Skip to main content

Kevin Connolly

Minerva Schools at KGI, Social Sciences, Faculty Member

Followers

31

Following

28

Co-author

1

Public Views

I am a cognitive scientist and philosopher who works on learning. My research focuses especially on perception-based learning, as found in experts from wine tasters to radiologists to bird watchers. My website is kevinlconnolly.com

less

Interests

Uploads

Papers by Kevin Connolly

Perceptual Learning and the Contents of Perception

Erkenntnis, 79(6), 1407-1418., 2014

Suppose you have recently gained a disposition for recognizing a high-level kind property, like t... more Suppose you have recently gained a disposition for recognizing a high-level kind property, like the property of being a wren. Wrens might look different to you now. According to the Phenomenal Contrast Argument, such cases of perceptual learning show that the contents of perception can include high-level kind properties such as the property of being a wren. I detail an alternative explanation for the different look of the wren: a shift in one's attentional pattern onto other low-level properties. Philosophers have alluded to this alternative before, but I provide a comprehensive account of the view, show how my account significantly differs from past claims, and offer a novel argument for the view. Finally, I show that my account puts us in a position to provide a new objection to the Phenomenal Contrast Argument.

How to Test Molyneux's Question Empirically

i-Perception , 2013

In a recent i-Perception article, Schwenkler (2012) criticizes a 2011 experiment by R. Held and c... more In a recent i-Perception article, Schwenkler (2012) criticizes a 2011 experiment by R. Held and colleagues purporting to answer Molyneux's question. Schwenkler proposes two ways to rerun the original experiment, either by allowing subjects to move around the stimuli, or by simplifying the stimuli to planar objects rather than three-dimensional ones. In Schwenkler (2013), he expands on and defends the former. I argue that this way of re-running the experiment is flawed, since it relies on a questionable assumption that newly sighted subjects will be able to appreciate depth cues. I then argue that the second way of re-running the experiment is successful both in avoiding the flaw of original Held experiment, and in avoiding the problem with the first way of re-running the experiment.

Multisensory Perception as an Associative Learning Process

Frontiers in psychology, 5, 1095., 2014

Suppose that you are at a live jazz show. The drummer begins a solo. You see the cymbal jolt and ... more Suppose that you are at a live jazz show. The drummer begins a solo. You see the cymbal jolt and you hear the clang. But in addition to seeing the cymbal jolt and hearing the clang, you are also aware that the jolt and the clang are part of the same event. Casey O’Callaghan (forthcoming) calls this awareness “intermodal feature binding awareness.” Psychologists have long assumed that multimodal perceptions such as this one are the result of a subpersonal feature binding mechanism (see Vatakis and Spence, 2007, Kubovy and Schutz, 2010, Pourtois et al., 2000, and Navarra et al., 2012). I present new evidence against this. I argue that there is no automatic feature binding mechanism that couples features like the jolt and the clang together. Instead, when you experience the jolt and the clang as part of the same event, this is the result of an associative learning process. The cymbal’s jolt and the clang are best understood as a single
learned perceptual unit, rather than as automatically bound. I outline the specific learning process in perception called “unitization,” whereby we come to “chunk” the world into multimodal units. Unitization has never before been applied to multimodal cases. Yet I argue that this learning process can do the same work that intermodal binding would do, and that this issue has important philosophical implications. Specifically, whether we take multimodal cases to involve a binding mechanism or an associative process will have impact on philosophical issues from Molyneux’s question to the question of how active or passive we consider perception to be.

Making Sense of Multiple Senses

Consciousness Inside and Out: Phenomenology, Neuroscience, and the Nature of Experience, Richard Brown (Ed.), Springer, 2014

In the case of ventriloquism, seeing the movement of the ventriloquist dummy's mouth changes your... more In the case of ventriloquism, seeing the movement of the ventriloquist dummy's mouth changes your experience of the auditory location of the vocals. Some have argued that cases like ventriloquism provide evidence for the view that at least some of the content of perception is fundamentally multimodal. In the ventriloquism case, this would mean your experience has constitutively audiovisual content (not just a conjunction of an audio content and visual content). In this paper, I argue that cases like ventriloquism do not in fact warrant that conclusion. I then try to make sense of crossmodal cases without appealing to fundamentally multimodal content.

