Russia boosts its surveillance capacity in the Ukraine.

Another tidbit I got from one of my 3rd party emails from work about the current kerfluffle in the Ukraine.

Credit: Dino Fracchia/Alamy Stock Photo

LONDON—The UK Defense Ministry has claimed that Russia may step up its use of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) aircraft to support its ongoing war in Ukraine.

In a series of intelligence updates posted to social media by the department in mid-November, UK defense intelligence analysts have suggested that Russia may return its Myasishchev M-55 high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft into service for standoff ISR missions. The department says the aircraft, which has been used as an Earth-sciences platform, recently carried a military reconnaissance pod, apparently developed for use on Russian combat aircraft.

“There is a realistic possibility that the M-55 will return to frontline service to bolster Russia’s limited [intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance] capabilities over Ukraine,” the Defense Ministry said in a Nov. 19 social media post.

The ministry notes that operating the sensors from high altitudes enables them to work at considerable standoff range and from within Russian airspace—away from the threat of Ukrainian ground-based air defense systems.

Moscow’s failure to establish an airborne ISR capability for the conflict has been a “critical flaw” in its operation, leaving Russia unable to undertake “timely and accurate prosecution” of targets, the ministry says.

Russia has begun using its Beriev A-50 airborne early warning aircraft to support ground-based air defenses, including the long-range S-400 system, a Nov. 17 post from the Defense Ministry reported. The department refers to the A-50 version by its NATO codename Mainstay D, which is understood to be a reference to upgraded A-50U versions.

A heavily modified version of the Ilyushin Il-76 airlifter, the A-50 is equipped with an over-fuselage rotodome radar, like that installed on the Boeing E-3 Sentry.

“Russia has likely expedited integrating Mainstay and SA-21 partially because it is concerned about the prospect of Ukraine deploying Western-provided combat aircraft,” defense officials add, in reference to NATO plans to supply F-16 fighters to Ukraine.

There is a “realistic possibility that Russia will accept more risk by flying Mainstay closer to the front line so the aircraft can effectively carry out its new role,” the ministry says

Ukrainian Assessment on Russia missile usage.

 I saw this report and thought it would be a good additional source for the stuff I had posted about Ukraine and the Soviet Russian attacks.

Two MiG-31Ks fly over the MAKS air show carrying Khinzal air-launched ballistic missiles.

Credit: Piotr Butowski/AW&ST

As a 10-month-long barrage of Ukraine’s energy infrastructure by Russian missiles and drones continues, a new Ukrainian military intelligence assessment claims that Russian companies are building strike missiles at a monthly clip of more than 100, and adjusting tactics to overcome defenses. 

A transcript of remarks by Maj. Gen. Vadym Skibitskyi, a representative of Ukraine’s Ministry of Defense, makes it clear that officials in Kyiv are bracing for a prolonged, long-range missile and drone assault from Russia, although in smaller batches due to stockpile shortages. 

“Such massive strikes as happened last October, November, December, when they launched 70-100 rockets at a time—most likely, there will be no more,” Skibitskyi told the RBK-Ukraine news service. “The Russians realize that they may not achieve their goal, but instead will only exhaust their reserves, as they did last year.”

Ukraine’s military intelligence arm, also known as the GUR, believes Russia has about 585 ballistic and cruise missiles with warheads still on hand, including about 270 9K720 Iskander missiles, about 140 3M-14 Kaliber cruise missiles and a total of about Kh-101, Kh-555 and Kh-55 cruise missiles. The tally also includes an estimated stockpile of 75 9-S-7760 Khinzal air-launched ballistic missiles, Skibitskyi said. 

 Meanwhile, the Russians have a plan to produce a maximum of 118 missiles of all types each month. For August, the Russian production plan, which the GUR claims to have obtained, calls for delivering 42 new Iskander missiles, 40 Kh-101s, 20 Kalibrs, a maximum of 10 Kh-32s and more than six Khinzals. 

Russian companies are now performing final assembly of Geran-2 one-way attack munitions, which rare Russia’s version of the Iranian Shahed 136 drone, Skibitskyi said. Russian components are now found in Geran-2s that land in Ukraine, he added. 

As Ukraine braces for a new missile barrage on energy infrastructure leading into winter, military officials in Kyiv are wary of improving Russian tactics. 

The Russians are alternating different classes of missiles with each wave attack, he said. More attention is being paid to planning the route for the strikes to avoid defenses. And the Russians are acting on targeting information faster than in the past, he said. 

“The enemy is now studying our energy facilities, looking for their vulnerable places and the location of our air defense systems,” Skibitskyi said. “The Russians will analyze all this in order to choose the optimal routes for launches.”

Teaser Post Postponed, but you get some Wagner Mercenary News....

 I was going to post a story about my travel to the Motor City, but I didn't get home until 20:00 hours so I have to postpone my teaser post, it may not go up until Saturday because I will have time on Friday to post it.

     I got this from my usual 3rd party email from work.

Yevgeny Prigozhin pictured during a video address on June 24, 2023.

Credit: Pool Photo/Wagner Group/Alamy

Ending his so-called “march for justice” against two Russian military leaders 200 mi. short of Moscow, Yevgeny Prigozhin had claimed his actions were bloodless.

Far from it, it has emerged. While his Wagner column of heavily armed mercenaries faced no opposition on the ground, imagery published on social media has confirmed that a Russian Air Force Ilyushin Il-22M airborne command post was among several military aircraft shot down inside Russia by Prigozhin’s Wagner Private Military as they advanced north.

