Fernando A Riofrio
Universidad de Piura, Departamento de Filosofía, Faculty Member Philosophy Professor Universidad de Piura
Ph.D. in Philosophy from the Philosophy Department at University of Navarra, in the merit of the Doctoral Dissertation entitled "La Multiplicidad de los Entes según Tomás de Aquino. Causas de la Diversidad de las Cosas", published as a book. See details in Orcid: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8002-1706
Professor of Philosophy, Theory of Knowledge, and Metaphysics, and Researcher in the field of metaphysics over the last 20 years. Teacher of upper-level courses and core-curriculum courses at the Universidad Hemisferios (August 2021 and continue), the Universidad Panamericana Panamericana (June and July 2021), and the Universidad de Piura (March 2016 - July 2021). Framed on Metaphysical Realism focussed on Aristotle's Metaphysics and Aquinas' Metaphysics.
Ph.D. in Philosophy from the University of Navarra (Spain.) in the merit of a defense of my Doctoral Dissertation "Multiplicity of Beings according to Thomas Aquinas. Causes of the Diversity of Things", which obtained the maximal qualification "Outstanding" and the honorific mention "Cum Laude" (December 2015). The Director of this dissertation was Prof.Dr. Alejandro Llano, Professor (emeritus) of the Philosophy Department and Chair of Metaphysics at the University of Navarra. I published my book born from this doctoral dissertation, published in - OmniScriptum, Saarbrücken (Alemania) 2017.
ISBN 978-3-639-53735-2
DNB 1129525120
URN: urn:nbn:de:101:1-201704082712
Enlace para adquisición: https://www.morebooks.de/store/gb/book/la-multiplicidad-de-los-entes-seg%C3%BAn-tom%C3%A1s-de-aquino/isbn/978-3-639-53735-2
ORCID account ID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8002-1706
Advanced Studies Diplomate and Certificate of Researching Proficiency - equivalent to Master in Philosophy by the University of Navarra. 2008-2010, Visiting Research Scholar in the Department of Philosophy at University of Saint Louis, SL Missouri. (February 17th - March 17th 2017).
My last article is “Metaphysics Z 17’s Ontological Deduction of the Εἶδος as Principle and Primary Substance through the Analysis of the Becoming”. Philosophy Study, January 2019, Vol. 9, No. 1, 16-42.
DOI: 10.17265/2159-5313/2019.01.002.
Open Access:
http://www.davidpublisher.org/Public/uploads/Contribute/5c91fe3953ec6.pdf
Supervisors: Prof. Dr. Alejandro Llano, Professor of Metaphysics (emeritus) at the University of Navarra, Prof. Dr. Rafael Alvira, and Professor of the Philosophy Department (emeritus) at the University of Navarra
Phone: +51 978000488
Address: Avenida Jorge Chávez 269, Urbanización Clarke, ciudad de Piura, distrito y provincia de Piura, Perú.
Postal Code: 20001
Professor of Philosophy, Theory of Knowledge, and Metaphysics, and Researcher in the field of metaphysics over the last 20 years. Teacher of upper-level courses and core-curriculum courses at the Universidad Hemisferios (August 2021 and continue), the Universidad Panamericana Panamericana (June and July 2021), and the Universidad de Piura (March 2016 - July 2021). Framed on Metaphysical Realism focussed on Aristotle's Metaphysics and Aquinas' Metaphysics.
Ph.D. in Philosophy from the University of Navarra (Spain.) in the merit of a defense of my Doctoral Dissertation "Multiplicity of Beings according to Thomas Aquinas. Causes of the Diversity of Things", which obtained the maximal qualification "Outstanding" and the honorific mention "Cum Laude" (December 2015). The Director of this dissertation was Prof.Dr. Alejandro Llano, Professor (emeritus) of the Philosophy Department and Chair of Metaphysics at the University of Navarra. I published my book born from this doctoral dissertation, published in - OmniScriptum, Saarbrücken (Alemania) 2017.
ISBN 978-3-639-53735-2
DNB 1129525120
URN: urn:nbn:de:101:1-201704082712
Enlace para adquisición: https://www.morebooks.de/store/gb/book/la-multiplicidad-de-los-entes-seg%C3%BAn-tom%C3%A1s-de-aquino/isbn/978-3-639-53735-2
ORCID account ID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8002-1706
Advanced Studies Diplomate and Certificate of Researching Proficiency - equivalent to Master in Philosophy by the University of Navarra. 2008-2010, Visiting Research Scholar in the Department of Philosophy at University of Saint Louis, SL Missouri. (February 17th - March 17th 2017).
