Papers by Christine Bratu
ERGO, 2019
This paper addresses the question whether there is a rational connection between self-respect and... more This paper addresses the question whether there is a rational connection between self-respect and the disrespect of others by engaging with the so-called Stoic View (SV) presented by Colin Bird. According to SV, there is no such connection because the disrespect other people show us can never provide us with a reason to lose our self-respect. This essay argues that SV is correct only from a third-personal perspective and false from a first-personal one. Since we are social cognizers, we use how other people treat us as evidence, for instance, about our moral status, and we are
justified in doing so if we have no reason to dismiss them as untrustworthy. Distinguishing between the first-and third-personal perspectives is important to avoid victim-blaming. I show this by discussing an example from literature in which the protagonist concludes that she does not have equal moral status and thus lacks in self-respect without any mistake in her reasoning simply because she has been given false information about her moral status.
Zeitschrift für Praktische Philosophie , 2020
In diesem Aufsatz diskutiere ich die Frage, ob es moralisch
zulässig ist, bei der Verteilung von ... more In diesem Aufsatz diskutiere ich die Frage, ob es moralisch
zulässig ist, bei der Verteilung von Positionen in der akademischen Philosophie in Deutschland partiell vom Prinzip der Bestenauswahl abzuweichen, um Frauen bevorzugt anzustellen. Für Anhänger*innen der traditionellen Sichtweise, der zufolge diejenige Bewerber*in eine akademische Position bekommen sollte, die über das meiste
Potential für diese Position verfügt, wäre dies eine ungerechtfertigte Form der Diskriminierung. Ich argumentiere, dass dieser Vorwurf nicht zutrifft, jedenfalls nicht, wenn wir davon ausgehen, dass die gegenwärtige Vergabepraxis von akademischen Positionen von Phänomenen wie implicit biases und stereotype threat verzerrt wird. Um diese These einzuholen, analysiere ich das meiner Ansicht nach beste Argument, das Anhänger*innen der traditionellen Sichtweise zur Verfügung steht, und zeige, dass dieses abgeschwächt werden muss. In seiner abgeschwächten Form ist dieses Argument aber nicht nur mit der bevorzugten Anstellung von Frauen vereinbar, diese setzt sogar die Ziele, die hinter der traditionellen Sichtweise stehen, besser um als die traditionelle Sichtweise selbst.
Handbuch Anerkennung (Springer), ed. by Ludwig Siep, Heikki Ikäheimo and Michael Quante, 2018
In this article, we give an overview over both past and present as well as possible future deba... more In this article, we give an overview over both past and present as well as possible future debates around recognition in and in connection with feminist thought. In principle, recognition can involve persons, collectives, and institutions, but here we are primarily concerned with the recognition of persons by other persons. In the first section, we start with a discussion of care as a form of recognition and the recognition of care work. In the second section, we turn to critiques of recognition in feminist thought. In the third section, we outline a new field of research that should be of interest to both feminist and recognition theorists, namely our credibility economy. Since there is a separate article on Judith Butler and queer feminism in this handbook, we exclude their contributions from our discussion here.
In the contemporary debate about respect, the writings of Immanuel Kant constitute an important p... more In the contemporary debate about respect, the writings of Immanuel Kant constitute an important point of reference. I argue that Kant distinguishes between two different kinds of respect: reverentia is a feeling that a person experiences towards whatever is morally warranted and that will lead her to do what is morally warranted, provided that she has cultivated a calm state of mind. In contrast, observantia consists in a set of actions she has to perform in response to certain morally relevant features of persons, for instance their dignity. So both kinds of respect are different stances and directed towards different objects. What they have in common is that they both consist in the acknowledgment of some morally relevant feature. But while in the case of reverentia this acknowledgment takes place on the level of feelings and motivations, in the case of observantia it takes place on the level of actions.
In this paper we argue that Kant cannot be considered a Kantian constitutivist. To do so, we firs... more In this paper we argue that Kant cannot be considered a Kantian constitutivist. To do so, we first explain what we mean by Kantian constitutivism, drawing on the work of Christine Korsgaard. In the second part of the paper, we go on to clarify the notion of Kantian constitutivism, defending our reconstruction of Korsgaard's approach against a possible objection. In the third and final part, we argue that Kant himself would have rejected each of the three claims we have shown to be central for Kantian constitutivism.
This is a presentation I gave at a workshop in Stockholm; I am currently working on the correspon... more This is a presentation I gave at a workshop in Stockholm; I am currently working on the correspondent paper.
