Papers by Tatsuya Murayama
Síntese: Revista de Filosofia, 2024
In Creative Evolution, Bergson criticized the problem of asking why there is something rather tha... more In Creative Evolution, Bergson criticized the problem of asking why there is something rather than nothing, judging it as a pseudo-problem. About a quarter of a century later, he briefly recapitulated this critique in an article titled “The Possible and the Real.” This recapitulation is not a mere summary, and its examination reveals the various elements that are difficult to discern in Creative Evolution, including Bergson's adoption of the inconceivability principle, common among 17th-century philosophers, and his vigilance against the deceptive workings of ordinary language, akin to the philosophy of ordinary language. This paper reconstructs and examines this recapitulative version, revealing a new argument against the problem and the traditional yet revolutionary character of Bergson's philosophy.
Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, 2023
(This is a penultimate draft. The final version is available at: https://www.degruyter.com/docume... more (This is a penultimate draft. The final version is available at: https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.1515/agph-2022-0127/html)
In Matter and Memory, Bergson identifies a problem with perception and resolves it by arguing that matter is an aggregate of images. However, it is unclear whether and how Bergson justifies this thesis, and interpreters differ considerably on this question. This paper formulates and analyzes Bergson's arguments for this thesis in Chapter 1 of Matter and Memory. Bergson presents five arguments, some of which echo arguments in early modern philosophy. They jointly compose a substantive, well-structured defense of his thesis. This paper also illuminates an aspect of Bergson's method that departs from his famous reliance on intuition and is grounded in his conception of the clarity required in philosophy.
M. Sinclair and Y. Wolf (ed.), The Bergsonian Mind, Routledge, 2021
(This is a penultimate draft of my paper 'Bergson on Virtuality and Possibility'. A final version... more (This is a penultimate draft of my paper 'Bergson on Virtuality and Possibility'. A final version with substantive modifications is now published in Sinclair and Wolf (eds.), Bergsonian Mind, Routledge, 2021.)
https://www.routledge.com/The-Bergsonian-Mind/Sinclair-Wolf/p/book/9780367074333
My aim in this paper is to clarify Bergson's prima facie perplexing critique of possibility and bring out its richness. In service of this purpose, I shall also touch on the concept of virtuality given that Deleuze described Bergon's attitude towards the concept of possibility as approving of virtuality and disapproving of possibility. With respect to the concept of virtuality, Deleuze asserts that Bergson formulates it in a peculiar way and puts it at the heart of his philosophy. In the first part of this paper, we shall see that this claim is almost, though not completely, wrong. With respect to the concept of possibility, Deleuze contends here that Bergson (a) criticises the concept, (b) proposes applying it only to things which lack radical novelty, and (c) considers it to be the origin of all kinds of pseudo-problems. In the second part, I will examine Bergson’s critique of this concept and conclude that while (a) is true, (b) and (c) need major corrections. That said, this paper’s principal aim is not to disprove Deleuze but rather to appreciate Bergson’s critique of the concept of possibility. Part 1 will indeed examine the concept of virtuality with reference to Deleuze; however, Part 2 will analyse Bergson’s critique of possibility through an examination of its justification but also through the history of its formation and its relationship to other concepts such as nothingness or truth.
Annales bergsoniennes V, 2012
Talks by Tatsuya Murayama
(Abridged but largely revised Japanese version now published in: https://amzn.to/2yMjgso)
My ai... more (Abridged but largely revised Japanese version now published in: https://amzn.to/2yMjgso)
My aim is to clarify the concept of virtuality expressed in Bergson’s philosophy.
According to Deleuze, virtuality is creativity and starkly contrasts with possibility. However, an examination of Matter and Memory shows that (1) when the word “virtual” modifies “action”, it is interchangeable with “possible”, and expresses the indeterminacy of the perceiver’s will, which is one of the necessary conditions of perception; (2) when this word modifies “recollection”, it is interchangeable with “unconscious and powerless” and expresses the necessary part of Bergson’s proof of the existence of the external world; and (3) examples of this term being used in the Deleuzean meaning are very rare.
Finally, I suggest that the contrast between the virtual and possible, which is made by Deleuze, blinds us to the fine argument of Bergson.
Je tenterai ici de tracer une première esquisse de la théorie de l'agent moral chez Bergson.
The question of the meaning of life is commonly held to be as old and widespread as human culture... more The question of the meaning of life is commonly held to be as old and widespread as human culture itself. The aim of my presentation is to deny this view. I would like to suggest (i) that the question of the meaning of life is less than 200 years old, which is relatively new in comparison with other questions on the values of human life (moral good, happiness, etc.), and (ii) that when we ask this question, we might think about different things depending on the language we use. In making both of these suggestions, we are going to face problems concerning translation, the topic of this symposium.
Selon la maxime de Jackie Robinson, une vie n’est pas importante excepté l’impact qu’elle a sur d... more Selon la maxime de Jackie Robinson, une vie n’est pas importante excepté l’impact qu’elle a sur d’autres vies. Kieran Setiya (2017) en tire le paradoxe, en disant que si rien d’autre n’est important que l’altruisme, rien n’a d’importance. J’ai proposé deux solutions. La première consiste à introduire la communauté comme possesseur de la valeur finale, en acceptant le refus complet de la valeur finale aux activités individuelles. La seconde essaye d’identifier la source même du paradoxe et de réinterpréter la maxime robinsonienne pour qu’elle exprime le véritable altruisme.