My last article is “Metaphysics Z 17’s Ontological Deduction of the Εἶδος as Principle and Primary Substance through the Analysis of the Becoming”. Philosophy Study, January 2019, Vol. 9, No. 1, 16-42.
DOI: 10.17265/2159-5313/2019.01.002.
Open Access:
http://www.davidpublisher.org/Public/uploads/Contribute/5c91fe3953ec6.pdf
Supervisors: Prof. Dr. Alejandro Llano, Professor of Metaphysics (emeritus) at the University of Navarra, Prof. Dr. Rafael Alvira, and Professor of the Philosophy Department (emeritus) at the University of Navarra
Phone: +51 978000488
Address: Avenida Jorge Chávez 269, Urbanización Clarke, ciudad de Piura, distrito y provincia de Piura, Perú.
Postal Code: 20001
less
Related Authors
InterestsView All (70)
Uploads
Books by Fernando A Riofrio
My 2021 CV up today.
My Research Plan 2021-2024.
An abstract of my published book "La Multiplicidad de los Entes según Tomás de Aquino. Causas de la diversidad de las cosas", born from my Ph.D. Dissertation.
One article concerning Aristotle eidos as a substance.
Two research statements on metaphysics
See my Orcid site:
<div itemscope itemtype="https://schema.org/Person"><a itemprop="sameAs" content="https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8002-1706" href="https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8002-1706" target="orcid.widget" rel="me noopener noreferrer" style="vertical-align:top;"><img src="https://orcid.org/sites/default/files/images/orcid_16x16.png" style="width:1em;margin-right:.5em;" alt="ORCID iD icon">https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8002-1706</a></div>
Editorial Académica Española - OmniScriptum, Saarbrücken, Gemany, 2017.
ISBN 978-3-639-53735-2
DNB 1129525120
URN: urn:nbn:de:101:1-201704082712
Link: https://www.morebooks.de/store/gb/book/la-multiplicidad-de-los-entes-seg%C3%BAn-tom%C3%A1s-de-aquino/isbn/978-3-639-53735-2
My ORCID ID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8002-1706
distinction of forms according to Thomas Aquinas. This doctrine has its
basis of the Aristotelian thesis of form and act as the cause of
the division of things. St. Thomas, following in this to Aristotle,
conceives the diversity of things as a diversity of forms of
substances, in such a way that it does not follow a pure distinction between the
potential subjects, or a distinction of matter.
Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas expressly reject that diversity
of entities is mainly explained by matter and subject. Tomás
attributes this last doctrine to Plato; rejecting it.
Conference Presentations by Fernando A Riofrio
Is God as Ipsum Esse Subsistens a Hypostatized Universal Incompatible with the Aristotelian Framework of Aquinas's Metaphysics?
For the most part, scholars now agree that Aquinas formulated his doctrine of God as Ipsum Esse Subsistens by taking up certain elements present in the doctrine of the participation of being, and the doctrine that postulates a hypostatized being, formulated by Plato and the ancient and medieval Neoplatonists. The question I am trying to answer in this essay is whether Aquinas incurred inconsistency when integrating such elements into the basically Aristotelian framework of his metaphysics. Today this question is the subject of lively debate.
On the one hand, the well-known scholar Anthony Kenny argues in his book Aquinas on Being that Aquinas fell into inconsistency in the different places where he dealt with the diversification of esse in the context of divine creation, by having formulated the doctrines of Ipsum Esse Subsistens and participation of being platonically; a formulation that, in Kenny’s view, is incompatible with Aquinas’s metaphysical framework, which, according to Kenny himself, is officially anti-Platonic.
Other scholars such as Lawrence Dewan, Stephen Brock, Rudi te Velde, Enrico Berti (his most recent opinion) and Giovanni Ventimiglia argue, on the contrary, that Aquinas did not incur inconsistency in formulating his doctrine of the Ipsum Esse Subsistens. Rudi te Velde thinks, in my view correctly, that Thomas successfully integrated some Platonic elements into Aristotle’s Metaphysics, without falling into inconsistency.
