Papers by Agustin Redonda
Governments use tax expenditures to boost investment, innovation and employment.
However, these s... more Governments use tax expenditures to boost investment, innovation and employment.
However, these schemes are largely opaque, costly and often ineffective in reaching their stated goals. They also frequently trigger unwanted side effects. In order to improve the performance of these tools, we present three concrete policy proposals:
First, governments should increase transparency on tax benefits. G20 members should take the lead on this with frequent and comprehensive tax expenditure reports.
Second, G20 governments should improve the design of tax incentives with the aim of minimizing the generation of windfall profits and negative spillover effects within and across (in particular, on poorer) countries. Third, governments should phase out tax expenditures that are environmentally harmful, including tax incentives for fossil
fuels and other schemes that promote an unsustainable use of natural resources.
The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is one of the poorest countries in the World. The construc... more The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is one of the poorest countries in the World. The construction sector will play an essential part to bring the country on the path of economic growth, and competition within the sector is crucial to achieve this goal. In this paper we analyze the effect of competition in public works tenders in the DRC. Using a unique and newly assembled database on tenders we find that the number of participating bidders and the observed spread of submitted bids both significantly reduce contract prices, confirming our prior that competitive pressure can enhance the overall performance of the sector. JEL-Code: D440, L130, L740.
Since gasoline has a relatively inelastic demand, raising government revenue via gasoline taxes c... more Since gasoline has a relatively inelastic demand, raising government revenue via gasoline taxes could appear appropriate as it entails a relatively small deadweight loss. However, gasoline retail is generally a highly concentrated market, hence the assumption of perfect competition when considering tax incidence might be misleading. Theoretically, in oligopolistic markets taxes can be shifted forward less (more) than proportionally to retail prices; a possibility usually denoted by undershifting (overshifting). Generally, this depends on unobservable parameters of the demand and cost functions. In this paper we device a novel empirical test, based on observables, to assess whether taxes are under-or overshifted in an oligopolistic market. The test depends on the interaction between market structure and taxes. We apply our test to the Canadian retail gasoline market using a panel data set of 10 cities, finding that gasoline taxes are undershifted. JEL-Code: H220, D430, L130.
OECD Economics Department Working …, Jan 1, 2009
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Papers by Agustin Redonda
However, these schemes are largely opaque, costly and often ineffective in reaching their stated goals. They also frequently trigger unwanted side effects. In order to improve the performance of these tools, we present three concrete policy proposals:
First, governments should increase transparency on tax benefits. G20 members should take the lead on this with frequent and comprehensive tax expenditure reports.
Second, G20 governments should improve the design of tax incentives with the aim of minimizing the generation of windfall profits and negative spillover effects within and across (in particular, on poorer) countries. Third, governments should phase out tax expenditures that are environmentally harmful, including tax incentives for fossil
fuels and other schemes that promote an unsustainable use of natural resources.
However, these schemes are largely opaque, costly and often ineffective in reaching their stated goals. They also frequently trigger unwanted side effects. In order to improve the performance of these tools, we present three concrete policy proposals:
First, governments should increase transparency on tax benefits. G20 members should take the lead on this with frequent and comprehensive tax expenditure reports.
Second, G20 governments should improve the design of tax incentives with the aim of minimizing the generation of windfall profits and negative spillover effects within and across (in particular, on poorer) countries. Third, governments should phase out tax expenditures that are environmentally harmful, including tax incentives for fossil
fuels and other schemes that promote an unsustainable use of natural resources.