56819-Texto Do Artigo-751375216679-1-10-20210101

Revista Brasileira de História das Religiões. ANPUH, Ano XIII, n.
39,
Janeiro/Abril de 2021 - ISSN 1983-2850
/ Field Notes from Brazil: We don’t believe in Democracy, p. 321-337 /
Field Notes from Brazil: We don’t believe in Democracy

Graham McGeoch1
DOI: https://doi.org/10.4025/rbhranpuh.v13i39.56819
Abstract: There is increasing attention to religion and democracy in scholarly research in

Brazil. In general terms, when scholars look to religion and democracy, an increasing
number focus on the question of evangelicals and electoral politics. Research is reacting
to the Brazilian political context provided by the most recent Presidential campaign and
the inauguration of a ‘terribly evangelical’ President. This article considers religion and
democracy, particularly with regard to laicité imported from France to Brazil, and indeed
Latin America more widely. The article concludes with ‘Field Notes’ from interviews and
conversations with Pentecostals about contemporary politics in Brazil.
Keywords: Religion, Democracy, Laicité, Pentecostals.
Notas de uma investigação de campo: não cremos na democracia

Resumo:Há crescente interesse em religião e democracia em pesquisas acadêmicas no
Brasil. De modo geral, quando a academia volta sua atenção para religião e democracia,
um número crescente foca na questão de evangélicos e política eleitoral. As pesquisas
reagem ao contexto político brasileiro fornecido pela última campanha presidencial e a
inauguração de um Presidente ‘terrivelmente evangélico’. Este artigo contempla religião e
democracia, especificamente à luz de laicidade importada da França ao Brasil, e América
Latina de modo geral. O artigo termina com notas de uma pesquisa de campo –
entrevistas e conversas – com pessoas pentecostais sobre política contemporânea
brasileira.
Palavras-chaves: Religião, Democracia, Laicidade. Pentecostais.
Notas de una investigación de campo: no creemos en la democracia

Resumen: Existe un creciente interés por la religión y la democracia en la investigación
académica en Brasil. En general, cuando la academia centra su atención en la religión y la
democracia, un número creciente se centra en el tema de los evangélicos y la política
electoral. Las encuestas reaccionan al contexto político brasileño proporcionado por la
1 Professor de Teologia e Ciências das Religiões na Faculdade Unida da Unida. Email:

[email protected].
[ 321 ]
Revista Brasileira de História das Religiões. ANPUH, Ano XIII, n.39,
última campaña presidencial y la toma de posesión de un presidente "terriblemente

evangélico". Este artículo contempla la religión y la democracia, específicamente a la luz
del laicismo importado de Francia a Brasil y América Latina en general. El artículo
termina con notas de una investigación de campo - entrevistas y conversaciones - con
personas pentecostales sobre la política brasileña contemporánea.
Palabras-claves: Religión, Democracia, Laicismo, Pentecostales.
Recebido em 20/11/2020- Aprovado em 04/12/2020
Introduction
Brazil is a democracy. After a period of military dictatorship (1964-1985), the
redemocratization process in Brazil, and indeed across the region, has appeared to
consolidate itself. Of course, the coup d’etat still peppers the political scene in Latin
America in the twenty-first century. Since the year 2000, the following countries have
experienced some form of coup d’etat: Ecuador, Venezuela, Honduras, Brazil and Bolivia.
However, differently from the twentieth century, the coup d’etat of the twenty-first century
appears to be the venture of civilians – normally political and economic elites – rather
than exclusively military leaders. It also appears to take place broadly within the
democratic system, rather than attempt to overthrow democracy.
Invariably, the military in Latin America plays a powerful role in the life of the
nation-states. Historically, with figures like Simon Bolivar, the military has acted as
creator and defender of the nation-state2. During the twentieth century, this played out
through a series of military interventions and military dictatorships designed to defend
the nation-state from perceived threats, both internal and external. Frequently, the
military interventions and subsequent dictatorships formally announced and promoted
their actions as a defense of democracy.
This situation led a number of observers to note the interrelationship between
weak states and a strong military3. As attention turned to redemocratization processes,
political scientists placed an emphasis on reverting this ‘weak state-strong military’
situation in order to consolidate democracy in the region. Democracy, it was thought,
would be consolidated and strengthened across Latin America to the extent that the
2 Boliviaranism tried to suppress nationalist tendencies during the decolonization process across
Latin America, developing the idea of the Patria Grande. In a strict sense, Bolivar sought to create
and defend the Patria Grande not create individual nation-states. However, his vision will
subsequently inform the nationalisms of various Latin American governments.
3 This theory is not restricted to analysis of Latin America. It is widely applied to Africa and Asia,
too.
[ 322 ]
military was brought under civilian control, and into political processes under civilian
control (MARES & MARTINEZ, 2014, p.3). While the progress towards this objective
varies across the region, the theory underpinning it is still prevalent.
History tells us not to discount future military interventions in Latin American
politics. However, in the twenty-first century, the increasing perceived threat to
democracy and its consolidation has come from a more surprising group: civilians acting
in the name of religion. While studies of civil-military relations in the region, and
particularly new research into the period of military dictatorships, has left untenable
popular and populist notions of ‘soft dictatorship’ and ‘economic miracles’ (ATENCIO,
SCNHEIDER & SCNHEIDER, 2018, p. 3), less attention has been dedicated to popular
and populist religious understandings of democracy.
The remainder of this article focusses on addressing religion and democracy,
particularly in Brazil. Firstly, it briefly sketches understandings about religion and
democracy. Secondly, based on fieldwork amongst groups of Pentecostals, it documents
some approaches and understandings of this group towards religion and democracy. The
opinions expressed counter some of the widespread contemporary analysis about
evangelicals and electoral politics, and confirm other tensions observable in Brazil. This is
in part due to the question of the rise of ‘identity politics’ and the opportunities and
problems that it brings to democracy – both representative and participatory. ‘Identity
politics’ and its consequences for representative and participatory democracy is not
addressed in this article4.
Specifically, this article arrives at the surprising conclusion that a significant
number of people do not believe in democracy for religious reasons. Obviously, this can
be understood as a threat to democracy, and forms a part of the wider trends of
‘democratic deficit’, which undermine confidence and trust in democracy. It also
highlights a difference at the micro-level – through the voices of participants in the
interviews and conversations – and the macro-level trends. It is clear from the micro-level
(in the field notes that follow) that there is reticence and suspicion about democracy both
representative and participatory amongst those interviewed. However, this must be
balanced by the fact that increasing numbers politicians and civil servants are occupying
democratic spaces in the name of religion. This dissonance requires further probing to better
understand the threats and opportunities that religion brings to democracy in Brazil 5.
4 ‘Identity politics’ is another key area of discussion and tension in Brazil. It is beyond the scope of
this preliminary article, which, as the title indicates, is drawn from field notes during 2020.
5 Again, it is beyond the scope of this preliminary text, which draws on field notes from 2020.
[ 323 ]
Religion and Democracy in Latin America