Perceptual Learning

Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2017

“Perceptual Learning” refers, roughly, to long-lasting changes in perception that result from pra... more “Perceptual Learning” refers, roughly, to long-lasting changes in perception that result from practice or experience (see E.J. Gibson 1963). William James, for instance, writes about how a person can become able to differentiate by taste between the upper and lower half of a bottle for a particular kind of wine (1890: 509). Assuming that the change in the person’s perception lasts, is genuinely perceptual (rather than, say, a learned inference), and is based on prior experience, James’ case is a case of perceptual learning.

This entry has three parts. The first part lays out the definition of perceptual learning as long-term changes in perception that result from practice or experience, and then distinguishes perceptual learning from several contrast classes. The second part specifies different varieties of perceptual learning. The third part details cases of perceptual learning in the philosophical literature and says why they are philosophically significant.

Which Kantian Conceptualism (or Nonconceptualism)?

The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 2014

A recent debate in Kant scholarship concerns the role of concepts in Kant's theory of perception.... more A recent debate in Kant scholarship concerns the role of concepts in Kant's theory of perception. Roughly, proponents of a conceptualist interpretation argue that for Kant, the possession of concepts is a prior condition for perception, while nonconceptualist interpreters deny this. The debate has two parts. One part concerns whether possessing empirical concepts is a prior condition for having empirical intuitions. A second part concerns whether Kant allows empirical intuitions without a priori concepts. Outside of Kant interpretation, the contemporary debate about Conceptualism concerns whether perception requires empirical concepts. But, as I argue, the debate about whether Kant allows intuitions without empirical concepts does not show whether Kant is a conceptualist. Even if Kant allows intuitions without empirical concepts, it could still be a priori concepts are required. While the debate could show that Kant is a conceptualist, I argue it does not. Finally, I sketch a novel way that the conceptualist interpreter might win the debate: roughly, by arguing that possessing a priori concepts is a prior condition for having appearances .

Does Perception Outstrip Our Concepts in Fineness of Grain?

Ratio, 2011

We seem perfectly able to perceive fine-grained shades of colour even without possessing precise ... more We seem perfectly able to perceive fine-grained shades of colour even without possessing precise concepts for them. The same might be said of shapes. I argue that this is in fact not the case. A subject can perceive a colour or shape only if she possesses a concept of that type of colour or shape. I provide new justification for this thesis, and do not rely on demonstrative concepts such as THIS SHADE or THAT SHAPE, a move first suggested by John McDowell, but rejected by Christopher Peacocke and Richard Heck among others.

Sensory Substitution and Perceptual Learning

Sensory Substitution and Augmentation, Fiona Macpherson (Ed.), Oxford University Press, 2019

When a user integrates a sensory substitution device into her life, the process involves perceptu... more When a user integrates a sensory substitution device into her life, the process involves perceptual learning, that is, 'relatively long-lasting changes to an organism's perceptual system that improve its ability to respond to its environment' (Goldstone 1998: 585). In this paper, I explore ways in which the extensive literature on perceptual learning can be applied to help improve sensory substitution devices. I then use these findings to answer a philosophical question. Much of the philosophical debate surrounding sensory substitution devices concerns what happens after perceptual learning occurs. In particular, should the resultant perceptual experience be classified in the substituted modality (as vision), in the substituting modality (as auditory or tactile), or in a new sense modality? I propose a novel empirical test to help resolve this philosophical debate.

Sensory Substitution and Non-Sensory Feelings

by Kevin Connolly and Umut Baysan

Sensory Substitution and Augmentation, Fiona Macpherson (Ed.), Oxford University Press, 2019

One of the central limitations of sensory substitution devices (SSDs) is their inability to repro... more One of the central limitations of sensory substitution devices (SSDs) is their inability to reproduce the non-sensory feelings that are normally associated with visual experiences, especially hedonic and aesthetic responses. This limitation is sometimes reported to cause SSD users frustration. To make matters worse, it is unclear that improvements in acuity, bandwidth, or training will resolve the issue. Yet, if SSDs are to actually reproduce visual experience in its fullness, it seems that the reproduction of non-sensory feelings will be of some importance. We offer a novel solution. Researchers can produce hedonic and aesthetic responses by eliciting these feelings artificially, pairing distal objects that should be pleasurable to pleasurable stimulus outputs from the SSD. We outline two strategies for accomplishing this: first, by means of a prefixed, hardwired, association of pleasant distal objects to pleasant stimulus outputs from the SSD; second, by means of a flexible, feedback-based association which creates associations based on a subject-directed matching of distal objects to patterns of stimuli from the SSD which the subject takes to have the corresponding hedonic properties. We evaluate some problems with both strategies, and we argue that the feedback-based strategy is more promising. Researchers can use this strategy to help the blind, allowing them to take pleasure in the objects they perceive using SSDs.

