Department of Philosophy

Cílem této práce je rozebrat možnosti argumentu holandské sázky ve prospěch probabilismu a stanovit jeho meze. Existuje mnoho podob argumentu, proto se nejprve budu věnovat popisu argumentu v jeho klasické podobě. Následně je podroben kritice ve třech oblastech: (1) problémy behaviorismu, (2) užitku peněz, (3) vztah koherence, jisté ztráty a racionality. Zásadní je dle mého především třetí oblast týkající se neschopnosti jednoduše propojit probabilistickou nekoherenci stupňů přesvědčení s jistou ztrátou a pragmatickou racionalitou. Věnuji se třem současným reinterpretacím argumentu ve prospěch probabilistických norem (Armendt, Howson, Christensen), přičemž v textu docházím k závěru, že ani jedna z nich není uspokojivá. Selhávají v řešení problémů (Armendt, Christensen), nebo neříkají nic zajímavého ve prospěch probabilismu (Howson). Proto se domnívám, že rozbor argumentu především ukazuje, že pragmatická obhajoba epistemických norem racionality, jako je ta v argumentu holandské sázky, není pro probabilismus schůdnou cestou. Závěr se snaží nastínit, proč tomu tak je.

The aim of this study is to consider possibilities of a Dutch Book Argument in favor of Probabilism and to determine its limits. There are many versions of the argument; therefore at first I analyze a description of a classic version of the argument. After that it sheds light on three problematic areas of the argument: (1) problems of behaviorism, (2) an utility of money, (3) relation between a coherence, a sure lose and rationality. The significant is mainly the third area regarding a failure to create a simple connection between probabilistic coherence of degrees of belief, a concept of sure lose and pragmatic rationality. I consider three contemporary reinterpretations of the argument in favor of probabilistic norms (Ardment, Howson, Christensen), and I conclude that neither of them is acceptable. They fail to solve the problems (Armendt, Christensen) or they don't speak in favor of Probabilism (Howson). Therefore I think the analysis of the argument primarily shows that prag...

Tato diplomová práce nazvaná „Common sense nebo vědecký realismus? Debata Thomase Reida a Josepha Priestleyho“ se věnuje doktrinálnímu sporu mezi Thomasem Reidem a Josephem Priestleym. Cílem práce je rekonstrukce hlavních argumentů této debaty, která je v dějinách filosofie stále opomíjená, i přesto, že na jedné straně představuje vlivnou kritiku materialismu a determinismu a na straně druhé jednu z prvních kritik pojmu common sense. Záměrem je také poukázat na zajímavosti této debaty. Především na fakt, že ačkoli mají oba filosofové rozdílné doktríny, tak tyto doktríny vycházejí ze stejného základu a rozdílná interpretace tohoto základu, jímž jsou Regulae philosophandi Isaaca Newtona, ovlivnila filosofii jak jednoho, tak i druhého a měla vliv na celou diskusi. / The present diploma thesis titled „Common sense or scientific realism? Debate of Thomas Reid and Joseph Priestley“ deals with the doctrinal dispute between Thomas Reid and Joseph Priestley. The objective of this paper is a reconstruction of the main arguments of this debate, which is still neglected in the history of philosophy, despite the fact that on the one hand, it shows an influential critique of materialism and determinism, and on the other hand, it presents one of the first instances of criticism of the concept of common sense. The work also aims to highlight interesting points of this debate; especially the fact that although both philosophers have different doctrines, these doctrines are based on the same foundation. Different interpretations of this foundation, which are Isaac Newton’s Regulae philosophandi, influenced their philosophy and had an impact on the whole debate.

The notion of common sense has been widely used in everyday speech and had its place within numerous philosophical doctrines in the past. One of the most comprehensive analysis of common sense was done by Thomas Reid. The problem is that Reid’s characteristics of common sense very often differ and that is why they are in most cases confusing. The aim of this paper is to organize Reid’s definitions of common sense and to show where we can find inconsistencies. Emphasis will be placed on distinction between common sense and principles of common sense and if Reid’s doctrine of common sense serves its purpose – to be an argument against the scepticism of David Hume.

Most of us perceive Hume as a sceptic regarding objective existence of causal powers or a necessary connexion between cause and effect, as well as a sceptic about objective existence of any secret powers of nature. However, in recent decades, there are many articles and books that with this traditional interpretation diverge. These interpreters, including in particular Galen Strawson, John P. Wright, Peter Kail and to some extent also Simon Blackburn, denote Hume a realist regarding causal powers in nature, so-called capital-C Causes. This new interpretation is being called The New Hume Debate, according to the book, which maps fundamental articles of this debate. The aim of this paper is not only to provide a  general characteristic of this new interpretation and its main arguments, but especially to highlight some problems which the new interpretation has to face.

