intervene in order to protect them against the abuse of the means provided for by the fiscal competition. The study wants to affirm that the involved conducts are not chargeable in principle, but the lawmaker can decide to charge them in order to protect the inland Revenue or to fight the organized crime. So, finally, the fiscal competition, which is declined in bank secrecy competition and tax competition, provides conducts of (i) tax savings – which are not unlawful-, (ii) conducts of elusion of taxes – for example, transfer pricing committed by multinationals-, which can be charged both by the administrative (Article 110, 7 TUIR,) and the criminal law (Articles 3 and 4 Legislative Decree 74/2000) and (iii) the conducts which are charged as offences (as money laundering, Article 648-bis of the Italian Criminal Code), which threaten the free market and the global financial system. L'articolo ha ad oggetto gli effetti della fiscal competition, analizzati sotto il duplice aspetto fisiologico e patologico del fenomeno. In primo luogo, esso evidenzia che fiscal competition è il risvolto naturale (i) della competizione fra Stati e imprese multinazionali, (ii) della globalizzazione economica e (iii) della propensione alla sovranazionalità dei singoli ordinamenti giuridici. Pertanto, innanzitutto, la fiscal competition è sostanzialmente un fenomeno fisiologico. Tuttavia, il presente elaborato sottolinea che la fiscal competition ha effetti negativi su alcuni importanti principi: la sovranità statale, l'equità fiscale e l'efficienza generale del sistema economico. In questo particolare contesto, è necessario l'intervento del legislatore per salvaguardare tali principi contro gli abusi degli strumenti messi a disposizione dalla fiscal competition. Questo studio mostra che tali condotte non sono al momento perseguibili, ma che il legislatore dovrà orientarsi in tal senso, al fine di proteggere la ricchezza prodotta entro i propri confini e contrastare il crimine organizzato. Dunque, in ultima analisi, la fiscal competition, che si declina nella tax competition e nella bank secrecy competition, offre vie per porre in essere (i) legittimi risparmi di spesa fiscale, (ii) condotte elusive – ad esempio, mediante il ricorso da parte delle multinazionali del meccanismo del transfer pricing-, che potrebbero essere sanzionate sia sotto il profilo amministrativo (ex art. 110, co. 7 TUIR), sia sotto il profilo penale (artt. 3 e 4, d. lgs.vo n. 74/2000), e (iii) condotte che integrano ipotesi di reato (come il riciclaggio ex art. 648-bis c.p.) e minacciano il libero mercato e il sistema finanziario globale.
FISCAL COMPETITION: definizione e modalita concrete, in Diritto e pratica tributaria internazionale n. 4/2016, p. 1308 s., 2016
This work aims to analyze the characteristics of fiscal competition within the framework of both ... more This work aims to analyze the characteristics of fiscal competition within the framework of both real and financial globalization and its implications in the relationships between states and corporations. It is also the first step in a larger study examining the positive and negative effects of tax competition and bank secrecy competition. In effect, outcomes in fiscal competition are produced by the sum of two different, but related, kinds of competition: tax competition and bank secrecy competition. In terms of the manifestation of tax competition, our analysis points to the phenomenon in which sovereign countries aim to attract both portfolio investments as well as direct investment by lowering their effective tax rate. As for the expression of bank secrecy competition, this paper underlines how legislative provisions allow for a strong bank secrecy regime and effective non-cooperation with foreign fiscal authorities. This, in turn, affects the outcome of fiscal competition in a way that allows "financial havens" to be the winners, by definition, of fiscal competition. Finally, it should be noted that the legislative functions of states are influenced by economic power and, in this scenario, our analysis shows the manner in which the principles of democracy and equality are changing in order to promote economic efficiency. Este estudio pretende analizar las características de la competición fiscal, en el 'framework' de la globalización real y financiera, y sus implicaciones en las relaciones entre estados y empresas multinacionales. Además, eso representa la primera etapa en un estudio más complejo que pretende analizar los efectos positivos y negativos de la competición tributaria y de la competición en el secreto bancario. De hecho, el resultado de la competición fiscal es dado por dos diferentes, pero relacionados, tipos de competición: competición tributaria y "bancaria". Bajo este primero punto de vista, nuestro análisis intenta revelar el fenómeno por el cual los estados soberanos tratan de atraer sea las inversiones de portfolio sea las inversiones directas a través de la diminución de sus efectivas tasas tributarias. Bajo el perfil de la competición en el secreto bancario, este trabajo subraya como las previsiones legislativas permiten un régimen de fuerte secreto bancario y efectiva non-cooperación con las autoridades fiscales extranjeras. Esto, a su vez, afecta el resultado de la competición fiscal en el sentido que los "paraísos fiscales" resultan ser los ganadores, por definición, de la competición fiscal. Por fin, se debe destacar que las funciones legislativas de los estados son