Wagner-operated air defenses brought down the four-engine turboprop on June 24 near the city of Voronezh in southwestern Russia. All on board—many likely to be experienced Russian air force personnel—were killed. Those same forces also bought down several Mil-8/17 transport helicopters, including a specialized electronic warfare version, a Kamov Ka-52 attack helicopter, and a Mil Mi-35 attack helicopter that were attempting to stave off Wagner’s advance.

“We regret that we had to strike at aircraft, but they were bombing us and launching missile strikes,” Prigozhin said in a 11-min. video clip explaining his actions published June 26.

Prigozhin, Wagner’s owner, seemingly triggered the rebellion, aiming his ire at the head of the Russian military, Gen. Valery Gerasimov, and Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu over concerns that Wagner was being stripped of its combat capability. Prigozhin publicly blamed the two men for the conflict in Ukraine, which has seen thousands of Wagner personnel killed. In an earlier video published online on June 23, he said the justification for the war in Ukraine was a lie, and just an excuse for “a small group of scumbags” to promote themselves and deceive both the public and Putin.

Hours later, Wagner forces seized the city of Rostov-on-Don and then launched what Prigozhin called their march toward Moscow, during which the aircraft and helicopters were engaged. Later that day, he halted the advance 200 mi. short of the Russian capital, agreeing to an undisclosed deal apparently brokered by Belarusian leader Alexander Lukashenko. The June 26 video does not reveal any details about the deal. 

U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken said the events of June 25 had been a “direct challenge to [President] Putin’s authority,” and that the episode suggested there were now “real cracks” in Putin’s rule.

Prigozhin himself said his actions had demonstrated shortfalls in Russian military capabilities, saying that Wagner forces had given “a master class on what should have happened on February 24, 2022”—a reference to the difficulties faced by the Russian Army in the first days of the war in Ukraine.

The loss of the Il-22M—a military conversion of the Il-18 airliner—represents a significant blow to the Russian Air Force’s intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capacity and its valued airborne command post capabilities.

Russia is no stranger to losses of vital platforms, however. In September 2018, an Il-20—an electronic intelligence version of the Il-18—was accidentally shot down by Syrian air defenses as it returned from a patrol flight over the Mediterranean Sea.

 

Credit: Stocktrek Images / Alamy Stock Photo

Imagery published on social media has confirmed that a Russian Air Force Ilyushin Il-22M airborne command post platform was among several military aircraft shot down inside Russia in an apparent attempted coup by the Wagner Private Military Co. 

Wagner-operated air defenses brought down the four-engine turboprop on June 24 near the city of Voronezh in southwestern Russia as the paramilitary group’s forces made an advance toward Moscow in what President Vladimir Putin described as an “internal betrayal” of the Russian people. All 10 crew on the Il-22 were killed. 

Wagner forces also bought down several Mil Mil-8/17 transport helicopters, including: a specialized electronic warfare version; a Kamov Ka-52 attack helicopter; and a Mil Mi-35 attack helicopter being used to to stave off Wagner’s advance.

Yevgeny Prigozhin, Wagner’s owner, triggered the rebellion, aiming his ire at the head of the Russian military, Gen. Valery Gerasimov, and Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu. 

Prigozhin publicly blamed the two men for the conflict in Ukraine which has seen thousands of Wagner personnel killed. In a video published online on June 23, he said justification for the war in Ukraine was a lie, and just an excuse for "a small group of scumbags" to promote themselves and deceive both the public and Putin.

Hours later, Wagner forces seized the city of Rostov-on-Don and then launched what Prigozhin called a “march for justice” toward Moscow, during which the aircraft and helicopters were engaged. Later that day, he halted the advance 200 mi. short of the Russian capital, agreeing to an undisclosed deal apparently brokered by Belarusian leader Alexander Lukashenko. The agreement calls for Prigozhin to exile himself in Belarus. Prigozhin’s whereabouts are unknown.

U.S. Secretary of State Anthony Blinken said the events of June 25 had been a “direct challenge to [President] Putin’s authority,” and suggested there were “real cracks” in Putin’s rule.

The loss of the Il-22M—a military conversion of the Il-18 airliner—represents a significant loss in the Russian Air Force’s intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance fleet. It is the second such loss in five years. Back in September 2018, an Il-20—an electronic intelligence version of the Il-18—was shot down accidentally by Syrian air defenses as it returned from a patrol flight over the Mediterranean Sea.

 

Canada Seizes AN124

 I have been sooper busy with work, I will be squeezing in posting where I can.

 If I was Russians, especially Putin, i would have a case of the ass at this because the AN124 is a national asset.  This escalated things between Russia and Canada but Trudeau being a hard lefty and the Ukraine being the cause celebrite of the modern left besides LGBTEIEIO issues is probably basking in the praise I suppose.  

I shamelessly snagged this off a 3rd party email from work.

The ban on over-sized cargo specialist Volga-Dnepr could delay production of some Boeing 767 freighters.

Credit: Joe Pries

The Canadian government has seized a large Russian cargo aircraft and agreed to provide a $500 million package of military support to Ukraine, which includes contributing to maintaining their future Lockheed Martin F-16s, training their fighter pilots and donating 288 AIM-7 missiles. 

The seizure and aid package was announced on June 10 by Prime Minister Justin Trudeau during a surprise visit to Kyiv to meet with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and Minister of Defense Denys Shmyhal. 

