Drafts by Matthew McGrath
Journal of Philosophy (forthcoming)
This is a review of Jessica Brown's recent book. I argue that the success of some of Brown's argu... more This is a review of Jessica Brown's recent book. I argue that the success of some of Brown's arguments against "the infallibilist" may depend on whether an infallibilist takes having entailing evidence to help explain knowledge or not.
OUP volume on defeat
Although there is disagreement about the details, John Pollock's framework for defeat is now part... more Although there is disagreement about the details, John Pollock's framework for defeat is now part of the received wisdom in analytic epistemology. Recently, however, cracks have appeared in the consensus, particularly on the understanding of undercutting defeat. While not questioning the existence of undercutting defeat, Scott Sturgeon argues that undercutting defeat operates differently from rebutting. Unlike the latter, undercutting defeat, Sturgeon claims, occurs only in conjunction with certain higher-order contributions, i.e., with beliefs about the basis on which one does or would believe. Sturgeon concludes that Pollock misconceives undercutting defeat. I argue that in the case of defeat of inferential justification, undercutting defeat is a genuine phenomenon and takes roughly the shape Pollock suggests, not needing help from higher-order beliefs or justifications. However, I agree with Sturgeon that for noninferential justification, the Pollockian account is in trouble. I try to explain why there should be this difference. This difference in defeaters has important implications, and even uses, in epistemology. In a final section, I use the defeat-related difference between inferential and noninferential justification to argue that there is less noninferential perceptual or testimonial justification than is commonly thought.
It is commonplace to discuss the looks of things. Consider: 1) Eeyore has a sad look. 2) From the... more It is commonplace to discuss the looks of things. Consider: 1) Eeyore has a sad look. 2) From the look of the tree, it is healthy. 3) The sun has a reddish look this evening. 4) This year's model has a different look than last year's. When asserted of the right objects in the right contexts, these statements seem to state easily verified facts. The facts stated, moreover, might be ones we care about, for their information value in some cases and for purely aesthetic value in others. This paper asks what looks are, and what it is to have a look. It seeks to make progress on the metaphysics of looks. The commonly assumed view that looks are somehow subjective -- somehow "in the mind" or at least to be explained in terms of relations to the mind. This paper argues against such subjectivism and sketches an outline of an objectivist view.
Epistemology by Matthew McGrath
Oxford Studies in Epistemology, 2019
and Keywords This chapter addresses concerns that pragmatic encroachers are committed to problema... more and Keywords This chapter addresses concerns that pragmatic encroachers are committed to problematic knowledge variance. It first replies to Charity Anderson and John Hawthorne's new putative problem cases, which purport to show that pragmatic encroachment is committed to problematic variations in knowledge depending on what choices are available to the potential knower. It argues that the new cases do not provide any new reasons to be concerned about the pragmatic encroacher's commitment to knowledge-variance. The chapter further argues that concerns about knowledge-variance are not limited to the pragmatic encroacher, but come up for traditional purist invariantism as well.
Nous
Epistemologists often claim that in addition to belief and disbelief there is a third, neutral, d... more Epistemologists often claim that in addition to belief and disbelief there is a third, neutral, doxastic attitude. Various terms are used: ‘suspending judgment’, ‘withholding’, ‘agnosticism’. It is also common to claim that only epistemic factors relevant to the justification of these attitudes, i.e., only factors that bear on how strongly or weakly placed one is epistemically with respect to the question at issue. This paper addresses two challenges to such traditionalism about doxastic attitudes. The first concerns the relevance of non-epistemic factors we might call "future-comparative" – e.g., that you’ll have more decisive evidence on whether p tomorrow – to the justification of suspending judgment. The second, from Jane Friedman, is to explain the point of the neutral attitude without appealing to inquiry and thus taking goal-related factors, which are not epistemic, such as the value of the goal or the prospects for finding means to achieve it, to bear on the justification of the neutral attitude. My defense of traditionalism relies on distinguishing three ways of being neutral on a question: agnosticism, inquiry and suspension. Traditionalism is saved because of these only agnosticism is a genuine doxastic attitude. An equally important goal of the paper is to consider the nature of suspension and its relation to inquiry. I conclude that suspension is distinct from inquiry and is vital to controlling the epistemic quality of our beliefs.
