Papers by Katherine Dormandy
Social Epistemology, 2024
Gatekeeping, or determining membership of your group, is crucial to science: the moniker ‘scienti... more Gatekeeping, or determining membership of your group, is crucial to science: the moniker ‘scientific’ is a stamp of epistemic quality or even authority. But gatekeeping in science is fraught with dangers. Gatekeepers must exclude bad science, science fraud and pseudoscience, while including the disagreeing viewpoints on which science thrives. This is a difficult tightrope, not least because gatekeeping is a human matter and can be influenced by biases such as groupthink. After spelling out these general tensions around gatekeeping in science, we shed light on them with a case study from psychology. This concerns whether academic psychologists rightly or wrongly classify the applied-psychology framework of NLP (‘neuro-linguistic programming’) as unscientific and even pseudoscientific. This example of gatekeeping is particularly instructive because both the NLP community and the psychology community, we argue, make legitimate but also illegitimate moves. This case gives rise to several general insights about gatekeeping in science more generally.
BMC Bioinformatics, 2006
Background: Ontologies and taxonomies are among the most important computational resources for mo... more Background: Ontologies and taxonomies are among the most important computational resources for molecular biology and bioinformatics. A series of recent papers has shown that the Gene Ontology (GO), the most prominent taxonomic resource in these fields, is marked by flaws of certain characteristic types, which flow from a failure to address basic ontological principles. As yet, no methods have been proposed which would allow ontology curators to pinpoint flawed terms or definitions in ontologies in a systematic way. Results: We present computational methods that automatically identify terms and definitions which are defined in a circular or unintelligible way. We further demonstrate the potential of these methods by applying them to isolate a subset of 6001 problematic GO terms. By automatically aligning GO with other ontologies and taxonomies we were able to propose alternative synonyms and definitions for some of these problematic terms. This allows us to demonstrate that these other resources do not contain definitions superior to those supplied by GO.
Trust in Epistemology, 2020
Where there is trust, there is also vulnerability, and vulnerability can be exploited. Epistemic ... more Where there is trust, there is also vulnerability, and vulnerability can be exploited. Epistemic trust is no exception. This chapter maps the phenomenon of the exploitation of epistemic trust. I start with a discussion of how trust in general can be exploited; a key observation is that trust incurs vulnerabilities not just for the party doing the trusting, but also for the trustee (after all, trust can be burdensome), so either party can exploit the other. I apply these considerations to epistemic trust, specifically in testimonial relationships. There, we standardly think of a hearer trusting a speaker. But we miss an important aspect of this relationship unless we consider too that the speaker standardly trusts the hearer. Given this mutual trust, and given that both trustees and trusters can exploit each other, we have four possibilities for exploitation in epistemic-trust relationships: a speaker exploiting a hearer (a) by accepting his trust or (b) by imposing her trust on him, and a hearer exploiting a speaker (c) by accepting her trust or (d) by imposing his trust on her. One result is that you do not need to betray someone to exploit him-you can exploit him just as easily by doing what he trusts you for.
Trust in Epistemology, 2020
I give an overview of the trust literature and then of six central issues concerning epistemic tr... more I give an overview of the trust literature and then of six central issues concerning epistemic trust. The survey of trust zeroes in on the kinds of expectations that trust involves, trust’s characteristic psychology, and what makes trust rational. The discussion of epistemic trust focuses on its role in testimony, the epistemic goods that we trust for, the significance of epistemic trust in contrast to reliance, what makes epistemic trust rational, and epistemic self-trust.
Religious Truth and Identity in an Age of Plurality, 2020
Some religious communities argue that public policy is best decided by their own members, on the ... more Some religious communities argue that public policy is best decided by their own members, on the grounds that collaborating with those reasoning from secular or "worldly" perspectives will only foment error about how society should be run. But I argue that epistemology instead recommends fostering disagreement among a plurality of religious and secular worldviews. Inter-worldview disagreement over public policy can challenge our unquestioned assumptions, deliver evidence we would likely have missed, and expose us to new epistemic alternatives; when done respectfully, it can also combat epistemically problematic biases and groupthink. I address two objections that members of a politically active religious community might raise: one that inter-worldview disagreement about public policy is not needed because one's own beliefs are already true, and another that it is not needed because one's own beliefforming processes are divinely guided.
