Papers by Michael McCarthy
Archives of …, 1988
The Lens Opacities Classification System (LOCS) is a simple system for classifying age-related ... more The Lens Opacities Classification System (LOCS) is a simple system for classifying age-related human lens opacities at the slit lamp or in retroilluminated and slit-lamp photographs. The system employs a set of standard Neitz CTR retroilluminated black-and-white photographs for ...
Political Power and Social Theory, 2020
Social class has long existed in tension with other forms of social difference such as race, gend... more Social class has long existed in tension with other forms of social difference such as race, gender, and sexuality, both in academic and popular debate. While Marxist-influenced class primacy perspectives gained prominence in US sociology in the 1970s, they faded from view by the 1990s, replaced by perspectives focusing on culture and institutions or on intersectional analyses of how multiple forms of social difference shape durable patterns of disempowerment and marginalization. More recently, class and capitalism have reasserted their place on the academic agenda, but continue to coexist uneasily with analyses of oppression and social difference. Here we discuss possibilities for bridging the gap between studies of class and other forms of social difference. We contend that these categories are best understood in relation to each other when situated in a larger system with its own endogenous dynamics and tendencies, namely capitalism. After providing an historical account of the fraught relationship between studies of class and other forms of social difference, we propose a theoretical model for integrating under-standings of class and social difference using Wright et al.'s concept of dynamic asymmetry. This shifts us away from discussions of which factors are most important in general toward concrete discussions of how these factors interact in particular cases and processes. We contend that class and other forms of social difference should not be studied primarily as traits embodied in individuals, but rather with respect to how these differences are organized in relation to each other within a framework shaped by the dynamics of capitalist development.
Critical Historical Studies, 2019
After World War II, collectively bargained private pensions were installed as an alternative to S... more After World War II, collectively bargained private pensions were installed as an alternative to Social Security expansions. But these plans began to go into decline in the 1980s, when defined-contribution retirement accounts, such as 401(k)s, came to replace them. This article makes three arguments about this rise and fall to contribute toward a theory of structural contingency. First, in both episodes, state intervention into labor-management relations triggered policy changes in the private pension system. Second, policy makers were motivated to intervene because of a structural condition-namely, to manage perceived crises in capitalism. And third, the particular way they intervened and how their policy choices spurred pension marketization were driven by contingent historical circumstances. This article argues that structural constraints that inhere in capitalist democracies established a range of possible policy options available to policy makers, yet contingent and historical factors channeled policy selection within that range.
Politics & Society, 2019
How can finance be durably democratized? In the centers of financial power in both the United Sta... more How can finance be durably democratized? In the centers of financial power in both the United States and the United Kingdom, proposals now circulate to give workers and the public more say over how flows of credit are allocated. This article examines five democratization proposals: credit union franchises, public investment banks, sovereign wealth funds, inclusive ownership funds, and bank nationalization. It considers how these plans might activate worker and public engagement in decision making about finance by focusing on three modes of public participation: representative democracy, direct democracy, and deliberative minipublics. It then considers the degree to which democratization plans might be resilient to de-democratization threats from business. It argues that of the five, bank nationalization goes furthest in guarding against de-democratization threats but is still pocked with pitfalls if it relies solely on representative democracy. It argues that two criteria appear necessary for democratically durable alternatives: the active direct participation of workers and citizens and the weakening of businesses' capacity for democratic retrenchment.
Socio-Economic Review, 2016
In comparative political economy, the patience of capital investment has often been explained wit... more In comparative political economy, the patience of capital investment has often been explained with the political activity of stakeholders. Such scholarship attributes investment preferences to either set assumptions about what various actors are likely to want from their pension systems or to macro-level institutional factors. Comparing the preferences of business and labor actors in the occupational pension systems in Finland, the Netherlands, and the USA, we argue that preferences are better explained more dynamically and emerge from meso-level institutional forces. We find that financing needs and capacities, governance capacities and financial regulations explain changes in labor and business preferences with regard to fund investment. In each of the cases, a combination of these three institutional factors explains a preference shift toward more varied and more impatient investing.
Studies in Political Economy, 2016
This essay argues that the reproduction of racial categories and racial inequalities are both, in... more This essay argues that the reproduction of racial categories and racial inequalities are both, in part, driven by processes fundamental to capitalist markets. Drawing from the work of Howard Botwinick and Barbara J. Fields, it suggests that racial problems are not solely the product of racial prejudice or racist institutional practices. Instead, it argues that seemingly race-neutral processes in capitalist markets are deeply racial in their implications.