Anthony Kenny is right in holding that Thomas Aquinas assumed certain central doctrinal elements of Plato, including the participation of being and the existence of a pure, hypostatized being. However, he is not right in assuming that such elements as conceived by Plato are incompatible with the basically Aristotelian framework of Aquinas's metaphysics, because Aquinas purified these doctrinal elements of others that were incompatible with Aristotle's metaphysics. Both Aristotle and Aquinas rejected these latter elements, among which was the doctrine that being is a hypostatized universal which is the common substance of things and a genus.
The theory of the form understood as the deepest cause of any material entity within the framework of the Hylomorphism, is called to play a fundamental explanatory function of the principles that sustain the scientific theory and experimentation in biology, neuroscience, psychology, chemistry, physics, and in the other particular sciences in the third millennium.
Drafts by Fernando A Riofrio
In order to elucidate Aquinas’s philosophical method and rigor in arriving at his teaching of Ipsum Esse Subsistens, it is useful to refer to works such as his Treatise on Separate Substances, but above all to his Commentary on Metaphysics. Here Aquinas states that Aristotle concludes, correctly, that there is a Being in Itself and a One in Itself which is the cause of the being of all other beings, but which is not their substance, but only its own substance. According to Aquinas, this conclusion is based on the teachings of act and potency, of substance and of being understood as act, within the framework of Aristotle’s science of being qua being. Aquinas states that although Aristotle inherited the seed of this teaching from Plato, he arrived at it by a different speculative path, rejecting the temptation to conceptualize a subsistent universal being.
It is, therefore, necessary today to seek a third way that explains the substantial unity of the mind-body compound and harmonizes the immaterial and intellectual character of the mind and the somatic character of the brain, because only in this way are the basic concepts from which neuroscience starts sufficiently explained, and neuroscience freed from initial inconsistencies. This third way is traveled by the Neo-Aristotelianism of the third millennium, which, as in the Greek myth, navigates between “the Scylla of materialism [mechanist reductionism] and the Charybdis of dualism,” as Gyula Klima puts it.
This research, therefore, explores this third way with the aim of finding a consistent and correct explanation of the substantial unity of the mind-body compound, which, as my research will aim to prove, is the only thesis currently being debated that has the power to rid neuroscience of the danger of falling into inconsistency at its initial starting points.
Aristotle's definitive demonstration of the essence of substance in the framework of the hylomorphic theory is found in chapter 17 of the Book Zeta of Metaphysics. There he concludes that form is the primary substance and the first cause of the generable and corruptible substance.
The theory of the form understood as the deepest cause of any material entity within the framework of the Hylomorphism, is called to play a fundamental explanatory function of the principles that sustain the scientific theory and experimentation in biology, neuroscience, psychology, chemistry, physics, and in the other particular sciences in the third millennium.
Nevertheless, the point of departure was a hypothesis that came from the transformed Platonism of Christian Neoplatonism. This paper is an abstract of a complete discourse I will pronounce at the 2020 American Maritaritain Association Conference. Anthony Kenny Following this procedure, Aquinas, both in his texts from youth and maturity, has demonstrated that the first cause from which things originate from is a first entity whose essence is its own subsistent being
Now, the initial hypothesis of Aquinas’s demonstration came from his reading of the suggestive thesis of Christian Neoplatonism according to which there is a hypostatized pure esse. This Platonist influence has led today to a lively debate about the consistency of Aquinas's metaphysics of being.
My 2021 CV up today.
My Research Plan 2021-2024.
An abstract of my published book "La Multiplicidad de los Entes según Tomás de Aquino. Causas de la diversidad de las cosas", born from my Ph.D. Dissertation.
One article concerning Aristotle eidos as a substance.
Two research statements on metaphysics
See my Orcid site:
<div itemscope itemtype="https://schema.org/Person"><a itemprop="sameAs" content="https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8002-1706" href="https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8002-1706" target="orcid.widget" rel="me noopener noreferrer" style="vertical-align:top;"><img src="https://orcid.org/sites/default/files/images/orcid_16x16.png" style="width:1em;margin-right:.5em;" alt="ORCID iD icon">https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8002-1706</a></div>
Editorial Académica Española - OmniScriptum, Saarbrücken, Gemany, 2017.