Walking through the supermarket, I see the avocados. I haven't seen any labels. I don't need to. ... more Walking through the supermarket, I see the avocados. I haven't seen any labels. I don't need to. I know those are avocados. Similarly, if you see a pumpkin on the desk in my office, you can know it's a pumpkin from its looks. The phenomenology in such cases is that of " just seeing " that such and such. This phenomenology might make one think the knowledge gained is immediate. This paper argues, to the contrary, that in these target cases, the knowledge is mediate, depending as it does on one's knowledge of what the relevant kind of thing looks like. To make the case requires an examination of the nature of knowing what Fs look like. Is such knowledge to be understood as knowledge of a fact, or rather as a kind of ability? From the conclusion that the knowledge in the target cases is not immediate, the paper concludes that perception does not afford us immediate knowledge concerning objects' kinds.
Synthese, 2007
Much of the plausibility of epistemic conservatism derives from its prospects of explaining our r... more Much of the plausibility of epistemic conservatism derives from its prospects of explaining our rationality in holding memory beliefs. In the first two parts of this paper, I argue for the inadequacy of the two standard approaches to the epistemology of memory beliefs, preservationism and evidentialism. In the third, I point out the advantages of the conservative approach and consider how well conservatism survives three of the strongest objections against it. Conservatism does survive, I claim, but only if qualified in certain ways. Appropriately qualified, conservatism is no longer the powerful anti-skeptical tool some have hoped for, but a doctrine closely connected with memory.
Goldman and his Critics
In this paper, forthcoming in *Goldman and his Critics*, I revisit the debate between Goldman and... more In this paper, forthcoming in *Goldman and his Critics*, I revisit the debate between Goldman and his evidentialist opponents on the justification of memory beliefs. I distinguish two sorts of epistemic status at issue and not usually clearly separated in these debates: historical justification vs. justification to retain a belief. A full epistemology of memory beliefs ought to give a unified account of both, acknowledging their distinctness but explaining each within the same theoretical framework and articulating their relations. I raise doubts about the resources of reliabilism for doing this. I conclude by making a plea for a less ambitious account of justification to retain beliefs, a restricted form of epistemic conservatism. I argue that the conservative account I recommend represents a kind of neutral baseline, insofar as there are both reliabilist-friendly arguments as well as evidentialist-friendly arguments for it.
The Philosophical Review, 2002
Train Case 1. You're at Back Bay Station in Boston preparing to take the commuter rail to Pr... more Train Case 1. You're at Back Bay Station in Boston preparing to take the commuter rail to Providence. You're going to see friends. It will be a relaxing vacation. You've been in a rather boring conversation with a guy standing beside you. He, too, is going to visit friends in ...
'Routledge Companion to Epistemology, 2011
This paper introduces the idea of "pragmatic encroachment," explaining where the idea comes from ... more This paper introduces the idea of "pragmatic encroachment," explaining where the idea comes from and why one might think it has merit. Several grades of encroachment are discussed. The paper is from 2011.
In this chapter, we follow Edward Craig's (1990) advice: ask what the concept of knowledge does f... more In this chapter, we follow Edward Craig's (1990) advice: ask what the concept of knowledge does for us and use our findings as clues about its application conditions. What a concept does for us is a matter of what we can do with it, and what we do with concepts is deploy them in thought and language. So, we will examine the purposes we have in attributing knowledge. This chapter examines two such purposes, agent-evaluation and informant-suggestion, and brings the results to bear on an important debate about the application conditions of the concept of knowledge—the debate between contextualists and their rivals. }
The paper responds to arguments from Jessica Brown that there is nothing special about the use of 'knows' to criticize and defend action. Briefly, I respond that by using 'knows that p' in this context we close off a certain sort of objection to one's evaluation of the action -- the "epistemic" objection, according to which the agent doesn't have good enough evidence, strong enough grounds for p. For instance, if I say, "Bob should have taken a left back there, because he knew the restaurant was on Elm Street!," I close off the objection "but Bob didn't have good enough grounds for thinking it was on Elm." Contrast this with criticizing Bob's action by say8ing, "Bob should have taken a left because he had reason to believe it was on Elm Street." This doesn't close off responses of the form "well, he had good reason, but not good enough; he didn't want to take the risk." Such a response isn't always appropriate, but it sometimes is. Using 'knows' closes it off in a way that using 'has reason to believe' doesn't. Using 'knew p' closes it off in a way that merely using 'p' or 'he truly believed that p' doesn't.
