While anti-exceptionalism about logic (AEL) is now a popular topic within the philosophy of logic... more While anti-exceptionalism about logic (AEL) is now a popular topic within the philosophy of logic, there's still a lack of clarity over what the proposal amounts to. Currently, it is most common to conceive of AEL as the proposal that logic is continuous with the sciences. Yet, as we show here, this conception of AEL is unhelpful due to both its lack of precision, and its distortion of the current debates. Rather, AEL is better understood as the rejection of certain traditional properties of logic. The picture that results is not of one singular position, but rather a cluster of often connected positions with distinct motivations, understood in terms of their rejection of clusters of the various traditional properties. In order to show the fruitfulness of this new conception of AEL, we distinguish between two prominent versions of the position, metaphysical and epistemological AEL, and show how the two positions need not stand or fall together.
Considerable attention recently has been paid to anti-exceptionalism about logic (AEL), the thesi... more Considerable attention recently has been paid to anti-exceptionalism about logic (AEL), the thesis that logic is more similar to the sciences in important respects than traditionally thought. One of AEL's prominent claims is that logic's methodology is similar to that of the recognised sciences, with part of this proposal being that logics provide explanations in some sense. However, insufficient attention has been given to what this proposal amounts to, and the challenges that arise in providing an account of explanations in logic. This paper clarifies these challenges, and shows how the practice-based approach is best placed to meet them.
While we now have an increasingly detailed understanding of the varied goals and methods which co... more While we now have an increasingly detailed understanding of the varied goals and methods which constitute the sciences and mathematics, our understanding of logic as a research area lags behind. A significant reason for this deficiency is that, unlike in the philosophy of science and mathematics, philosophers of logic have yet to embrace a practice-based approach to their field, re-orientating their attention towards logic as it is actually practiced by logicians. This paper makes the case for a new area of research, the Philosophy of Logical Practice, to sit alongside traditional philosophy of logic and systematically investigate logic's aims and methodologies using the practice-based approach.
Motivated by weaknesses with traditional accounts of logical epistemology, considerable attention... more Motivated by weaknesses with traditional accounts of logical epistemology, considerable attention has been paid recently to the view, known as anti-exceptionalism about logic (AEL), that the subject matter and epistemology of logic may not be so different from that of the recognised sciences. One of the most prevalent claims made by advocates of AEL is that theory choice within logic is significantly similar to that within the sciences. This connection with scientific methodology highlights a considerable challenge for the anti-exceptionalist, as two uncontentious claims about scientific theories are that they attempt to explain a target phenomenon and (at least partially) prove their worth through successful predictions. Thus, if this methodological AEL is to be viable, the anti-exceptionalist will need a reasonable account of what phenomena logics are attempting to explain, how they can explain, and in what sense they can be said to issue predictions. This paper makes sense of the anti-exceptionalist proposal with a new account of logical theory choice, logical predictivism, according to which logics are engaged in both a process of prediction and explanation.
The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Evidence (edited by M. Lasnon-Aarnio & C. Littlejohn), 2020
The historical consensus is that logical evidence is special. Whereas empirical evidence is used ... more The historical consensus is that logical evidence is special. Whereas empirical evidence is used to support theories within both the natural and social sciences, logic answers solely to a priori evidence. Further, unlike other areas of research that rely upon a priori evidence, such as mathematics , logical evidence is basic. While we can assume the validity of certain inferences in order to establish truths within mathematics and test scientific theories, logicians cannot use results from mathematics or the empirical sciences without seemingly begging the question. Appeals to rational intuition and analyticity in order to account for logical knowledge are symptomatic of these commitments to the apriority and basicness of logical evidence. This chapter argues that these historically prevalent accounts of logical evidence are mistaken, and that if we take logical practice seriously we find that logical evidence is rather unexceptional, sharing many similarities to the types of evidence appealed to within other research areas.
