Realists about tense, or A-theorists of time, believe that some of the facts that fundamentally c... more Realists about tense, or A-theorists of time, believe that some of the facts that fundamentally constitute reality are tensed, and most of them seem to think that those tensed facts are to be understood as fixing the way things are, absolutely speaking, or simpliciter. But there is a simple yet powerful argument, the argument from atemporality, to the effect that realists should reject the absolutist conception of reality's constitution by facts because, despite appearances to the contrary, that conception is in fact inconsistent with realism about tense. After presenting the argument, I investigate why the relevant inconsistency has not been recognised so far and point to one possible explanation.
Henry Mackenzie’s The Man of Feeling (1771) is commonly described as a typical sentimental novel,... more Henry Mackenzie’s The Man of Feeling (1771) is commonly described as a typical sentimental novel, yet the work has many aspects that a straightforward sentimentalist interpretation cannot possibly account for. I argue in this paper that The Man of Feeling, far from being a straightforward sentimental novel, encapsulates a profound critique of both moral sentimentalism and the genre of sentimental fiction. This critical stance is established in the first instance, I claim, by the ironic distance to the sentimental material in the novel, which results from the complex, multilevel narrative structure, and is further reinforced by numerous satirical elements in the text. As I demonstrate, reading Mackenzie’s work as an antithesis of the sentimental novel that parodies the sentimentalist moral epistemology underlying this mode of fiction does a much better job at explaining several crucial aspects of the novel than the sentimentalist interpretation.
Evaluativism about desire, the view that desires just are, or necessarily involve, positive evalu... more Evaluativism about desire, the view that desires just are, or necessarily involve, positive evaluations of their objects, currently enjoys widespread popularity in many philosophical circles. This essay argues that evaluativism, in both its doxastic and its perceptual versions, overstates and mischaracterizes the connection between desires and evaluations. Whereas doxastic evaluativism implausibly rules out cases where someone has a desire, despite evaluating its object negatively, being uncertain about its value, or having no doxastic attitude whatsoever toward its evaluative status at all, perceptual evaluativism cannot even properly apply to the large class of standing desires. It is also argued that evaluativism about desire is not even well-motivated in the first place: the theory is supposed to solve a particular puzzle about the role desires play in the explanation of action, yet in fact it does not offer any help whatsoever in dealing with the relevant puzzle.
Realists about tense, or A-theorists of time, believe that some of the facts that fundamentally c... more Realists about tense, or A-theorists of time, believe that some of the facts that fundamentally constitute reality are tensed, and most of them seem to think that those tensed facts are to be understood as fixing the way things are, absolutely speaking, or simpliciter. But there is a simple yet powerful argument, the argument from atemporality, to the effect that realists should reject the absolutist conception of reality's constitution by facts because, despite appearances to the contrary, that conception is in fact inconsistent with realism about tense. After presenting the argument, I investigate why the relevant inconsistency has not been recognised so far and point to one possible explanation.
It is usually agreed that reality is temporal in the sense of containing entities that exist in t... more It is usually agreed that reality is temporal in the sense of containing entities that exist in time, but some philosophers, roughly those who have been traditionally called A-theorists, hold that reality is temporal in a far more profound sense than what is implied by the mere existence of such entities. This hypothesis of deep temporality typically involves two ideas: that reality is temporally compartmentalised into distinct present, past, and future ‘realms’, and that this compartmentalisation is temporally dynamic in the sense that the boundaries of those temporal realms change from one moment to the next. The truth of something like this hypothesis is commonly thought to require that at least some of the facts that fundamentally constitute reality be tensed. While this seems plausible, realism about fundamental tensed facts does not seem to entail deep temporality. Nor is it clear exactly what realism about tense amounts to, given that no informative answer has been given to t...
It is usually agreed that reality is temporal in the sense of containing entities that exist in t... more It is usually agreed that reality is temporal in the sense of containing entities that exist in time, but some philosophers, roughly those who have been traditionally called A-theorists, hold that reality is temporal in a far more profound sense than what is implied by the mere existence of such entities. This hypothesis of deep temporality typically involves two ideas: that reality is temporally compartmentalised into distinct present, past, and future 'realms', and that this compartmentalisation is temporally dynamic in the sense that the boundaries of those temporal realms change from one moment to the next. The truth of something like this hypothesis is commonly thought to require that at least some of the facts that fundamentally constitute reality be tensed. While this seems plausible, realism about fundamental tensed facts does not seem to entail deep temporality. Nor is it clear exactly what realism about tense amounts to, given that no informative answer has been given to the question of what it is for a fact to be tensed. In this paper, I introduce a novel approach, perspectivalism about temporal reality, that seeks to vindicate the hypothesis of deep temporality by ascribing to reality a certain kind of temporally perspectival structure, which also provides a straightforward answer to the question of what the tensedness of facts consists in as well as to the question of what it is for reality to be constituted by such facts.