Normatively: Epistemic and Practical
Abstract: The thesis of pragmatic encroachment about knowledge holds that whether a subject knows... more Abstract: The thesis of pragmatic encroachment about knowledge holds that whether a subject knows that p can vary due to differences in practical stakes, holding fixed the strength of the subject’s epistemic position with respect to p. Accepting pragmatic encroachment about knowledge brings with it a significant explanatory burden: if knowledge varies like this with the stakes, why does knowledge show so many signs of staying fixed with variations in the stakes? This paper argues that explanatory burdens of this general kind are harder to avoid than is commonly thought: even if you deny the stakes-sensitivity of knowledge, you will be stuck accepting the stakes-sensitivity of other statuses which, like knowledge, show the same signs of staying fixed with variations in the stakes. In this paper, I discuss two such statuses: reason-worthiness (i.e., being sufficiently warranted in a proposition p to have p as a practical reason) and emotion-worthiness (i.e., being sufficiently warranted in a proposition p appropriately to have factive emotions that p). If I am right, then, we’re all stuck with the explanatory burdens faced by pragmatic encroachment theorists, and in that sense the problems of pragmatic encroachment are everyone’s problems.
In some cases there is a reason for one to do or believe something, but because one has no inklin... more In some cases there is a reason for one to do or believe something, but because one has no inkling of this reason, it doesn"t matter to the rationality of one"s actions or beliefs. 1 If you are sitting in a building which has just caught fire, there is a very good reason for you to leave as quickly as possible; but if you have no idea that anything is unusual, you might be quite rational to stay put where you are. In this case there exists a reason for you do something, but, because you do not "have" or "possess" that reason, it does not affect what you are rational to do. Williams" example thus shows that there can be reasons for one to do something which don"t affect rationality because they are not "had."
Imagine I hold up a Granny Smith apple for all to see. You would thereby gain justified beliefs t... more Imagine I hold up a Granny Smith apple for all to see. You would thereby gain justified beliefs that it was green, that it was apple, and that it is a Granny Smith apple. Under classical foundationalism, such simple visual beliefs are mediately justified on the basis of reasons concerning your experience. Under dogmatism, some or all of these beliefs are justified immediately by your experience and not by reasons you possess. This paper argues for what I call the looks view of the justification of simple visual beliefs. According to the looks view, such beliefs are mediately justified on the basis of reasons concerning how the relevant things look. Unlike under classical foundationalism, under the looks view as I develop it, these reasons are public. They are public with respect to both their content and possession: with respect to content, they are not about ourselves and our experiences, and with respect to their possession, many people can have the very same looks-related reasons.
There is pragmatic encroachment on some epistemic status just in case whether a proposition has t... more There is pragmatic encroachment on some epistemic status just in case whether a proposition has that status for a subject depends not only on the subject’s epistemic position with respect to the proposition, but also on features of the subject’s nonepistemic, practical environment. Discussions of pragmatic encroachment usually focus on knowledge. Here we argue that, barring infallibilism, there is pragmatic encroachment on what is arguably a more fundamental epistemic status – the status a proposition has when it is warranted enough to be a reason one has for believing other things.
Synthese
True belief is better than false belief. Knowledge is better than mere true belief. Knowledge is ... more True belief is better than false belief. Knowledge is better than mere true belief. Knowledge is better than mere justified true belief. Such claims are familiar from the literature on epistemic value. Like many epistemologists, Ernest Sosa seeks a comprehensive theory of epistemic value that explains these claims about comparative value. Not only that: like many epistemologists, he seeks an account of what sort of value this is, its source and nature.
Sosa has provided just such a comprehensive account, developed over the last few decades, culminating in his recent books Knowing Full Well and especially Judgment and Agency. Crucial to the account is an axiology of performances, a category he argues includes beliefs. One of the theoretical virtues of his account is precisely its generality. The account applies to performances, and claims about epistemic value fall out as simple consequences, given the premise that beliefs are themselves performances of a certain sort.
I argue that, despite its attractiveness, Sosa’s account is problematic. Powerful Kantian intuitions undermine his axiology when applied to performances conceived as attempts with aims. A final section examines whether there is an alternative axiology available within Sosa’s general competence-theoretic framework which avoids the problem.
Philosophical Studies, 2009
We begin by asking what fallibilism about knowledge is, distinguishing several conceptions of fal... more We begin by asking what fallibilism about knowledge is, distinguishing several conceptions of fallibilism and giving reason to accept what we call strong epistemic fallibilism, the view that one can know that something is the case even if there remains an epistemic chance, for one, that it is not the case.
Seemings and Justification, 2013
Knowledge Ascriptions, 2012
The chapter distinguishes two different strategies one could use to defend ‘shifty epistemology’ ... more The chapter distinguishes two different strategies one could use to defend ‘shifty epistemology’ according to which the truth values of knowledge ascriptions vary not merely with differences in traditional factors such as belief, truth, and evidence, etc., but also with the salience of error possibilities and practical stakes. Shifty epistemologists assert an existential claim to the effect that there is a least one pair of cases in which the relevant knowledge ascriptions differ in their truth values due to variation in some non-traditional factor. The first ‘argument-from-instances’ strategy attempts to provide instances of the existential. By contrast, the second ‘argument-from-principles’ strategy defends the existential claim by argument from further general claims or principles. The main point of the chapter is to argue that the latter strategy has advantages when compared to the former.
