In debating philosophical anthropology and mind, Christian philosophers have not yet paid enough ... more In debating philosophical anthropology and mind, Christian philosophers have not yet paid enough attention to Christ's Incarnation. I contend that the Incarnation is inconsistent with materialism about human beings, which should rule out materialism for Christians. Since the doctrine is consistent with substance dualism, Christians should be dualists.
Trenton Merricks has recently argued that substance dualist accounts of embodiment and humanness ... more Trenton Merricks has recently argued that substance dualist accounts of embodiment and humanness do not cohere well with the Incarnation. He has also claimed that physicalism about human persons avoids this problem, which should lead Christians to be physicalists. In this paper, I argue that there are plausible dualist accounts of embodiment and humanness that avoid his objections. Furthermore, I argue that physicalism is inconsistent with the Incarnation. Trenton Merricks has recently argued that the best account of the divine Son's becoming flesh is that the Son became a material object. 1 More specifically, Merricks has claimed that The incarnation points us toward physicalism. For the physicalist, unlike the dualist, can insist that becoming embodied is necessary for becoming human; she can insist that the Incarnation requires the Son to become incarnate. Moreover, and more importantly, the physicalist-but not the dualist-can easily and straightforwardly account for God the Son's having the body of Jesus and no other. 2
As is well known, over the last thirty years or so there has been a revival of interest in the la... more As is well known, over the last thirty years or so there has been a revival of interest in the late medieval doctrine of divine scientia media, or middle knowledge, amongst philosophers of religion and theologians.1 Surprisingly, among theologians some of the more enthusiastic proponents of this doctrine are theological determinists. This has led to some controversy over whether or not theological determinism (hereafter TD) is consistent with middle knowledge (hereafter MK). As a result of this controversy, some former theological determinist proponents of MK are now renouncing the doctrine. In this paper, I will argue that both sides to this controversy are correct. More exactly, I will attempt to establish two theses: (1) if one assumes traditional Calvinism and the standard account of the truth conditions for counterfactuals, TD is inconsistent with MK; (2) nevertheless, there are at least prima facie ways of coherently combining Calvinism with MK. The former claim is not origina...
Many have thought that there is a problem with causal commerce between immaterial souls and mater... more Many have thought that there is a problem with causal commerce between immaterial souls and material bodies. In Physicalism or Something Near Enough, Jaegwon Kim attempts to spell out that problem. Rather than merely posing a question or raising a mystery for defenders of substance dualism to answer or address, he offers a compelling argument for the conclusion that immaterial souls cannot causally interact with material bodies. We offer a reconstruction of that argument that hinges on two premises: Kim's Dictum and the Nowhere Man principle. Kim's Dictum says that causation requires a spatial relation. Nowhere Man says that souls can't be in space. By our lights, both premises can be called into question. We'll begin our evaluation of the argument by pointing out some consequences of Kim's Dictum. For some, these will be costs. We will then present two defeaters for Kim's Dictum and a critical analysis of Kim's case for Nowhere Man. The upshot is that Kim's argument against substance dualism fails.
Trenton Merricks has recently argued that substance dualist accounts of embodiment and humanness ... more Trenton Merricks has recently argued that substance dualist accounts of embodiment and humanness do not cohere well with the Incarnation. He has also claimed that physicalism about human persons avoids this problem, which should lead Christians to be physicalists. In this paper, I argue that there are plausible dualist accounts of embodiment and humanness that avoid his objections. Furthermore, I argue that physicalism is inconsistent with the Incarnation.
Many have thought that there is a problem with causal commerce between immaterial souls and mater... more Many have thought that there is a problem with causal commerce between immaterial souls and material bodies. In Physicalism or Something Near Enough, Jaegwon Kim attempts to spell out that problem. Rather than merely posing a question or raising a mystery for defenders of substance dualism to answer or address, he offers a compelling argument for the conclusion that immaterial souls cannot causally interact with material bodies. We offer a reconstruction of that argument that hinges on two premises: Kim's Dictum and the Nowhere Man principle. Kim's Dictum says that causation requires a spatial relation. Nowhere Man says that souls can't be in space. By our lights, both premises can be called into question. We'll begin our evaluation of the argument by pointing out some consequences of Kim's Dictum. For some, these will be costs. We will then present two defeaters for Kim's Dictum and a critical analysis of Kim's case for Nowhere Man. The upshot is that Kim's argument against substance dualism fails.
In debating philosophical anthropology and mind, Christian philosophers have not yet paid enough ... more In debating philosophical anthropology and mind, Christian philosophers have not yet paid enough attention to Christ's Incarnation. I contend that the Incarnation is inconsistent with materialism about human beings, which should rule out materialism for Christians. Since the doctrine is consistent with substance dualism, Christians should be dualists.