Resume: Most of us perceive Hume as a sceptic regarding objective existence of causal powers or a necessary connexion between cause and effect, as well as a sceptic about objective existence of any secret powers of nature. However, in recent decades, there are many articles and books that with this traditional interpretation diverge. These interpreters, including in particular Galen Strawson, John P. Wright, Peter Kail and to some extent also Simon Blackburn, denote Hume a realist regarding causal powers in nature, so-called capital-C Causes. This new interpretation is being called The New Hume Debate, according to the book, which maps fundamental articles of this debate. The aim of this paper is not only to provide a general characteristic of this new interpretation and its main arguments, but especially to highlight some problems which the new interpretation has to face.

Článek se snaží přiblížit přístup Josepha Priestleyho ke zkoumání lidské mysli. Postupně jsou ukázány dva kroky, ve kterých Priestley mění svůj pohled na hmotu a ducha a dochází k materialismu. V prvním kroku redefinuje pojem hmoty a přisuzuje hmotě zcela nové vlastnosti – síly přitahování a odpuzování. V druhém kroku pomocí těchto nových vlastností vysvětluje schopnost vnímání a myšlení. V těchto krocích navíc využívá poznatky tehdejší přírodní filosofie, zejména mechaniky. Člověk a jeho mysl jsou podle Priestleyho součástí přírody. To znamená, že člověk a lidská mysl jsou určitým mechanismem, který pracuje podle přírodních zákonů a lze jej pomocí těchto zákonů také vysvětlit. / This article attempts to introduce Joseph Priestley's approach to the research of the human mind. It is demonstrated in two consecutive steps how Priestley changes his view of matter and spirit, and how he moves to materialism. In the first step, he redefines the notion of matter and gives it new attributes – the forces of attraction and repulsion. In the second step, using these new attributes, he explains the ability of perception and thinking. In these steps, he also uses findings of the contemporary natural philosophy, especially the mechanics. For Priestley, man and his mind are part of nature. This means that the man and the human mind are a certain mechanism that works according to natural laws and can also be explained by these laws.

The paper deals with Thomas Reid’s comments against Joseph Priestley’s materialism. Priestley’s mechanical materialism is based on the philosophy of Isaac Newton, especially Newton’s rules of reasoning. Priestley rejected substantive dualism and argumented in favor of a single material substance on the basis of these rules. The paper first presents the form of Priestley’s materialism and then analyzes the individual remarks of Reid. The emphasis is on the notions of truth and causality, which both philosophers interpret differently. The last part of the article analyzes whether Reid’s remarks are relevant or not.

The paper deals with Thomas Reid's comments against Joseph Priestley's materialism. Priestley's mechanical materialism is based on the philosophy of Isaac Newton, especially Newton's rules of reasoning. Priestley rejected substantive dualism and argumented in favor of a single material substance on the basis of these rules. The paper first presents the form of Priestley's materialism and then analyzes the individual remarks of Reid. The emphasis is on the notions of truth and causality, which both philosophers interpret differently. The last part of the article analyzes whether Reid's remarks are relevant or not.

David Hume (1711-1776) is often considered as a sceptic about the existence of causal powers or the necessary connection between cause and effect, and his work is interpreted in various books on the history of philosophy in this way. In the last century, however, new interpreters have emerged who are destroying this traditional image of Hume's philosophy. These philosophers, known as "The New Humeans", also consider Hume to be a sceptic, but not as to the objective existence of causal forces, but only as to the recognizability of those forces. The presented article deals with the main arguments of the new interpretation and connects them with Hume's work. The conclusion of the article presents our own argument on the issue.

This article attempts to introduce Joseph Priestley’s approach to the research of the human mind. It is demonstrated in two consecutive steps how Priestley changes his view of matter and spirit, and how he moves to materialism. In the first step, he redefines the notion of matter and gives it new attributes – the forces of attraction and repulsion. In the second step, using these new attributes, he explains the ability of perception and thinking. In these steps, he also uses findings of the contemporary natural philosophy, especially the mechanics. For Priestley, man and his mind are part of nature. This means that the man and the human mind are a certain mechanism that works according to natural laws and can also be explained by these laws.

This article deals with the previously discussed, yet still unresolved question: What was the relation of J. A. Comenius to the philosophical work of the Croatian philosopher Francesco Patrizi? Based on the analysis of their major works, De rerum humanarum emendatione consultatio catholica and Nova de universis philosophia, I have stated that Comenius took over Patrizi’s light metaphysics and its central concept – panaugia. Also, in the Comenius’s terminology or methodology the influence of Patrizi's thought can be clearly traced, while in his epistemology or selected theological conceptions this influence is only potential.