Books by Kevin Connolly

Perceptual Learning: The Flexibility of the Senses

Perceptual Learning: The Flexibility of the Senses, New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2019

People often say things like the following: Cabernet Sauvignon tastes differently to an expert wi... more People often say things like the following: Cabernet Sauvignon tastes differently to an expert wine taster, or Beethoven's Ninth Symphony sounds differently to a seasoned conductor. The examples just described are cases of perceptual learning-cases of long-term changes in perception that result from practice or experience. Philosophers have been discussing such cases for centuries, from the 14 th-century Indian philosopher Vedānta Deśika to Thomas Reid as well as to contemporary philosophers like John McDowell, Ned Block, Susanna Siegel, and Christopher Peacocke. In the book, I use recent evidence from psychology and neuroscience to show that perceptual learning in fact occurs. I also offer a way for philosophers to distinguish between various different types of it. In some cases, perceptual learning involves changes in how one attends; in other cases, it involves a learned ability to differentiate two properties, or to perceive two properties as unified. I show how this taxonomy helps to classify cases in the philosophical literature. I then go on to rethink several domains in the philosophy of perception in terms of perceptual learning, including multisensory perception, color perception, speech perception, and sensory substitution. As a whole, the book offers a theory of the function of perceptual learning. Perceptual learning embeds into our quick perceptual systems what would be a slower task were it to be done in a controlled, cognitive manner. This frees up cognitive resources for other tasks. For instance, a novice wine taster drinking a Cabernet Sauvignon might have to think about its features first and then infer the type of wine, while an expert would be able to identify it immediately. This learned ability to immediately identify the wine enables the expert to think about other things like the vineyard or the vintage of the wine. My account gives us a new way to understand such cases in terms of cognitive resources and cognitive economy.

Perceptual Learning and the Contents of Perception

Erkenntnis, 79(6), 1407-1418., 2014

Suppose you have recently gained a disposition for recognizing a high-level kind property, like t... more Suppose you have recently gained a disposition for recognizing a high-level kind property, like the property of being a wren. Wrens might look different to you now. According to the Phenomenal Contrast Argument, such cases of perceptual learning show that the contents of perception can include high-level kind properties such as the property of being a wren. I detail an alternative explanation for the different look of the wren: a shift in one's attentional pattern onto other low-level properties. Philosophers have alluded to this alternative before, but I provide a comprehensive account of the view, show how my account significantly differs from past claims, and offer a novel argument for the view. Finally, I show that my account puts us in a position to provide a new objection to the Phenomenal Contrast Argument.

How to Test Molyneux's Question Empirically

i-Perception , 2013

In a recent i-Perception article, Schwenkler (2012) criticizes a 2011 experiment by R. Held and c... more In a recent i-Perception article, Schwenkler (2012) criticizes a 2011 experiment by R. Held and colleagues purporting to answer Molyneux's question. Schwenkler proposes two ways to rerun the original experiment, either by allowing subjects to move around the stimuli, or by simplifying the stimuli to planar objects rather than three-dimensional ones. In Schwenkler (2013), he expands on and defends the former. I argue that this way of re-running the experiment is flawed, since it relies on a questionable assumption that newly sighted subjects will be able to appreciate depth cues. I then argue that the second way of re-running the experiment is successful both in avoiding the flaw of original Held experiment, and in avoiding the problem with the first way of re-running the experiment.