Handbuch Analytische Religionsphilosophie. Akteure – Diskurse – Perspektiven, 2019
Wir leben in einem Zeitalter der religiösen Vielfalt. Es gibt viele unterschiedliche und scheinba... more Wir leben in einem Zeitalter der religiösen Vielfalt. Es gibt viele unterschiedliche und scheinbar inkompatible religiöse und säkulare Glaubensformen, die einander mit einer erstaunlichen Intensität und Geschwindigkeit dank Globalisierung und sozialen Medien begegnen. Damit wächst die Einsicht, dass das eigene Überzeugungssystem nicht mehr einfach als gegeben und plausibel anzunehmen ist. Aufgrund dieser neuen Entwicklungen haben sich in den letzten Jahren intensive philosophische Diskussionen ergeben.
Episteme, 2020
What is epistemic self-trust? There is a tension in the way in which prominent accounts answer th... more What is epistemic self-trust? There is a tension in the way in which prominent accounts answer this question. Many construe epistemic trust in oneself as no more than reliance on our sub-personal cognitive faculties. Yet many accountsoften the same onesconstrue epistemic trust in others as a normatively laden attitude directed at persons whom we expect to care about our epistemic needs. Is epistemic self-trust really so different from epistemic trust in others? I argue that it is not. We certainly do rely on our cognitive faculties to achieve epistemic ends; but I argue that we also have the normatively rich sort of epistemic trust in ourselves. Moreover, there is a theoretical need for this normatively rich notion of epistemic self-trust: positing it yields the best account of how we secure important epistemic goods, including knowledge and recognition as knowers. I argue this by giving an account of epistemic trust in others and showing that it can be generalized to epistemic trust in oneself.
The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Humility, 2020
Epistemic trust helps secure knowledge, and so does intellectual humility. They do so independent... more Epistemic trust helps secure knowledge, and so does intellectual humility. They do so independently; but they can also support each other, and this chapter discusses how. Epistemic trust, at least the form discussed here, is trust in oneself or another person for knowledge. It involves a norm-governed relationship with positive affective and volitional attitudes, and is effective at securing knowledge when directed toward a trustworthy person. Intellectual humility is a character virtue that involves caring about epistemic ends and promotes accurate insight into those of one's own cognitive, affective, and volitional faculties that are relevant to acquiring knowledge. Intellectual humility, I argue, promotes effective epistemic trust in oneself and in others. It promotes effective epistemic self-trust by yielding insight into one's own epistemic trustworthiness, and by ensuring that one is motivated to epistemically self-improve if necessary. It promotes effective epistemic trust in others, at least in the context of testimony, by helping a hearer assess whether he needs outside epistemic assistance, and how apt he is at selecting trustworthy testifiers; and by helping a speaker be epistemically trustworthy.
Religion und Pluralität, 2020
Religious Disagreement and Pluralism, 2021
Religious disagreement, like disagreement in science, stands to deliver important epistemic benef... more Religious disagreement, like disagreement in science, stands to deliver important epistemic benefits. But religious communities tend to frown on it. A salient reason is that, whereas scientists should be neutral toward the topics they discuss, religious believers should be loyal to God; and religious disagreement, they argue, is disloyal. For it often involves discussion with people who believe more negatively about God than you do, putting you at risk of forming negative beliefs yourself. And forming negative beliefs about someone, or even being open to doing so, is disloyal. A loyal person, says the objector, should instead exhibit doxastic partiality, doing her best to believe positively about the other party even at the cost of accuracy. I discuss two arguments from doxastic partiality that aim to show that religious disagreement is typically disloyal. I argue that even given doxastic partiality, religious disagreement is not typically disloyal, and can in fact be loyal. But then I argue that doxastic partiality is false. A superior form of loyalty is epistemically oriented: concerned with knowing the other party as she really is. This opens up new ways in which religious disagreement for the sake of learning about God can be loyal to him.
Synthese, 2022
If you love someone, is it good to believe better of her than epistemic norms allow? The partiali... more If you love someone, is it good to believe better of her than epistemic norms allow? The partiality view says that it is: love, on this view, issues norms of belief that clash with epistemic norms. The partiality view is supposedly supported by an analogy between beliefs and actions, by the phenomenology of love, and by the idea that love commits us to the loved one's good character. I argue that the partiality view is false, and defend what I call the epistemic view. On the epistemic view, love also issues norms of belief. But these say simply (and perhaps surprisingly) that you should adhere to epistemic norms in forming and maintaining beliefs about loved ones. I offer two arguments for the epistemic view. The first appeals to the emotional responses of love, which, when sensitive to what the loved one is really like, can make love great and be morally transformative. The second is a new argument for why caring for a loved one requires true beliefs about him. We see that there may be some boundaries, such as stuffy traditions, that love is right to defy, but that epistemic boundaries are not among them.