The Canadian government is seizing a Volga-Dnepr Antonov An-124 airlifter that has been seen parked at Toronto Pearson International Airport since Feb. 27, 2022. The charter freighter had arrived in Toronto a few days before to deliver COVID-19 tests, but the shipment coincided with the Russian military’s invasion of Ukraine. 

In June 2022, Canadian government officials amended a law that allows the seizure of sanctioned Russian assets, including the An-124. If a forfeiture process is completed, Trudeau’s government will work with Ukrainian officials to decide how to use the asset as compensation for the Russian invasion. 

“We send out this message - Canada will stand by the people of Ukraine with whatever it takes, for as long as it takes,” Trudeau said in Kyiv.

The military aid package also confirms a Canadian military role in a broad international effort to equip the Ukrainian air force with used F-16s. 

“Canada will contribute to multinational efforts to train pilots, and maintain and support Ukraine’s F-16s, leveraging Canadian expertise in these areas,” Trudeau’s office said in a statement. 

Canada does not operate F-16s itself, but manages a NATO training site at the Cold Lake air base in Alberta. The site often hosts F-16s operated by other NATO air forces who come to the base to participate in training and exercises. 

The package also includes the donation to Ukraine of 288 Raytheon AIM-7 Sparrow missiles. These semi-active radar homing, air-to-air missiles “will be repurposed in the United States for use in air defense systems, which will support Ukraine in its efforts to defend its skies,” the government said. 

The U.S. government has previously announced that a different version of the AIM-7 has been integrated on Ukraine’s Buk systems, which are mobile launchers for surface-to-air missiles. 

Trudeau announced that he has extended until 2026 Operation Unifier, an effort that has trained 36,000 Ukrainian troops since 2015

 

"Why The American Experience in WWI Matters"...

 

I saw this article from "Angry Staff Officer" and sometimes I use his stuff on my blog if I really 

like it.  He is really opinionated  and "Mack" twigged me onto this guy years ago.

Why the American Experience in World War I Matters Today

One would say that picking the day before the anniversary of D-Day in World War II is an odd time to talk about the first world war, yet, here we are. Because the more that I look at the war in Ukraine, the more I am drawn back to World War I. And no, not because of trenches and massed artillery bombardments. Those have been staples of modern war and are hardly unique to the fighting going on now. Hell, earthen protective positions have been around as long as someone realized that you could put a big mound of dirt between you and the person trying to kill you. Instead, I look at it from the American perspective and context of the Great War.  Now, since the U.S. perspective is mostly overlooked, this will require a lot of explaining. So, let’s get to it.

As the war in Ukraine continues in its second year, there are many in the U.S. Army who look towards it with great interest. Indeed, I would hazard to say that there have been few contemporary conflicts that have captured the attention of the U.S. military as has Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. From the doctrinal standpoint, an Army that is attempting to extricate itself from decades of low intensity conflict can watch large scale combat operations play out in real time. And it’s not like it takes a lot of imagination to see ourselves in this conflict, given that we can watch our equipment and technology as used by the Ukrainian military. Nor are we lacking accounts of Americans to follow as U.S. veterans travel to Ukraine to fight – for some, hoping to find a “good” war, to counterbalance their own years in Iraq or Afghanistan. In all of this, there are ties back to the American experience in World War I.

When the U.S. entered World War I in April of 1917, it could hardly be described as a dominant land power. The Army was small and lacked the new technology of the day – machine guns, heavy artillery, tanks, airplanes – in any large numbers. Nor did we have doctrine to take into account what all this new tech did to the essentially fragile human soldiers who would fight with it. These same soldiers would somehow have to be drawn from all parts of the U.S. population. It is not too far a stretch to say that the U.S. Army of 1916 was closer to the Army of 1865 than the Army of 1918. Change, therefore, was in the air.

Of course, change is the evil “c” word for the Army. It is highly resistant to organizational and institutional change. And yet, between 1917-1918, the Army underwent a radical transformation shaped by the new realities of war and technology. As we today struggle to figure out how unmanned aerial systems and the space and cyber domains will change warfare, the Army of 1917 struggled with how the machine gun and pneumatic recoil artillery had changed the battlefield. They asked the same questions that we do today: is new technology best used at the lowest level, where it can provide direct support to the ground pounder? Or is it best used en masse, in a formation commanded by someone who is intricately familiar with its capabilities? The Army of 1917 eventually determined that machine guns should be grouped into machine gun battalions, which could be broken up by companies and platoons, if needed, to support the infantry. Artillery was grouped into divisions, with two regiments of light artillery and one of heavy – too few, as it turned out in the end.

But because General John J. Pershing believed the rifle was still the dominant weapon in war, all force structure changes due to technology were based around supporting the infantryman. Pershing designed massive divisions of 28,000 soldiers each, all based around supporting the advance – and attrition – of the division’s four infantry regiments. Technology and doctrine – albeit misguided doctrine – shaped force structure. Flawed doctrine resulted in flawed force structure that turned out to be too unwieldy and cumbersome for the modern battlefield. Nor did that doctrine account for aircraft, tanks, and other emerging technologies.

View of a supply tank named “Griff” carrying supplies for advanced troops in the Caution Paddock, near Villeret, France, involving the 30th Division. The tank went where other transportation could not go (September 29, 1918) [Photograph by: U.S. Army Signal Corps, #24532].
 
From George T. Skinner Papers, WWI 59, WWI Papers, Military Collection, State Archives of North Carolina, Raleigh, N.C.

