Papers by Michal Kotnarowski
The One Percent Problem: Muslims in the West and the Rise of the New Populists (The Brookings Institution's report), 2019
Public opinion polls suggest that Poles hold unfavorable attitudes toward Muslims in general and ... more Public opinion polls suggest that Poles hold unfavorable attitudes toward Muslims in general and oppose accepting refugees from the Middle East and Africa. Attitudes toward Muslims, in general, appear to be stable and constant over time. However, opinions on receiving refugees are, at least in part, the product of elite politics and democratic competition and have changed markedly since the 2015 electoral campaign when PiS began emphasizing its opposition to accepting refugees.
The PiS government’s policy to refuse Muslim refugees corresponds with voter attitudes (while also influencing those very attitudes). The government is unlikely to moderate its position, because of the competition from the more radical right. PiS is afraid that other right-wing parties will capture those voters who are against accepting refugees in Poland. PiS’s fear of losing part of its constituency is even more obvious in the case of economic immigration. On the one hand, PiS, in light of its responsibilities in government, supports economic immigration because of the country’s economic needs. On the other hand, PiS officially tends to avoid taking a clear position on the issue in fear of losing electoral support. Furthermore, the radical Right sharply criticizes what they see as PiS’ silent support of immigration.
The Catholic Church is far more open on refugee-related issues than right-wing parties. And here there is an important dissonance: although the right proclaims attachment to the Catholic Church, voters of right-wing parties are more likely to follow their political party over the Church and oppose accepting refugees.
Right-wing activists and supporters criticized Western European societies for secularization and abandonment of Christian values, as well as for striving for further political integration. Here, we can see how the question of Muslims in Poland is not just a “domestic” issue for Poles but takes on broader significance in light of EU membership and pressure from EU structures to accept a greater number of (Muslim) refugees. Not surprisingly, then, PiS as well as most other right-wing parties are in favor of a EU made up of strong nation-states.
Across the board, Polish right respondents expressed fear of accepting Muslim refugees due to expected problems with assimilation. Such fear is intertwined with Islam as a religion and—in their perception—as a political ideology fundamentally at odds with aspects of Christian culture. All of these perceptions have developed in the context of a country that, itself, has very few Muslims. This is Poland’s paradox: Unlike in a number of other European countries, where Muslim share of the population has increased, anti-Muslim sentiment has moved to the center of national political debates without Muslims.
Warsaw Studies in Politics and Society, 2015
This article is a case study of a single election in a single country focusing on the economic th... more This article is a case study of a single election in a single country focusing on the economic theory of voting during the 2011 parliamentary election in Poland. These are very specific elections, first because of the context – global economic crisis, and second, because for the first time after collapse of communism the incumbent party retained power by winning a second election in a row. In our analyses, we tested classic economic theory of voting hypotheses. Briefly, the hypotheses are derived from the reward/punishment model, in which it is assumed that satisfied with economic condition voters support governing parties, and dissatisfied voters favour opposition parties. The empirical tests are grounded in two alternative analytical approaches: the discrete choice and the propensity to vote models. In our analyses we use multiple regression models, in which the effects of the perceptions of economy factor on vote choice is controlled by several other independents. Main hypotheses drawn from the theory of economic voting are confirmed in our analyses. Positive assessment of the economy increases the probability of voting for incumbent parties. On the other hand, voters dissatisfied with the economic situation tend to vote for the main opposition party.
Measurement of the electoral mobilization of ethnic parties has posed a considerable challenge to... more Measurement of the electoral mobilization of ethnic parties has posed a considerable challenge to those performing comparative research on the political mobilization of ethnic groups. To address this issue, we propose indicators that estimate the electoral mobilization of ethnic parties by combining administrative and survey data. Specifically, we propose two measures: an absolute one, fully isolable from context, and a relative one, which corrects for turnouts. Furthermore, we show that a particular indicator based entirely on more widely available administrative data is valid when a narrow definition of ethnic parties is applied. Our indicators for the electoral mobilization of ethnic parties allow for valid comparisons across ethnic parties in different countries and regions at different points in time. We expect these new indicators to trigger further comparative studies on ethnic parties.