The newly independent nation-states in Latin America drew heavily on the
French and American Revolutions. Laicité was a nation-state principle. Sometimes, this is
expressed popularly as the separation between Church and State. However, laicité is a
more explicit political project of the nation-state that seeks to control a powerful church.
It is not so much a question of separation, as control by the state. The statecraft of laicité
is to remove the power of the Church and bring it under control of the nation-state. In
some sense, like the contemporary debates around civilian-military relations, laicité brings
the Church under civilian control and into political processes under civilian control. This
was very important in Latin America where the Church rivalled the Court since the
Treaty of Tordesillas (1494) in matters of statecraft. The newly configured nation-states
had to choose between a powerful Church and a rival political system. The choice,
universally in the region, was to bring the Church under control of the Court, and into
the political system based on laicité6.
The problem with this settlement, and indeed more widely with laicité, is that it
depends on having (and controlling) one powerful Church. At the time of independence
in Latin America, Roman Catholic hegemony was unquestioned in the region. This is not
the case in the twenty-first century. There is now more than one church with significant
influence on societies across the region. Coupled with this is the rise of awareness of
religious pluralism. Laicité struggles with aspects of religious pluralism. Its struggles are
rooted in its own design.
Laicité is designed to control one powerful Church. It was not designed to
address the question of a plurality of powerful churches, or even a plurality of religions
with no relation to a church, powerful or not. France’s ongoing struggles in relation to
how it democratically addresses Muslim political inputs are but one example of this. In
Latin America, attention most obviously turns to what the literature loosely describes as
‘evangelicals’, what in this dossier is called grupos carismáticos católicos e pentecostais. What
Muslims in France and charismatic Roman Catholics or Pentecostals in Latin America
have in common is that neither group is formally contemplated by laicité. This is for two
reasons: either they are a minority and by definition not rivalling the nation-state and not
needing to be brought under control, or more specifically they are minority not under the
6 Ricardo Mariano has noted that Brazilian laicité did not follow the French model to the letter. The
Roman Catholic Church still enjoyed huge privileges, and the State still persecuted other religions
to the benefit of the Roman Catholic Church. MARIANO, Ricardo. “Laicidade à brasileira:
Católicos, pentecostais e laicos em disputa na esfera pública” In Civitas, Porto Alegre v. 11 n. 2,
maio-ago. 2011, p. 246. In discussing laicité in the course of this article, I do not ignore the varieties
of laicité practiced in Brazil and around the globe.
[ 324 ]
control of the religious hegemony of the nation-state7. In both France and Latin America,
Muslims and Pentecostals, for example, are not part of a powerful Roman Catholic
Church.
It is perhaps worth a historical detour to note that while at independence
Roman Catholic hegemony was unquestioned, Latin American was not universally
Roman Catholic. The work of scholars on Judaism, Islam, African Religions and
Amerindian Religions, not to mention the scholars of Protestantism in the region 8, all
demonstrate a significant if minority presence of religions other than Christianity under
the control of the Roman Catholic Church at least since the 15th century when Latin
America enters the World System. The model of laicité – developed centuries later and
imported to Latin America – does not contemplate this historical reality. The structures
of Latin American nation-states, for example, are inherited from both canon law, and
Greek and Roman models of society and politics9. This can give the false impression that,
in the case of Brazil, for example, its roots and ethos are Roman Catholic. Sometimes this
theory is advanced under the guise of lusotropicalism. Lusotropicalism is an influential
theory created by Brazilian sociologist Gilberto Freyre in the early twentieth century to
denote and explain Brazil’s exceptionalism as a civilization. Brazil is more than a nation-
state in the understanding of Freyre. He roots Brazil’s exceptionalism as a civilization in
the Christocentrism of its Roman Catholic ethos (FREYRE, 2010, p. 91). The elision of
laicité and lusotropicalism has important consequences for contemporary political
processes in Brazil, particularly democracy.
The model of laicité sketched here is not the only way that it need operate. Over
time, and in different places, it can and has evolved. The laicité of the French Revolution
is different from the secularism of the American Revolution. The USA had no need to
bring under control one powerful Roman Catholic Church. Far from understanding laicité
as exclusively about controlling a powerful Church, Charles Taylor has advocated for a
twenty-first century understanding of laicité as a form of management of different
religious and philosophical views (TAYLOR, 2014, p. 59). In its (preferable) model,
Taylor argues, that state neutrality is paramount:
7 This holds true even for charismatic Roman Catholics who are a minority within the Roman
Catholic Church, and not always under the full control of the Bishops’ Conferences with many
charismatic Roman Catholic movements benefitting from transnational alliances.
8 Technically Protestantism is not a different religion from Roman Catholicism. It is a different
church within the same religion, Christianity. Frequently, scholarly literature does not make this
technical distinction.
9 For a broader interdisciplinary study of the influence and legacy of Greece and Rome on Latin
America see: LAIRD, Andrew, MILLER, Nicola. Antiquities and Classical Traditions in Latin America.
Wiley-Blackwell: London, 2018.
[ 325 ]
the point of state neutrality is precisely to avoid favoring or