ISBN 978-3-639-53735-2
DNB 1129525120
URN: urn:nbn:de:101:1-201704082712
Link: https://www.morebooks.de/store/gb/book/la-multiplicidad-de-los-entes-seg%C3%BAn-tom%C3%A1s-de-aquino/isbn/978-3-639-53735-2
My ORCID ID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8002-1706
distinction of forms according to Thomas Aquinas. This doctrine has its
basis of the Aristotelian thesis of form and act as the cause of
the division of things. St. Thomas, following in this to Aristotle,
conceives the diversity of things as a diversity of forms of
substances, in such a way that it does not follow a pure distinction between the
potential subjects, or a distinction of matter.
Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas expressly reject that diversity
of entities is mainly explained by matter and subject. Tomás
attributes this last doctrine to Plato; rejecting it.
Is God as Ipsum Esse Subsistens a Hypostatized Universal Incompatible with the Aristotelian Framework of Aquinas's Metaphysics?
For the most part, scholars now agree that Aquinas formulated his doctrine of God as Ipsum Esse Subsistens by taking up certain elements present in the doctrine of the participation of being, and the doctrine that postulates a hypostatized being, formulated by Plato and the ancient and medieval Neoplatonists. The question I am trying to answer in this essay is whether Aquinas incurred inconsistency when integrating such elements into the basically Aristotelian framework of his metaphysics. Today this question is the subject of lively debate.
On the one hand, the well-known scholar Anthony Kenny argues in his book Aquinas on Being that Aquinas fell into inconsistency in the different places where he dealt with the diversification of esse in the context of divine creation, by having formulated the doctrines of Ipsum Esse Subsistens and participation of being platonically; a formulation that, in Kenny’s view, is incompatible with Aquinas’s metaphysical framework, which, according to Kenny himself, is officially anti-Platonic.
Other scholars such as Lawrence Dewan, Stephen Brock, Rudi te Velde, Enrico Berti (his most recent opinion) and Giovanni Ventimiglia argue, on the contrary, that Aquinas did not incur inconsistency in formulating his doctrine of the Ipsum Esse Subsistens. Rudi te Velde thinks, in my view correctly, that Thomas successfully integrated some Platonic elements into Aristotle’s Metaphysics, without falling into inconsistency.
Anthony Kenny is right in holding that Thomas Aquinas assumed certain central doctrinal elements of Plato, including the participation of being and the existence of a pure, hypostatized being. However, he is not right in assuming that such elements as conceived by Plato are incompatible with the basically Aristotelian framework of Aquinas's metaphysics, because Aquinas purified these doctrinal elements of others that were incompatible with Aristotle's metaphysics. Both Aristotle and Aquinas rejected these latter elements, among which was the doctrine that being is a hypostatized universal which is the common substance of things and a genus.
The theory of the form understood as the deepest cause of any material entity within the framework of the Hylomorphism, is called to play a fundamental explanatory function of the principles that sustain the scientific theory and experimentation in biology, neuroscience, psychology, chemistry, physics, and in the other particular sciences in the third millennium.
In order to elucidate Aquinas’s philosophical method and rigor in arriving at his teaching of Ipsum Esse Subsistens, it is useful to refer to works such as his Treatise on Separate Substances, but above all to his Commentary on Metaphysics. Here Aquinas states that Aristotle concludes, correctly, that there is a Being in Itself and a One in Itself which is the cause of the being of all other beings, but which is not their substance, but only its own substance. According to Aquinas, this conclusion is based on the teachings of act and potency, of substance and of being understood as act, within the framework of Aristotle’s science of being qua being. Aquinas states that although Aristotle inherited the seed of this teaching from Plato, he arrived at it by a different speculative path, rejecting the temptation to conceptualize a subsistent universal being.
It is, therefore, necessary today to seek a third way that explains the substantial unity of the mind-body compound and harmonizes the immaterial and intellectual character of the mind and the somatic character of the brain, because only in this way are the basic concepts from which neuroscience starts sufficiently explained, and neuroscience freed from initial inconsistencies. This third way is traveled by the Neo-Aristotelianism of the third millennium, which, as in the Greek myth, navigates between “the Scylla of materialism [mechanist reductionism] and the Charybdis of dualism,” as Gyula Klima puts it.
This research, therefore, explores this third way with the aim of finding a consistent and correct explanation of the substantial unity of the mind-body compound, which, as my research will aim to prove, is the only thesis currently being debated that has the power to rid neuroscience of the danger of falling into inconsistency at its initial starting points.