This adaptation of force structure to fit technology was not an easy change. Old, established units were broken up and turned into entirely different units. Cavalry troops in the National Guard traded their sabers for machine guns. Coast artillery soldiers picked up rifles or manned field guns. Infantry platoons now carried such things as automatic rifles and grenade launchers, while other infantrymen trained on 37mm guns and Stokes mortars. The old ways of doing business – almost unchanged for 50 years – were going by the wayside. Modern war required adaptation and moving away from the “Well that’s how we’ve always done it,” approach. The Army was rapidly changing. Just as it must today to adapt to the needs and hazards of the modern battlefield.

Who was serving was changing as well. In order to man this massive force, the War Department had requested Congress to authorize conscription. Soon, millions of people found themselves in uniform. Women were in service, granted official military status for the first time although having served in every war since the founding. In a war fought between ethnic groups in Europe, the U.S. was unique in fielding units that seemed to boast every ethnicity in its ranks – with the glaring absence of African Americans, who were segregated in separate units. Despite the wishes of many racists in the War Department, the American Expeditionary Force fielded two divisions of Black combat troops who acquitted themselves incredibly well in dehumanizing circumstances. The Army was changing, because modern war doesn’t care what color you are – or what your sexuality or gender identities are, either, I might add.

Although technically serving in non-government organizations like the Red Cross, Salvation Army, and YMCA, young women served just behind or sometimes even on the front lines of the AEF, coming under artillery, gas, and aircraft attack (Courtesy of the State Library of Massachusetts)

In a matter of months, the American Expeditionary Force (A.E.F.) ballooned to several hundred thousand troops in France between the fall of 1917 and the spring of 1918. By the late summer, there were over a million Americans in the theater of operations. By the fall – and the Armistice – over two million. Casualties, too, were exponentially high: over 50,000 dead and 200,000 wounded, in about six months of sustained combat operations. Misguided doctrine, abbreviated training, and inexperienced leaders caused many casualties. However, as the rest of the combatants of that war demonstrated, most of those casualties came because modern war – modern large scale combat operations – comes with a staggering price tag. A nation that will go to war must be prepared to give up her young people.

And World War I taught the United States that it must be the entire nation which goes to war. War – as we see it in Ukraine – must be a whole of government endeavor. One part of the nation cannot go to war while the other goes to the mall, as has been the experience of the U.S. for the last two decades as laid out by military and political leaders alike. Large scale wars, where entire cities are obliterated, are so horrendous that you must leverage all of a nation’s resources to end the war as soon as possible. And that nation must be willing to pay the requisite price in blood and treasure.

W.J. Duke of Co. L, 103rd Regt. Inf., wounded but still able to smile for the camera, near Mery, France, July 22, 1918. U.S. Army Signal Corps Collection, National Archives, 111-SC-16370.

For the U.S. of 1918-1919, that price was too high. The nation turned away from international affairs and stepped back from the world stage. Veterans, however, remained incredibly proud of their service. They formed organizations like the American Legion and dedicated memorials to their fallen comrades in towns and cities across the U.S. and France. They went back to France in mass numbers to visit their comrades buried there and to visit the places they had been during the war. In 1927, 30,000 veterans and their spouses travelled France in what was called the “Second A.E.F.” By 1937, their numbers had diminished to fewer than 10,000 but the pilgrims still came. There would be no more. Between 1939 and 1945, the veterans of World War I watched as everything they fought and bled for was washed away in a tide of bloodshed and fury. Like the veterans of Iraq and Afghanistan today, they watched as familiar towns and cities fell to a conquering enemy. It was surely hard to find a good answer to the question, “What was it all for?” One veteran in the 1980s answered the question, “Was your service during World War I of any specific benefit (or detriment) when you returned to civil life?” with, “No, just the loss of about 2 years that the world didn’t seem to feel was of any value to the country.”¹ Many today could echo that sentiment.

Today, many veterans of the Global War on Terror find themselves asking that same question. Moral injury in the U.S. military and veteran community is not something that has been significantly addressed in any large way. People deal with it in many ways. Many have chosen to go back to war, to take the skills they acquired and use them in what is thought of as a “good” war, to help preserve Ukraine as a nation and as a people. Many World War I veterans sought to find “good” wars as well, some serving in the Abraham Lincoln Brigade in the Spanish Civil War. Many served in the Allied forces in World War II. Moral injury takes a strong toll.

No war changed the U.S. Army in the way that World War I did. And very few wars have been forgotten so quickly. As much as those who follow the combat operations in Ukraine want to look at maneuver operations from World War II for comparisons, I would invite them to reexamine World War I. The paradigm shifts in technology and manpower were extreme. They might look very familiar for those today interested in how armies adapt to new technology and new ways of fighting war. Most importantly, studying World War I can help today’s veterans of the war on terror find a linkage to another group of veterans who struggled to make sense of their service and sacrifice.

 

Russia and the International Standard of Airworthiness and Maintenance.

 I had "Blogged" about Russian aviation sending their commercial aviation assets to Iran for heavy maintenance, as Russia tries to keep their western based planes flying.  The longer this goes on the harder it will be to reconcile the planes with the manufacturer and the recommended maintenance schedule.  I'm pretty sure those plane will wound up being scrapped,

 

Any hope of a quick resolution in the Russia-Ukraine war is long gone. 

Nearly 15 months and counting since Russia invaded its neighbor, the idea that anything affected can be easily reset to its pre-war status is gone, too. That includes the war’s ramifications on commercial aviation.

The wave of sanctions that Russia’s invasion triggered had immediate consequences for the country’s airline industry. Belarus, which served as a base for the invasion, has been hit, too. 