Multisensory Perception as an Associative Learning Process

Frontiers in psychology, 5, 1095., 2014

Suppose that you are at a live jazz show. The drummer begins a solo. You see the cymbal jolt and ... more Suppose that you are at a live jazz show. The drummer begins a solo. You see the cymbal jolt and you hear the clang. But in addition to seeing the cymbal jolt and hearing the clang, you are also aware that the jolt and the clang are part of the same event. Casey O’Callaghan (forthcoming) calls this awareness “intermodal feature binding awareness.” Psychologists have long assumed that multimodal perceptions such as this one are the result of a subpersonal feature binding mechanism (see Vatakis and Spence, 2007, Kubovy and Schutz, 2010, Pourtois et al., 2000, and Navarra et al., 2012). I present new evidence against this. I argue that there is no automatic feature binding mechanism that couples features like the jolt and the clang together. Instead, when you experience the jolt and the clang as part of the same event, this is the result of an associative learning process. The cymbal’s jolt and the clang are best understood as a single
learned perceptual unit, rather than as automatically bound. I outline the specific learning process in perception called “unitization,” whereby we come to “chunk” the world into multimodal units. Unitization has never before been applied to multimodal cases. Yet I argue that this learning process can do the same work that intermodal binding would do, and that this issue has important philosophical implications. Specifically, whether we take multimodal cases to involve a binding mechanism or an associative process will have impact on philosophical issues from Molyneux’s question to the question of how active or passive we consider perception to be.

Making Sense of Multiple Senses

Consciousness Inside and Out: Phenomenology, Neuroscience, and the Nature of Experience, Richard Brown (Ed.), Springer, 2014

In the case of ventriloquism, seeing the movement of the ventriloquist dummy's mouth changes your... more In the case of ventriloquism, seeing the movement of the ventriloquist dummy's mouth changes your experience of the auditory location of the vocals. Some have argued that cases like ventriloquism provide evidence for the view that at least some of the content of perception is fundamentally multimodal. In the ventriloquism case, this would mean your experience has constitutively audiovisual content (not just a conjunction of an audio content and visual content). In this paper, I argue that cases like ventriloquism do not in fact warrant that conclusion. I then try to make sense of crossmodal cases without appealing to fundamentally multimodal content.

Perceptual Learning

Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2017

“Perceptual Learning” refers, roughly, to long-lasting changes in perception that result from pra... more “Perceptual Learning” refers, roughly, to long-lasting changes in perception that result from practice or experience (see E.J. Gibson 1963). William James, for instance, writes about how a person can become able to differentiate by taste between the upper and lower half of a bottle for a particular kind of wine (1890: 509). Assuming that the change in the person’s perception lasts, is genuinely perceptual (rather than, say, a learned inference), and is based on prior experience, James’ case is a case of perceptual learning.

This entry has three parts. The first part lays out the definition of perceptual learning as long-term changes in perception that result from practice or experience, and then distinguishes perceptual learning from several contrast classes. The second part specifies different varieties of perceptual learning. The third part details cases of perceptual learning in the philosophical literature and says why they are philosophically significant.

Which Kantian Conceptualism (or Nonconceptualism)?

The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 2014

A recent debate in Kant scholarship concerns the role of concepts in Kant's theory of perception.... more A recent debate in Kant scholarship concerns the role of concepts in Kant's theory of perception. Roughly, proponents of a conceptualist interpretation argue that for Kant, the possession of concepts is a prior condition for perception, while nonconceptualist interpreters deny this. The debate has two parts. One part concerns whether possessing empirical concepts is a prior condition for having empirical intuitions. A second part concerns whether Kant allows empirical intuitions without a priori concepts. Outside of Kant interpretation, the contemporary debate about Conceptualism concerns whether perception requires empirical concepts. But, as I argue, the debate about whether Kant allows intuitions without empirical concepts does not show whether Kant is a conceptualist. Even if Kant allows intuitions without empirical concepts, it could still be a priori concepts are required. While the debate could show that Kant is a conceptualist, I argue it does not. Finally, I sketch a novel way that the conceptualist interpreter might win the debate: roughly, by arguing that possessing a priori concepts is a prior condition for having appearances .

Does Perception Outstrip Our Concepts in Fineness of Grain?

Ratio, 2011

We seem perfectly able to perceive fine-grained shades of colour even without possessing precise ... more We seem perfectly able to perceive fine-grained shades of colour even without possessing precise concepts for them. The same might be said of shapes. I argue that this is in fact not the case. A subject can perceive a colour or shape only if she possesses a concept of that type of colour or shape. I provide new justification for this thesis, and do not rely on demonstrative concepts such as THIS SHADE or THAT SHAPE, a move first suggested by John McDowell, but rejected by Christopher Peacocke and Richard Heck among others.