MPIfG Discussion Paper Series, 2014
This paper considers the rise of defined-contribution (DC) pensions – such as 401(k) plans – in
o... more This paper considers the rise of defined-contribution (DC) pensions – such as 401(k) plans – in
order to contribute to the debate about neoliberalism. It challenges the generalizability of two
common accounts: the weak state intervention thesis, which argues that neoliberal policy change
is driven by state retreat and deregulation, and the state-managed transition thesis, which argues
that neoliberal policies are both enacted and managed through new regulations. In contrast, this
paper argues that the development of the employer-based pension system between 1970 and
1995 is an instance of “neoliberalism without neoliberals.” A battery of regulations was passed
between 1974 and the late 1980s that were intended to make the traditional system of definedbenefit
(DB) pensioning more secure. However, this legislation triggered a business shift to
401(k)s. The legislation worked in such a counterintuitive way because of three factors related
to changes in “the balance of class forces” in American society: (1) new laws increased costs for
firms, with small businesses being hit the heaviest, (2) employment in the manufacturing sector,
labor’s traditional stronghold, declined as a share of total employment, and (3) because unions
were unable or unwilling to unionize emergent sectors of the economy, new businesses in them
were not compelled to negotiate DB plans. In such a context, growing regulatory costs pushed
many firms to adopt DC pensions for their employees. The outcome was a major policy shift,
considered by many to be a defining feature of the neoliberal era.
Politics & Society, 2014
This article explores union attempts to control pension fund investment for the debate on financi... more This article explores union attempts to control pension fund investment for the debate on financial restructuring in the United States. It puts popular control of finance into comparative and historical perspective and argues that laws and politics help explain why the flow of finance is corporate controlled. First, changes in the legal regime-the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974-put constraints on labor's ability to influence investment decisions. This is evident when comparing single-and multi-employer plans, where the laws had different consequences. Second, attempts to reform these laws failed. Had they been successful, Carter's proposed economic revitalization plan in the run-up to his failed reelection in 1980 would have created new ways for unions to control and redirect retirement investment for social purposes. The reform failure is treated as a "suppressed historical alternative" through a comparison with a successful reform in Quebec, Canada, which gave unions broad controls over the Solidarity Fund in 1983. The findings suggest, somewhat counter-intuitively, that legal restrictions need to be loosened for democratic control of finance to be possible. For pension funds, more regulations led to more corporate control, not less.
Labor Studies Journal, 2010
Union democracy has tended to result in prolabor contracts in the American labor
movement. Howeve... more Union democracy has tended to result in prolabor contracts in the American labor
movement. However, many rank-and-file movements attempting to transform staff-led
unions into democratic ones have experienced failure. The author examines some of the
reasons why insurgent democracy movements are often unable to institute lasting
democratic structures and militant reforms in the building trades, through an in-depth
analysis of a failed rebellion in New York City’s painters’ union from 1947 to 1973. In
contrast to recent literature that explains success and failure by emphasizing the traits
of the general membership and the tactics of insurgent reformers, the author argues that
fuller attention should be given to the union characteristics that generate staff power.
In particular, the author shows that job allocation through the hiring hall is one means
by which a corrupt staff can discipline an insurgent membership. The author also shows
that when these conditions are undermined through contestation, staff-employer collusion
can continue to make discipline through job allocation possible.
Work & Occupations, 2014
Debates over America's heavy reliance on employer-provided private pensions have understated the ... more Debates over America's heavy reliance on employer-provided private pensions have understated the profound role organized labor played after World War II. Archival evidence from prominent unions and business associations suggests that the shift in organized labor's strategy after the New Deal toward electoral activity helps explain critical interventions by Northern Democrats into the system of private pensioning in the postwar period that laid the foundation for America's old-age security system. Such a strategy was insufficient, however, to expand Social Security. This article offers a political mediation account of electoral activity as a source of labor influence on social policy that draws on political institutionalist and class power theories.
Annual Review of Socioogy, 2011
A significant group of sociologists entering graduate school in the late 1960s and 1970s embraced... more A significant group of sociologists entering graduate school in the late 1960s and 1970s embraced Marxism as the foundation for a critical challenge to reigning orthodoxies in the discipline. In this review, we ask what impact this cohort of scholars and their students had on the mainstream of American sociology. More generally, how and in what ways did the resurgence of neo-Marxist thought within the discipline lead to new theoretical and empirical research and findings? Using two models of Marxism as science as our guide, we examine the impact of sociological Marxism on research on the state, inequality, the labor process, and global political economy. We conclude with some thoughts about the future of sociological Marxism.
