David Denver Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003. 211 pp.; £15.50, pbk, ISBN 03337... more David Denver Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003. 211 pp.; £15.50, pbk, ISBN 0333751922
In order to appreciate fully the psephological position of the Conservative Party under David Cam... more In order to appreciate fully the psephological position of the Conservative Party under David Cameron, we first need to examine the electoral history of the party since it was last in power. When David Cameron became its leader in December 2005 the Conservative Party had been in the electoral doldrums for 13 years and under three different leaders had been badly defeated in three successive general elections. The rot began shortly after an unexpectedly comfortable victory at the 1992 general election as the popularity of John Major’s government declined very quickly and very markedly. The catalyst for this transformation was the forced withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European exchange rate mechanism (ERM) in September 1992. Billions of pounds were wasted in trying to shore up the pound but in the end there was an effective devaluation of the currency. This shook the electorate’s longstanding confidence in the ability of the Conservatives to manage the economy competently — a matter on which they had consistently outscored Labour for decades (see Denver, 1998). During the ensuing five years, Major and his party plumbed new depths of unpopularity in the opinion polls, lost thousands of council seats in local elections, failed to hold any of the eight constituencies that they defended in parliamentary by-elections and achieved their worst ever national election result (to that point) in the European elections of June 1994.
The Results: How Britain Voted For many months before it happened, the overwhelming majority of m... more The Results: How Britain Voted For many months before it happened, the overwhelming majority of media commentators and academic specialists were united in suggesting that the General Election in May 2015 was the most unpredictable in living memory. The reason for this was the extraordinary evolution of party popularity after the 2010 election. The days have long gone when inter-election cycles followed a fairly simple and familiar pattern-the government would become unpopular and opposition parties more popular until about the middle of the term and then the governing party would gradually recover, while the others faded. Even by recent standards, however, the course of opinion between 2010 and 2015 was remarkable. 1. The inter-election cycle of party support Trends in General Election voting intentions over the period are shown in Figure 1.1. As usual, the new government's honeymoon with the electorate was short-lived. Despite falling behind Labour by the end of 2010, however, Conservative support remained relatively buoyant until April 2012. The significant slump in that month followed an ill-judged and poorly received Budget delivered by the Chancellor, George Osborne, which was characterised by Ed Miliband as an 'omnishambles'. This was later named 'word of the year' by the Oxford English Dictionary and began to be applied to various aspects of the government's performance. The electorate appeared to agree with Miliband. After the Budget, according to Ipsos MORI, Osborne had the poorest satisfaction ratings (230) of any Chancellor since Kenneth Clarke in 1994. The effects were felt in the local elections in May, when the Conservatives lost over 400 seats and fell to 33% of the 'national equivalent' vote share, well behind Labour on 39%. From April 2012 through to March 2015 support for the Conservatives varied within very narrow limits. On these data, the party's share of voting intentions fell (just) below 30% only once and never exceeded 33.6%. The reasons underlying
Unison • Y4NE and NESNO were the respective 'designated organisations'. All other groups listed o... more Unison • Y4NE and NESNO were the respective 'designated organisations'. All other groups listed on the Yes side were affiliated with Y4NE; on the No side the Conservatives and UKIP were affiliated with NESNO but NENC ran an independent campaign. • Other groups registered as participants-the Senior Citizens Party, the British National Party and the English Democrats party-played little or no part in the campaign. Campaigning • The core activities of effective constituency campaigns in general elections are identifying supporters and mobilising them on polling day but this approach was not possible in the referendum because voting was by post and was spread over several days, party workers were not as enthusiastic as in a general election and party records of past voting in elections are not necessarily a good guide to referendum voting.