Sensory Substitution and Perceptual Learning

Sensory Substitution and Augmentation, Fiona Macpherson (Ed.), Oxford University Press, 2019

When a user integrates a sensory substitution device into her life, the process involves perceptu... more When a user integrates a sensory substitution device into her life, the process involves perceptual learning, that is, 'relatively long-lasting changes to an organism's perceptual system that improve its ability to respond to its environment' (Goldstone 1998: 585). In this paper, I explore ways in which the extensive literature on perceptual learning can be applied to help improve sensory substitution devices. I then use these findings to answer a philosophical question. Much of the philosophical debate surrounding sensory substitution devices concerns what happens after perceptual learning occurs. In particular, should the resultant perceptual experience be classified in the substituted modality (as vision), in the substituting modality (as auditory or tactile), or in a new sense modality? I propose a novel empirical test to help resolve this philosophical debate.

Sensory Substitution and Non-Sensory Feelings

by Kevin Connolly and Umut Baysan

Sensory Substitution and Augmentation, Fiona Macpherson (Ed.), Oxford University Press, 2019

One of the central limitations of sensory substitution devices (SSDs) is their inability to repro... more One of the central limitations of sensory substitution devices (SSDs) is their inability to reproduce the non-sensory feelings that are normally associated with visual experiences, especially hedonic and aesthetic responses. This limitation is sometimes reported to cause SSD users frustration. To make matters worse, it is unclear that improvements in acuity, bandwidth, or training will resolve the issue. Yet, if SSDs are to actually reproduce visual experience in its fullness, it seems that the reproduction of non-sensory feelings will be of some importance. We offer a novel solution. Researchers can produce hedonic and aesthetic responses by eliciting these feelings artificially, pairing distal objects that should be pleasurable to pleasurable stimulus outputs from the SSD. We outline two strategies for accomplishing this: first, by means of a prefixed, hardwired, association of pleasant distal objects to pleasant stimulus outputs from the SSD; second, by means of a flexible, feedback-based association which creates associations based on a subject-directed matching of distal objects to patterns of stimuli from the SSD which the subject takes to have the corresponding hedonic properties. We evaluate some problems with both strategies, and we argue that the feedback-based strategy is more promising. Researchers can use this strategy to help the blind, allowing them to take pleasure in the objects they perceive using SSDs.

Perceptual Learning: The Flexibility of the Senses

Perceptual Learning: The Flexibility of the Senses, New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2019

People often say things like the following: Cabernet Sauvignon tastes differently to an expert wi... more People often say things like the following: Cabernet Sauvignon tastes differently to an expert wine taster, or Beethoven's Ninth Symphony sounds differently to a seasoned conductor. The examples just described are cases of perceptual learning-cases of long-term changes in perception that result from practice or experience. Philosophers have been discussing such cases for centuries, from the 14 th-century Indian philosopher Vedānta Deśika to Thomas Reid as well as to contemporary philosophers like John McDowell, Ned Block, Susanna Siegel, and Christopher Peacocke. In the book, I use recent evidence from psychology and neuroscience to show that perceptual learning in fact occurs. I also offer a way for philosophers to distinguish between various different types of it. In some cases, perceptual learning involves changes in how one attends; in other cases, it involves a learned ability to differentiate two properties, or to perceive two properties as unified. I show how this taxonomy helps to classify cases in the philosophical literature. I then go on to rethink several domains in the philosophy of perception in terms of perceptual learning, including multisensory perception, color perception, speech perception, and sensory substitution. As a whole, the book offers a theory of the function of perceptual learning. Perceptual learning embeds into our quick perceptual systems what would be a slower task were it to be done in a controlled, cognitive manner. This frees up cognitive resources for other tasks. For instance, a novice wine taster drinking a Cabernet Sauvignon might have to think about its features first and then infer the type of wine, while an expert would be able to identify it immediately. This learned ability to immediately identify the wine enables the expert to think about other things like the vineyard or the vintage of the wine. My account gives us a new way to understand such cases in terms of cognitive resources and cognitive economy.