Forget adding new or used Western-built aircraft to the Russian or Belarussian fleets. Everything from spare parts to airworthiness directives are no longer available legally for the existing fleets.

This means hundreds of aircraft—the backbone of Russia’s commercial fleet—could no longer be maintained to internationally agreed-upon standards. The restrictions extend to some Russian-built aircraft because of their reliance on Western suppliers.

The sanctions came with flight bans that have gutted Russia’s route networks. Russian carriers moved 25% fewer people in 2022 than 2019, a recent Carnegie Endowment analysis found. The share of international traffic has fallen from 43% to 10%—a direct result of the sanctions.

As the figures show, however, the sanctions, while damaging, have hardly put Russia on a commercial aviation island. Aeroflot’s website shows flights to a handful countries beyond Russia’s borders, including China, Egypt, India, Thailand, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates.

As a recent white paper from the Flight Safety Foundation (FSF) points out, permitting Russian carriers—or any carrier, for that matter—to fly into your airspace is far more than a political decision. It’s a regulatory one, with ramifications.

“State regulators have an obligation to carry out effective oversight over foreign operators flying in their territory, with closer scrutiny on aircraft registered in sanctioned states,” FSF noted.

The reasons are simple. Without access to spare parts and technical support, sanctioned carriers are forced to get creative.

“The disrupted supply of components may result in affected air operators from Russia and Belarus stripping parts from parked planes or being tempted to explore alternative unapproved sources or parts in order to continue flying,” FSF said. “Parts may even be swapped out and find their way to the [maintenance] facilities, possibly being accepted by regulators with weak oversight or those that lack the engineering competence to further scrutinize the paperwork.”

Software updates, which are fairly common on today’s advanced air transports, are no longer available. Russia’s official response? Permit aircraft on its registry to operate without them.

It’s not clear how regulators in the countries Russian carriers are still permitted to operate are handling their oversight obligations.

FSF sees little room for error.

“With the large number of prolonged sanctions, as well as U.S. Export Controls currently in place on Belarus and Russia, state regulators worldwide need to be fully aware of the current international sanctions in effect and their implications on aviation safety,” the foundation said. “States unable to adequately ensure safety and provide adequate safety oversight—particularly of aircraft registered in sanctioned states—should not allow these flights into their airspace.

Tempting Armageddon with Russia.

 I saw this and it got me thinking,especially how much the Donks and the Xiden White House are "all In" for a confrontation with Russia and ignoring China.  They have been using the Ukraine as a slush fund to launder money for years and letting the rest of the world "go to Pot" as they used to say, the policies of this administration will have long term ramifications for this country for generations to come from loss of prestige, the loss of the petrodollar, the Dollar as no longer the reserve currency of choice of the world and China pushing the Yuan as a replacement, and the feckless spending from D.C, it is like they are really trying to crash this country.   

       This email from was a 3rd party source in my work email.

Russian threats of nuclear use have grown increasingly serious as Ukrainian forces, buttressed by Western support, have pressed forward against the Russian front lines in Ukraine. In his Feb. 21 address to the Russian Federal Assembly, Russian President Vladimir Putin explicitly claimed “an existential threat,” citing U.S. officials’ talk of seeking Russia’s strategic defeat. Putin also suspended participation in the New START arms control treaty and directed the military to prepare to resume nuclear testing, asserting that Washington was doing the same. This may reveal his next move.

Along its present course, the Ukraine conflict likely will culminate in a U.S.-Russia standoff more serious than the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. Washington contends that Putin’s nuclear threats ring hollow and that U.S. counterthreats are a sufficient deterrent. This is a grave miscalculation. Washington misconstrues Moscow’s perspective in several ways that obscure the risk of nuclear use.

First, Moscow sees the current conflict as a strategic showdown with the West that has profound implications for Russia’s global sway. Washington sees this as well, but contends that Moscow is caught in a corner without practicable exit options. This is wrong.

Second, as Moscow sees it, the advance of NATO-enabled Ukrainian forces presages the advance of NATO itself. For 30 years, Moscow has called the eastward expansion of NATO a critical security concern. For just as long, NATO leaders have denied it. What matters, however, is whether Moscow is sincere in fearing the leverage that NATO might gain by sitting forces on Russia’s long border with Ukraine.

Third, many Western observers suggest that Moscow will not risk the U.S. retaliation that a resort to nuclear weapons would bring—as though Moscow has no option for counterretaliation. Putin reasonably might wonder: Is Washington ready to sacrifice Boston for, say, the Ukrainian 92nd Mechanized Brigade? For that matter, how much risk are the NATO allies willing to assume? Their commitment to “staying the course” in Ukraine is the target of Putin’s threats.

The outcome of the Ukraine war will profoundly affect Russia’s stature and influence as a global power. It also will affect the nation’s internal stability. The conflict asks: Can Russia win even a local war against an adversary supported by the West? Does Russia’s massive nuclear arsenal count for much in the contest of powers? In this light, the conflict should count at minimum as a “near-existential” crisis for Moscow—“check,” if not quite “checkmate.”

Facing conventional defeat, Moscow would have a variety of nuclear options. The least likely of these is garnering the most attention in the West: an attack on Ukrainian forces using so-called “tactical” nuclear systems. Such weapons would not be effective enough to blunt a major Ukrainian offensive unless used in numbers that would also put Russian troops and areas at risk. Moreover, such action would earn global reprobation and invite direct U.S. intervention—Washington has pledged as much. Putin still has other, more likely options.

