Papers by Jeppe von Platz
Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 2013
The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy, Politics, and Economics, 2022
Analyse & Kritik, 2017
Holt argues that Rawls’s first principle of justice requires democratic control of the economy an... more Holt argues that Rawls’s first principle of justice requires democratic control of the economy and that property owning democracy fails to satisfy this requirement; only liberal socialism is fully democratic. However, the notion of democratic control is ambiguous, and Holt has to choose between the weaker notion of democratic control that Rawls is committed to and the stronger notion that property owning democracy fails to satisfy. It may be that there is a tension between capitalism and democracy, so that only liberal socialism can be fully democratic, but if so,we should reject, rather than argue from, the theory of democracy we find in justice as fairness.
Ethics, 2020
Is capitalism compatible with democratic equality? Rawls’s critique of welfare-state capitalism i... more Is capitalism compatible with democratic equality? Rawls’s critique of welfare-state capitalism implies a negative answer. I argue that Rawls’s critique fails and that welfare-state capitalism can satisfy the demands of democratic equality. I articulate a social democratic interpretation of the ideal of democratic equality and show that it justifies welfare-state capitalism. This argument also implies that welfare-state capitalism can satisfy the demands of democratic equality as interpreted by Rawls’s justice as fairness. So, whether we accept Rawls’s interpretation of democratic equality or the social democratic alternative, welfare-state capitalism can satisfy the demands of democratic equality.
Journal of Social Philosophy, 2016
The central idea of Rawls’s theory of justice is the idea of democratic society as a fair system ... more The central idea of Rawls’s theory of justice is the idea of democratic society as a fair system of cooperation between free and equal citizens. The moral powers of democratic citizens are the ca-pacities presupposed by this idea. Rawls identifies two such powers, the capacity for a concep-tion of the good and the capacity for a sense of justice. I argue that the idea of democratic citi-zenship presupposes also a third moral power: the capacity for working. Since the basic rights are the rights necessary for the development and exercise of the moral powers of citizenship; and since the capacity for working is such a moral power; and since access to work, education, and healthcare are necessary for the development and exercise of the capacity for working; access to work, education, and healthcare are basic rights.
Politics, Philosophy & Economics, 2013
In this essay I discuss a powerful challenge to high-liberalism: the challenge presented by neocl... more In this essay I discuss a powerful challenge to high-liberalism: the challenge presented by neoclassical liberals that the high-liberal assumptions and values imply that the full range of economic liberties are basic rights. If the claim is true, then the high-liberal road from ideals of democracy and democratic citizenship to left-liberal institutions is blocked. Indeed, in that case the high-liberal is committed to an institutional scheme more along the lines of laissez-faire capitalism than property-owning democracy. To present and discuss this challenge, I let John Rawls represent the high-liberal argument that only a narrow range of economic liberties are basic rights and John Tomasi represent the neoclassical liberal argument that the full range of economic liberties are basic rights. I show that Rawls’s argument is inadequate, but also that Tomasi’s argument fails. I thus conclude that high-liberalism is in a precarious situation, but is not yet undone by the neoclassical lib...
Journal of Social Philosophy, 2006
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Economics and Philosophy, 2021
Some meritocratic defenders of capitalism rely on the principle that cooperators should receive a... more Some meritocratic defenders of capitalism rely on the principle that cooperators should receive a share of the product commensurate with their contribution. However, such defences of capitalism fail due to a dilemma.Eitherthey rely on an understanding of contribution that arguably will be reflected by the capital-labour split in suitably idealized capitalist economies, butcannotserve as a plausible standard of merit;orthey rely on an interpretation of contribution thatisa plausible standard of merit, but which won’t tend to be reflected by the capital-labour split in capitalist economies.
Robin Hood and his merry band of outlaws took from the rich and gave to the poor. Why did they do... more Robin Hood and his merry band of outlaws took from the rich and gave to the poor. Why did they do it? Were they justified in doing it? Should we do it too? Of course, Robin Hood is “essentially a fictional creation,” and even if an outlaw by the name of Robin Hood once resided in Sherwood Forest, it is doubtful that he gave much to the poor. Yet the legend of Robin Hood suggests answers to these questions that reveal an overlooked but powerful principle of justice, relevant beyond its legendary context: the principle that justified Robin Hood also justifies taking from the rich and giving to the poor today. The justification for Robin Hood’s redistributive activities is not any of those supplied by the standard principles of distributive justice—sufficiency, equality, priority, liberty, and utility. Instead, Robin Hood is engaged in a sort of correctivedistributive justice. Robin Hood’s redistributive actions are not justified because they correct individual rights violations (thoug...
In line with a tradition running from the Ancients through Christian thought, Kant affirms the id... more In line with a tradition running from the Ancients through Christian thought, Kant affirms the idea of moral freedom: that true freedom consists in moral self-determination. The idea of moral freedom raises the problem of moral freedom: if freedom is moral self-determination, it seems that the wicked are not free and therefore not responsible for their wrongdoings. In this essay I discuss Kant’s solution to this problem. I argue that Kant distinguishes between four modalities of freedom as moral selfdetermination and that the problem of moral freedom disappears when these distinctions are brought to light.
In Rawls’s justice as fairness, the moral powers of democratic citizenship are the capacity for a... more In Rawls’s justice as fairness, the moral powers of democratic citizenship are the capacity for a conception of the good and the sense of justice, and basic rights are those necessary for the development and exercise of these two powers. Since economic agency is not a power of democratic citizenship, economic rights are not basic. To libertarians, this relative devaluation of economic agency and economic rights is a mistake, since economic agency and economic rights are the main concerns of justice. This libertarian critique is correct: justice as fairness underestimates the importance of economic agency and economic rights. Yet libertarian critics mistake how we should care about economic agency and which economic rights are basic. The economic agency that matters for justice as fairness is the capacity to work together with others, and the basic economic rights are those that enable and protect this capacity.
In this paper, the authors consider the ways in which formal structural differences between histo... more In this paper, the authors consider the ways in which formal structural differences between historical injustices bear on reparations claims made in the name of those injustices.
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Papers by Jeppe von Platz