Given the plethora of competing logical theories of validity available, it's understandable that ... more Given the plethora of competing logical theories of validity available, it's understandable that there has been a marked increase in interest in logical epistemology within the literature. If we are to choose between these logical theories, we require a good understanding of the suitable criteria we ought to judge according to. However, so far there's been a lack of appreciation of how logical practice could support an epistemology of logic. This paper aims to correct that error, by arguing for a practice-based approach to logical epistemology. By looking at the types of evidence logicians actually appeal to in attempting to support their theories, we can provide a more detailed and realistic picture of logical epistemology. To demonstrate the fruitfulness of a practice-based approach, we look to a particular case of logical argumentation-the dialetheist's arguments based upon the self-referential paradoxes-and show that the evidence appealed to support a particular theory of logical epistemology, logical abductivism. Keywords: Logical abductivism · Logical epistemology · Logical evidence · Practice-based approach · Dialetheism · Self-referential paradoxes 1. Motivating Logical Abductivism The last fifty years has been marked by a proliferation in the number of formal logical systems to serve a wide spectrum of technical and philosophical purposes. Dynamic logics to model reasoning within mobile robots, temporal logics to model formal verification within systems, and annotated logics to model systems containing uncertainty. Sometimes this proliferation is epistemically unproblematic, as the logics are either simply proposed as being interesting in themselves, or seen to serve a distinct purpose from those of the other available logics. At other times, however, several non-equivalent logics are considered as candidates to serve the same purpose. In such cases, we find ourselves engaged in theory choice. Probably the most prominent and philosophically interesting example of such theory choice is over logics that aim to not just solve a certain technical or philosophical problem, but aim to provide a general account of validity-what propositions follow from what. Multiple logics have been proposed as viable candidates to capture validity: paraconsistent logics, intuitionistic logics, paracomplete logics, quantum logics, and of course classical logic. Given that these various logics license different rules of implication, often with significant repercussions, it clearly matters which logic we ultimately endorse. Yet, if we are to make a principled decision over which logic to endorse, we also need an understanding of what constitutes logical evidence, which ultimately requires a theory of logical epistemology. The problem that we currently have when faced with such theory choice is that a fully-formed account of how we come to know logical propositions, and what exactly constitutes logical evidence, is not forthcoming. † Contact details: [email protected]
According to Fogelin’s account of deep disagreements, disputes caused by a clash in framework pro... more According to Fogelin’s account of deep disagreements, disputes caused by a clash in framework propositions are necessarily rationally irresolvable. Fogelin’s thesis is a claim about real-life, and not purely hypothetical, arguments: there are such disagreements, and they are incapable of rational resolution. Surprisingly then, few attempts have been made to find such disputes in order to test Fogelin’s thesis. This paper aims to rectify that failure. Firstly, it clarifies Fogelin’s concept of deep disagreement and shows there are several different breeds of such disagreements. Thus, to fully assess Fogelin’s thesis, it will be necessary to seek out cases of each breed to evaluate their rational irresolvability. Secondly, it begins this task by looking at a significant debate within the logical literature over the truth of contradictions. We demonstrate that, while the debate exemplifies a breed of deep disagreement, the parties involved can supply one another with rationally compelling reasons.
The truths of a fiction extend far beyond those stated in its text. We have good reason, for exam... more The truths of a fiction extend far beyond those stated in its text. We have good reason, for example, to believe that Sherlock Holmes possesses a Cerebral Cortex, although we are never told so within the stories. To infer these further truths, we must rely upon a host of previously acquired background assumptions. Establishing what exactly these assumptions are, and how they help us extend the truths of a fiction, however, is not a simple matter. Contributing to the debate, Stacie Friend (2017) has recently argued that fictions fundamentally rely upon the actual world for their content, appealing to evidence from the cognitive sciences. According to her Reality Assumption, every proposition which is actually true is also fictionally true, unless otherwise excluded by the fiction. This paper challenges Friend's Reality Assumption, arguing both that the empirical evidence advanced in its favour offers inadequate support, and that the Assumption in its present form inadequately serves its intended function.
In recent editions of this journal, Jean-Yves Beziau [8] and Marcin Tkaczyk [42] have criticised ... more In recent editions of this journal, Jean-Yves Beziau [8] and Marcin Tkaczyk [42] have criticised a prominent dialetheic logic and common arguments for dialetheism, respectively. While Beziau argues that Priest's logic LP commits the dialetheist to trivialism, the thesis that all propositions are true, Tkaczyk maintains that the arguments traditionally proposed for dialetheism are faulty and ultimately that dialetheism should be rejected as self-refuting. This paper shows that both are mistaken in their contentions. Beziau's argument conflates truth-in-an-interpretation with truth simpliciter and Tkaczyk misconstrues the substance of dialetheic arguments. In the process of identifying these weaknesses of both arguments , the paper clarifies elements of both dialetheic logics and dialethe-ism which these discussions demonstrate are still misunderstood within the literature.