Evaluativism about desire, the view that desires just are, or necessarily involve, positive evalu... more Evaluativism about desire, the view that desires just are, or necessarily involve, positive evaluations of their objects, currently enjoys widespread popularity in many philosophical circles. This chapter argues that evaluativism, in both of its doxastic and perceptual versions, overstates and mischaracterises the connection between desires and evaluations. Whereas doxastic evaluativism implausibly rules out cases where someone has a desire, despite evaluating its object negatively, being uncertain about its value, or having no doxastic attitude whatsoever towards its evaluative status at all, perceptual evaluativism cannot even properly apply to the large class of standing desires. It is also argued that evaluativism about desire is not even well-motivated in the first place: the theory is supposed to solve a particular puzzle about the role desires play in the explanation of action, yet, in fact, it does not offer any help whatsoever in dealing with the relevant puzzle
It has been argued recently that one major difficulty facing the A-theory of time consists in the... more It has been argued recently that one major difficulty facing the A-theory of time consists in the view’s failure to provide a satisfactory account of the passage of time. Critics have objected that this particular charge is premised on an unduly strong conception of temporal passage, and that the argument does not go through on alternative, less demanding conceptions of passage. The resulting dialectical stalemate threatens to prove intractable, given the notorious elusiveness of the notion of temporal passage. Here I argue that there is progress to be made in this regard. The argument from passage takes issue with a certain feature of the standard versions of the A-theory that is in fact problematic independently of worries about temporal passage. To illustrate this, I present a new argument, the argument from comprehensiveness, which demonstrates that the standard A-theoretic account of temporal reality is inadequate, even if it is granted that it can accommodate passage.
It has been argued recently that one major difficulty facing the A-theory of time consists in the... more It has been argued recently that one major difficulty facing the A-theory of time consists in the view’s failure to provide a satisfactory account of the passage of time. Critics have objected that this particular charge is premised on an unduly strong conception of temporal passage, and that the argument does not go through on alternative, less demanding conceptions of passage. The resulting dialectical stalemate threatens to prove intractable, given the notorious elusiveness of the notion of temporal passage. Here I argue that there is progress to be made in this regard. The argument from passage takes issue with a certain feature of the standard versions of the A-theory that is in fact problematic independently of worries about temporal passage. To illustrate this, I present a new argument, the argument from comprehensiveness, which demonstrates that the standard A-theoretic account of temporal reality is inadequate, even if it is granted that it can accommodate passage.
According to Fine’s (Modality and tense: philosophical papers. Oxford University Press, Oxford, p... more According to Fine’s (Modality and tense: philosophical papers. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 261–320, 2005) famous take on the infamous McTaggartian paradox, realism about tensed facts is incompatible with the joint acceptence of three very general and seemingly plausible theses about reality. However, Correia and Rosenkranz (As time goes by: eternal facts in an ageing universe. Mentis, Paderborn, 2011) have recently objected that Fine’s argument depends on a crucial assumption about the nature of tensed facts; once that assumption is given up, they claim, realists can endorse the theses in question without further ado. They also argue that their novel version of tense realism, called dynamic absolutism, is to be preferred over its rivals. I argue in this paper that dynamic absolutism does not constitute a genuine alternative for realists about tense.
It has been argued recently that one major difficulty facing the A-theory of time consists in the... more It has been argued recently that one major difficulty facing the A-theory of time consists in the view's failure to provide a satisfactory account of the passage of time. Critics have objected that this particular charge is premised on an unduly strong conception of temporal passage, and that the argument does not go through on alternative, less demanding conceptions of passage. The resulting dialectical stalemate threatens to prove intractable, given the notorious elusiveness of the notion of temporal passage. Here I argue that there is progress to be made in this regard. The argument from passage takes issue with a certain feature of the standard versions of the A-theory that is in fact problematic independently of worries about temporal passage. To illustrate this, I present a new argument, the argument from comprehensiveness, which demonstrates that the standard A-theoretic account of temporal reality is inadequate, even if it is granted that it can accommodate passage.
According to Kit Fine’s (Modality and tense: Philosophical papers. Oxford: Oxford
University Pres... more According to Kit Fine’s (Modality and tense: Philosophical papers. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 261–320, 2005) famous take on the infamous McTaggartian paradox, realism about tensed facts is incompatible with the joint acceptence of three very general and seemingly plausible theses about reality. However, Fabrice Correia and Sven Rosenkranz (As time goes by: Eternal facts in an ageing universe. Paderborn: Mentis, 2011) have recently objected that Fine’s argument depends on a crucial assumption about the nature of tensed facts; once that assumption is given up, they claim, realists can endorse the theses in question without further ado. They also argue that their novel version of tense realism, called dynamic absolutism, is to be preferred over its rivals. I argue in this paper that dynamic absolutism does not constitute a genuine alternative for realists about tense.
In his stimulating recent book Reasons without Persons, Brian Hedden develops a novel theory of r... more In his stimulating recent book Reasons without Persons, Brian Hedden develops a novel theory of rationality that he calls Time-Slice Rationality (TSR). One of the main theses of TSR is that all rational requirements are synchronic. We argue here first that this thesis is not well-motivated. We also demonstrate that Hedden is in fact committed to an even stronger claim about the rationality of an agent at a time. Finally, we provide some arguments against the conception of rationality that results from this stronger claim.