disfavoring not just religion but any basic position, religious
or non-religious. We can’t favor Christianity over Islam, but
also religion over against nonbelief in religion or vice versa
(TAYLOR, 2015, p. 60).
Taylor is attempting to redraw the sometimes-excessive anti-religious nature of

some models of laicité and secularism, which seek to control and exclude religious
contributions from political processes. However, the matter is perhaps more complex
than he is willing to admit. For example, how can a nation-state, which operates a judicial
system based on both Christian canon law, and Roman law account for the use of and
inclusion of Sharia in its constitutional settlement10? This question arises directly in
relation to the constitutions, and the practice of laicité and democracy in Latin America.
These preliminary remarks about laicité are important for two major reason.
Firstly, in the ‘Field Notes’ section of this article, which engages with Pentecostals, the
concept of laicité is often rejected for religious reasons. This will be explored further in
that section. However, the second reason for addressing laicité is its relation to democracy.
Alfred Stepan, and indeed the wider literature in political science related to democracy,
does not insist on the need for democracy to practice laicité to be considered democratic.
This fact is important to consider in relation to Latin America and specifically Brazil
where often the contemporary ‘defense of democracy’ is couched in terms of ‘defense of
laicité’. In other words, due to the model of laicité imported from France, democracy and
its practice is often conflated with laicité in contemporary politics in Brazil.
Alfred Stepan has drawn attention to two important aspects of contemporary
debates about religion and democracy. Firstly, he advocated the concept of ‘twin
tolerations’. The twin tolerations are a consideration of the necessary boundaries of
freedom between an elected government and religious groups, and the necessary
boundaries of freedom of religious individuals and groups from government (STEPAN,
2001, p. 213-255). Stepan himself notes that the exploration and practice of the ‘twin
tolerations’ will not produce a ‘one size fits all’ democracy. In other words, the nature and
10 This is perhaps the most obvious and pressing issue facing laicité. It is important to note, as in the
case of Latin America, that it is not a question of practicing or not Sharia. Sharia has been practiced
in Latin America at least since the 15th century. The question is how – if at all – the constitution of
the Latin American nation-state maintains neutrality between different religious and philosophical
views, including questions pertaining to canon law and sharia. In maintaining this neutrality, how
[ 326 ]
possibilities of state-religion relations (a broader category in the twenty-first century than