Forthcoming in McCain ed. BELIEVING IN ACCORD WITH THE EVIDENCE, Synthese Library Book Series
Evidentialism, as I understand it here, holds that whether one is justified in believing a propos... more Evidentialism, as I understand it here, holds that whether one is justified in believing a proposition is explained by whether or not one’s evidence on balance supports that proposition. This view has undeniable appeal. It just sounds right. Here I will present a challenge for evidentialists, one I argue they cannot meet. The challenge is to explain the crucial notion of having supporting evidence in a way that is not only acceptable on its own, but acceptable when conjoined with evidentialism. This challenge asks the evidentialist to go beyond just sounding right. Warning to the reader: this gets into the nitty gritty.
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Drafts by Matthew McGrath
Epistemology by Matthew McGrath
The paper responds to arguments from Jessica Brown that there is nothing special about the use of 'knows' to criticize and defend action. Briefly, I respond that by using 'knows that p' in this context we close off a certain sort of objection to one's evaluation of the action -- the "epistemic" objection, according to which the agent doesn't have good enough evidence, strong enough grounds for p. For instance, if I say, "Bob should have taken a left back there, because he knew the restaurant was on Elm Street!," I close off the objection "but Bob didn't have good enough grounds for thinking it was on Elm." Contrast this with criticizing Bob's action by say8ing, "Bob should have taken a left because he had reason to believe it was on Elm Street." This doesn't close off responses of the form "well, he had good reason, but not good enough; he didn't want to take the risk." Such a response isn't always appropriate, but it sometimes is. Using 'knows' closes it off in a way that using 'has reason to believe' doesn't. Using 'knew p' closes it off in a way that merely using 'p' or 'he truly believed that p' doesn't.
Sosa has provided just such a comprehensive account, developed over the last few decades, culminating in his recent books Knowing Full Well and especially Judgment and Agency. Crucial to the account is an axiology of performances, a category he argues includes beliefs. One of the theoretical virtues of his account is precisely its generality. The account applies to performances, and claims about epistemic value fall out as simple consequences, given the premise that beliefs are themselves performances of a certain sort.
I argue that, despite its attractiveness, Sosa’s account is problematic. Powerful Kantian intuitions undermine his axiology when applied to performances conceived as attempts with aims. A final section examines whether there is an alternative axiology available within Sosa’s general competence-theoretic framework which avoids the problem.
The paper responds to arguments from Jessica Brown that there is nothing special about the use of 'knows' to criticize and defend action. Briefly, I respond that by using 'knows that p' in this context we close off a certain sort of objection to one's evaluation of the action -- the "epistemic" objection, according to which the agent doesn't have good enough evidence, strong enough grounds for p. For instance, if I say, "Bob should have taken a left back there, because he knew the restaurant was on Elm Street!," I close off the objection "but Bob didn't have good enough grounds for thinking it was on Elm." Contrast this with criticizing Bob's action by say8ing, "Bob should have taken a left because he had reason to believe it was on Elm Street." This doesn't close off responses of the form "well, he had good reason, but not good enough; he didn't want to take the risk." Such a response isn't always appropriate, but it sometimes is. Using 'knows' closes it off in a way that using 'has reason to believe' doesn't. Using 'knew p' closes it off in a way that merely using 'p' or 'he truly believed that p' doesn't.
Sosa has provided just such a comprehensive account, developed over the last few decades, culminating in his recent books Knowing Full Well and especially Judgment and Agency. Crucial to the account is an axiology of performances, a category he argues includes beliefs. One of the theoretical virtues of his account is precisely its generality. The account applies to performances, and claims about epistemic value fall out as simple consequences, given the premise that beliefs are themselves performances of a certain sort.
I argue that, despite its attractiveness, Sosa’s account is problematic. Powerful Kantian intuitions undermine his axiology when applied to performances conceived as attempts with aims. A final section examines whether there is an alternative axiology available within Sosa’s general competence-theoretic framework which avoids the problem.
considerations concerning the stakes. The second appeals to defeaters which do not defeat reasons but which nonetheless do something similar: they make the action
recommended by those reasons vicious. In a high stakes case performing the "risky" action would be vicious even if it is justified in the sense of being supported by undefeated reasons. What is defeated is a virtue-based epistemic status rather than reasons or justification. I argue that neither proposal halts the march from a knowledge-reason link to pragmatic encroachment.