The Nature of Desire. Eds. Julien Deonna and Federico Lauria.
Evaluativism about desire, the view that desires just are, or necessarily involve, positive evalu... more Evaluativism about desire, the view that desires just are, or necessarily involve, positive evaluations of their objects, currently enjoys widespread popularity in many philosophical circles. This chapter argues that evaluativism, in both of its doxastic and perceptual versions, overstates and mischaracterises the connection between desires and evaluations. Whereas doxastic evaluativism implausibly rules out cases where someone has a desire, despite evaluating its object negatively, being uncertain about its value, or having no doxastic attitude whatsoever towards its evaluative status at all, perceptual evaluativism cannot even properly apply to the large class of standing desires. It is also argued that evaluativism about desire is not even well-motivated in the first place: the theory is supposed to solve a particular puzzle about the role desires play in the explanation of action, yet, in fact, it does not offer any help whatsoever in dealing with the relevant puzzle.
Fiktion und Fiktionalismus: Beiträge zu Hans Vaihingers "Philosophie des Als Ob", Jul 2014
Seit einigen Jahren ist der so genannte moralische Fiktionalismus (im folgenden kurz: „Fiktionali... more Seit einigen Jahren ist der so genannte moralische Fiktionalismus (im folgenden kurz: „Fiktionalismus“) in den Fokus der Debatte um ethische Theoriebildung gerückt. Genau betrachtet gibt es allerdings nicht den Fiktionalismus, sondern dieser Ansatz zerfällt in mindestens drei unterschiedliche Theorievarianten. Auf einen Nenner gebracht läßt sich der moralische Fiktionalismus vorläufig als die These bestimmen, daß moralische Äußerungen in ihrer buchstäblichen faktualen Bedeutung weder wahr noch falsch sind; sie sind aber wahrheitswertfähig im fiktionalen Kontext einer fiktiven Geschichte, die sie entweder beschreiben oder erzählen.1 Diese vorläufige Bestimmung dient hier als ein allererster Ausgangspunkt und wird im folgenden noch zu präzisieren sein. Zuvor jedoch sei der Fiktionalismus in die gegenwärtige Moral- philosophie eingeordnet. Er ist nämlich keineswegs eine randständige oder exotische Position, und das nicht nur, weil der Fiktionalismus auch in vielen anderen philosophischen Teildisziplinen längst seinen Platz gefunden hat; speziell der moralische Fiktionalismus entspricht zudem einer für die Metaethik des 21. Jahrhunderts charakteristischen Entwicklung hin zu sogenannten „Hybridtheorien“.
Wir werden in diesem Beitrag in vier Schritten vorgehen: Erstens werden wir den moralischen Fiktionalismus als einen Spezialfall einer Hybridtheorie ausweisen. Zweitens werden wir den präskriptiven, revolutionären Fiktionalismus im Unterschied zum deskriptiven, hermeneu- tischen Fiktionalismus erläutern, um dann drittens zu zeigen, daß der Fiktionalist sein Hauptversprechen nicht einlösen kann. Dieses besteht darin, als eine dritte Variante eines moralischen Antirealismus den Haupteinwänden einerseits gegen den Nonkognitivismus und andererseits gegen John Leslie Mackies einflußreiche Irrtumstheorie begegnen zu können. Fordert Mackie von uns einzusehen, daß unsere mora- lischen Urteile allesamt systematisch falsch sind, um gleichwohl fortzufahren, den Inhalt unserer moralischen Urteile ohne Einschränkung für wahr zu halten, besteht das offensichtlich unauflösliche Problem für den Nonkognitivisten darin, unsere alltägliche moralische Praxis angemessen zu rekonstruieren, in der wir moralische Meinungsverschiedenheiten austragen und moralische Schlußfolgerungen ziehen. Unser Ziel in diesem Aufsatz ist es zu zeigen, daß der Fiktionalist sein Versprechen nicht einlösen kann: Moral läßt sich nicht auf das Beschreiben oder Erzählen von Geschichten reduzieren. Damit scheitert auch diese dritte Variante eines moralischen Antirealismus. Im Ausgang hiervon werden wir dann schließlich viertens prüfen, inwiefern Hans Vaihingers Thesen über die „ethischen“ bzw. „praktischen Fiktionen“ in seiner Philosophie des Als Ob innerhalb der aktuellen metaethischen Debatte um den moralischen Fiktionalismus einzuordnen sind. Wie sich erweisen wird, kann Vaihinger zwar als Vorläufer des revolutionären Fiktionalismus angesehen werden, aber es bleibt letztlich unklar, welche spezifische Form desselben er vertritt. Das kann allerdings insofern kaum verwundern, als es von vornherein Vaihingers Absicht war, eine eigenständige metaethische Theorie aufzustellen, sondern seine „metaethischen Thesen“ immer schon Teil eines viel umfassenderen, ambitionierteren Projekts sind, nämlich eines globalen Fiktionalismus. Davon abgesehen stößt der revolutionäre Fiktionalismus auf erhebliche Schwierigkeiten, so daß fraglich ist, was für Vaihinger gewonnen wäre, ließe er sich auf einen revolutionären Fiktionalismus welcher Spielart auch immer festlegen.