Australasian Philosophical Review, 2021
Australasian Philosophical Review, 2021
The Monist, 2023
I argue that faith is a type of trust. It is also part of a relationship in which both parties ar... more I argue that faith is a type of trust. It is also part of a relationship in which both parties are called on to be faithful, where faithfulness is a type of trustworthiness. What distinguishes faith relationships from trust relationships is that both parties value the faith relationship intrinsically. I discuss how faith on this account can, and cannot, be rational when it goes beyond a person's evidence. It turns out that faith has the same rationality conditions as trust, differing from it only in the cases that fix our intuitions.
Epistemology: Contexts, Values, Disagreement., 2007
Religious Studies, 2023
A prominent view in religious epistemology, which I call divine-help epistemology, says that peop... more A prominent view in religious epistemology, which I call divine-help epistemology, says that people of faith are epistemically gifted by God, whereas non-believers are subject to the noetic effects of a fallen world. This view aims to show how religious beliefs for people of faith can be epistemically justified. But I argue that it makes such people prone to a cluster of epistemic vices that I call epistemic phariseeism. Divine-help epistemology is especially apt to promote these vices because its normativity is not just epistemic, but also religious and moral. I suggest an alternative epistemological view that is better suited to religious faith.
The Cambridge Handbook of Religious Epistemology, 2023
Religious disagreement describes the fact that religious and secular beliefs exhibit massive vari... more Religious disagreement describes the fact that religious and secular beliefs exhibit massive variety, and cannot all be perfectly accurate. It yields a problem and an opportunity. The problem is that, especially given the apparent epistemic parity of many who hold other beliefs, you cannot suppose that your beliefs are accurate. This arguably puts pressure on you to weaken or abandon your beliefs. Responses include denying the parity of those who disagree, or denying that religious disagreement speaks strongly against your beliefs. I criticize these, defending an alternative epistemology to those employed by both the problem and the responses. My epistemological view finds a middle-ground between them, and positions us to benefit from the opportunity that religious disagreement offers to improve our beliefs. I address the objections that the opportunity mentality is unnecessary if God supports our beliefs, that it risks our (true) beliefs, and that it is disloyal to God.
Religious Truth and Identity in an Age of Plurality, 2021
Much of this discussion is translated and adapted from Katherine Dormandy's "Religiöse Vielfalt u... more Much of this discussion is translated and adapted from Katherine Dormandy's "Religiöse Vielfalt und Religiöser Dissens", forthcoming in the Handbuch analytischer Theologie (Handbook of Analytic Theology), ed. Klaus Viertbauer and Georg Gasser, forthcoming with Metzler Verlag. 2 Cottingham (this volume) formulates this conclusion as the claim that religious beliefs lack epistemic respectability; on Wiertz's construal it says that an agnostic position is the only rational option.
Computation, Information, Cognition: The Nexus and the Liminal, 2007
Routledge Handbook of Disagreement, 2023
Disagreement between community worldviews-or what I'll call maps of reality-abounds. Many communi... more Disagreement between community worldviews-or what I'll call maps of reality-abounds. Many communities, such as religious or political ones, welcome this situation as an opportunity for dialogue or cooperation. But for others it gives rise to what I'll call the competition worry: You regard your community's map of reality as competing with other communities', and you worry that members of your community may switch allegiance. Why harbor this worry? One reason is epistemic: you are concerned that disagreement with epistemic peers from other communities provides strong evidence against your community's map. Another reason is affective: you worry that members of your community may find alternative maps of reality more attractive. Whatever reasons motivate the competition worry, some communities respond positively, by doing their best to understand and meet members' needs. But others respond in a way that I will argue is problematic: by developing practices aimed at entrenching members in the community's map-that is, nudging them to be unwilling, or even unable, to filter reality through any alternative map. Entrenching practices might for example discourage significant interactions with outsiders or their ideas, or may deploy manipulative rhetoric to create an "us-versus-them" mentality. This chapter discusses how religious communities might develop entrenching practices in response to the competition worry. Religious practices do not generally aim to entrench. But those that do, I'll argue, are problematic even by the lights of those religious communities that employ them. For entrenching practices undermine another central aim that many other religious practices have. This aim is to secure religious knowledge. Religious knowledge is an important part of many religious maps, assuming that there is a religious reality to be known and that the community map captures it in an epistemically appropriate way. There are at least three types of religious knowledge: knowledge-that certain propositions about religious matters obtain, knowledge-how to engage with God, and personal knowledge of God. Securing this religious knowledge is an aim of many religious practices. But this epistemic aim, I'll argue, is undermined by religious practices that have the entrenching aim discussed above. Is there a different response to the competition worry that does not promote entrenchment? I argue that there is. Section 2 gives an account of religious maps of reality and their relationship to religious practice. Section 3 discusses three forms of putative religious knowledge that religious practices can generate. Section 4 discusses the competition worry, and section 5 discusses the response provided by entrenching practices. Section 6 presents an alternative response. 