Uploads
Papers by Tatsuya Murayama
In Matter and Memory, Bergson identifies a problem with perception and resolves it by arguing that matter is an aggregate of images. However, it is unclear whether and how Bergson justifies this thesis, and interpreters differ considerably on this question. This paper formulates and analyzes Bergson's arguments for this thesis in Chapter 1 of Matter and Memory. Bergson presents five arguments, some of which echo arguments in early modern philosophy. They jointly compose a substantive, well-structured defense of his thesis. This paper also illuminates an aspect of Bergson's method that departs from his famous reliance on intuition and is grounded in his conception of the clarity required in philosophy.
https://www.routledge.com/The-Bergsonian-Mind/Sinclair-Wolf/p/book/9780367074333
My aim in this paper is to clarify Bergson's prima facie perplexing critique of possibility and bring out its richness. In service of this purpose, I shall also touch on the concept of virtuality given that Deleuze described Bergon's attitude towards the concept of possibility as approving of virtuality and disapproving of possibility. With respect to the concept of virtuality, Deleuze asserts that Bergson formulates it in a peculiar way and puts it at the heart of his philosophy. In the first part of this paper, we shall see that this claim is almost, though not completely, wrong. With respect to the concept of possibility, Deleuze contends here that Bergson (a) criticises the concept, (b) proposes applying it only to things which lack radical novelty, and (c) considers it to be the origin of all kinds of pseudo-problems. In the second part, I will examine Bergson’s critique of this concept and conclude that while (a) is true, (b) and (c) need major corrections. That said, this paper’s principal aim is not to disprove Deleuze but rather to appreciate Bergson’s critique of the concept of possibility. Part 1 will indeed examine the concept of virtuality with reference to Deleuze; however, Part 2 will analyse Bergson’s critique of possibility through an examination of its justification but also through the history of its formation and its relationship to other concepts such as nothingness or truth.
Talks by Tatsuya Murayama
My aim is to clarify the concept of virtuality expressed in Bergson’s philosophy.
According to Deleuze, virtuality is creativity and starkly contrasts with possibility. However, an examination of Matter and Memory shows that (1) when the word “virtual” modifies “action”, it is interchangeable with “possible”, and expresses the indeterminacy of the perceiver’s will, which is one of the necessary conditions of perception; (2) when this word modifies “recollection”, it is interchangeable with “unconscious and powerless” and expresses the necessary part of Bergson’s proof of the existence of the external world; and (3) examples of this term being used in the Deleuzean meaning are very rare.
Finally, I suggest that the contrast between the virtual and possible, which is made by Deleuze, blinds us to the fine argument of Bergson.
In Matter and Memory, Bergson identifies a problem with perception and resolves it by arguing that matter is an aggregate of images. However, it is unclear whether and how Bergson justifies this thesis, and interpreters differ considerably on this question. This paper formulates and analyzes Bergson's arguments for this thesis in Chapter 1 of Matter and Memory. Bergson presents five arguments, some of which echo arguments in early modern philosophy. They jointly compose a substantive, well-structured defense of his thesis. This paper also illuminates an aspect of Bergson's method that departs from his famous reliance on intuition and is grounded in his conception of the clarity required in philosophy.
https://www.routledge.com/The-Bergsonian-Mind/Sinclair-Wolf/p/book/9780367074333
My aim in this paper is to clarify Bergson's prima facie perplexing critique of possibility and bring out its richness. In service of this purpose, I shall also touch on the concept of virtuality given that Deleuze described Bergon's attitude towards the concept of possibility as approving of virtuality and disapproving of possibility. With respect to the concept of virtuality, Deleuze asserts that Bergson formulates it in a peculiar way and puts it at the heart of his philosophy. In the first part of this paper, we shall see that this claim is almost, though not completely, wrong. With respect to the concept of possibility, Deleuze contends here that Bergson (a) criticises the concept, (b) proposes applying it only to things which lack radical novelty, and (c) considers it to be the origin of all kinds of pseudo-problems. In the second part, I will examine Bergson’s critique of this concept and conclude that while (a) is true, (b) and (c) need major corrections. That said, this paper’s principal aim is not to disprove Deleuze but rather to appreciate Bergson’s critique of the concept of possibility. Part 1 will indeed examine the concept of virtuality with reference to Deleuze; however, Part 2 will analyse Bergson’s critique of possibility through an examination of its justification but also through the history of its formation and its relationship to other concepts such as nothingness or truth.
My aim is to clarify the concept of virtuality expressed in Bergson’s philosophy.
According to Deleuze, virtuality is creativity and starkly contrasts with possibility. However, an examination of Matter and Memory shows that (1) when the word “virtual” modifies “action”, it is interchangeable with “possible”, and expresses the indeterminacy of the perceiver’s will, which is one of the necessary conditions of perception; (2) when this word modifies “recollection”, it is interchangeable with “unconscious and powerless” and expresses the necessary part of Bergson’s proof of the existence of the external world; and (3) examples of this term being used in the Deleuzean meaning are very rare.
Finally, I suggest that the contrast between the virtual and possible, which is made by Deleuze, blinds us to the fine argument of Bergson.