the state-church model contemplated by laicité in the nineteenth century) are more varied
now than 200 years ago, and the variety of democratic possibilities are more varied too.
In this vein, Stepan, in line with the political science literature on democracy,
noted that there are four popular misconceptions assumed about democracy and its
practice. Firstly, the misconception that democracy always requires a strict separation of
state and religion. Secondly, the misconception that Christianity, particularly Western
Christianities11, are tolerant. Thirdly, the misconception that religion has no place in
political processes and instead consensus is built on philosophical shared principles.
Fourthly, the misconception that democracy requires and is strengthened by the
decreasing presence and practice of religion (STEPAN, 2015, p. 270-272). In different
ways, each of these misconceptions is played out in contemporary political debates in
Brazil about religion and democracy. Again, this will be explored more fully in the ‘Field
Notes’ section.
At this stage, it is perhaps important to underline that Alfred Stepan is not an
outlier. His scholarship on democracy and on Latin America is still referenced and
recognized within both the fields of political science and Brazilian studies. He was
recognized as a Brazilianist. His observations on democracy also find support and
resonance in the political science literature. None of the classic works treating democracy
advocates for a definition of democracy that conflate democracy and laicité (DAHL, 1971;
LINZ & STEPAN, 1996; LIPHART, 1999). This consensus in the scholarship is
significantly different from the contemporary discussions in Brazil about religion and
democracy, whether in academic circles, amongst different religious groups, or in the
echo chambers of social media. This, again, will be an important background to the
exploration in the ‘Field Notes’ which follow.
Field Notes from Brazil

This section is based on a series of interviews and conversations conducted by
the researcher during 2020 with Pentecostals in Vitoria, ES. In November 2020, Brazil
held municipal elections during the COVID-19 pandemic. The interviews and
conversations about religion and democracy were conducted between August and
does the constitution recognize the practice and contribution of Sharia within the life of the nation-
state?
11 The term is used in the plural to denote that Western Christianities, at least in theological terms,
exert a continuing influence on theologies and Christianities that no longer consider themselves
Western. Brazilian and Latin American Christianities being a case in point. I make this observation
because it is important for some of the documentation in the ‘Field notes’ section.
[ 327 ]
November 2020 by videoconference. The interviews and conversations were always

conducted in groups. Twenty-seven people participated in the interviews and
conversations – five women, 22 men. The participants were aged 20-55. The majority of
the participants live in urban peripheries and come from low-income backgrounds12.
Pentecostalism influenced all of the participants, but not all participants are formally
members of Pentecostal churches. One person was from the Roman Catholic Church, 4
people from the Presbyterian Church and 4 people from Baptist churches. The remaining
participants were from the Assembly of God Church, or a series of independent
Pentecostal churches strongly influenced by the Assembly of God Church 13.
Pentecostalism in Latin America is a movement. Different scholars hold
differing opinions about whether it is an autonomous movement indigenous to the
region, or whether it is imported, primarily from the USA. Both scholarly arguments have
merits and shortcomings. Historically, Pentecostalism is inserted into Brazil in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth century by missionaries under the influence of the pietistic
revival in both Europe and the USA. Differently from what are sometimes called historic
Protestants, Pentecostals quickly asserted their autonomy from the foreign missionaries
and assimilated Amerindian and Afro-Brazilian cosmovisions and practices. Similarly to
historic Protestants, Pentecostals perpetuated a strong feeling of anti-Roman Catholicism
across the region. The exponential growth of Pentecostalism, and the birth of
Neopentecostalism, occurred during the period of the military dictatorship. In an analysis
of religion and democracy, the correlation between Pentecostalism and military
dictatorship should not be overlooked14. Indeed, this dossier notes the presence of
religious candidates for legislative and executive functions as early as the 1980s during the
transition to democracy.
Pentecostalism, as a movement, whether indigenous or imported, demonstrates
two further characteristics in Brazil. It is part of a transnational movement, and it is an
expression of massified religion15. These two characteristics appear to be important in any
12 Faculdade Unida de Vitória understands ‘low-income background’ as students from families with
a monthly income of up to 3 minimum wages (the minimum wage is R$ 1.045,00 per month).
13 The interviews and conversations confirmed the thesis of Bernardo Campos about the
Pentecostalization of both Protestantism and Popular Religion (2002). Historic Protestants –

Presbyterians and Baptists – and have not traditionally paid much attention to popular religion,
mainly due to questions of social class, however, even the participants from these churches
demonstrated Pentecostal influences.
14 It is not a topic for discussion in this article.
15 I am using the term ‘massified religion’ in line with the theological reflections of Juan Luis
Segundo. In Segundo’s analysis massified religion elides membership of a church, popular religion
and socio-cultural values so that they are sometimes used synonymously (1982, 185).
[ 328 ]
consideration of religion and democracy. A transnational religious movement, like