Rejectivism is one of the most influential embodiments of pragmatism within contemporary philosop... more Rejectivism is one of the most influential embodiments of pragmatism within contemporary philosophy of logic, advancing an explanation of the meaning of a logical notion, negation, in terms of the speech act of denial. This paper offers a challenge to rejectivism by proposing that in virtue of explaining negation in terms of denial, the rejectivist ought to be able to explain the concept of contradiction partially in terms of denial. It is argued that any failure to achieve this constitutes an explanatory failure on the part of rejectivism, and reasons are then provided to doubt that the challenge can be successfully met.
This paper first offers a standard modal extension of dialetheic logics that respect the normal s... more This paper first offers a standard modal extension of dialetheic logics that respect the normal semantics for negation and conjunction in an attempt to adequately model absolutism, the thesis that there are true contradictions at metaphysically possible worlds. It is shown, however, that the modal extension has unsavoury consequences for both absolutism and dialetheism. While the logic commits the absolutist to dialetheism, it commits the dialetheist to the impossibility of the actual world. A new modal logic AV is then proposed which avoids these unsavoury consequences by invalidating the interdefinability rules for the modal operators with the use of two valuation relations. However, while using AV carries no significant cost for the absolutist, the same isn’t true for the dialetheist. Although using AV allows her to avoid the consequence that the actual world is an impossible world, it does so only on the condition that the dialetheist admits that she cannot give a dialetheic solution to all self-referential semantic paradoxes. Thus, unless there are any further available modal logics that don’t commit her to the impossibility of the actual world, the dialetheist is faced with a dilemma. Either admit that the actual world is an impossible world, or admit that her research programme cannot give a comprehensive solution to the self-referential paradoxes.
The concept of contradiction plays an important role in philosophical discourse. Thus, it’s surpr... more The concept of contradiction plays an important role in philosophical discourse. Thus, it’s surprising that little effort has been exerted in evaluating the plausibility of the various prevalent non-equivalent definitions of ‘contradiction’ in the literature. This paper continues the project of evaluating available definitions by considering the explosion account of contradiction, an account which constitutes an apparent challenge to the plausibility of dialetheism by defining contradictions as (sets of) propositions that imply every proposition, thereby committing the dialetheist to the truth of every proposition. Two versions of the account are considered: ExS), which defines contradictions as explosive sets of propositions and ExP), which defines contradictions as explosive propositions. While ExS) is found to be inadequate for failing to facilitate important distinctions between sets of propositions and conceiving of contradictions as sets, ExP) is found to miscategorise certain logical falsehoods and non-logical falsehoods as contradictions, fail to respect the substance of the law of non-contradiction, and preclude the term ‘contradiction’ from entering the vocabulary of paraconsistent logics. The paper concludes that these criticisms give us good reason to believe that the explosion account, in both its forms, is an implausible definition of ‘contradiction’, and consequently isn’t a viable threat to the dialetheist’s thesis.
The concept of contradiction plays an important role in philosophical discourse. Therefore, it’s ... more The concept of contradiction plays an important role in philosophical discourse. Therefore, it’s surprising that there’s been little effort exerted in evaluating the numerous non-equivalent definitions of ‘contradiction’ found in the literature. This paper initiates the project of evaluating available definitions of ‘contradiction’ by considering the prevalent truth-conditional account, which defines contradictions as propositions that are necessarily false. Five versions of the account found in the literature are considered, and all are found to fail to fulfil the criteria for an adequate definition of ‘contradiction’. In addition, it is shown that the truth-conditional account cannot be meaningfully embedded within the law of non-contradiction whilst maintaining the law’s substance and philosophical importance, a prerequisite for any adequate definition of ‘contradiction’. The paper concludes that these criticisms of the truth-conditional account give us good reason to believe that all versions of the account are inadequate definitions of ‘contradiction’.
The view that contradictions cannot be true has been part of accepted philosophical theory since ... more The view that contradictions cannot be true has been part of accepted philosophical theory since at least the time of Aristotle. In this regard, it is almost unique in the history of philosophy. Only in the last forty years has the view been systematically challenged with the advent of dialetheism. Since Graham Priest introduced dialetheism as a solution to certain self-referential paradoxes, the possibility of true contradictions has been a live issue in the philosophy of logic. Yet, despite the arguments advanced by dialetheists, many logicians and philosophers still hold the opinion that contradictions cannot be true.
