Papers by Ivan Milić
Hypocritical Blame: A Question
for the Normative Accounts of Assertion , 2020
An agent A blames B hypocritically for violating a moral norm N if and only if: (i) A is likewise... more An agent A blames B hypocritically for violating a moral norm N if and only if: (i) A is likewise blameworthy for violating N, and (ii) A is not disposed to blame herself for violating N. Normally, an assertion involving blame is retracted following the objection that (i) and (ii) hold. I discuss two prima facie explanations for such a withdrawal: that the objection hampers the speaker’s assertoric authority, rendering (i) and (ii) the necessary condition to assert, and that the joint condition is, instead, merely a regulative rule. Having shown that the former option is too revisory as it requires reformulation of all normative accounts of assertion on the table, and the latter false, I proceed to argue that (i) and (ii) do not target assertions to begin with. An assertion involving blame is, instead, a clear case of a double speech act: after arguing for this claim, I proceed to show that qua assertion, the act is correct given one’s preferred normative account, whereas it is incorrect qua blaming, as in order to perform such an act, the speaker needs to satisfy the conditions (i) and (ii).
Acta Analytica , 2018
In virtue of what does a linguistic act count as an insult? I discuss five main approaches to thi... more In virtue of what does a linguistic act count as an insult? I discuss five main approaches to this question, according to which an insult is determined by (i) the semantic properties of the expression used, (ii) the insulter, her intention or attitudes, (iii) the addressee and her personal standard, (iv) the features of the speech act performed and (v) the standard of the relevant social group. I endorse the last, objectivist account, according to which an act x counts as an insult if and only if x is assessed as demeaning when addressed at A by the standard of the relevant social group at t.
Philosophical Studies , 2017
Lackey's (2007) class of " selfless assertions " is controversial in at least two respects: it al... more Lackey's (2007) class of " selfless assertions " is controversial in at least two respects: it allows propositions that express Moorean absurdity to be asserted warrantedly, and it challenges the orthodox view that the speaker's belief is a necessary condition for warranted assertibility. With regard to the former point, I critically examine Lackey's broadly Gricean treatment of Moorean absurdity and McKinnon's (2013, 2015) epistemic approach. With regard to the latter point, I defend the received view by supporting the knowledge account (KA), on which knowledge is the necessary condition for warranted assertion. After examining two defenses of KA, by Montminy (2013) and Turri (2014), I propose two alternative approaches. Although I remain neutral between them, I develop in more detail the view which classifies " selfless assertions " as " presentations " , a type of assertives distinct from genuine assertions. This account is motivated further by allowing for the expansion of the normative approach to other assertives, a feature we may be interested in, in the light of a recent wave of normative accounts of speech acts.
Philosophical Quarterly, 2015
An assertion is existentially known if and only if: (i) the speaker knows that the sentence she u... more An assertion is existentially known if and only if: (i) the speaker knows that the sentence she uses to make the assertion expresses a true proposition; (ii) she makes the assertion based on that knowledge; and (iii) she does not believe, have justification for, or know the proposition asserted. Accordingly, if existentially known assertions could be made correctly––as argued by Charlie Pelling in his 'Assertion and the Provision of Knowledge'––this would show that the norm of assertion cannot be the speaker's belief in, justification for or knowledge of the proposition. In this paper, I try to show that Pelling's argument is inconclusive, as it rests on two assumptions which can be resisted. In turn, I offer a pair of alternative strategies to explain how we can deal with existentially known assertions under the assumption that the speaker's knowledge is the norm of assertion.
The paper offers a semantic and pragmatic analysis of statements of the form 'x is beautiful' as ... more The paper offers a semantic and pragmatic analysis of statements of the form 'x is beautiful' as involving a double speech act: first, a report that x is beautiful relative to the speaker's aesthetic standard, along the lines of naive contextualism; second, the speaker's recommendation that her audience comes to share her appraisal of x as beautiful. We suggest that attributions of beauty tend to convey such a recommendation due to the role that aesthetic practices play in fostering and enhancing interpersonal coordination. Aesthetic practices are driven by a disposition towards the attunement of attitudes and aesthetic recommendations contribute to forwarding such attunement. Our view is motivated by an attempt to satisfy the following set of desiderata: to account for (i) the experiential nature of aesthetic judgments, (ii) disagreements in aesthetic debates, and (iii) the normative aspirations of aesthetic discourse, as well as to avoid appealing to (iv) error theory and (v) realist ontological commitments.
Philosophical Investigations , 2017
According to an " orthodox " reading proposed by Dummett and more recently endorsed by Lugg and P... more According to an " orthodox " reading proposed by Dummett and more recently endorsed by Lugg and Price, the later Wittgenstein rejects the idea of grouping together certain utterances as a single class of assertions. We offer an alternative commentary on the Philosophical Investigations § §21–24, developing what we call a Wittgensteinian role-based account of assertion. We then examine whether this role-based account can solve the problem of on-stage utterances. In the course of this, the merits of the account are shown and compared to an alternative proposal offered by Searle.
Dissertation by Ivan Milić
PhD dissertation , 2015
In this thesis, I propose and defend a theory according to which committing oneself to knowing th... more In this thesis, I propose and defend a theory according to which committing oneself to knowing the proposition expressed counts as an assertion of that proposition. A consequence of this view is the knowledge account of assertion, according to which one asserts that p correctly only if one knows that p. In support of this approach, I offer a strategy of identifying an assertion’s “normative consequences”, types of act that normally take place as a result of one’s making an assertion incorrectly. I outline two such phenomena: retraction and disavowal of knowledge. In continuation, I put the theory to test and critically examine four sets of objections against it, arguing that it can convincingly defuse them. Finally, I discuss two related issues: I maintain that by performing “aesthetic assertions” one also normally performs a non-assertoric speech act of recommendation, and argue for the possibility of “non-linguistic assertions”, whose content is expressed by gestures in appropriate contexts
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Papers by Ivan Milić
Dissertation by Ivan Milić