Mobilization, 2012
In contrast to prevalent theories of terrorism, this study develops a contention-oriented approac... more In contrast to prevalent theories of terrorism, this study develops a contention-oriented approach where levels and forms of political violence against civilians depend upon: (1) the strategies of combatants; (2) the means of contention; (3) the locations of allies and opponents; (4) the collective identities of combatants; and (5) the dynamics of contention, including whether or not representatives of paramilitary organizations are included in formal peace processes. Quantitative analyses of a multi-source database of civilian deaths taking place in Northern Ireland between 1966 and 2006 offer preliminary support for this approach. The study underscores the insights provided by theories and methods used in the fields of social movements research and peace and conflict studies. The concept of terrorism is deeply emotive, power-laden, and contested. Thus, the frequent use of the term "terror" in public discourse provides an opportunity for academic research to resonate with the public. Yet, use of the term in research runs the danger of scholarly work legitimating the agendas of the powerful while overlooking oppression as an underlying source of insurgency. It also runs the risks of glossing over variations in the actors responsible for political violence against civilians as well as differences in the motivations of those responsible. These dangers and risks are evidenced by the ad-hoc analyses found in the 9/11 literature. Much of this work is based on theories that have been discredited in the fields of social movement research and peace and conflict studies. In contrast, this article calls for a contention-oriented approach to understanding political violence against civilians. We conceptualize four distinct types of political violence against civilians-selective, collective, categorical, and indiscriminate. Moreover, we argue that five facets of contention help to explain variations in the levels and forms of political violence against civilians: (1) the strategies of combatants; (2) the means of contention; (3) the locations of allies and opponents; (4) the collective identities of combatants; and (5) the dynamics of contention, including dynamics related to peace processes. Quantitative analyses of lethal political violence against civilians in Northern Ireland between 1966 and 2006 are used to illustrate the utility of the four-part typology, as well as to assess hypotheses regarding factors influencing each type of political violence against civilians. The analyses largely support our hypotheses, underscoring the promise of a contention-oriented approach. THEORETICAL APPROACHES BEYOND "TERROR" Scholars have developed a myriad of definitions of terror that variously emphasize the perpetrator of violence, the target of violence, and the intent of violence. We argue that because _______________________________ * Our deepest appreciation goes to Jeff Goodwin for his inspiration, insights, and research assistants for this project. We also thank Denis O'Hearn, Lee Smithey, Robert White, and the anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments and suggestions. Earlier versions of this article were presented at the
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Papers by Michael McCarthy
order to contribute to the debate about neoliberalism. It challenges the generalizability of two
common accounts: the weak state intervention thesis, which argues that neoliberal policy change
is driven by state retreat and deregulation, and the state-managed transition thesis, which argues
that neoliberal policies are both enacted and managed through new regulations. In contrast, this
paper argues that the development of the employer-based pension system between 1970 and
1995 is an instance of “neoliberalism without neoliberals.” A battery of regulations was passed
between 1974 and the late 1980s that were intended to make the traditional system of definedbenefit
(DB) pensioning more secure. However, this legislation triggered a business shift to
401(k)s. The legislation worked in such a counterintuitive way because of three factors related
to changes in “the balance of class forces” in American society: (1) new laws increased costs for
firms, with small businesses being hit the heaviest, (2) employment in the manufacturing sector,
labor’s traditional stronghold, declined as a share of total employment, and (3) because unions
were unable or unwilling to unionize emergent sectors of the economy, new businesses in them
were not compelled to negotiate DB plans. In such a context, growing regulatory costs pushed
many firms to adopt DC pensions for their employees. The outcome was a major policy shift,
considered by many to be a defining feature of the neoliberal era.
movement. However, many rank-and-file movements attempting to transform staff-led
unions into democratic ones have experienced failure. The author examines some of the
reasons why insurgent democracy movements are often unable to institute lasting
democratic structures and militant reforms in the building trades, through an in-depth
analysis of a failed rebellion in New York City’s painters’ union from 1947 to 1973. In
contrast to recent literature that explains success and failure by emphasizing the traits
of the general membership and the tactics of insurgent reformers, the author argues that
fuller attention should be given to the union characteristics that generate staff power.
In particular, the author shows that job allocation through the hiring hall is one means
by which a corrupt staff can discipline an insurgent membership. The author also shows
that when these conditions are undermined through contestation, staff-employer collusion
can continue to make discipline through job allocation possible.
order to contribute to the debate about neoliberalism. It challenges the generalizability of two
common accounts: the weak state intervention thesis, which argues that neoliberal policy change
is driven by state retreat and deregulation, and the state-managed transition thesis, which argues
that neoliberal policies are both enacted and managed through new regulations. In contrast, this
paper argues that the development of the employer-based pension system between 1970 and
1995 is an instance of “neoliberalism without neoliberals.” A battery of regulations was passed
between 1974 and the late 1980s that were intended to make the traditional system of definedbenefit
(DB) pensioning more secure. However, this legislation triggered a business shift to
401(k)s. The legislation worked in such a counterintuitive way because of three factors related
to changes in “the balance of class forces” in American society: (1) new laws increased costs for
firms, with small businesses being hit the heaviest, (2) employment in the manufacturing sector,
labor’s traditional stronghold, declined as a share of total employment, and (3) because unions
were unable or unwilling to unionize emergent sectors of the economy, new businesses in them
were not compelled to negotiate DB plans. In such a context, growing regulatory costs pushed
many firms to adopt DC pensions for their employees. The outcome was a major policy shift,
considered by many to be a defining feature of the neoliberal era.
movement. However, many rank-and-file movements attempting to transform staff-led
unions into democratic ones have experienced failure. The author examines some of the
reasons why insurgent democracy movements are often unable to institute lasting
democratic structures and militant reforms in the building trades, through an in-depth
analysis of a failed rebellion in New York City’s painters’ union from 1947 to 1973. In
contrast to recent literature that explains success and failure by emphasizing the traits
of the general membership and the tactics of insurgent reformers, the author argues that
fuller attention should be given to the union characteristics that generate staff power.
In particular, the author shows that job allocation through the hiring hall is one means
by which a corrupt staff can discipline an insurgent membership. The author also shows
that when these conditions are undermined through contestation, staff-employer collusion
can continue to make discipline through job allocation possible.