Tony Booth
I am currently Reader in Philosophy at the University of Sussex. Previously, I've worked at the University of Durham, Queen's University Belfast, Utrecht University, and the UNAM in Mexico City. I got my Ph.D. in 2006 at the University of Durham (supervisor: Robin Hendry; examiners: Jonathan Lowe & Chris Hookway).
My current research interests are (roughly) the following:
The Ethics of Belief:
How, if at all, are beliefs subject to normative appraisal? Should the ethics of belief give us prescriptive guidance as to what we should believe/how we should conduct our lives qua believers? Is the ethics of belief a subset of Ethics? Of Epistemology? Is Clifford’s Evidentialism (as opposed to James’ Pragmatism) true?
Epistemology:
Fallibilism; Epistemic Permissibility; The Gettier Problem-problem; Epistemic Justification; Externalism vs. Internalism; Epistemic Normativity; the Basing Relation; Epistemic Conservatism; the Nature of Curiosity, Understanding; Knowledge-wh; Epistemic Luck; Epistemic Value.
Philosophy of Mind:
The Nature of Belief, “Alief”, Suspended Judgement, wh-attitudes, Intention, Self-Deception; Doxastic Voluntarism; Degrees of Belief; Doxastic Compatibilism; the Phenomenology of Belief; Proprioception; Intuitions.
Ethics:
Normativity, Reasons, Rationality; Parfit’s State-Given/Object-Given Reasons distinction; the All-Things-Considered/Pro Tanto Reasons, Oughts, and Duties distinction; “’Ought’ Implies ‘Can’”; Blameworthiness, Blame, Praise, Responsibility, Obligation (and the relation between them); Rights; Permissibility; the Error-Theory.
Applied Philosophy:
Freedom of Speech & Expression; Financial Ethics; Informed Consent.
My current research interests are (roughly) the following:
The Ethics of Belief:
How, if at all, are beliefs subject to normative appraisal? Should the ethics of belief give us prescriptive guidance as to what we should believe/how we should conduct our lives qua believers? Is the ethics of belief a subset of Ethics? Of Epistemology? Is Clifford’s Evidentialism (as opposed to James’ Pragmatism) true?
Epistemology:
Fallibilism; Epistemic Permissibility; The Gettier Problem-problem; Epistemic Justification; Externalism vs. Internalism; Epistemic Normativity; the Basing Relation; Epistemic Conservatism; the Nature of Curiosity, Understanding; Knowledge-wh; Epistemic Luck; Epistemic Value.
Philosophy of Mind:
The Nature of Belief, “Alief”, Suspended Judgement, wh-attitudes, Intention, Self-Deception; Doxastic Voluntarism; Degrees of Belief; Doxastic Compatibilism; the Phenomenology of Belief; Proprioception; Intuitions.
Ethics:
Normativity, Reasons, Rationality; Parfit’s State-Given/Object-Given Reasons distinction; the All-Things-Considered/Pro Tanto Reasons, Oughts, and Duties distinction; “’Ought’ Implies ‘Can’”; Blameworthiness, Blame, Praise, Responsibility, Obligation (and the relation between them); Rights; Permissibility; the Error-Theory.
Applied Philosophy:
Freedom of Speech & Expression; Financial Ethics; Informed Consent.
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Papers by Tony Booth
obliged belief. On the Unique Thesis (UT), our evidence is always such that there is a unique
doxastic attitude that we are obliged to have given that evidence, whereas the Permissibility
Thesis (PT) denies this. After distinguishing several varieties of UT and PT, we argue that the
main arguments that have been levied against PT fail. Next, two arguments in favour of PT
are provided. Finally, two motivations for PT are put forward by showing that PT is entailed
by two views that are quite popular among theorists working on doxastic responsibility. If the
arguments in this paper are successful, we not only have good reasons to prefer PT over UT,
but also good reasons to think that the gap between the ways in which we are meant to
normatively assess belief and action may not be as wide as has been thought."
Papers in English by Tony Booth
Drafts by Tony Booth
obliged belief. On the Unique Thesis (UT), our evidence is always such that there is a unique
doxastic attitude that we are obliged to have given that evidence, whereas the Permissibility
Thesis (PT) denies this. After distinguishing several varieties of UT and PT, we argue that the
main arguments that have been levied against PT fail. Next, two arguments in favour of PT
are provided. Finally, two motivations for PT are put forward by showing that PT is entailed
by two views that are quite popular among theorists working on doxastic responsibility. If the
arguments in this paper are successful, we not only have good reasons to prefer PT over UT,
but also good reasons to think that the gap between the ways in which we are meant to
normatively assess belief and action may not be as wide as has been thought."