influenciadas por el poder económico e, en este escenario, nuestro análisis muestra como el principio de democracia y equidad están cambiando para favorecer la eficiencia económica. Questo lavoro si propone di analizzare le caratteristiche della competizione fiscale, nel framework della globalizzazione reale e finanziaria, e le sue implicazioni nelle relazioni tra Stati e imprese multinazionali. Peraltro, lo stesso rappresenta la prima tappa di un più complesso studio che si propone di analizzare gli effetti positivi e negativi della tax competition e bank secrecy competition. Di fatti, il risultato della fiscal competition è dato da due differenti, ma relazionati, tipi di competizione: quella più propriamente tributaria e quella "bancaria". Quanto alla prima, la nostra analisi mira a rivelare il fenomeno per il quale gli Stati sovrani cercano di attrarre sia gli investimenti di portfolio sia gli investimenti diretti esteri attraverso la diminuzione dell'aliquota fiscale effettivamente applicata. Sotto il profilo della competizione nel segreto bancario, questo lavoro sottolinea come le previsioni legislative
Le agenzie di rating nel discorso pubblico: effetti normativi e sanzionatori dei ratings sovrani , 2018
This essay aims to explore the role played by rating agencies in the public discourse and to offe... more This essay aims to explore the role played by rating agencies in the public discourse and to offer an interpretation able to provide an adequate understanding of the argumentative-communicative use of sovereign ratings within States’ decision-making processes. Basing on the role of standard-setter played by rating agencies, it is possible to argue that they can be considered as epistemic authorities by investors and de facto authorities by evaluated States. As a result of the influence exerted by sovereign ratings on investment choices and public opinion, they have two kinds of effects on States. On the one hand, the criteria in accordance with which ratings are developed are powerful arguments usable in the public discourse pro (or against) a certain policy (“normative effects”). On the other hand, a downgrade or a negative outlook can produce “sanctioning effects” which implicate a certain level of compliance to sovereign ratings criteria by States.
This article deals with the effects caused by the fiscal competition, which is analyzed both as a... more This article deals with the effects caused by the fiscal competition, which is analyzed both as a physiological and a pathological phenomenon. Firstly, it is outlined that the fiscal competition is a natural consequence of (i) competition between States and between corporations, (ii) market's globalization and (iii) State's trend to become supranational subjects. Therefore, the fiscal competition is basically a physiological phenomenon. The work underlines that the fiscal competition affects negatively some important principles: i.e. States' sovereignty, fiscal equity and general efficiency. In this framework, the lawmakers must intervene in order to protect them against the abuse of the means provided for by the fiscal competition. The study wants to affirm that the involved conducts are not chargeable in principle, but the lawmaker can decide to charge them in order to protect the inland Revenue or to fight the organized crime. So, finally, the fiscal competition, which is declined in bank secrecy competition and tax competition, provides conducts of (i) tax savings – which are not unlawful-, (ii) conducts of elusion of taxes – for example, transfer pricing committed by multinationals-, which can be charged both by the administrative (Article 110, 7 t.u.i.r.) and the criminal law (Articles 3 and 4 Legislative Decree 74/2000) and (iii) the conducts which are charged as offences (as money laundering, Article 648-bis of the Italian Criminal Code), which threaten the free market and the global financial system. Abstract: L'articolo ha ad oggetto gli effetti della fiscal competition, analizzati sotto il duplice aspetto fisiologico e patologico del fenomeno. In primo luogo, esso evidenzia che la fiscal competition è il risvolto naturale (i) della competizione fra Stati e imprese multinazionali, (ii) della globalizzazione economica e (iii) della propensione alla sovranazionalità dei singoli ordinamenti giuridici. Pertanto, innanzitutto, la fiscal competition è sostanzialmente un fenomeno fisiologico. Tuttavia, il presente elaborato evidenzia che la fiscal competition ha effetti negativi su alcuni importanti principi: la sovranità statale, l'equità fiscale e l'efficienza generale del sistema economico. In questo particolare contesto, è necessario l'intervento del legislatore per salvaguardare i menzionati principi contro gli abusi degli strumenti messi a disposizione dalla fiscal competition. Il presente studio mostra che tali abusi non sono al momento perseguibili, ma che il legislatore dovrà orientarsi in tal senso, al fine di proteggere la ricchezza prodotta entro i propri confini e contrastare il crimine organizzato. In ultima analisi, la fiscal competition, che si declina nella tax competition e nella bank secrecy competition, offre vie per porre in essere (i) legittimi risparmi di spesa fiscale, (ii) condotte elusive – ad esempio, mediante il ricorso da parte delle multinazionali del meccanismo del transfer pricing-, che potrebbero essere sanzionate sia sotto il profilo
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Papers by Pietro Nicola Salemi