Realists about tense, or A-theorists of time, believe that some of the facts that fundamentally c... more Realists about tense, or A-theorists of time, believe that some of the facts that fundamentally constitute reality are tensed, and most of them seem to think that those tensed facts are to be understood as fixing the way things are, absolutely speaking, or simpliciter. But there is a simple yet powerful argument, the argument from atemporality, to the effect that realists should reject the absolutist conception of reality's constitution by facts because, despite appearances to the contrary, that conception is in fact inconsistent with realism about tense. After presenting the argument, I investigate why the relevant inconsistency has not been recognised so far and point to one possible explanation.
Henry Mackenzie’s The Man of Feeling (1771) is commonly described as a typical sentimental novel,... more Henry Mackenzie’s The Man of Feeling (1771) is commonly described as a typical sentimental novel, yet the work has many aspects that a straightforward sentimentalist interpretation cannot possibly account for. I argue in this paper that The Man of Feeling, far from being a straightforward sentimental novel, encapsulates a profound critique of both moral sentimentalism and the genre of sentimental fiction. This critical stance is established in the first instance, I claim, by the ironic distance to the sentimental material in the novel, which results from the complex, multilevel narrative structure, and is further reinforced by numerous satirical elements in the text. As I demonstrate, reading Mackenzie’s work as an antithesis of the sentimental novel that parodies the sentimentalist moral epistemology underlying this mode of fiction does a much better job at explaining several crucial aspects of the novel than the sentimentalist interpretation.
Evaluativism about desire, the view that desires just are, or necessarily involve, positive evalu... more Evaluativism about desire, the view that desires just are, or necessarily involve, positive evaluations of their objects, currently enjoys widespread popularity in many philosophical circles. This essay argues that evaluativism, in both its doxastic and its perceptual versions, overstates and mischaracterizes the connection between desires and evaluations. Whereas doxastic evaluativism implausibly rules out cases where someone has a desire, despite evaluating its object negatively, being uncertain about its value, or having no doxastic attitude whatsoever toward its evaluative status at all, perceptual evaluativism cannot even properly apply to the large class of standing desires. It is also argued that evaluativism about desire is not even well-motivated in the first place: the theory is supposed to solve a particular puzzle about the role desires play in the explanation of action, yet in fact it does not offer any help whatsoever in dealing with the relevant puzzle.
Realists about tense, or A-theorists of time, believe that some of the facts that fundamentally c... more Realists about tense, or A-theorists of time, believe that some of the facts that fundamentally constitute reality are tensed, and most of them seem to think that those tensed facts are to be understood as fixing the way things are, absolutely speaking, or simpliciter. But there is a simple yet powerful argument, the argument from atemporality, to the effect that realists should reject the absolutist conception of reality's constitution by facts because, despite appearances to the contrary, that conception is in fact inconsistent with realism about tense. After presenting the argument, I investigate why the relevant inconsistency has not been recognised so far and point to one possible explanation.
It is usually agreed that reality is temporal in the sense of containing entities that exist in t... more It is usually agreed that reality is temporal in the sense of containing entities that exist in time, but some philosophers, roughly those who have been traditionally called A-theorists, hold that reality is temporal in a far more profound sense than what is implied by the mere existence of such entities. This hypothesis of deep temporality typically involves two ideas: that reality is temporally compartmentalised into distinct present, past, and future ‘realms’, and that this compartmentalisation is temporally dynamic in the sense that the boundaries of those temporal realms change from one moment to the next. The truth of something like this hypothesis is commonly thought to require that at least some of the facts that fundamentally constitute reality be tensed. While this seems plausible, realism about fundamental tensed facts does not seem to entail deep temporality. Nor is it clear exactly what realism about tense amounts to, given that no informative answer has been given to t...
It is usually agreed that reality is temporal in the sense of containing entities that exist in t... more It is usually agreed that reality is temporal in the sense of containing entities that exist in time, but some philosophers, roughly those who have been traditionally called A-theorists, hold that reality is temporal in a far more profound sense than what is implied by the mere existence of such entities. This hypothesis of deep temporality typically involves two ideas: that reality is temporally compartmentalised into distinct present, past, and future 'realms', and that this compartmentalisation is temporally dynamic in the sense that the boundaries of those temporal realms change from one moment to the next. The truth of something like this hypothesis is commonly thought to require that at least some of the facts that fundamentally constitute reality be tensed. While this seems plausible, realism about fundamental tensed facts does not seem to entail deep temporality. Nor is it clear exactly what realism about tense amounts to, given that no informative answer has been given to the question of what it is for a fact to be tensed. In this paper, I introduce a novel approach, perspectivalism about temporal reality, that seeks to vindicate the hypothesis of deep temporality by ascribing to reality a certain kind of temporally perspectival structure, which also provides a straightforward answer to the question of what the tensedness of facts consists in as well as to the question of what it is for reality to be constituted by such facts.