While anti-exceptionalism about logic (AEL) is now a popular topic within the philosophy of logic... more While anti-exceptionalism about logic (AEL) is now a popular topic within the philosophy of logic, there's still a lack of clarity over what the proposal amounts to. Currently, it is most common to conceive of AEL as the proposal that logic is continuous with the sciences. Yet, as we show here, this conception of AEL is unhelpful due to both its lack of precision, and its distortion of the current debates. Rather, AEL is better understood as the rejection of certain traditional properties of logic. The picture that results is not of one singular position, but rather a cluster of often connected positions with distinct motivations, understood in terms of their rejection of clusters of the various traditional properties. In order to show the fruitfulness of this new conception of AEL, we distinguish between two prominent versions of the position, metaphysical and epistemological AEL, and show how the two positions need not stand or fall together.
Considerable attention recently has been paid to anti-exceptionalism about logic (AEL), the thesi... more Considerable attention recently has been paid to anti-exceptionalism about logic (AEL), the thesis that logic is more similar to the sciences in important respects than traditionally thought. One of AEL's prominent claims is that logic's methodology is similar to that of the recognised sciences, with part of this proposal being that logics provide explanations in some sense. However, insufficient attention has been given to what this proposal amounts to, and the challenges that arise in providing an account of explanations in logic. This paper clarifies these challenges, and shows how the practice-based approach is best placed to meet them.
While we now have an increasingly detailed understanding of the varied goals and methods which co... more While we now have an increasingly detailed understanding of the varied goals and methods which constitute the sciences and mathematics, our understanding of logic as a research area lags behind. A significant reason for this deficiency is that, unlike in the philosophy of science and mathematics, philosophers of logic have yet to embrace a practice-based approach to their field, re-orientating their attention towards logic as it is actually practiced by logicians. This paper makes the case for a new area of research, the Philosophy of Logical Practice, to sit alongside traditional philosophy of logic and systematically investigate logic's aims and methodologies using the practice-based approach.
Motivated by weaknesses with traditional accounts of logical epistemology, considerable attention... more Motivated by weaknesses with traditional accounts of logical epistemology, considerable attention has been paid recently to the view, known as anti-exceptionalism about logic (AEL), that the subject matter and epistemology of logic may not be so different from that of the recognised sciences. One of the most prevalent claims made by advocates of AEL is that theory choice within logic is significantly similar to that within the sciences. This connection with scientific methodology highlights a considerable challenge for the anti-exceptionalist, as two uncontentious claims about scientific theories are that they attempt to explain a target phenomenon and (at least partially) prove their worth through successful predictions. Thus, if this methodological AEL is to be viable, the anti-exceptionalist will need a reasonable account of what phenomena logics are attempting to explain, how they can explain, and in what sense they can be said to issue predictions. This paper makes sense of the anti-exceptionalist proposal with a new account of logical theory choice, logical predictivism, according to which logics are engaged in both a process of prediction and explanation.
The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Evidence (edited by M. Lasnon-Aarnio & C. Littlejohn), 2020
The historical consensus is that logical evidence is special. Whereas empirical evidence is used ... more The historical consensus is that logical evidence is special. Whereas empirical evidence is used to support theories within both the natural and social sciences, logic answers solely to a priori evidence. Further, unlike other areas of research that rely upon a priori evidence, such as mathematics , logical evidence is basic. While we can assume the validity of certain inferences in order to establish truths within mathematics and test scientific theories, logicians cannot use results from mathematics or the empirical sciences without seemingly begging the question. Appeals to rational intuition and analyticity in order to account for logical knowledge are symptomatic of these commitments to the apriority and basicness of logical evidence. This chapter argues that these historically prevalent accounts of logical evidence are mistaken, and that if we take logical practice seriously we find that logical evidence is rather unexceptional, sharing many similarities to the types of evidence appealed to within other research areas.