tag=1 data=The return of two party politics. by David Denver. tag=2 data=Denver, David tag=3 data... more tag=1 data=The return of two party politics. by David Denver. tag=2 data=Denver, David tag=3 data=Contemporary Record. tag=4 data=4 tag=5 data=1 tag=6 data=September 1990 tag=7 data=2-5. tag=8 data=POLITICAL PARTIES tag=9 data=GREAT BRITAIN tag=10 data=The apparent collapse of support for the centre parties in opinion polls since the last general election has led many politicians and some political commentators to believe that Britain is returning to a two-party system once again. Provided by MICAH, Canberra. tag=11 data=1990/2/12 tag=12 data=570 tag=13 data=CAB
The Social Democratic Party (SDP) was perhaps the nearest thing to a 'flash' party seen in Britis... more The Social Democratic Party (SDP) was perhaps the nearest thing to a 'flash' party seen in British politics in modern times. It was formed in March 1981, largely on the initiative of four leading figures in the Labour party (Roy Jenkins, David Owen, Shirley Williams and William Rogers), following the apparent success of the left in dominating the party, and initially it had a sensational impact on British politics. It had thirty MPs by March 1982 (mostly as a result of defections by Labour MPs); in alliance with the Liberals it immediately went to first place in the opinion polls and stayed in that position until May 1982. The Alliance won four by-elections between 1981 and 1983, and in the 1983 general election, with 25.4 per cent of the vote, came within two points of ousting Labour from its second place. For the next four years the Alliance held its position and in the 1987 election its vote fell only slightly to 22.6 per cent. Immediately following the 1987 election, however, things started to go wrong for the SDP. The party decided to enter full merger negotiations with the Liberals but a group of die-hards, led by the party leader David Owen, vigorously opposed any merger. After tortuous negotiations, SDP members voted by 65 per cent to 35 per cent in favour of merger in February 1988, and the party submerged its separate identity in a new Liberal Democratic party (as it was eventually named). Opponents of merger re-established a separate 'continuing' SDP, but it performed lamentably in local elections and by-elections. In June 1990 the continuing party was formally closed down. David Owen did not seek re-election to the House of Commons in 1992 and the two remaining SDP MPs lost their seats.' Flash parties experience rapid rises in support followed by rapid declines. Public opinion, wrote Duverger, 'seems to display a sudden flash of temper, a gust of passion'. 2 It is true that the SDP did not simply collapse. Rather, the majority of members voluntarily transferred themselves to a new party. None the less, the sudden rise and subsequent disappearance of the party is close to what would be expected of a flash party and, as such, it was a unique phenomenon in modern British politics.
This book was published with incorrect imprint and published information. This has now been corre... more This book was published with incorrect imprint and published information. This has now been corrected.
In previous chapters I have been mainly concerned with survey evidence about voting behaviour in ... more In previous chapters I have been mainly concerned with survey evidence about voting behaviour in Britain. The focus has been on individual electors. In this chapter I consider election results themselves — the aggregate, net effect of the voting decisions made by individuals. There is an obvious link between individual behaviour and election results and we would expect the developments in voting behaviour at the individual level, which have been outlined in previous chapters, to be reflected at the aggregate level.
Elections are fun. In the first half of the nineteenth century, part of the fun involved the vote... more Elections are fun. In the first half of the nineteenth century, part of the fun involved the voters getting roaring drunk at the candidates’ expense, brawling in the street with opponents and pelting them with rotten fruit. The practice of candidates ‘treating’ voters was effectively ended by the Second Reform Act of 1867 which greatly enlarged the electorate. There were now simply too many voters to treat. In addition, in 1872 the Ballot Act made voting secret (previously voters had had to declare their choice in public) so that candidates could no longer check that the voters they had treated actually voted for them. Finally, in 1883, the Corrupt Practices Act outlawed treating (much to the disappointment of most voters, one suspects).
To outsiders who are non-specialists, the Irish party system has long been a source of bewilderme... more To outsiders who are non-specialists, the Irish party system has long been a source of bewilderment. Parties famously ‘without social bases’ and difficult to locate on a left–right continuum were r...
In order to appreciate fully the psephological position of the Conservative Party under David Cam... more In order to appreciate fully the psephological position of the Conservative Party under David Cameron, we first need to examine the electoral history of the party since it was last in power. When David Cameron became its leader in December 2005 the Conservative Party had been in the electoral doldrums for 13 years and under three different leaders had been badly defeated in three successive general elections. The rot began shortly after an unexpectedly comfortable victory at the 1992 general election as the popularity of John Major’s government declined very quickly and very markedly. The catalyst for this transformation was the forced withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European exchange rate mechanism (ERM) in September 1992. Billions of pounds were wasted in trying to shore up the pound but in the end there was an effective devaluation of the currency. This shook the electorate’s longstanding confidence in the ability of the Conservatives to manage the economy competently — a matter on which they had consistently outscored Labour for decades (see Denver, 1998). During the ensuing five years, Major and his party plumbed new depths of unpopularity in the opinion polls, lost thousands of council seats in local elections, failed to hold any of the eight constituencies that they defended in parliamentary by-elections and achieved their worst ever national election result (to that point) in the European elections of June 1994.