Evaluativism about desire, the view that desires just are, or necessarily involve, positive evalu... more Evaluativism about desire, the view that desires just are, or necessarily involve, positive evaluations of their objects, currently enjoys widespread popularity in many philosophical circles. This chapter argues that evaluativism, in both of its doxastic and perceptual versions, overstates and mischaracterises the connection between desires and evaluations. Whereas doxastic evaluativism implausibly rules out cases where someone has a desire, despite evaluating its object negatively, being uncertain about its value, or having no doxastic attitude whatsoever towards its evaluative status at all, perceptual evaluativism cannot even properly apply to the large class of standing desires. It is also argued that evaluativism about desire is not even well-motivated in the first place: the theory is supposed to solve a particular puzzle about the role desires play in the explanation of action, yet, in fact, it does not offer any help whatsoever in dealing with the relevant puzzle
It has been argued recently that one major difficulty facing the A-theory of time consists in the... more It has been argued recently that one major difficulty facing the A-theory of time consists in the view’s failure to provide a satisfactory account of the passage of time. Critics have objected that this particular charge is premised on an unduly strong conception of temporal passage, and that the argument does not go through on alternative, less demanding conceptions of passage. The resulting dialectical stalemate threatens to prove intractable, given the notorious elusiveness of the notion of temporal passage. Here I argue that there is progress to be made in this regard. The argument from passage takes issue with a certain feature of the standard versions of the A-theory that is in fact problematic independently of worries about temporal passage. To illustrate this, I present a new argument, the argument from comprehensiveness, which demonstrates that the standard A-theoretic account of temporal reality is inadequate, even if it is granted that it can accommodate passage.
It has been argued recently that one major difficulty facing the A-theory of time consists in the... more It has been argued recently that one major difficulty facing the A-theory of time consists in the view’s failure to provide a satisfactory account of the passage of time. Critics have objected that this particular charge is premised on an unduly strong conception of temporal passage, and that the argument does not go through on alternative, less demanding conceptions of passage. The resulting dialectical stalemate threatens to prove intractable, given the notorious elusiveness of the notion of temporal passage. Here I argue that there is progress to be made in this regard. The argument from passage takes issue with a certain feature of the standard versions of the A-theory that is in fact problematic independently of worries about temporal passage. To illustrate this, I present a new argument, the argument from comprehensiveness, which demonstrates that the standard A-theoretic account of temporal reality is inadequate, even if it is granted that it can accommodate passage.
According to Fine’s (Modality and tense: philosophical papers. Oxford University Press, Oxford, p... more According to Fine’s (Modality and tense: philosophical papers. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 261–320, 2005) famous take on the infamous McTaggartian paradox, realism about tensed facts is incompatible with the joint acceptence of three very general and seemingly plausible theses about reality. However, Correia and Rosenkranz (As time goes by: eternal facts in an ageing universe. Mentis, Paderborn, 2011) have recently objected that Fine’s argument depends on a crucial assumption about the nature of tensed facts; once that assumption is given up, they claim, realists can endorse the theses in question without further ado. They also argue that their novel version of tense realism, called dynamic absolutism, is to be preferred over its rivals. I argue in this paper that dynamic absolutism does not constitute a genuine alternative for realists about tense.
It has been argued recently that one major difficulty facing the A-theory of time consists in the... more It has been argued recently that one major difficulty facing the A-theory of time consists in the view's failure to provide a satisfactory account of the passage of time. Critics have objected that this particular charge is premised on an unduly strong conception of temporal passage, and that the argument does not go through on alternative, less demanding conceptions of passage. The resulting dialectical stalemate threatens to prove intractable, given the notorious elusiveness of the notion of temporal passage. Here I argue that there is progress to be made in this regard. The argument from passage takes issue with a certain feature of the standard versions of the A-theory that is in fact problematic independently of worries about temporal passage. To illustrate this, I present a new argument, the argument from comprehensiveness, which demonstrates that the standard A-theoretic account of temporal reality is inadequate, even if it is granted that it can accommodate passage.
According to Kit Fine’s (Modality and tense: Philosophical papers. Oxford: Oxford
University Pres... more According to Kit Fine’s (Modality and tense: Philosophical papers. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 261–320, 2005) famous take on the infamous McTaggartian paradox, realism about tensed facts is incompatible with the joint acceptence of three very general and seemingly plausible theses about reality. However, Fabrice Correia and Sven Rosenkranz (As time goes by: Eternal facts in an ageing universe. Paderborn: Mentis, 2011) have recently objected that Fine’s argument depends on a crucial assumption about the nature of tensed facts; once that assumption is given up, they claim, realists can endorse the theses in question without further ado. They also argue that their novel version of tense realism, called dynamic absolutism, is to be preferred over its rivals. I argue in this paper that dynamic absolutism does not constitute a genuine alternative for realists about tense.