Among the wide range of theories explaining why some people vote and others do not, one is recent... more Among the wide range of theories explaining why some people vote and others do not, one is recently gaining particular popularity. This is the theory of voting as a habit (e.g. Plutzer, 2002; Franklin, 2004; Hooghe, 2004). The empirical evidence supporting this theory covers only Western democracies, so the following question might be asked: is this pattern universal? In the case of old democracies, voting is a habit acquired gradually in a process which starts at the moment of the very first election one can cast the ballot. In new democracies the situation is different, as we can pinpoint the starting moment (first democratic election), which is the same for different voters and thus different age cohorts. In this paper we investigate voting as a habit in new democracies, using data from the Polish National Election Study. We find that voting in Poland has some habitual aspect; repeated voting brings about a (sort of) habit, which has an intrinsic, irreducible effect on voter turnout. We also find that habit of voting is formed likewise in all age cohorts.
Media Appearances by Michal Kotnarowski
Il Regno - attualità e documenti , 2020
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Papers by Michal Kotnarowski
The PiS government’s policy to refuse Muslim refugees corresponds with voter attitudes (while also influencing those very attitudes). The government is unlikely to moderate its position, because of the competition from the more radical right. PiS is afraid that other right-wing parties will capture those voters who are against accepting refugees in Poland. PiS’s fear of losing part of its constituency is even more obvious in the case of economic immigration. On the one hand, PiS, in light of its responsibilities in government, supports economic immigration because of the country’s economic needs. On the other hand, PiS officially tends to avoid taking a clear position on the issue in fear of losing electoral support. Furthermore, the radical Right sharply criticizes what they see as PiS’ silent support of immigration.
The Catholic Church is far more open on refugee-related issues than right-wing parties. And here there is an important dissonance: although the right proclaims attachment to the Catholic Church, voters of right-wing parties are more likely to follow their political party over the Church and oppose accepting refugees.
Right-wing activists and supporters criticized Western European societies for secularization and abandonment of Christian values, as well as for striving for further political integration. Here, we can see how the question of Muslims in Poland is not just a “domestic” issue for Poles but takes on broader significance in light of EU membership and pressure from EU structures to accept a greater number of (Muslim) refugees. Not surprisingly, then, PiS as well as most other right-wing parties are in favor of a EU made up of strong nation-states.
Across the board, Polish right respondents expressed fear of accepting Muslim refugees due to expected problems with assimilation. Such fear is intertwined with Islam as a religion and—in their perception—as a political ideology fundamentally at odds with aspects of Christian culture. All of these perceptions have developed in the context of a country that, itself, has very few Muslims. This is Poland’s paradox: Unlike in a number of other European countries, where Muslim share of the population has increased, anti-Muslim sentiment has moved to the center of national political debates without Muslims.
Media Appearances by Michal Kotnarowski
The PiS government’s policy to refuse Muslim refugees corresponds with voter attitudes (while also influencing those very attitudes). The government is unlikely to moderate its position, because of the competition from the more radical right. PiS is afraid that other right-wing parties will capture those voters who are against accepting refugees in Poland. PiS’s fear of losing part of its constituency is even more obvious in the case of economic immigration. On the one hand, PiS, in light of its responsibilities in government, supports economic immigration because of the country’s economic needs. On the other hand, PiS officially tends to avoid taking a clear position on the issue in fear of losing electoral support. Furthermore, the radical Right sharply criticizes what they see as PiS’ silent support of immigration.
The Catholic Church is far more open on refugee-related issues than right-wing parties. And here there is an important dissonance: although the right proclaims attachment to the Catholic Church, voters of right-wing parties are more likely to follow their political party over the Church and oppose accepting refugees.
Right-wing activists and supporters criticized Western European societies for secularization and abandonment of Christian values, as well as for striving for further political integration. Here, we can see how the question of Muslims in Poland is not just a “domestic” issue for Poles but takes on broader significance in light of EU membership and pressure from EU structures to accept a greater number of (Muslim) refugees. Not surprisingly, then, PiS as well as most other right-wing parties are in favor of a EU made up of strong nation-states.
Across the board, Polish right respondents expressed fear of accepting Muslim refugees due to expected problems with assimilation. Such fear is intertwined with Islam as a religion and—in their perception—as a political ideology fundamentally at odds with aspects of Christian culture. All of these perceptions have developed in the context of a country that, itself, has very few Muslims. This is Poland’s paradox: Unlike in a number of other European countries, where Muslim share of the population has increased, anti-Muslim sentiment has moved to the center of national political debates without Muslims.