Pentecostalism, enables a local group, in this case Brazilian Pentecostals, to mobilize
global networks in support of or defense of issues apparently pertaining to their practice,
customs or institutions. This transnational aspect of Pentecostalism is important to
understand how it engages with democracy and the perceived threats it attributes to
democracy. Any localized debate about religion and democracy is configured by the
transnational nature of both religion and democracy. The ongoing debates about religious
freedom and belief are perhaps the most evident manifestation of this transnational
movement. Sometimes what appears to be a local situation is in fact part of a
transnational mobilization. Perhaps a concrete example of this in Brazil is the ongoing
(and sometimes fractious) debate about the place of God in political life: Deus acima de
tudo, Brasil acima de todos. Alternatively, even the fear amongst Pentecostals of the threat of
communism16. It is important to remember that these local manifestations and debates
actually form part of transnational religious and political movements 17.
The second characteristic – that of massified religion – is also important.
Pentecostalism is frequently, although not exclusively, experienced as a popular and
populist religion and a socio-cultural value system. The massified Pentecostal movement
also affects other chistianities, which are not necessarily Pentecostal, with Roman
Catholicism and Protestantism in Latin America being a case in point. Some have argued
that christianities in Latin America are undergoing a process of Pentecostalization
(CAMPOS, 2002). This process of Pentecostalization is experienced as the massification
of a certain kind of religious culture. Some scholars, notably Gideon Alencar, have
identified it as religious culture, which is anti-Roman Catholic, and anti-democratic
(ALENCAR, 2005)18. This kind of massified religious experience in Brazil has important
consequences when we consider religion and democracy.
For example, all of those participating in the groups advocated separation of
Church and State as necessary in Brazil. In part, this is perhaps a reflection of the popular
(and scholarly) misconception in Brazil that democracy always requires a strict separation
of state and religion. Alfred Stepan is right to draw attention to this misconception.
However, in the interviews and conversations with participants about this strict
16 Anti-communism was a strong feeling amongst participants. As the weeks passed, increasingly
certain participants were addressed as ‘comrade’ by other group members when identified as
engaging with agendas perceived to be in the human rights field, or associated with left-wing
political ideas.
17 It is important not to homogenize Pentecostals and Pentecostalism. However, the reflections in
this text are derived directly from the interviews and conversations with participants, which did
demonstrate a certain massified religious experience, sometimes associated with fundamentalism.
18 It also has strong anti-intellectual aspects, although Alencar does not directly address this.
[ 329 ]
separation, other elements came to the fore. The strict separation advocated by
participants owed more to feelings of anti-Roman Catholicism than necessarily support
per se for laicité.
When probed further about models of government, the majority of participants
suggested that the only biblical form of government, and therefore the only form of
government in line with the will of God, is a theocracy19. Obviously, there is little
evidence of systematic reflection amongst participants about how to reconcile theocracy
with laicité. It was surprising how effortlessly a number of participants moved between an
articulation of strict separation (laicité) and a theocracy as the preferred model.
Perhaps by interpreting laicité through the lens of a massified anti-Roman
Catholic religious culture can help to explain this apparently incongruous political
comprehension of participants. As mentioned earlier, it is certainly possible to interpret
laicité as a way of limiting, controlling and even excluding the Roman Catholic Church
from its traditional influence on the politics and culture of Brazil. In this sense,
participants are not articulating a position in favor of laicité, nor are they articulating a
position in favor of Charles Taylor’s suggestion of a neutral nation-state. Instead,
participants advocated laicité as a policy of statecraft to favor other religions20 at the
expense of the Roman Catholic Church. The participants, in favoring another religion,
are also not assuming a position of favoring other religions per se in a context of religious
pluralism. They are assuming a position of the nation-state favoring my religion at the
expense of the Roman Catholic Church. Understood in this way, the nation-state
becomes an ‘instrument in God’s hand to fulfill God’s will’. We can call this a theocratic-
laicité.
The second misconception identified by Alfred Stepan is that Christianity,
particularly Western Christianity, is tolerant. In the global literature on Pentecostalism,
there is a debate about whether it is in fact ‘Western’. However, the leading scholars in
Brazil side with an interpretation that roots Pentecostalism in the tradition of the
Protestant Reformation (normally the so-called radical Reformation), the Protestant
missionary movement (normally the pietistic revival movements), and North American
socio-cultural values (normally WASP, racist and fundamentalist) (MENDONÇA &
VELASQUES FILHO, 1990)21. This Western root of Pentecostalism exposes it to the
19 I do not propose to discuss the hermeneutics of this reading of the Bible by participants. That
would merit a full discussion on its own.
20 See earlier note about religion and church.
21 This understanding is not restricted to scholars in Brazil. The Assembly of God Church, perhaps
the most influential Pentecostal church in Brazil, assumes this position in its Declaration of Faith
produced by its theological committee and approved by its leadership (SILVA, 2019).
[ 330 ]
practice of Western Christianity’s intolerance. Alfred Stepan notes that part of the
intolerance in Western Christianity is demonstrated by its ‘multivocal’ approach to
democracy (STEPAN, 2014, p. 270). From the 16th century onwards, Western
Christianity continued to display anti-democratic tendencies. Indeed, in the case of the
Roman Catholic Church, it was only with the Vatican II (1962-1965) that the church
finally came down decidedly in favor of democracy.
The anti-democratic nature of Pentecostalism – the theocratic form of
government as the only biblical form in line with the will of God, as expressed by
participants – is worth exploring in light of this ‘Western’ legacy of intolerance. It is
important to note that intolerance is not intrinsic to Pentecostalism, but is a legacy of its
radical reformation, pietistic, WASP, racist and fundamentalist roots in Western
Christianity’s story of intolerance. Moreover, in the specific case of Brazilian
Pentecostalism, it is also important to note that it massified during the military
dictatorship in the twentieth century. It is clear from scholarship on the period of the
military dictatorship that some churches thrived, while others were persecuted. In
general, Pentecostalism thrived and responded positively to the military dictatorship’s
‘civil religion’ built on ‘family values’22. Interestingly participants all identified a recent
sermon from pulpits about ‘the family’; none could recall ever having heard a sermon
about democracy.