In his stimulating recent book Reasons without Persons, Brian Hedden develops a novel theory of r... more In his stimulating recent book Reasons without Persons, Brian Hedden develops a novel theory of rationality that he calls Time-Slice Rationality (TSR). One of the main theses of TSR is that all rational requirements are synchronic. We argue here first that this thesis is not well-motivated. We also demonstrate that Hedden is in fact committed to an even stronger claim about the rationality of an agent at a time. Finally, we provide some arguments against the conception of rationality that results from this stronger claim.
The Nature of Desire. Eds. Julien Deonna and Federico Lauria.
Evaluativism about desire, the view that desires just are, or necessarily involve, positive evalu... more Evaluativism about desire, the view that desires just are, or necessarily involve, positive evaluations of their objects, currently enjoys widespread popularity in many philosophical circles. This chapter argues that evaluativism, in both of its doxastic and perceptual versions, overstates and mischaracterises the connection between desires and evaluations. Whereas doxastic evaluativism implausibly rules out cases where someone has a desire, despite evaluating its object negatively, being uncertain about its value, or having no doxastic attitude whatsoever towards its evaluative status at all, perceptual evaluativism cannot even properly apply to the large class of standing desires. It is also argued that evaluativism about desire is not even well-motivated in the first place: the theory is supposed to solve a particular puzzle about the role desires play in the explanation of action, yet, in fact, it does not offer any help whatsoever in dealing with the relevant puzzle.
Fiktion und Fiktionalismus: Beiträge zu Hans Vaihingers "Philosophie des Als Ob", Jul 2014
Seit einigen Jahren ist der so genannte moralische Fiktionalismus (im folgenden kurz: „Fiktionali... more Seit einigen Jahren ist der so genannte moralische Fiktionalismus (im folgenden kurz: „Fiktionalismus“) in den Fokus der Debatte um ethische Theoriebildung gerückt. Genau betrachtet gibt es allerdings nicht den Fiktionalismus, sondern dieser Ansatz zerfällt in mindestens drei unterschiedliche Theorievarianten. Auf einen Nenner gebracht läßt sich der moralische Fiktionalismus vorläufig als die These bestimmen, daß moralische Äußerungen in ihrer buchstäblichen faktualen Bedeutung weder wahr noch falsch sind; sie sind aber wahrheitswertfähig im fiktionalen Kontext einer fiktiven Geschichte, die sie entweder beschreiben oder erzählen.1 Diese vorläufige Bestimmung dient hier als ein allererster Ausgangspunkt und wird im folgenden noch zu präzisieren sein. Zuvor jedoch sei der Fiktionalismus in die gegenwärtige Moral- philosophie eingeordnet. Er ist nämlich keineswegs eine randständige oder exotische Position, und das nicht nur, weil der Fiktionalismus auch in vielen anderen philosophischen Teildisziplinen längst seinen Platz gefunden hat; speziell der moralische Fiktionalismus entspricht zudem einer für die Metaethik des 21. Jahrhunderts charakteristischen Entwicklung hin zu sogenannten „Hybridtheorien“.
Wir werden in diesem Beitrag in vier Schritten vorgehen: Erstens werden wir den moralischen Fiktionalismus als einen Spezialfall einer Hybridtheorie ausweisen. Zweitens werden wir den präskriptiven, revolutionären Fiktionalismus im Unterschied zum deskriptiven, hermeneu- tischen Fiktionalismus erläutern, um dann drittens zu zeigen, daß der Fiktionalist sein Hauptversprechen nicht einlösen kann. Dieses besteht darin, als eine dritte Variante eines moralischen Antirealismus den Haupteinwänden einerseits gegen den Nonkognitivismus und andererseits gegen John Leslie Mackies einflußreiche Irrtumstheorie begegnen zu können. Fordert Mackie von uns einzusehen, daß unsere mora- lischen Urteile allesamt systematisch falsch sind, um gleichwohl fortzufahren, den Inhalt unserer moralischen Urteile ohne Einschränkung für wahr zu halten, besteht das offensichtlich unauflösliche Problem für den Nonkognitivisten darin, unsere alltägliche moralische Praxis angemessen zu rekonstruieren, in der wir moralische Meinungsverschiedenheiten austragen und moralische Schlußfolgerungen ziehen. Unser Ziel in diesem Aufsatz ist es zu zeigen, daß der Fiktionalist sein Versprechen nicht einlösen kann: Moral läßt sich nicht auf das Beschreiben oder Erzählen von Geschichten reduzieren. Damit scheitert auch diese dritte Variante eines moralischen Antirealismus. Im Ausgang hiervon werden wir dann schließlich viertens prüfen, inwiefern Hans Vaihingers Thesen über die „ethischen“ bzw. „praktischen Fiktionen“ in seiner Philosophie des Als Ob innerhalb der aktuellen metaethischen Debatte um den moralischen Fiktionalismus einzuordnen sind. Wie sich erweisen wird, kann Vaihinger zwar als Vorläufer des revolutionären Fiktionalismus angesehen werden, aber es bleibt letztlich unklar, welche spezifische Form desselben er vertritt. Das kann allerdings insofern kaum verwundern, als es von vornherein Vaihingers Absicht war, eine eigenständige metaethische Theorie aufzustellen, sondern seine „metaethischen Thesen“ immer schon Teil eines viel umfassenderen, ambitionierteren Projekts sind, nämlich eines globalen Fiktionalismus. Davon abgesehen stößt der revolutionäre Fiktionalismus auf erhebliche Schwierigkeiten, so daß fraglich ist, was für Vaihinger gewonnen wäre, ließe er sich auf einen revolutionären Fiktionalismus welcher Spielart auch immer festlegen.