Given the plethora of competing logical theories of validity available, it's understandable that ... more Given the plethora of competing logical theories of validity available, it's understandable that there has been a marked increase in interest in logical epistemology within the literature. If we are to choose between these logical theories, we require a good understanding of the suitable criteria we ought to judge according to. However, so far there's been a lack of appreciation of how logical practice could support an epistemology of logic. This paper aims to correct that error, by arguing for a practice-based approach to logical epistemology. By looking at the types of evidence logicians actually appeal to in attempting to support their theories, we can provide a more detailed and realistic picture of logical epistemology. To demonstrate the fruitfulness of a practice-based approach, we look to a particular case of logical argumentation-the dialetheist's arguments based upon the self-referential paradoxes-and show that the evidence appealed to support a particular theory of logical epistemology, logical abductivism. Keywords: Logical abductivism · Logical epistemology · Logical evidence · Practice-based approach · Dialetheism · Self-referential paradoxes 1. Motivating Logical Abductivism The last fifty years has been marked by a proliferation in the number of formal logical systems to serve a wide spectrum of technical and philosophical purposes. Dynamic logics to model reasoning within mobile robots, temporal logics to model formal verification within systems, and annotated logics to model systems containing uncertainty. Sometimes this proliferation is epistemically unproblematic, as the logics are either simply proposed as being interesting in themselves, or seen to serve a distinct purpose from those of the other available logics. At other times, however, several non-equivalent logics are considered as candidates to serve the same purpose. In such cases, we find ourselves engaged in theory choice. Probably the most prominent and philosophically interesting example of such theory choice is over logics that aim to not just solve a certain technical or philosophical problem, but aim to provide a general account of validity-what propositions follow from what. Multiple logics have been proposed as viable candidates to capture validity: paraconsistent logics, intuitionistic logics, paracomplete logics, quantum logics, and of course classical logic. Given that these various logics license different rules of implication, often with significant repercussions, it clearly matters which logic we ultimately endorse. Yet, if we are to make a principled decision over which logic to endorse, we also need an understanding of what constitutes logical evidence, which ultimately requires a theory of logical epistemology. The problem that we currently have when faced with such theory choice is that a fully-formed account of how we come to know logical propositions, and what exactly constitutes logical evidence, is not forthcoming. † Contact details: [email protected]
According to Fogelin’s account of deep disagreements, disputes caused by a clash in framework pro... more According to Fogelin’s account of deep disagreements, disputes caused by a clash in framework propositions are necessarily rationally irresolvable. Fogelin’s thesis is a claim about real-life, and not purely hypothetical, arguments: there are such disagreements, and they are incapable of rational resolution. Surprisingly then, few attempts have been made to find such disputes in order to test Fogelin’s thesis. This paper aims to rectify that failure. Firstly, it clarifies Fogelin’s concept of deep disagreement and shows there are several different breeds of such disagreements. Thus, to fully assess Fogelin’s thesis, it will be necessary to seek out cases of each breed to evaluate their rational irresolvability. Secondly, it begins this task by looking at a significant debate within the logical literature over the truth of contradictions. We demonstrate that, while the debate exemplifies a breed of deep disagreement, the parties involved can supply one another with rationally compelling reasons.
The truths of a fiction extend far beyond those stated in its text. We have good reason, for exam... more The truths of a fiction extend far beyond those stated in its text. We have good reason, for example, to believe that Sherlock Holmes possesses a Cerebral Cortex, although we are never told so within the stories. To infer these further truths, we must rely upon a host of previously acquired background assumptions. Establishing what exactly these assumptions are, and how they help us extend the truths of a fiction, however, is not a simple matter. Contributing to the debate, Stacie Friend (2017) has recently argued that fictions fundamentally rely upon the actual world for their content, appealing to evidence from the cognitive sciences. According to her Reality Assumption, every proposition which is actually true is also fictionally true, unless otherwise excluded by the fiction. This paper challenges Friend's Reality Assumption, arguing both that the empirical evidence advanced in its favour offers inadequate support, and that the Assumption in its present form inadequately serves its intended function.
In recent editions of this journal, Jean-Yves Beziau [8] and Marcin Tkaczyk [42] have criticised ... more In recent editions of this journal, Jean-Yves Beziau [8] and Marcin Tkaczyk [42] have criticised a prominent dialetheic logic and common arguments for dialetheism, respectively. While Beziau argues that Priest's logic LP commits the dialetheist to trivialism, the thesis that all propositions are true, Tkaczyk maintains that the arguments traditionally proposed for dialetheism are faulty and ultimately that dialetheism should be rejected as self-refuting. This paper shows that both are mistaken in their contentions. Beziau's argument conflates truth-in-an-interpretation with truth simpliciter and Tkaczyk misconstrues the substance of dialetheic arguments. In the process of identifying these weaknesses of both arguments , the paper clarifies elements of both dialetheic logics and dialethe-ism which these discussions demonstrate are still misunderstood within the literature.