However, as Alencar rightly notes, Pentecostalism grows from an ecclesiological
model that should favor democracy: congregationalism (ALENCAR, 2005, p. 54). Not all
‘Western Christianity’ was intolerant of democracy. Churches played and continue to play
important roles in democracy. In other nation-states, particularly the USA, this
congregational ecclesiology has been influential in creating a culture of democracy.
Alencar, as a sociologist of religion, is also quick to note that congregational
ecclesiologies, in addition to helping create a democratic culture, have aided the creation
of a popular or massified democratic culture reaching parts of the population normally
excluded from traditional democratic statecraft. What, we might ask in harmony with
Alencar, has gone wrong in Brazil?
Part of the answer comes from the participants themselves. While Brazilian
Pentecostalism formally operates a congregational ecclesiology, in practice each
congregation functions with an episcopal ecclesiology. “The Pastor decides”, was how
one participant put it. However, again this should not come as a surprise. Brazil’s politics
and culture has been shaped and influenced by Roman Catholicism, and therefore an
22For a study about the civil religion of the Brazilian military dictatorship, see: AZEVEDO, Thales
de. A religion civil brasileira: um instrumento político. Petrópolis: Vozes, 1981
[ 331 ]
episcopal ecclesiology23. The institutions of state are, largely, Roman Catholic influenced
institutions of state. Popular culture has the same influences. For a religious movement –
indigenous or imported – to survive and thrive in Brazil, it needs to adapt to this Roman
Catholic context. Brazilian Pentecostalism is congregational in theory, and frequently
episcopal in practice. This enables it to fit the ‘sabe com quem está falando?’ culture described
by Roberto da Matta (1997, p. 193), a culture which, it should be observed, is both
interpersonal and impersonal, and deeply rooted in authoritarianism.
The third of the misconceptions outlined by Alfred Stepan is that religion has
no place in political processes and instead consensus is built on philosophical shared
principles. This is the classic position set out by John Rawls (1996). The Rawlsian
position is not without contestation amongst scholars, indeed, to some degree, the
ongoing discussion of his proposal sustains whole fields of scholarly activity, such as so-
called public theology. Moreover and perhaps more importantly, the Rawlsian position is
not without contestation in contemporary political processes in Brazil. Alfred Stepan
built his ‘twin tolerations’ in dialogue with the Rawlsian principle and, in Brazil, it is
precisely the pressure on the ‘twin tolerations’ and the presence of a minority, but
massified Pentecostalism, that brings democracy into dispute.
The ‘twin tolerations’ are a consideration of the necessary boundaries of
freedom between an elected government and religious groups, and the necessary
boundaries of freedom of religious individuals and groups from government. In Brazil’s
most recent Presidential election, and in the practice of its subsequent executive and
legislature, the necessary boundaries suggested by Stepan are clearly under pressure, or
being reconfigured to reflect the Brazil of the twenty-first century. Oftentimes it has been
the judiciary which has stepped in to ‘police’ the necessary boundaries. This in itself is
another sign of the transnational nature of religious and political movements whereby we
are seeing an emerging trend of a judicialization of politics in the attempts to maintain the
‘twin tolerations’ and laicité a la Rawls.
The participants clearly articulated a preference for an elected government in
harmony with their socio-cultural values. However, there was not a consensus about the
necessary boundary of freedom exercised by both government and Pentecostals. One
participant asked, should churches and church people be involved in elected politics at
all, especially when using the name of the church in an election campaign? Another
23 Indeed a large part of the shift in Roman Catholic ecclesiology following Vatican II, with
Comunidades Ecclesiais de Base (CEBs), and the work of theologians like Leonardo Boff, is an attempt
to deploy a Protestant ecclesiology – specifically along the lines of a congregational model. It is
therefore no surprise that CEBs, with this congregational ecclesiology, were so important to the
redemocratisation process in Brazil.
[ 332 ]
questioned the use of religious language by elected legislative members, and indeed some
government ministers in the exercise of their duties. Interestingly – at least publicly in the
interviews and conversations – no participant related these questions to the figure of the
President of the Republic, that is to say either his use of Pentecostals for electoral
purposes nor his use of religious language in official communications. It seems that the
participant Pentecostals are aware of the ‘twin tolerations’ within democracy, but reject
the Rawlsian proposition of no religion and therefore a philosophical basis for common
values. It is also worth noting that the current figure of the President of the Republic is
exempted from the necessary boundaries of the ‘twin tolerations’ by participants, and is
positively appreciated for contesting the Rawlsian proposition and bringing a religious
bias to common values.
Another factor worth mentioning in passing in relation to the ‘twin tolerations’
and the rejection of the Rawlsian proposition is the anti-intellectualism of the
Pentecostalism of the participants. This anti-intellectual undercurrent in Brazil is an
important consideration in reflections on religion and democracy. Gideon Alencar credits
Pentecostalism with helping to reduce illiteracy in urban peripheries, and this is certainly
important (2005, p. 53). Democracy depends on literacy. However, among the
participants in my groups not one person was able to identify a Pentecostal church that
has literacy classes. Moreover, participants shared that the Bible was at the center of
religious practice, particularly memorization. Memorization is a well-known technique for
illiterate adults to negotiate the signs and symbols of modern urban life. It is based on
recognition and recollection more than understanding. The experience of the participants
echoed the description by Ruben Alves in his book, Religião e Repressão, when he describes
a theology of ‘affirmative propositions’ appropriately memorized and repeated.
This anti-intellectualism, coupled with illiteracy and a popular religious culture
that operates through the memorization and repetition of ‘affirmative propositions’, is
precisely the point of friction in the ‘twin tolerations’ in Brazil. The use of religious
language and symbols – Pentecostal in this case – by elected government demonstrates a
willingness to engage anti-intellectual, illiterate popular religion in the construction of
common values of shared signs and symbols. Obviously, the signs and symbols used by
elected government need to be those memorized and repeated by Pentecostals in the
exercise of their necessary religious freedom. From outside this Pentecostalism, and this
specific form of operation of ‘twin tolerations’, it is all too easy to deride the
Pentecostalization of democracy through the elision of massified religion – church,
popular religion and socio-cultural values – with Western Christianity’s practice of
intolerance. The major argument against the presence of religion in politics, and
[ 333 ]
particularly monotheistic religions, is their supposed epistemic intolerance towards