EINFÜHRUNG IN DIE PHILOSOPHIE DER FARBE (BA 01, 02, 05) (Proseminar, Sommersemester 2016) GRUNDDA... more EINFÜHRUNG IN DIE PHILOSOPHIE DER FARBE (BA 01, 02, 05) (Proseminar, Sommersemester 2016) GRUNDDATEN Dozent: Bahadir Eker, M.A. ([email protected]; Sprechstunde: nach Vereinbarung) Tag & Uhrzeit: Mo, 12-14 Ort: Burse, Raum X Webseite: ILIAS-Ordner des Seminars (Passwort: "magenta") E-Mail-Adresse des Seminars: [email protected] (nur für die Einreichung von schriftlichen Seminarleistungen; nicht für Fragen usw.)
Proseminar, Sommersemester 2016) GRUNDDATEN Dozent: Bahadir Eker, M.A. (bahadir.eker@uni-tuebinge... more Proseminar, Sommersemester 2016) GRUNDDATEN Dozent: Bahadir Eker, M.A. ([email protected]; Sprechstunde: nach Vereinbarung) Tag & Uhrzeit: Mi, 14-16 Ort: Burse, Schellingzimmer Webseite: ILIAS-Ordner des Seminars (Passwort: "sherlock") E-Mail-Adresse des Seminars: [email protected] (nur für die Einreichung von schriftlichen Seminarleistungen; nicht für Fragen usw.)
GRUNDDATEN Dozent: Bahadir Eker, M.A. ([email protected]; Sprechstunde: Mo, 15-16) Ta... more GRUNDDATEN Dozent: Bahadir Eker, M.A. ([email protected]; Sprechstunde: Mo, 15-16) Tag & Uhrzeit: Do, 12-14 Ort: Burse, Raum X Webseite: ILIAS-Ordner des Seminars (Passwort: "gründe") E-Mail-Adresse des Seminars: [email protected] (nur für die Einreichung von schriftlichen Seminarleistungen; nicht für Fragen usw.)
GRUNDDATEN Dozent: Bahadir Eker, M.A. ([email protected]; Sprechstunde: n. V.) Tag & ... more GRUNDDATEN Dozent: Bahadir Eker, M.A. ([email protected]; Sprechstunde: n. V.) Tag & Uhrzeit: Mo, 12-14 Ort: Burse, Schellingzimmer Webseite: ILIAS-Ordner des Seminars (Passwort: "überzeugung") E-Mail-Adresse des Seminars: [email protected] (nur für die Einreichung von schriftlichen Seminarleistungen; nicht für Fragen usw.)
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Papers by Bahadır Eker
University Press, pp. 261–320, 2005) famous take on the infamous McTaggartian
paradox, realism about tensed facts is incompatible with the joint acceptence of three
very general and seemingly plausible theses about reality. However, Fabrice Correia
and Sven Rosenkranz (As time goes by: Eternal facts in an ageing universe.
Paderborn: Mentis, 2011) have recently objected that Fine’s argument depends on a
crucial assumption about the nature of tensed facts; once that assumption is given up,
they claim, realists can endorse the theses in question without further ado. They also
argue that their novel version of tense realism, called dynamic absolutism, is to be
preferred over its rivals. I argue in this paper that dynamic absolutism does not
constitute a genuine alternative for realists about tense.