In the case of a decisive Ukrainian drive on the Russian border or Crimea, Moscow could signal dramatic escalation by putting its strategic nuclear forces on high alert and deploying some tactical nuclear units in an ostentatious fashion. The aim would be to break the Western consensus for war and prompt a cease-fire and negotiations. An additional step, although unlikely, would be a nuclear “warning blast” over or under Russian territory. Warning shots are entirely consonant with Russian nuclear doctrine. An underground test of a strategic weapon in violation of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty would suffice, and it would accord with Putin’s recent statement. This would be an attempt at extended deterrence by intimidation, which also would involve any obvious increases in nuclear force readiness.

In the case of a marked rise in Russian nuclear activity, Washington would necessarily raise the alert level of U.S. nuclear forces. The result would be a confrontation more dangerous than the 1962 Cuban missile standoff—more dangerous due to the context of the Russia-Ukraine war.

An early, deadly use of nuclear weapons remains very unlikely. Realistically, it is crisis instability that poses the greatest danger of nuclear cataclysm. Any situation that prompts a bilateral resort to peak levels of nuclear readiness—a hair-trigger standoff—greatly increases the likelihood of accidental or mistaken nuclear use.

The experience of the Cuban missile crisis remains relevant to managing the current confrontation wisely. Reflecting on the crisis, McGeorge Bundy, who was President John F. Kennedy’s national security advisor during it, estimated that the crisis had involved a rather modest one-in-100 risk of nuclear war. Nonetheless, Bundy observed: “In this apocalyptic matter, the risk can be very small indeed and still much too large for comfort.” Foremost in Washington’s planning about the Ukraine conflict should be Bundy’s observation that even a very limited nuclear exchange “would be a disaster beyond history.” 

Carl Conetta is a researcher at the Project on Defense Alternatives and author of “Tempting Armageddon: The Likelihood of Russian Nuclear Use Is Misconstrued in Western Policy.

 

Former Head of Security of Antonov Will be charged for the loss of the AN-225

 When the AN-225 was destroyed, I was trying to figure out why the plane wasn't flown out of the country before the attack, the Ukraine knew the attack was coming.  The "tells" were there and for some ungodly reason the plane was left, a strategic asset was left to be destroyed...Planes can fly away easily..unlike other assets, that had me stumped.  Well apparently the head of Security had his head up his ass and refused to release the plane.  Was it *MICE* (Money, Ideology, coercion or ego?)  It will be interesting how the trial will play out.

     The Article came from my work email,

 

The Antonov An-225 Mriya, the world’s largest cargo plane, destroyed in the Battle of Antonov Airport during the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, stays in a ruined hangar in Hostomel, Kyiv Region, northern Ukraine.

 

 

Ukrainian prosecutors have informed the former head of Antonov of suspicion of crimes including failing to dispatch the An-225 Mriya airlifter before the Russian invasion last year and neglecting to renew an insurance policy.

The allegations have come out more than 13 months after Russian and Ukrainian forces fought a battle around Hostomel airport in the opening hours of the invasion. During a crossfire of small arms and artillery, the An-225 was destroyed, along with several Antonov-owned facilities around the airport. 

The Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) said on its Telegram social media channel on April 5 that Serhiy Bychkov, the then-director of state-owned Antonov, failed to approve an order that would have flown the An-225 to Leipzig, Germany, in the weeks before the battle. The An-225 was “in proper technical condition, which [would have] allowed it to fly outside Ukraine” at the time of the invasion, the SBU said on Telegram. 

Bychkov also failed to extend Antonov’s insurance contract, which resulted in $1.14 million in lost compensation payments, the SBU said. 

At the time of its destruction, the sole An-225 was the world’s largest air transport and the second-largest aircraft in the world. Only the Stratolaunch Roc, a space and hypersonic vehicle launch platform, is larger. 

Antonov built the An-225 to transport the Soviet space shuttle Buran in the 1980s. The Mriya instead operated as a commercial transport for out-size cargo. In the wake of the aircraft’s destruction, Antonov has committed to complete the assembly of the partially built second An-225 airframe after the war, although the cost and schedule have not been fixed.

     I clipped this from "Wiki", it had more information, I included the hyperlinks.

The aircraft's last commercial mission was from 2 to 5 February 2022, to collect almost 90 tons of COVID-19 test kits from Tianjin, China, and deliver them to Billund, Denmark, via Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan.^[65][66] From there, it returned on 5 February to its base at Antonov Airport in Hostomel,^[66] where it underwent an engine swap.^[65] On the advice of NATO it was prepared for evacuation, scheduled for the morning of 24 February, but on that day Russia invaded, with the airfield being one of their first targets.^[65] A ban on civilian flights was quickly enacted by Ukrainian authorities.^[65] During the ensuing Battle of Antonov Airport, the runway was rendered unusable.^[65]

On 24 February, the An-225 was said to be intact.^[67] On 27 February, a photo was posted on Twitter of an object tentatively identified as the An-225 on fire in its hangar.^[68][69] A report by the Ukrainian edition of Radio Liberty stated that the airplane was destroyed during the Battle of Antonov Airport,^[70] which was repeated by Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba^[71] and by Ukroboronprom, Antonov's parent organisation.^[72] The Antonov company initially refused to confirm or deny the reports,^[73][70] and said it was still investigating them.^[74]

Also on 27 February, a press release by Ukroboronprom^[72] stated that the An-225 had been destroyed by Russian forces.^[75] Several other aircraft were in the same hangar as the An-225 at the time of its destruction, and were also destroyed or damaged during the battle; these include a Hungarian-registered Cessna 152, which was crushed by the An-225's left wingtip after the latter fell on top of it.^[76]