others.
These debates have been conducted on the ground identified by Alfred Stepan
as the fourth misconception, namely, that democracy requires and is strengthened by the
decreasing presence and practice of religion. This perception and argument derived from
a European Enlightenment tradition, which sees religion as irrational, and therefore
dangerous, and inferior, therefore to be overcome. It strongly underlies theories of
religion in the fields of sociology and anthropology, as well as the social sciences more
broadly24. However, many scholars have argued against this misconception. Perhaps one
of the leading examples is Miroslav Volf. Noting that religious people generally act from
religious convictions, he demonstrates that the Rawlsian proposition is untenable in a
world where the majority of people are religious. A major shift needed in democratic
polities, argues Volf, is how to distinguish between tolerant and intolerant religions –
between religions that contribute to human flourishing and those that are malfunctioning
totalitarianisms (to use Volf’s own language) (2011). The participants demonstrated a
positioning in line with Stepan’s ‘twin tolerations’ and Volf’s observation that there can
be no compulsion in religion. According to Volf, religion grounded in the ‘golden rule’ –
to treat others as you would wish to be treated yourself or the ‘love of neighbour’ in
monotheistic religions – commits religion to pluralism and the exercise of the necessary
freedoms in democracy.
One final observation from the participants was about democracy itself. ‘We
don’t believe in democracy’ was a widely held opinion. I would like to explore this a little.
To do so, I would like to restate some of the contributions from participants and from
the scholars. According to scholars, ‘belief in democracy’ is fundamental to its
functioning. The increasing concerns around ‘democratic deficits’ point to fears about the
ebbing of belief in the model. However, when scholars discuss belief in democracy and
attempts to reduce democratic deficit they do so generally on the philosophical basis
outlined by Rawls. In other words, belief in democracy is about the philosophical basis of
common values that include democracy, human rights and the common good.
The participant Pentecostals do not express their lack of belief in democracy in
these terms. Put simply, the Pentecostal participants do not believe in democracy because
it is not a biblical form of government, and therefore it is not God’s will. At one level,
this observation is quite correct. We do not find democracy in the Bible, at least not in
24 It is worth noting that Brazil’s public universities are founded on this concept of the exclusion of
religion. While nowadays, there are many scholars of religion in public universities and flourishing
fields of study, structurally, Brazil’s public universities continue to look at Theology & Religious
Studies with suspicion.
[ 334 ]
the form that it is practiced today. However, this does not necessarily mean that it is not
biblical. The question of God’s will, as any theologian will tell you, is very difficult to
discern. A classic contribution from the political theology of Oliver O’Donovan might
help us (1996). O’Donovan notes that Christianity has no specific preference for a polity,
neither democracy nor theocracy are inevitable in Christian theology. Likewise,
Christianity has lived under, and survived, many different kinds of polity. Some have
allowed Christianity to thrive, while others have brought persecution. There is no
blueprint; there is no idealized Christian polity that could ever be biblical or fulfilling
God’s will, in the sense articulated by participant Pentecostals.
The position of Pentecostal participants about not believing in democracy, and
O’Donovan’s scholarly sophistication in searching for the theological roots of politics,
brings a new challenge to debates about religion and democracy in Brazil. Can Brazilian
democracy make the religious argument for democracy to encourage Pentecostals, and
others, to believe in democracy? The practice of democracy depends on belief in
democracy, and religious people generally act upon religious convictions. As Brazil
continues to navigate the ‘twin tolerations’, and to consolidate and deepen its sometimes
fragile democracy, the twin threats to its democracy are military intervention and religious
revindication. Can Brazilian democracy find a way to bring both military and religion
under civilian control and into the democratic process? This is a huge challenge in light of
my interviews and conversations with Pentecostals in Vitoria, ES. I would argue that the
nation-state now needs to be able to make the religious argument for belief in democracy.
If not, perhaps Brazil risks authoritarianism and theocracy.
A Coda by way of Conclusion