In debating philosophical anthropology and mind, Christian philosophers have not yet paid enough ... more In debating philosophical anthropology and mind, Christian philosophers have not yet paid enough attention to Christ's Incarnation. I contend that the Incarnation is inconsistent with materialism about human beings, which should rule out materialism for Christians. Since the doctrine is consistent with substance dualism, Christians should be dualists.
Trenton Merricks has recently argued that substance dualist accounts of embodiment and humanness ... more Trenton Merricks has recently argued that substance dualist accounts of embodiment and humanness do not cohere well with the Incarnation. He has also claimed that physicalism about human persons avoids this problem, which should lead Christians to be physicalists. In this paper, I argue that there are plausible dualist accounts of embodiment and humanness that avoid his objections. Furthermore, I argue that physicalism is inconsistent with the Incarnation. Trenton Merricks has recently argued that the best account of the divine Son's becoming flesh is that the Son became a material object. 1 More specifically, Merricks has claimed that The incarnation points us toward physicalism. For the physicalist, unlike the dualist, can insist that becoming embodied is necessary for becoming human; she can insist that the Incarnation requires the Son to become incarnate. Moreover, and more importantly, the physicalist-but not the dualist-can easily and straightforwardly account for God the Son's having the body of Jesus and no other. 2
As is well known, over the last thirty years or so there has been a revival of interest in the la... more As is well known, over the last thirty years or so there has been a revival of interest in the late medieval doctrine of divine scientia media, or middle knowledge, amongst philosophers of religion and theologians.1 Surprisingly, among theologians some of the more enthusiastic proponents of this doctrine are theological determinists. This has led to some controversy over whether or not theological determinism (hereafter TD) is consistent with middle knowledge (hereafter MK). As a result of this controversy, some former theological determinist proponents of MK are now renouncing the doctrine. In this paper, I will argue that both sides to this controversy are correct. More exactly, I will attempt to establish two theses: (1) if one assumes traditional Calvinism and the standard account of the truth conditions for counterfactuals, TD is inconsistent with MK; (2) nevertheless, there are at least prima facie ways of coherently combining Calvinism with MK. The former claim is not origina...
Many have thought that there is a problem with causal commerce between immaterial souls and mater... more Many have thought that there is a problem with causal commerce between immaterial souls and material bodies. In Physicalism or Something Near Enough, Jaegwon Kim attempts to spell out that problem. Rather than merely posing a question or raising a mystery for defenders of substance dualism to answer or address, he offers a compelling argument for the conclusion that immaterial souls cannot causally interact with material bodies. We offer a reconstruction of that argument that hinges on two premises: Kim's Dictum and the Nowhere Man principle. Kim's Dictum says that causation requires a spatial relation. Nowhere Man says that souls can't be in space. By our lights, both premises can be called into question. We'll begin our evaluation of the argument by pointing out some consequences of Kim's Dictum. For some, these will be costs. We will then present two defeaters for Kim's Dictum and a critical analysis of Kim's case for Nowhere Man. The upshot is that Kim's argument against substance dualism fails.
Trenton Merricks has recently argued that substance dualist accounts of embodiment and humanness ... more Trenton Merricks has recently argued that substance dualist accounts of embodiment and humanness do not cohere well with the Incarnation. He has also claimed that physicalism about human persons avoids this problem, which should lead Christians to be physicalists. In this paper, I argue that there are plausible dualist accounts of embodiment and humanness that avoid his objections. Furthermore, I argue that physicalism is inconsistent with the Incarnation.
Many have thought that there is a problem with causal commerce between immaterial souls and mater... more Many have thought that there is a problem with causal commerce between immaterial souls and material bodies. In Physicalism or Something Near Enough, Jaegwon Kim attempts to spell out that problem. Rather than merely posing a question or raising a mystery for defenders of substance dualism to answer or address, he offers a compelling argument for the conclusion that immaterial souls cannot causally interact with material bodies. We offer a reconstruction of that argument that hinges on two premises: Kim's Dictum and the Nowhere Man principle. Kim's Dictum says that causation requires a spatial relation. Nowhere Man says that souls can't be in space. By our lights, both premises can be called into question. We'll begin our evaluation of the argument by pointing out some consequences of Kim's Dictum. For some, these will be costs. We will then present two defeaters for Kim's Dictum and a critical analysis of Kim's case for Nowhere Man. The upshot is that Kim's argument against substance dualism fails.
In debating philosophical anthropology and mind, Christian philosophers have not yet paid enough ... more In debating philosophical anthropology and mind, Christian philosophers have not yet paid enough attention to Christ's Incarnation. I contend that the Incarnation is inconsistent with materialism about human beings, which should rule out materialism for Christians. Since the doctrine is consistent with substance dualism, Christians should be dualists.
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