Aristotle's definitive demonstration of the essence of substance in the framework of the hylomorphic theory is found in chapter 17 of the Book Zeta of Metaphysics. There he concludes that form is the primary substance and the first cause of the generable and corruptible substance.
The theory of the form understood as the deepest cause of any material entity within the framework of the Hylomorphism, is called to play a fundamental explanatory function of the principles that sustain the scientific theory and experimentation in biology, neuroscience, psychology, chemistry, physics, and in the other particular sciences in the third millennium.
Nevertheless, the point of departure was a hypothesis that came from the transformed Platonism of Christian Neoplatonism. This paper is an abstract of a complete discourse I will pronounce at the 2020 American Maritaritain Association Conference. Anthony Kenny Following this procedure, Aquinas, both in his texts from youth and maturity, has demonstrated that the first cause from which things originate from is a first entity whose essence is its own subsistent being
Now, the initial hypothesis of Aquinas’s demonstration came from his reading of the suggestive thesis of Christian Neoplatonism according to which there is a hypostatized pure esse. This Platonist influence has led today to a lively debate about the consistency of Aquinas's metaphysics of being.
All the best.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=umEQRZTqEqg
Hylomorphism is the doctrine adopted by the contemporary philosophical view of Neoaristotelianism which explains better the body/mind problem and neuroscience's axiom according to which brain and mind are united.
Hylomorphism provides the solution and the foundation of this axiom.
Aristotle's hylomorphism provides a philosophical explanation of this axiom.
https://youtu.be/-Oh-vrCzPRA
I did this presentation in 2020. I think it is very suggestive because I make evident the Aristotle's metaphysical foundations which explains the body-mind substantial unity of a man and resolves the mind-body problem which arises from the new advances and discoveries of neuroscience of the last 20 years. The Aristotle's holomorphic solution is the philosophical approach that led to solve this problem better than the modern cartesian dualism and the mechanistic materialist approaches.
Aristotle metaphysical solution is centered in the notion of actuality.
Esta ponencia ha sido pronunciada en el Club de Filosofía de la Universidad de Piura, agradeceré comentarios y discusión acerca de los contenidos vertidos. El tema es muy conocido: Mente-Cerebro, pero tratado desde el ángulo de la filosofía primera y mediante un diagnóstico de la influencia cultural en los principios básicos sobre los que se basa la actividad de la neurociencia. Propongo unas bases filosóficas más adecuadas para sostener los cimientos o bases sobre los que se apoyan los neurocientícos en su actividad.
Is God as Ipsum Esse Subsistens a Hypostatized Universal Incompatible with the Aristotelian Framework of Aquinas's Metaphysics?
For the most part, scholars now agree that Aquinas formulated his doctrine of God as Ipsum Esse Subsistens by taking up certain elements present in the doctrine of the participation of being, and the doctrine that postulates a hypostatized being, formulated by Plato and the ancient and medieval Neoplatonists. The question I am trying to answer in this essay is whether Aquinas incurred inconsistency when integrating such elements into the basically Aristotelian framework of his metaphysics. Today this question is the subject of lively debate.
On the one hand, the well-known scholar Anthony Kenny argues in his book Aquinas on Being that Aquinas fell into inconsistency in the different places where he dealt with the diversification of esse in the context of divine creation, by having formulated the doctrines of Ipsum Esse Subsistens and participation of being platonically; a formulation that, in Kenny’s view, is incompatible with Aquinas’s metaphysical framework, which, according to Kenny himself, is officially anti-Platonic.
Other scholars such as Lawrence Dewan, Stephen Brock, Rudi te Velde, Enrico Berti (his most recent opinion) and Giovanni Ventimiglia argue, on the contrary, that Aquinas did not incur inconsistency in formulating his doctrine of the Ipsum Esse Subsistens. Rudi te Velde thinks, in my view correctly, that Thomas successfully integrated some Platonic elements into Aristotle’s Metaphysics, without falling into inconsistency.
Anthony Kenny is right in holding that Thomas Aquinas assumed certain central doctrinal elements of Plato, including the participation of being and the existence of a pure, hypostatized being. However, he is not right in assuming that such elements as conceived by Plato are incompatible with the basically Aristotelian framework of Aquinas's metaphysics, because Aquinas purified these doctrinal elements of others that were incompatible with Aristotle's metaphysics. Both Aristotle and Aquinas rejected these latter elements, among which was the doctrine that being is a hypostatized universal which is the common substance of things and a genus.