The paper deals with the teachings of the Czech thinker Petr Chelčický. The research focuses on his theologizing philosophy, which was rather neglected in the previous philosophical and historical works dealing with his thought. The author focuses on basic aspects of Chelčický’s teachings as his rejection of all forms of violence and the idea of Christocentrim. The main interest of the author is the analysis of the reception, de-viation or re-reception of Chelčický´s philosophical and theological thought from the first generation of the Unity of the Brethren to John Amos Comenius. According to the author, Comenius’ work can be interpreted as a completion of the triad reception (characteristic of the Czech context up to the mid-nineties of the 15th century) – de-viation (delimitated in fact by the 16th century and the first two decades of the following century) – analogy (being represented by the last bishop of the Unity of the Brethren).

This study follows the author’s previous research that pointed out to significant similarities between the philosophical conceptions of Francesco Patrizi and those of Jan Amos Comenius. If we admit that the contents of Patrizi’s greatest work Nova de universis philosophia did influence Comenius’s thought in some respect, it raises the question of when Jan Amos encountered Patrizi’s views. The question is the more topical when we consider that an indirect reference to Patrizi’s work can be found in Comenius’s treatise Conatuum pansophicorum dilucidatio, written several years before he travelled to London where, according to the present opinion of historians of philosophy, he became familiar with the contents of Nova de universis philosophia. The most probable mediator of Patrizi’s work is Comenius’s Herborn teacher Johann Heinrich Alsted. On the basis of an analysis of Alsted’s works we come to the conclusion that even though he knew Patrizi’s philosophical views, he took over and presented in his writings completely different ideas from those which later influenced Jan Amos Comenius.

The talk deals with the question of the reception of Franciscus Patricius and his philosophical work in early modern Central Europe, especially in two cases – of Jan Amos Comenius and his teacher Johann Heinrich Alsted. Based on the analysis of Nova de universis philosophia by Patricius and De rerum humanarum emendatione consultatio catholica by Comenius, I have earlier stated that Comenius’ work resembles that of Patricius in many aspects, which shows an obvious influence of the Croatian thinker. First and foremost there is the metaphysics of light and its central concept panaugia, which Comenius no doubt takes over from Patricius, whereas the reception of the concept further influenced his methodology, in which light features as a fundamental principle. If we accept that Comenius was strongly influenced by Patricius, we ought to establish when and how Comenius encountered Patricius’ views. Apparently, Johann Heinrich Alsted, Comenius’ teacher in Herborn, may be considered the mediator of Patricius’ work.

In Consultatio catholica man is presented as a being determined by its own and unique nature. 
Yet this nature is based on man’s free and unlimited will, in other words, on the unlimitedness of
man’s existence. Man is thus described as creatura indeterminata, in infinito infinite seipsam agens .
In his, from the terminological point of view, non-homogenous work we can see that Comenius
presents the human mind as the aspect that raises man over the other parts of the material world.
The will is then set to be the middle and even the central part of the mind. However, this concept
is not characteristic for the whole Consultatio. In Panaugia, which was written as soon as in the
early 1640s, we can trace a strong influence of Comenius’ earlier opinions when the author preferred
reason over will. This paper tries to explain this inconsistency and also give an general overview 
of Comenius’ anthropology.

This study deals with the concept of natura as it is presented in Comenius’s Pansophia. Since Comenius’s concept of nature is inseparable from his anthropological views, the paper discusses also his anthropology. Man is considered here a an integral part of the material world which, however, through his immortal mind and its three infinite components surpasses the material world and rises above it. Man, especially in his limitlessness and freedom of human will, resembles God. The human individual thus becomes not only the creation of God, but the partner and collaborator of God, insofar as the process of completing the work of Creation is concerned. The outcomes of human activity are called the world of human creation, the world of morality and the world of the spirit, in which nature is brought to perfection. The fi nal part of the study focuses on the concept of natura humana which is important in the whole Consultatio catholica, not only in the Pansophia. Despite all diffi  culties in interpretation, Comenius’s concept of human nature can be reconstructed. According to Comenius the basis of human nature is the openness of human existence founded on the free and unrestricted will.

This book maps the entire development of Comenius’s considerations on man, from his earliest writings to his philosophical masterwork. Although this book primarily offers an analysis and description of the conception of man in Comenius’s work, it may also serve the reader as a more general introduction to his philosophical conception. The author shows that, in spite of the fact that Comenius has received no small amount of academic attention, funded studies or monographs in English language remain in single figures. Thus, a range of Comenius’s remarkable ideas are still unknown to the wider public.