Rejectivism is one of the most influential embodiments of pragmatism within contemporary philosop... more Rejectivism is one of the most influential embodiments of pragmatism within contemporary philosophy of logic, advancing an explanation of the meaning of a logical notion, negation, in terms of the speech act of denial. This paper offers a challenge to rejectivism by proposing that in virtue of explaining negation in terms of denial, the rejectivist ought to be able to explain the concept of contradiction partially in terms of denial. It is argued that any failure to achieve this constitutes an explanatory failure on the part of rejectivism, and reasons are then provided to doubt that the challenge can be successfully met.
This paper first offers a standard modal extension of dialetheic logics that respect the normal s... more This paper first offers a standard modal extension of dialetheic logics that respect the normal semantics for negation and conjunction in an attempt to adequately model absolutism, the thesis that there are true contradictions at metaphysically possible worlds. It is shown, however, that the modal extension has unsavoury consequences for both absolutism and dialetheism. While the logic commits the absolutist to dialetheism, it commits the dialetheist to the impossibility of the actual world. A new modal logic AV is then proposed which avoids these unsavoury consequences by invalidating the interdefinability rules for the modal operators with the use of two valuation relations. However, while using AV carries no significant cost for the absolutist, the same isn’t true for the dialetheist. Although using AV allows her to avoid the consequence that the actual world is an impossible world, it does so only on the condition that the dialetheist admits that she cannot give a dialetheic solution to all self-referential semantic paradoxes. Thus, unless there are any further available modal logics that don’t commit her to the impossibility of the actual world, the dialetheist is faced with a dilemma. Either admit that the actual world is an impossible world, or admit that her research programme cannot give a comprehensive solution to the self-referential paradoxes.
The concept of contradiction plays an important role in philosophical discourse. Thus, it’s surpr... more The concept of contradiction plays an important role in philosophical discourse. Thus, it’s surprising that little effort has been exerted in evaluating the plausibility of the various prevalent non-equivalent definitions of ‘contradiction’ in the literature. This paper continues the project of evaluating available definitions by considering the explosion account of contradiction, an account which constitutes an apparent challenge to the plausibility of dialetheism by defining contradictions as (sets of) propositions that imply every proposition, thereby committing the dialetheist to the truth of every proposition. Two versions of the account are considered: ExS), which defines contradictions as explosive sets of propositions and ExP), which defines contradictions as explosive propositions. While ExS) is found to be inadequate for failing to facilitate important distinctions between sets of propositions and conceiving of contradictions as sets, ExP) is found to miscategorise certain logical falsehoods and non-logical falsehoods as contradictions, fail to respect the substance of the law of non-contradiction, and preclude the term ‘contradiction’ from entering the vocabulary of paraconsistent logics. The paper concludes that these criticisms give us good reason to believe that the explosion account, in both its forms, is an implausible definition of ‘contradiction’, and consequently isn’t a viable threat to the dialetheist’s thesis.
The concept of contradiction plays an important role in philosophical discourse. Therefore, it’s ... more The concept of contradiction plays an important role in philosophical discourse. Therefore, it’s surprising that there’s been little effort exerted in evaluating the numerous non-equivalent definitions of ‘contradiction’ found in the literature. This paper initiates the project of evaluating available definitions of ‘contradiction’ by considering the prevalent truth-conditional account, which defines contradictions as propositions that are necessarily false. Five versions of the account found in the literature are considered, and all are found to fail to fulfil the criteria for an adequate definition of ‘contradiction’. In addition, it is shown that the truth-conditional account cannot be meaningfully embedded within the law of non-contradiction whilst maintaining the law’s substance and philosophical importance, a prerequisite for any adequate definition of ‘contradiction’. The paper concludes that these criticisms of the truth-conditional account give us good reason to believe that all versions of the account are inadequate definitions of ‘contradiction’.
The view that contradictions cannot be true has been part of accepted philosophical theory since ... more The view that contradictions cannot be true has been part of accepted philosophical theory since at least the time of Aristotle. In this regard, it is almost unique in the history of philosophy. Only in the last forty years has the view been systematically challenged with the advent of dialetheism. Since Graham Priest introduced dialetheism as a solution to certain self-referential paradoxes, the possibility of true contradictions has been a live issue in the philosophy of logic. Yet, despite the arguments advanced by dialetheists, many logicians and philosophers still hold the opinion that contradictions cannot be true.
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