Ukroboronprom said that they planned to rebuild the plane at the Russians' expense.^[72] The statement said: "The restoration is estimated to take over 3 billion USD and over five years. Our task is to ensure that these costs are covered by the Russian Federation, which has caused intentional damage to Ukraine's aviation and the air cargo sector."^[77][78] The Ukrainian government also said that it would be rebuilt.^[78][79]

Aftermath

Destroyed Myria
The New York Times, April 2022
The New York Times, March 2023

On 1 March, a new photograph, taken since the initial conflict, was tentatively identified as the tail of the aircraft protruding from its hangar, suggesting that it remained at least partly intact, however, further evidence proved to show that the aircraft is inoperable due to the extreme damage it sustained.^[80] On 3 March, a video circulated on social media, showing the aircraft burning inside the hangar alongside several Russian trucks, confirming its likely destruction. Nonetheless, Antonov stated again that until the aircraft is inspected by experts, its official status could not be fully known.^[81][82] On 4 March, footage on Russian state television Channel One showed the first clear ground images of the destroyed aircraft, with much of the front section missing.^[80] Following Russia's withdrawal from northern Ukraine, the second unfinished aircraft airframe was reported to be intact, despite Russian artillery strikes on the hangar housing it at the Antonov factory at Sviatoshyn airfield.^[83][84]

Major Dmytro Antonov, the pilot of the An-225, alleged on 19 March 2022 that Antonov Airlines knew that an invasion was imminent for quite some time, but did nothing to prevent the loss of the aircraft. On his YouTube channel, Antonov accused company management of not doing enough to prevent the destruction of the aircraft, after having been advised by NATO to move the aircraft (ready to fly status) to Leipzig, Germany, in advance.^[85][86] Multiple Antonov staff have denied his allegations.^[87]

On 1 April, drone footage of Hostomel Airport showed the destroyed Mriya, with the forward fuselage completely burned and destroyed, but with the wings partly intact.^[88] It was later revealed that the right wing had been broken, but was held up only by its engines resting on the ground.^[89]

Investigations into rebuilding the An-225 are being undertaken, including the possibilities of cannibalising the second, incomplete An-225, or salvaging the remnants of the first plane to finish the second. However, there are several obstacles to rebuilding. Many of the aircraft's Soviet-made components were from the 1980s and are no longer made. Engineers quote a price of US$350–500 million, although there is uncertainty regarding whether or not it would be commercially viable and worth the cost.^[90] However, Andrii Sovenko, a former An-225 pilot and aviation author, said:^[90]

It's impossible to talk about the repair or restoration of this aircraft -- we can only talk about the construction of another Mriya, using individual components that can be salvaged from the wreckage and combining them with those that were, back in the 1980s, intended for the construction of a second aircraft.

On 20 May 2022, Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelenskyy announced his intentions to complete the second An-225, to replace the destroyed aircraft and as a tribute to all the Ukrainian pilots killed during the war.^[91] In November 2022, Antonov confirmed plans to rebuild the aircraft at an estimated cost of $500 million.^[92] At the time, the company did not state whether parts from the wrecked aircraft and the incomplete airframe would be combined to create a new flying aircraft or where funding might come from.^[93] Four months later, Antonov confirmed that parts had been removed from the wrecked aircraft for future mating to the unfinished fuselage.^[89]

In March 2023, the Ukrainian government announced that it detained two of three Antonov officials suspected of preventing the Ukrainian National Guard from setting up defenses at Hostomel Airport in anticipation of an invasion.^[94]

 

 

Poland sending some Mig 29's to the Ukraine

 

 I clipped this from my work email, I get information from aviation sources in my work email, they are 3rd party sources not related to my employer.

Poland will send four operational Mikoyan "Mig 29" to the Ukrainian Air force in the “coming days” and possibly the rest of its Soviet-era Fulcrum fleet as they are restored to combat service condition, President Andrzej Duda said on March 16. 

The announcement breaks a yearlong impasse over whether Western governments would heed Ukrainian demands for fighters. The pending Polish MiG-29s will provide Ukrainian Air force pilots with a familiar fighter type with the need for little, if any, refresher training. But the aircraft still fall short of Kyiv’s pleas for NATO-standard fighters, such as Lockheed Martin F-16s or Fairchild Republic A-10s. 

“Literally, in the next few days, we are actually handing over four planes to Ukraine in full working order,” Duda told reporters in a joint press conference with Czech President Petr Pavel. “The remaining planes are currently being prepared, and will probably be handed over successively.” 

Ukraine has not reported aircraft losses during its yearlong, ongoing war with Russia, but the government has prioritized being resupplied with fighters for air defense and ground support operations. In February, Ukrainian officials also called for Western attack helicopters, such as Bell AH-1Zs and Boeing AH-64s. 

For Warsaw, the donated MiG-29s will be backfilled in the Polish Air force with 12 Korea Aerospace Industries (KAI) FA-50s scheduled for delivery later this year, Duda said. The first batch of Lot 16-configured Lockheed Martin F-35As ordered by Poland are expected to be delivered in 2024, but the first several aircraft will likely remain in the U.S. for several months to train pilots and maintainers. 

 

                                               "KAI "Golden Eagle""

KAI is diverting the 12 light combat fighters ordered by Poland last September from planned deliveries to the South Korean Air force. A follow-on order by Poland for 36 FA-50PLs will be delivered after 2023 in a special configuration, with new extended-range fuel tanks, an active electronically scanned array radar and a high off-boresight air-to-air missile. 