In this paper (which will be published in Zeitschrift für politische Theorie 1/2015) I try to sho... more In this paper (which will be published in Zeitschrift für politische Theorie 1/2015) I try to show what account of neutrality liberalism should endorse.
Drafts by Christine Bratu
Can we wrong each other just by entertaining certain beliefs about each other? So far, authors wh... more Can we wrong each other just by entertaining certain beliefs about each other? So far, authors who are interested in the possibility of doxastic wronging have tried to answer this question by focusing on issues of control and coordination. In this paper, I raise a different point by discussing whether the idea of doxastic wronging is compatible with a liberal normative commitment. To do so, I first show that there are two ways to interpret the phenomenon of doxastic wronging, a harm-based one and an obligation-based one. Then I argue that only the harm-based interpretation is compatible with the so called liberal principle and, more specifically, freedom of thought. Engaging with this moral issue thus enriches our understanding of doxastic wronging as it reveals that the wrong-making feature of doxastic wronging lies in the harm it constitutes for its targets and not, as the obligation-based interpretation would have it, in the violation of a morally grounded epistemic obligation.
In this paper I argue that we need to develop a new understanding of disrespect since current pro... more In this paper I argue that we need to develop a new understanding of disrespect since current proposals fail to make sense of the wrong of disrespect.
Talks by Christine Bratu
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Papers by Christine Bratu
justified in doing so if we have no reason to dismiss them as untrustworthy. Distinguishing between the first-and third-personal perspectives is important to avoid victim-blaming. I show this by discussing an example from literature in which the protagonist concludes that she does not have equal moral status and thus lacks in self-respect without any mistake in her reasoning simply because she has been given false information about her moral status.
zulässig ist, bei der Verteilung von Positionen in der akademischen Philosophie in Deutschland partiell vom Prinzip der Bestenauswahl abzuweichen, um Frauen bevorzugt anzustellen. Für Anhänger*innen der traditionellen Sichtweise, der zufolge diejenige Bewerber*in eine akademische Position bekommen sollte, die über das meiste
Potential für diese Position verfügt, wäre dies eine ungerechtfertigte Form der Diskriminierung. Ich argumentiere, dass dieser Vorwurf nicht zutrifft, jedenfalls nicht, wenn wir davon ausgehen, dass die gegenwärtige Vergabepraxis von akademischen Positionen von Phänomenen wie implicit biases und stereotype threat verzerrt wird. Um diese These einzuholen, analysiere ich das meiner Ansicht nach beste Argument, das Anhänger*innen der traditionellen Sichtweise zur Verfügung steht, und zeige, dass dieses abgeschwächt werden muss. In seiner abgeschwächten Form ist dieses Argument aber nicht nur mit der bevorzugten Anstellung von Frauen vereinbar, diese setzt sogar die Ziele, die hinter der traditionellen Sichtweise stehen, besser um als die traditionelle Sichtweise selbst.
Drafts by Christine Bratu
Talks by Christine Bratu
justified in doing so if we have no reason to dismiss them as untrustworthy. Distinguishing between the first-and third-personal perspectives is important to avoid victim-blaming. I show this by discussing an example from literature in which the protagonist concludes that she does not have equal moral status and thus lacks in self-respect without any mistake in her reasoning simply because she has been given false information about her moral status.
zulässig ist, bei der Verteilung von Positionen in der akademischen Philosophie in Deutschland partiell vom Prinzip der Bestenauswahl abzuweichen, um Frauen bevorzugt anzustellen. Für Anhänger*innen der traditionellen Sichtweise, der zufolge diejenige Bewerber*in eine akademische Position bekommen sollte, die über das meiste
Potential für diese Position verfügt, wäre dies eine ungerechtfertigte Form der Diskriminierung. Ich argumentiere, dass dieser Vorwurf nicht zutrifft, jedenfalls nicht, wenn wir davon ausgehen, dass die gegenwärtige Vergabepraxis von akademischen Positionen von Phänomenen wie implicit biases und stereotype threat verzerrt wird. Um diese These einzuholen, analysiere ich das meiner Ansicht nach beste Argument, das Anhänger*innen der traditionellen Sichtweise zur Verfügung steht, und zeige, dass dieses abgeschwächt werden muss. In seiner abgeschwächten Form ist dieses Argument aber nicht nur mit der bevorzugten Anstellung von Frauen vereinbar, diese setzt sogar die Ziele, die hinter der traditionellen Sichtweise stehen, besser um als die traditionelle Sichtweise selbst.