2. Religious Maps and Religious Practices The epistemology of disagreement commonly focuses on disagreement over beliefs and knowledge-that. But religious disagreement is best understood through a broader lens. Religious beliefs are often intertwined with a person's practices, self-understanding, communities, and putative relationship to God; this is why competition can be worrisome. So I will zoom out beyond beliefs and knowledge-that, incorporating other aspects of a person's map of reality, including other forms of knowledge. I'll suppose that there are two things that make a map of reality religious. First, its content makes reference to a reality that transcends the material; for simplicity I'll focus on God. Different religious maps make these references with varying degrees of literalness, which the map may make explicit. Second, the map has an important function for community members, perhaps contributing to their sense of identity, community belonging, or existential security. Here are some components of a map of reality as I'll understand it. 1 Perhaps the most familiar are beliefs, or your assent to the truth of particular propositions. Some beliefs are religious, pertaining explicitly to religious matters (e.g. that God exists, that community members celebrate a certain holiday thus-and-so). Others, often neglected in religious epistemology, are auxiliary beliefs (Wynn 2017; Dormandy 2020a); these do not pertain directly to religious matters, but are taken either to epistemically support religious beliefs, to follow from them or be made probable by them, or to be background assumptions against which entailment or support relations get off the ground. Examples include beliefs about metaphysics, empirical science, politics or economics, or epistemology. Maps of reality also include concepts. These are the categories that structure some but probably not all of our perception (Vetter and Newen 2014), such as the concept table that enables me to perceive a four-legged, flat-surface object as a table. A person's map typically has a self-concept, or set of categories for thinking of oneself, and religious maps have a God-concept. Maps also include values, or preference orderings of things we care about. One might prioritize family over career, or the social safety net over the national debt. Maps include representational experiences, such as your sensory experiences, and memories of them. (These may take conceptual form.) Representational experiences, alongside certain of your beliefs, constitute your evidence, which we'll understand as what a person legitimately relies on in epistemic reasoning. Maps also include emotions, which I'll assume have representational content (Fredrickson 2001; whether they count as evidence is controversial). And maps include associationsbetween different concepts, or between concepts and emotions (e.g. Rolexes with Ferraris, or with envy; Holroyd and Sweetman 2016). Associations create unconscious links between certain parts of our map and others. Finally, maps contain models, which are representations (perhaps in various sensory modalities) of how things function or are disposed to change given certain input, and which we draw on in practical or theoretical reasoning (Elgin 2017). Take for instance your model of your bicycle, or of your friend's emotional states. If a model is complex enough to include each component of a map listed here, it may count as a minimap of a specific phenomenon or object. These components of our map, plus others not mentioned, join up to create meaning for us. I do not mean just linguistic meaning, but rather a holistic big picture or frame for orienting ourselves in the world and making cognitive and affective sense of things (Heintzelman and King 2014). Meaning differs from objectual understanding (i.e., from grasping a phenomenon or a body of information; Carter and Gordon 2014) in three ways. 1 Leaning on psychology, I use the map metaphor more broadly than its coiner (Korzybski 1931).
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Papers by Katherine Dormandy
gaining testimonial knowledge that corrects our own biases; or they will be just the right strength but will make testimonial knowledge much harder to achieve than our heavy reliance on testimony suggests. The third horn is the correct one. The lesson is that we must broaden our social-epistemological focus away from paradigm testimony. I argue
that paradigm testimonial believing is only one of a variety of epistemically relational ways of gaining knowledge from others. Many other ways are much less susceptible to
the worries articulated in the trilemma. I discuss belief on the basis of other forms of linguistic communication, including non-literal and ctional communication, as well as
non-linguistic communication.