David Denver Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003. 211 pp.; £15.50, pbk, ISBN 03337... more David Denver Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003. 211 pp.; £15.50, pbk, ISBN 0333751922
In order to appreciate fully the psephological position of the Conservative Party under David Cam... more In order to appreciate fully the psephological position of the Conservative Party under David Cameron, we first need to examine the electoral history of the party since it was last in power. When David Cameron became its leader in December 2005 the Conservative Party had been in the electoral doldrums for 13 years and under three different leaders had been badly defeated in three successive general elections. The rot began shortly after an unexpectedly comfortable victory at the 1992 general election as the popularity of John Major’s government declined very quickly and very markedly. The catalyst for this transformation was the forced withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European exchange rate mechanism (ERM) in September 1992. Billions of pounds were wasted in trying to shore up the pound but in the end there was an effective devaluation of the currency. This shook the electorate’s longstanding confidence in the ability of the Conservatives to manage the economy competently — a matter on which they had consistently outscored Labour for decades (see Denver, 1998). During the ensuing five years, Major and his party plumbed new depths of unpopularity in the opinion polls, lost thousands of council seats in local elections, failed to hold any of the eight constituencies that they defended in parliamentary by-elections and achieved their worst ever national election result (to that point) in the European elections of June 1994.
The Results: How Britain Voted For many months before it happened, the overwhelming majority of m... more The Results: How Britain Voted For many months before it happened, the overwhelming majority of media commentators and academic specialists were united in suggesting that the General Election in May 2015 was the most unpredictable in living memory. The reason for this was the extraordinary evolution of party popularity after the 2010 election. The days have long gone when inter-election cycles followed a fairly simple and familiar pattern-the government would become unpopular and opposition parties more popular until about the middle of the term and then the governing party would gradually recover, while the others faded. Even by recent standards, however, the course of opinion between 2010 and 2015 was remarkable. 1. The inter-election cycle of party support Trends in General Election voting intentions over the period are shown in Figure 1.1. As usual, the new government's honeymoon with the electorate was short-lived. Despite falling behind Labour by the end of 2010, however, Conservative support remained relatively buoyant until April 2012. The significant slump in that month followed an ill-judged and poorly received Budget delivered by the Chancellor, George Osborne, which was characterised by Ed Miliband as an 'omnishambles'. This was later named 'word of the year' by the Oxford English Dictionary and began to be applied to various aspects of the government's performance. The electorate appeared to agree with Miliband. After the Budget, according to Ipsos MORI, Osborne had the poorest satisfaction ratings (230) of any Chancellor since Kenneth Clarke in 1994. The effects were felt in the local elections in May, when the Conservatives lost over 400 seats and fell to 33% of the 'national equivalent' vote share, well behind Labour on 39%. From April 2012 through to March 2015 support for the Conservatives varied within very narrow limits. On these data, the party's share of voting intentions fell (just) below 30% only once and never exceeded 33.6%. The reasons underlying
Unison • Y4NE and NESNO were the respective 'designated organisations'. All other groups listed o... more Unison • Y4NE and NESNO were the respective 'designated organisations'. All other groups listed on the Yes side were affiliated with Y4NE; on the No side the Conservatives and UKIP were affiliated with NESNO but NENC ran an independent campaign. • Other groups registered as participants-the Senior Citizens Party, the British National Party and the English Democrats party-played little or no part in the campaign. Campaigning • The core activities of effective constituency campaigns in general elections are identifying supporters and mobilising them on polling day but this approach was not possible in the referendum because voting was by post and was spread over several days, party workers were not as enthusiastic as in a general election and party records of past voting in elections are not necessarily a good guide to referendum voting.
