J. Pawlikowski (red.), Ciało ludzkie w badaniach naukowych i praktyce medycznej. Warszawa: PZWL, s. 343–364, 2020
W ciągu ostatnich kliku dekad wzrosło zainteresowanie wielu państw utworzeniem biobanków. Wynika ... more W ciągu ostatnich kliku dekad wzrosło zainteresowanie wielu państw utworzeniem biobanków. Wynika to z rozpoznania ich potencjału w zakresie zdrowia publicznego i nadziei, że rozwój badań przyczyni się do poznania patogenezy wielu chorób i opracowania nowych terapii oraz rozwoju medycy personalizowanej. Koncentracja na badaniach może jednak prowadzić do umniejszenia znaczenia udziału opinii publicznej w organizacji i funkcjonowaniu biobanków. Tymczasem nie są one możliwe bez stałego udziału dużej liczby dawców, którzy przekażą próbki swojego materiału biologicznego na badania. Stąd poznanie opinii publicznej oraz ocena poziomu zaufania i wsparcia dla idei biobankowania, a także czynników wpływających na gotowość do przekazania próbek jest niezbędne dla planowania skutecznej współpracy z potencjalnymi dawcami i budowy społecznego zaufania do biobanków. Stąd celem raportu jest dokonanie przeglądu istniejących badań na temat postaw społecznych wobec biobankowania ludzkiego materiały biologicznego. Analiza 64 publikacji pozwoliła wyodrębnić kilka najczęściej pojawiających się wątków: 1) wiedza na temat biobanków, 2) opinie o biobankowaniu; 3) gotowość do oddania próbek, 4) motywacje dawców, 5) percepcja korzyści i ryzyka, 6) preferowany rodzaju zgody, 7) kwestia własności próbek, 8) zaufanie do instytucji gromadzących dane, oraz 9) cechy społeczno-demograficznych potencjalnych dawców.
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Papers by Jan Domaradzki
communication as the ‘real’ science. Fictional filmic representations of geneticists portrayed in 145 films reveal that popular culture (re)constructs common images and stereotypes of scientists. While the most prevalent negative stereotypes depicted in films include: the evil demiurge, the egoist without morals, the nerdy geneticist, and the capitalist who betrays the ethos of science, over the last few decades films tend to construct more positive images of geneticists: the objective researcher, the practical expert, the bioethicist, the caring physician and the dedicated idealist. Additionally, although molecular biology depicted in films largely represents a man’s world, especially since the 1990s, the figure of the woman geneticist is on the rise. The coexistence of multiple representations of geneticists in films demonstrate that cinematic images of geneticists constitute an important narrative tool that helps moviemakers in reconstructing the social promises and perils related to biotechnology. Thus, films should be understood as a site for the examination of how popular culture fuels hopes and anxieties related to the scientific revolution that permeate culture and how these hopes and
fears change over time from horror to hope and from fiction to reality.
vaccination rates. Support for Eurosceptic and anti-establishment parties was a strong predictor of persistent vaccine hesitancy. Ideological divergence from the mainstream appeared to reinforce vaccine hesitancy, and this relationship remained highly relevant even when controlling for possible time or spatial lag. Markers of social inclusion and social capital—voter turnout and employment rate—remained statistically significant even when controlling for time lag, thus implying clear relevance of trust in the public message. The share of the population with higher education remained a highly relevant factor as well, though in the 20–39 age bracket it predicted a higher vaccination rate, while in all older brackets it was a negative predictor—this implies that those people had already made up their minds. Delaying vaccination seems predominantly explainable by political views, as well as social exclusion and the historical specificity of sub-regions. On a regional level, there was actually a paradoxical Spearmans Rho correlation (0.641) between the share of population refusing mandatory vaccination for kids and the percentage of people receiving a COVID-19 vaccine, which further undermines the idea that overall observed vaccine hesitancy was in any meaningful way affected by anti-vaccine movements.
communication as the ‘real’ science. Fictional filmic representations of geneticists portrayed in 145 films reveal that popular culture (re)constructs common images and stereotypes of scientists. While the most prevalent negative stereotypes depicted in films include: the evil demiurge, the egoist without morals, the nerdy geneticist, and the capitalist who betrays the ethos of science, over the last few decades films tend to construct more positive images of geneticists: the objective researcher, the practical expert, the bioethicist, the caring physician and the dedicated idealist. Additionally, although molecular biology depicted in films largely represents a man’s world, especially since the 1990s, the figure of the woman geneticist is on the rise. The coexistence of multiple representations of geneticists in films demonstrate that cinematic images of geneticists constitute an important narrative tool that helps moviemakers in reconstructing the social promises and perils related to biotechnology. Thus, films should be understood as a site for the examination of how popular culture fuels hopes and anxieties related to the scientific revolution that permeate culture and how these hopes and
fears change over time from horror to hope and from fiction to reality.
vaccination rates. Support for Eurosceptic and anti-establishment parties was a strong predictor of persistent vaccine hesitancy. Ideological divergence from the mainstream appeared to reinforce vaccine hesitancy, and this relationship remained highly relevant even when controlling for possible time or spatial lag. Markers of social inclusion and social capital—voter turnout and employment rate—remained statistically significant even when controlling for time lag, thus implying clear relevance of trust in the public message. The share of the population with higher education remained a highly relevant factor as well, though in the 20–39 age bracket it predicted a higher vaccination rate, while in all older brackets it was a negative predictor—this implies that those people had already made up their minds. Delaying vaccination seems predominantly explainable by political views, as well as social exclusion and the historical specificity of sub-regions. On a regional level, there was actually a paradoxical Spearmans Rho correlation (0.641) between the share of population refusing mandatory vaccination for kids and the percentage of people receiving a COVID-19 vaccine, which further undermines the idea that overall observed vaccine hesitancy was in any meaningful way affected by anti-vaccine movements.