Papers by Per Ivan Grini
This thesis is an attempt to understand what kind of force that lies in the use of practical reas... more This thesis is an attempt to understand what kind of force that lies in the use of practical reason. I wish to show how practical reason can be used to discuss and establish moral norms that have universal validity by elucidating the discourse-theoretical approach to reason and action that one finds in the philosophy of Jürgen Habermas. The justification for the universal force of practical reason is based on a transformed transcendental philosophy that seeks to make explicit the presuppositions for rational discourse and what Habermas calls «Communicative action». Habermas is able to explicate a moral point of view that takes into account the interest of all participants by reconstructing practical reason and its presuppositions that rational agents must commit to by engaging in discourse. I will show that this is internally connected to the performative attitude that agents engaged in speech take towards each other. At the same time, Habermas' theory lacks the force to motivate a person that does not acknowledge that the moral point of view should have any authority in choosing how to act, even though one could acknowledge that the moral usage of practical reason is possible. This is due to the fact that Habermas' justification of the moral point of view is an epistemic one and not an ethical one. I will show how Habermas opens the gap between the epistemic justification for the rational force of the moral point of view on the one hand, and the ethical question «why should I be moral?» on the other. The final part of this thesis will show that even though Habermas lacks the arguments to motivate a person to choose a moral life, he can show how a good self-understanding has to include moral actions to some degree
Thesis Chapters by Per Ivan Grini
This thesis is an attempt to understand what kind of force that lies in the use of practical reas... more This thesis is an attempt to understand what kind of force that lies in the use of practical reason. I wish to show how practical reason can be used to discuss and establish moral norms that have universal validity by elucidating the discourse-theoretical approach to reason and action that one finds in the philosophy of Jürgen Habermas. The justification for the universal force of practical reason is based on a transformed transcendental philosophy that seeks to make explicit the presuppositions for rational discourse and what Habermas calls «Communicative action». Habermas is able to explicate a moral point of view that takes into account the interest of all participants by reconstructing practical reason and its presuppositions that rational agents must commit to by engaging in discourse. I will show that this is internally connected to the performative attitude that agents engaged in speech take towards each other. At the same time, Habermas' theory lacks the force to motivate a person that does not acknowledge that the moral point of view should have any authority in choosing how to act, even though one could acknowledge that the moral usage of practical reason is possible. This is due to the fact that Habermas' justification of the moral point of view is an epistemic one and not an ethical one. I will show how Habermas opens the gap between the epistemic justification for the rational force of the moral point of view on the one hand, and the ethical question «why should I be moral?» on the other. The final part of this thesis will show that even though Habermas lacks the arguments to motivate a person to choose a moral life, he can show how a good self-understanding has to include moral actions to some degree.
Drafts by Per Ivan Grini
The question of the meaning of life is, in a sense the philosophical question. At least outside o... more The question of the meaning of life is, in a sense the philosophical question. At least outside of professional philosophy, for it is somewhat seldom to see professional philosophers explitly engaged in this question. Even so, I will show how this question may be answered from a somewhat kantian perspective. This text is not supposed to provide a full answer, partly pressupposes a lot of complex philosophical ideas. My goal is to show that an answer may be possible, and that a lot of regular, but seemingly distant philosophical problems are needed to provide an answer. The crucial part of the argument is the possibility of providing a normative theory of rationality, which has been one of the central problems of classical western philosophy.
Prøveforelesning for mastergraden i filosofi – «Finnes det desisjonistiske element i diskursetikk... more Prøveforelesning for mastergraden i filosofi – «Finnes det desisjonistiske element i diskursetikken?» 1.-INTRO-70-og 80-tallet var viktige tiår for diskursetikken. To av teoriens mest sentrale tenkere, Jürgen Habermas og Karl-Otto Apel skrev begge sine viktigste diskursetiske tekster på denne tiden. Flere ting er endret siden de dager, men både diskursetikken og dagens tema har sitt grunnlag her. I '73 kommenterer Habermas på Apels kapittel om kommunikasjonsfellesskapet som grunnlag for en rasjonell begrunnelse for etikken i en vitenskapelig tidsalder fra verket transformasjon av filosofien. Habermas' kommentar er en anklage, som går på at Apels teori angivelig skal inneholde en «desisjonistisk restproblematikk». Utvekslingen mellom Habermas og Apel kan betraktes som utgangspunktet for denne prøveforelesningen, som skal svare på følgende problemstilling. «Finnes det desisjonistiske element i diskursetikken?». Problemstillingen må forstås i kontekst av masteroppgaven min som jeg leverte like før jul. I oppgaven tok jeg for meg Habermas forståelse av kraften til den praktiske fornuft og viste ut i fra det hvordan man kan etablere gyldigheten til moralske dommer. Desisjonisme ble ikke eksplisitt tatt opp i masteroppgaven, men problematikken er veldig lik. Desisjonisme er en posisjon der man forfekter at man har anledning til å velge å bry seg om rettferdiggjøring. Man ser for seg at valget om å vaere rasjonell går forut for det å vaere rasjonell, at man må velge å bry seg om grunner, fra et perspektiv der man ikke bryr seg om grunner. Det korte svaret på spørsmålet om hvorvidt det finnes desisjonistiske element i diskursetikken er ET SVAKT JA. Det finnes desisjonististke element i diskursetikken. Men det er også slik at det forblir bare element, for diskursetikken kan ikke sies å vaere en desisjonistisk teori, i den forstand at den er prisgitt desisjonistiske valg for å vise gyldigheten til moralske dommer. Og det er hvordan vi skal forholde oss til gyldigheten til moralske dommer som er det overordnede problemet, som gjør at
Uploads
Papers by Per Ivan Grini
Thesis Chapters by Per Ivan Grini
Drafts by Per Ivan Grini