tag=1 data=The return of two party politics. by David Denver. tag=2 data=Denver, David tag=3 data... more tag=1 data=The return of two party politics. by David Denver. tag=2 data=Denver, David tag=3 data=Contemporary Record. tag=4 data=4 tag=5 data=1 tag=6 data=September 1990 tag=7 data=2-5. tag=8 data=POLITICAL PARTIES tag=9 data=GREAT BRITAIN tag=10 data=The apparent collapse of support for the centre parties in opinion polls since the last general election has led many politicians and some political commentators to believe that Britain is returning to a two-party system once again. Provided by MICAH, Canberra. tag=11 data=1990/2/12 tag=12 data=570 tag=13 data=CAB
The Social Democratic Party (SDP) was perhaps the nearest thing to a 'flash' party seen in Britis... more The Social Democratic Party (SDP) was perhaps the nearest thing to a 'flash' party seen in British politics in modern times. It was formed in March 1981, largely on the initiative of four leading figures in the Labour party (Roy Jenkins, David Owen, Shirley Williams and William Rogers), following the apparent success of the left in dominating the party, and initially it had a sensational impact on British politics. It had thirty MPs by March 1982 (mostly as a result of defections by Labour MPs); in alliance with the Liberals it immediately went to first place in the opinion polls and stayed in that position until May 1982. The Alliance won four by-elections between 1981 and 1983, and in the 1983 general election, with 25.4 per cent of the vote, came within two points of ousting Labour from its second place. For the next four years the Alliance held its position and in the 1987 election its vote fell only slightly to 22.6 per cent. Immediately following the 1987 election, however, things started to go wrong for the SDP. The party decided to enter full merger negotiations with the Liberals but a group of die-hards, led by the party leader David Owen, vigorously opposed any merger. After tortuous negotiations, SDP members voted by 65 per cent to 35 per cent in favour of merger in February 1988, and the party submerged its separate identity in a new Liberal Democratic party (as it was eventually named). Opponents of merger re-established a separate 'continuing' SDP, but it performed lamentably in local elections and by-elections. In June 1990 the continuing party was formally closed down. David Owen did not seek re-election to the House of Commons in 1992 and the two remaining SDP MPs lost their seats.' Flash parties experience rapid rises in support followed by rapid declines. Public opinion, wrote Duverger, 'seems to display a sudden flash of temper, a gust of passion'. 2 It is true that the SDP did not simply collapse. Rather, the majority of members voluntarily transferred themselves to a new party. None the less, the sudden rise and subsequent disappearance of the party is close to what would be expected of a flash party and, as such, it was a unique phenomenon in modern British politics.
This book was published with incorrect imprint and published information. This has now been corre... more This book was published with incorrect imprint and published information. This has now been corrected.
In previous chapters I have been mainly concerned with survey evidence about voting behaviour in ... more In previous chapters I have been mainly concerned with survey evidence about voting behaviour in Britain. The focus has been on individual electors. In this chapter I consider election results themselves — the aggregate, net effect of the voting decisions made by individuals. There is an obvious link between individual behaviour and election results and we would expect the developments in voting behaviour at the individual level, which have been outlined in previous chapters, to be reflected at the aggregate level.
Elections are fun. In the first half of the nineteenth century, part of the fun involved the vote... more Elections are fun. In the first half of the nineteenth century, part of the fun involved the voters getting roaring drunk at the candidates’ expense, brawling in the street with opponents and pelting them with rotten fruit. The practice of candidates ‘treating’ voters was effectively ended by the Second Reform Act of 1867 which greatly enlarged the electorate. There were now simply too many voters to treat. In addition, in 1872 the Ballot Act made voting secret (previously voters had had to declare their choice in public) so that candidates could no longer check that the voters they had treated actually voted for them. Finally, in 1883, the Corrupt Practices Act outlawed treating (much to the disappointment of most voters, one suspects).
To outsiders who are non-specialists, the Irish party system has long been a source of bewilderme... more To outsiders who are non-specialists, the Irish party system has long been a source of bewilderment. Parties famously ‘without social bases’ and difficult to locate on a left–right continuum were r...
In order to appreciate fully the psephological position of the Conservative Party under David Cam... more In order to appreciate fully the psephological position of the Conservative Party under David Cameron, we first need to examine the electoral history of the party since it was last in power. When David Cameron became its leader in December 2005 the Conservative Party had been in the electoral doldrums for 13 years and under three different leaders had been badly defeated in three successive general elections. The rot began shortly after an unexpectedly comfortable victory at the 1992 general election as the popularity of John Major’s government declined very quickly and very markedly. The catalyst for this transformation was the forced withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European exchange rate mechanism (ERM) in September 1992. Billions of pounds were wasted in trying to shore up the pound but in the end there was an effective devaluation of the currency. This shook the electorate’s longstanding confidence in the ability of the Conservatives to manage the economy competently — a matter on which they had consistently outscored Labour for decades (see Denver, 1998). During the ensuing five years, Major and his party plumbed new depths of unpopularity in the opinion polls, lost thousands of council seats in local elections, failed to hold any of the eight constituencies that they defended in parliamentary by-elections and achieved their worst ever national election result (to that point) in the European elections of June 1994.
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