Wir werden in diesem Beitrag in vier Schritten vorgehen: Erstens werden wir den moralischen Fiktionalismus als einen Spezialfall einer Hybridtheorie ausweisen. Zweitens werden wir den präskriptiven, revolutionären Fiktionalismus im Unterschied zum deskriptiven, hermeneu- tischen Fiktionalismus erläutern, um dann drittens zu zeigen, daß der Fiktionalist sein Hauptversprechen nicht einlösen kann. Dieses besteht darin, als eine dritte Variante eines moralischen Antirealismus den Haupteinwänden einerseits gegen den Nonkognitivismus und andererseits gegen John Leslie Mackies einflußreiche Irrtumstheorie begegnen zu können. Fordert Mackie von uns einzusehen, daß unsere mora- lischen Urteile allesamt systematisch falsch sind, um gleichwohl fortzufahren, den Inhalt unserer moralischen Urteile ohne Einschränkung für wahr zu halten, besteht das offensichtlich unauflösliche Problem für den Nonkognitivisten darin, unsere alltägliche moralische Praxis angemessen zu rekonstruieren, in der wir moralische Meinungsverschiedenheiten austragen und moralische Schlußfolgerungen ziehen. Unser Ziel in diesem Aufsatz ist es zu zeigen, daß der Fiktionalist sein Versprechen nicht einlösen kann: Moral läßt sich nicht auf das Beschreiben oder Erzählen von Geschichten reduzieren. Damit scheitert auch diese dritte Variante eines moralischen Antirealismus. Im Ausgang hiervon werden wir dann schließlich viertens prüfen, inwiefern Hans Vaihingers Thesen über die „ethischen“ bzw. „praktischen Fiktionen“ in seiner Philosophie des Als Ob innerhalb der aktuellen metaethischen Debatte um den moralischen Fiktionalismus einzuordnen sind. Wie sich erweisen wird, kann Vaihinger zwar als Vorläufer des revolutionären Fiktionalismus angesehen werden, aber es bleibt letztlich unklar, welche spezifische Form desselben er vertritt. Das kann allerdings insofern kaum verwundern, als es von vornherein Vaihingers Absicht war, eine eigenständige metaethische Theorie aufzustellen, sondern seine „metaethischen Thesen“ immer schon Teil eines viel umfassenderen, ambitionierteren Projekts sind, nämlich eines globalen Fiktionalismus. Davon abgesehen stößt der revolutionäre Fiktionalismus auf erhebliche Schwierigkeiten, so daß fraglich ist, was für Vaihinger gewonnen wäre, ließe er sich auf einen revolutionären Fiktionalismus welcher Spielart auch immer festlegen.
Talks by Bahadır Eker
University Press, pp. 261–320, 2005) famous take on the infamous McTaggartian
paradox, realism about tensed facts is incompatible with the joint acceptence of three
very general and seemingly plausible theses about reality. However, Fabrice Correia
and Sven Rosenkranz (As time goes by: Eternal facts in an ageing universe.
Paderborn: Mentis, 2011) have recently objected that Fine’s argument depends on a
crucial assumption about the nature of tensed facts; once that assumption is given up,
they claim, realists can endorse the theses in question without further ado. They also
argue that their novel version of tense realism, called dynamic absolutism, is to be
preferred over its rivals. I argue in this paper that dynamic absolutism does not
constitute a genuine alternative for realists about tense.
Wir werden in diesem Beitrag in vier Schritten vorgehen: Erstens werden wir den moralischen Fiktionalismus als einen Spezialfall einer Hybridtheorie ausweisen. Zweitens werden wir den präskriptiven, revolutionären Fiktionalismus im Unterschied zum deskriptiven, hermeneu- tischen Fiktionalismus erläutern, um dann drittens zu zeigen, daß der Fiktionalist sein Hauptversprechen nicht einlösen kann. Dieses besteht darin, als eine dritte Variante eines moralischen Antirealismus den Haupteinwänden einerseits gegen den Nonkognitivismus und andererseits gegen John Leslie Mackies einflußreiche Irrtumstheorie begegnen zu können. Fordert Mackie von uns einzusehen, daß unsere mora- lischen Urteile allesamt systematisch falsch sind, um gleichwohl fortzufahren, den Inhalt unserer moralischen Urteile ohne Einschränkung für wahr zu halten, besteht das offensichtlich unauflösliche Problem für den Nonkognitivisten darin, unsere alltägliche moralische Praxis angemessen zu rekonstruieren, in der wir moralische Meinungsverschiedenheiten austragen und moralische Schlußfolgerungen ziehen. Unser Ziel in diesem Aufsatz ist es zu zeigen, daß der Fiktionalist sein Versprechen nicht einlösen kann: Moral läßt sich nicht auf das Beschreiben oder Erzählen von Geschichten reduzieren. Damit scheitert auch diese dritte Variante eines moralischen Antirealismus. Im Ausgang hiervon werden wir dann schließlich viertens prüfen, inwiefern Hans Vaihingers Thesen über die „ethischen“ bzw. „praktischen Fiktionen“ in seiner Philosophie des Als Ob innerhalb der aktuellen metaethischen Debatte um den moralischen Fiktionalismus einzuordnen sind. Wie sich erweisen wird, kann Vaihinger zwar als Vorläufer des revolutionären Fiktionalismus angesehen werden, aber es bleibt letztlich unklar, welche spezifische Form desselben er vertritt. Das kann allerdings insofern kaum verwundern, als es von vornherein Vaihingers Absicht war, eine eigenständige metaethische Theorie aufzustellen, sondern seine „metaethischen Thesen“ immer schon Teil eines viel umfassenderen, ambitionierteren Projekts sind, nämlich eines globalen Fiktionalismus. Davon abgesehen stößt der revolutionäre Fiktionalismus auf erhebliche Schwierigkeiten, so daß fraglich ist, was für Vaihinger gewonnen wäre, ließe er sich auf einen revolutionären Fiktionalismus welcher Spielart auch immer festlegen.