Edited Volumes by Baron Reed
Bloomsbury, 2018
55 new essays on skepticism, representing both historical and contemporary approaches. Includes e... more 55 new essays on skepticism, representing both historical and contemporary approaches. Includes essays on Ancient, Medieval, Early Modern, Modern, and Twentieth-Century figures, both Western and non-Western, as well as essays on contemporary arguments for, and reactions to, skepticism.
Philosophical Issues, 2013
Edited volume on epistemic agency, with new essays by Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij, Selim Berker, Jess... more Edited volume on epistemic agency, with new essays by Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij, Selim Berker, Jessica Brown, E.J. Coffman, Pascal Engel, Miguel Ángel Fernández, Stephen Hetherington, Michael Lynch, Conor McHugh, Ram Neta, Lucy O’Brien, Baron Reed, Mark Schroeder, Kieran Setiya, Nishi Shah, Ernest Sosa, Valerie Tiberius, Ralph Wedgwood, Sarah Wright, and Linda Zagzebski.
Papers by Baron Reed
The Mystery of Skepticism, 2019
It is by now well known that ancient Pyrrhonism was intended to be a way of life rather than a do... more It is by now well known that ancient Pyrrhonism was intended to be a way of life rather than a doctrine. Various objections to Pyrrhonism as a way of life have been raised—that it is psychologically impossible and that it makes life grind to a halt. While there are answers to those objections, I’ll argue that there are aspects of Pyrrhonism that make it nonetheless an unappealing way of life and unsuitable in modern circumstances. One crucial change from ancient times is that the Greek skeptics found themselves puzzled by disagreement, while modern philosophers have been worried by doubt. This helps to explain why skepticism is now seen as a challenge to be overcome rather than as a possible way of life. I argue, however, that a deeper understanding of the nature of doubt and its relation to knowledge will allow us to move past the current stalemate between skeptical and anti-skeptical arguments, recover a more accurate history of epistemology, and identify the best sort of epistemic lives available to us. In particular, I argue that a life lived in accordance with a Neo-Academic form of skepticism is more attractive than one guided by dogmatism.
Skepticism: From Antiquity to the Present, 2018
Introduction to a section comprising seventeen articles on skepticism in the modern world. Attent... more Introduction to a section comprising seventeen articles on skepticism in the modern world. Attention is given to historical and cultural background that shaped, and was shaped by, skepticism, including globalization, the Reformation, and the rise of modern science.
Skepticism: From Antiquity to the Present, 2018
Overview of skepticism in contemporary epistemology, with attention given to how it intersects wi... more Overview of skepticism in contemporary epistemology, with attention given to how it intersects with internalism and externalism, fallibilism, contextualism, disjunctivism, disagreement with others, morality, and religion. Consideration of skeptical arguments about the structure of justification, the external world, induction, the a priori, and other minds.
Skepticism: From Antiquity to the Present, 2018
Introduction to co-edited volume on skepticism.
Normativity: Epistemic and Practical (OUP), 2018
In this paper, I examine the relationship between the practical and the epistemic. I reject two b... more In this paper, I examine the relationship between the practical and the epistemic. I reject two broad ways of thinking about that relationship— pragmatic encroachment and an epistemology centered on the truth norm— before offering a new approach, which explains epistemic normativity as arising from our practical commitment to a social practice that has arisen from our need to share information with one another. The social practice view captures the importance of knowledge and epistemic reasons to action, while preventing our practical interests from playing a disruptive role in how we arrive at our beliefs.
Episteme, 2016
I articulate the value of the epistemic and the central importance of epistemology in response to... more I articulate the value of the epistemic and the central importance of epistemology in response to a challenge from Allan Hazlett. I argue that epistemic evaluations should not be simply absorbed into a single, all-things-considered point of view.
Episteme, 2015
Hilary Kornblith explores the prospects for reasons eliminationism, the view that reasons ought n... more Hilary Kornblith explores the prospects for reasons eliminationism, the view that reasons ought not to be regarded as being of central importance in epistemology. I reply by conceding that reasons may not be necessary for knowledge, in at least some cases, but I argue that they are nevertheless vitally important in epistemology more broadly. Their importance stems from being necessary, not for knowledge but for us, given that we are social agents with practical concerns. In that sense, we have (social and practical) reasons for (having a practice of giving and receiving epistemic) reasons.
Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Perception, 2015
A variety of arguments for and against skepticism with respect to perception are presented and ev... more A variety of arguments for and against skepticism with respect to perception are presented and evaluated. The skeptical arguments are drawn from the Academics, the Pyrrhonists, and Descartes. Anti-skeptical responses considered include Moorean common sense, dogmatism, and externalism.
Performance Epistemology, 2016
In this paper, I trace the significance of a common feature of action and knowledge. A successful... more In this paper, I trace the significance of a common feature of action and knowledge. A successful analysis of action must capture the sense in which there is someone who is acting. Similarly, I argue, a successful analysis of knowledge must capture the sense in which there is someone who knows. Explicitly recognizing this fact helps to explain the importance of epistemic agency in understanding what knowledge is. I explore the connections between knowledge, agency, and personhood and argue that some of the most widely shared intuitions in epistemology can be grounded in the sense that knowledge belongs to persons. I comment on the way in which a claim of this sort has been taken up by virtue epistemology, as well as the difficulties we face in providing a full understanding of how knowledge can belong to persons. The paper closes with a consideration of the value of knowledge.
Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, 2nd ed. (Wiley-Blackwell), 2013
I present three arguments for the view that practical matters are relevant to whether you have kn... more I present three arguments for the view that practical matters are relevant to whether you have knowledge before giving seven objections to that view. The paper closes with a brief consideration of an alternative to pragmatism.
Virtuous Thoughts: The Philosophy of Ernest Sosa (Springer), 2013
Ernest Sosa’s work in epistemology has frequently progressed through careful examination of key m... more Ernest Sosa’s work in epistemology has frequently progressed through careful examination of key moments in the history of philosophy. Here I examine some of the most important cases in which this is so, including his introduction of virtues into epistemology and his reason for adding the subject’s perspective to externalism. I especially focus on the way Sosa adapts the structure of Descartes’s epistemology for his own externalist, virtue theoretic answer to skepticism.
Philosophical Issues, 2013
Fallibilism is roughly the view that one can have knowledge even though one’s belief could have b... more Fallibilism is roughly the view that one can have knowledge even though one’s belief could have been mistaken. Such a view seems to be incompatible with the standard way of thinking about epistemic possibility: it is possible (for me) that p just in case I don’t know that not-p. It is also difficult to reconcile fallibilism with the thought that knowledge ought to be action-guiding, given that the margin of error built into fallibilistic knowledge can sometimes become practically relevant. In this paper, I offer a solution to both of these puzzles for fallibilism—one that relies on neither contextualism nor subject-sensitive invariantism. I conclude by offering a new invariantist account of the way we speak about knowledge and epistemic possibility.
Synthese, 2012
Ernest Sosa’s virtue perspectivism can be thought of as an attempt to capture as much as possible... more Ernest Sosa’s virtue perspectivism can be thought of as an attempt to capture as much as possible of the Cartesian project in epistemology while remaining within the framework of externalist fallibilism. I argue (a) that Descartes’s project was motivated by a desire for intellectual stability and (b) that his project does not suffer from epistemic circularity. By contrast, Sosa’s epistemology does entail epistemic circularity and, for this reason, proves unable to secure the sort of intellectual stability Descartes wanted. I then argue that this leaves Sosa’s epistemology vulnerable to an important kind of skepticism.
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2012
I provide several objections to the thesis of pragmatic encroachment, which is the claim that, if... more I provide several objections to the thesis of pragmatic encroachment, which is the claim that, if you know that p, you should be able to act as if p (or use the proposition that p in practical reasoning).
Philosophy Compass, 2012
Although recent epistemology has been marked by several prominent disagreements – e.g., between f... more Although recent epistemology has been marked by several prominent disagreements – e.g., between foundationalists and coherentists, internalists and externalists – there has been widespread agreement that some form of fallibilism must be correct. According to a rough formulation of this view, it is possible for a subject to have knowledge even in cases where the justification or grounding for the knowledge is compatible with the subject’s being mistaken. In this paper, I examine the motivation for fallibilism before providing a fully general account of the view. I conclude by looking at the two major difficulties for fallibilism: the Gettier problem and the lottery paradox.
Oxford Bibliographies Online, 2011
The skeptical tradition originated in the Hellenistic period of ancient philosophy. After mostly ... more The skeptical tradition originated in the Hellenistic period of ancient philosophy. After mostly lying dormant through much of the medieval era, it was revived and—to some extent—transformed in early modern philosophy. Determining to what extent there is a single view shared across the different periods is complicated by the fact that at least some of the main figures in the tradition said quite explicitly that they did not have any view at all. But if there are no theoretical commitments binding all of the different skeptics together, then what allows us to say that there is in fact a single tradition? There are at least two relevant considerations. The first is that the later figures in the tradition make use of many of the arguments originally formulated by the ancient skeptics—and, indeed, given their centrality to epistemology, those arguments are likely to be an enduring legacy of the skeptical tradition. The second consideration is that many of the later skeptics—Hume is a good example—arrived at their philosophical outlook through profound reflection on the earlier figures in the tradition. It is a matter of controversy whether key aspects of ancient skepticism have been retained or lost—for example, some scholars of ancient philosophy have argued that modern skepticism is in certain ways a watered down version of its ancient predecessor, given that the ancient skeptics focused on what we ought to believe and the modern skeptics focus, supposedly, only on whether we have knowledge. But, whether or not this is true, it has become increasingly clear that there is much to be learned about skepticism through study of the tradition as a whole. Given that so much of philosophy has been shaped by both skepticism and anti-skeptical responses to it, the importance of the history of skepticism cannot be overstated.
Noûs, 2010
I argue on behalf of an account of knowledge that is invariantist—i.e., the semantic value of kno... more I argue on behalf of an account of knowledge that is invariantist—i.e., the semantic value of knowledge attributions does not vary from context to context—and stable, in that it does not take knowledge to be affected by practical considerations. I show how a view of this sort, using nothing but the basic resources of fallibilism, can provide both a resolution to the lottery paradox and a satisfying explanation for the appeal of skepticism.
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2010
There have been several recent attempts to account for the special authority of self-knowledge by... more There have been several recent attempts to account for the special authority of self-knowledge by grounding it in a constitutive relation between an agent’s intentional states and her judgments about those intentional states. This constitutive relation is said to hold in virtue of the rationality of the subject. I argue, however, that there are two ways in which we have self-knowledge without there being such a constitutive relation between first-order intentional states and the second-order judgments about them. Recognition of this fact thus represents a significant challenge to the rational agency view.
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Edited Volumes by Baron Reed
Papers by Baron Reed