Democracy and laicité are both equally important, but they are not dependent on
each other, as Alfred Stepan has reminded us. In Brazil, the reconfiguration of religion
and democracy posit the question as to whether, as important as they are together up to
this point in Brazilian history, they are equally tenable in their current form for Brazil’s
future? This kind of discussion places us before the social theory of Roberto Mangabeira
Unger, particularly his theories of ‘institutional imagination’ (2005) which are concerned
with a deepening of democracy, an expansion of opportunity and an overcoming of false
institutional determinism. For democracy to deepen and expand in Brazil, institutional
imagination is urgently needed to help its massified religions – churches, popular religion
and socio-culture values – believe in democracy. It is not clear that Brazil’s nation-state
structure, inherited from laicité and lusotropicalism, is fully open to what Stepan has called
the variety of democratic possibilities in the twenty-first century. This article, drawing on
[ 335 ]
Field Notes amongst Pentecostals, sets out some of the misconceptions, frictions and
possibilities for religion and democracy in Brazil.
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ALENCAR, Gideon. Protestantismo Tupiniquim: hipótese sobre a (não) contribuição
evangélica a cultura brasileira. São Paulo: Arte Editorial, 2005.
ALVES, Rubem. Religião e repressão. São Paulo: Loyola, 2005.
ATENCIO, Rebecca, SCHNEIDER, Nina & SCHNEIDER, Ann. M. “Introduction:
Special Section on Dictatorship and its Legacies in Brazil” In Bulletin of Latin American
Research. Vol. 37. No. 1 January 2018, p. 3-4.
AZEVEDO, Thales de. A religião civil brasileira: um instrumento político. Petrópolis:
Vozes, 1981.
CAMPOS, Bernardo. Da Reforma Protestante à Pentecostalidade da Igreja. São Leopoldo:
Sinodal, 2002.
DAHL, Roberto. Polyarchy: participation and opposition. New Haven: Yale University
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DA MATTA, Roberto. Carnavais, Malandros e Heróis: para uma sociologia do dilema
brasileiro. São Paulo: Rocco, 1997.
FREYRE, Gilberto. O Luso e o Tropical. São Paulo: É Realizações, 2010.
LAIRD, Andrew & MILLER, Nicola. Antiquities and Classical Traditions in Latin America.
London: Willey-Blackwell, 2018.
LIPHART, Arend. Patterns of Democracy: government forms and performance in thirty-six
countries. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999.
LINZ, Juan. J. & STEPAN, Alfred. Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation:
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MENDONÇA, Antônio Gouvêa & VELASQUES FILHO, Prócoro. Introdução ao
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CPAD, 2019.
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[ 337 ]

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Revista Brasileira de História das Religiões. ANPUH, Ano XIII, n.

Field Notes from Brazil: We don’t believe in Democracy

Abstract: There is increasing attention to religion and democracy in scholarly research in

Notas de uma investigação de campo: não cremos na democracia

Notas de una investigación de campo: no creemos en la democracia

1 Professor de Teologia e Ciências das Religiões na Faculdade Unida da Unida. Email:

última campaña presidencial y la toma de posesión de un presidente "terriblemente

Recebido em 20/11/2020- Aprovado em 04/12/2020

Religion and Democracy in Latin America

the point of state neutrality is precisely to avoid favoring or

Taylor is attempting to redraw the sometimes-excessive anti-religious nature of

possibilities of state-religion relations (a broader category in the twenty-first century than

Field Notes from Brazil

November 2020 by videoconference. The interviews and conversations were always

Pentecostalization of both Protestantism and Popular Religion (2002). Historic Protestants –

consideration of religion and democracy. A transnational religious movement, like

particularly monotheistic religions, is their supposed epistemic intolerance towards

A Coda by way of Conclusion

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