Poland has about 24 MiG-29s in service, according to Aviation Week’s military aircraft database, but many are expected to be at a low level of combat readiness. The fleet is composed of a mix of MiG-29s ordered by Poland in the late 1980s, and others that were transferred from the Czech Republic in the 1990s and donated by Germany in the early 2000s. 

The Polish air force originally planned to retire the MiG-29s by 2010, but budget shortfalls delayed orders for their replacement for more than a decade. 

But the country’s leaders have struggled with the decision to donate the fleet to Ukraine. In the first two weeks of the war, Poland proposed handing over the MiG-29s to the U.S., which would then send them to Ukraine. But the U.S. government rejected the offer. Even last month, Duda had voiced doubts about the wisdom of sending even an aging portion of the country’s air power capability to another country. 

“We have not enough [fighters] … and we would need many more of them,” Duda told the BBC in an interview, noting the Polish MiG-29s have a “very serious need for maintenance.” 

But Poland’s decision to donate the MiG-29s anyway could inspire similar moves in Eastern Europe. Slovakian Defense Minister Jaroslav Nad said on March 9 that the time had come to decide whether to send Ukraine its MiG-29s, which were officially retired last August. Slovakia is not due to receive the first of 12 F-16 Block 70s on order until March 2024. 

 

"What We Got Right And Wrong About The War in The Ukraine"

 I saw this in a 3rd party news in my work email and it has some salient point worthy of reprints.

The one-year anniversary of Russia’s large-scale invasion of Ukraine was marked by a torrent of commentary and events remarking on what the war has meant and speculation about what is in store. For the most part, however, there has been little reflection on how much was incorrectly assessed since late 2021, particularly by persons or institutions who were wrong. That may be one of the biggest lessons of the war that should be taken to heart in 2023 and beyond: Assessments must be better.

It is hard to measure in hindsight what the consensus was, but it is worth reviewing some of the dominant projections and views and just how wrong they were. Here are a few, for example: “Russia would not invade Ukraine.” It did. “If Russia invaded Ukraine, it would only have minor aims in the Donbas.” Its goals were far larger. “Russia would crush the Ukrainian military in a couple of weeks.” It did not.

Western anti-tank weapons such as the Lockheed Martin Javelin and Saab’s NLAW were decisive. They helped Ukraine but did not defeat Russia. Tanks were again pronounced obsolete. Yet Ukraine wants at least 300 tanks, and Poland announced major orders from the U.S. and South Korea. The value of rotary-wing aircraft also was questioned after an initial Russian helicopter assault failed. But then Poland ordered Boeing AH-64 Apaches, and the U.S. proceeded to award a Future Long-Range Assault Aircraft contract to Bell Textron.

Another projection was that sanctions and export controls would crush Russia’s economy. They have imposed costs on Russia, but it is manufacturing weapons that include Western microelectronics, and its economy is not in the gutter.

Some observers said China would not dare help Russia. But it has in minor ways, and China could provide substantially more help in 2023. Some said that Putin would not risk a broader mobilization of Russia or that he would fall. Putin has mobilized more widely, but he has not fallen. Many expected that Ukraine would not be able to mount a major counteroffensive, and yet it has. And there were worries that countries in the Middle East and North Africa would starve and Europe would freeze. Fortunately, neither has happened.

I used to work for a research director who stated that “surprises” were a Wall Street myth. Someone knew if a quarter’s shipments were going to be missed or there was a major cost overrun. A turnaround could be delivering far better results than recognized by outsiders. Bob Lutz of Chrysler discusses this in his book Guts.

“Surprises” also may be a military-geopolitical myth. The U.S. and other European intelligence communities were prescient in warning that Russia would invade. People who had observed Russian military exercises or worked with its military units could attest to its performance. Some individuals know how Russian logistics and maintenance compare with NATO practices and standards. Some know the quality of Ukraine’s officers and soldiers.

Another “surprise” is economic and defense-industrial: In the spring of 2022, analyses noted how dependent Russia’s industry had become on European and Asian machine tools. Coupled with the brain drain of Russian engineers fleeing the country, I thought its defense sector would face insurmountable problems supplying the military.

Clearly, Russia’s defense sector has struggled, but the Royal Services Institute has done excellent work documenting how Western microelectronics are still finding their way into Russian weapons. Data compiled by Matt Klein and published on his blog “The Overshoot” shows that the value of total exports at the end of 2022 were 15% below their monthly preinvasion average.

Some current and emerging narratives on the Russia-Ukraine war are worth probing. One is the provision of Western combat aircraft to Ukraine, notably Lockheed Martin F-16s. The fighters will be provided eventually, I expect, but I doubt they will be decisive in tipping the balance of the war in Ukraine’s favor.

Another narrative is that no end to the war is in sight. I don’t know how this war will end, but wars typically end in a negotiated armistice or cease-fire—the Korean War in 1953, multiple Arab-Israeli wars, Iran and Iraq in 1988 and the Desert Storm conflict of 1991 are all examples. Or they end with the total defeat and collapse of one of the combatants, such as happened in South Vietnam in 1975 and Iraq in 2003.

Surprises are part of war, as 2022 has amply demonstrated, and we are certain to see more surprises in 2023 that confound dominant narratives. Ukraine’s offensive could be highly successful in routing Russian forces. Or Ukraine could lose the armor and other kit supplied to it in a poorly executed offensive against a Russian military that might have learned from events last year.

Contributing columnist Byron Callan is a director at Capital Alpha Partne