Aid organisations spend considerable time lobbying for aid to be sent to refugees in poorer neigh... more Aid organisations spend considerable time lobbying for aid to be sent to refugees in poorer neighboring states, rather than campaigning for more refugees to be resettled to wealthy states. Lawmakers in wealthy countries similarly tend to focus on aiding refugees abroad, rather than resettling more refugees. One moral justification raised for focusing on aid rather than resettlement is that refugees prefer to remain in neighboring countries so that they can quickly repatriate when the time is safe. Yet, few have established what refugees' preferences actually are. Drawing upon an original dataset of a representative sample of Syrian refugees in Lebanon, we find that most prefer remaining to resettling when the details of resettlement are not clarified, but roughly half prefer to relocate if offered certain types of resettlement. We further argue that organisations and states have reason to account for whether preferences are "adaptive". Adaptive preferences arise when refugees prefer remaining in neighbouring countries only when relocating to other countries is not an option. We present a novel philosophical reason for not appealing to adaptive preferences as a justification for not resettling refugees. We further apply a novel experimental method for evaluating whether preferences are adaptive.
This article considers how much harm is justified in reaching a given immigration goal. Political... more This article considers how much harm is justified in reaching a given immigration goal. Political philosophers generally overlook this question, focusing on whether states have a right to exclude immigrants in general, rather than whether certain means of exclusion are justified. For example, even if excluding new migrants during a pandemic is justified, shooting at migrants attempting to enter is likely an unjustified means of exclusion. We argue that harm against migrants in immigration enforcement must be proportional. Whether harm is proportional is dependent on the level of harm migrants experience relative to the harm immigration control averts; whether migrants are forced to migrate; whether the harm against migrants is intended; and whether the harm is instigated directly by a state vs. a non-state actor. We demonstrate that these claims regarding enforcement have implications for justice in immigration currently overlooked. Moreover, these claims are supported in a sample of citizens of the UK and US, despite general opposition to increasing migration in both countries. Drawing on an original experiment focusing on enforcement, novel in evaluating whether the public's opinions are consistent with the requirements of immigration justice, we demonstrate that opinions on enforcement are consistent with sub-principles of proportionality we present.
It is commonly claimed that, when X coerces Y into consenting to Z φ-ing, Y’s consent is invalid,... more It is commonly claimed that, when X coerces Y into consenting to Z φ-ing, Y’s consent is invalid, and Z is only permitted to φ if this reduces harm or increases optionality for Y. This article demonstrates that Y’s consent in such cases is valid if Y is choosing between options that include all those Z has a duty to offer Y, and no autonomy-reducing options Z has a duty to not offer Y. When these conditions are met, Z acts permissibly in φ-ing even if φ-ing does not reduce harm for Y or increase Y’s optionality.
This article presents the case for granting permanent residency to those experiencing significant... more This article presents the case for granting permanent residency to those experiencing significant risks throughout the Covid-19 pandemic to increase citizens' safety. Increasing safety comes in many forms: directly, as when doctors, paramedics and nurses assist patients; and indirectly, as when farmworkers produce life-sustaining food, garbage collectors protect sanitation, and social workers respond to emergency calls. A range of such workers are owed gratitude-derived duties from citizens which are best fulfilled via permanent residency. I defend this claim first for authorised migrants, and then for unauthorised migrants whose presence citizens would consent to, if aware of the benefits they provide. Finally, I defend the claim that many frontline workers not owed gratitude are owed duties of justice, acquiring similar rights to permanent residency.
Moving is hard. Moving to a new neighbourhood, city or country is difficult without money to buy ... more Moving is hard. Moving to a new neighbourhood, city or country is difficult without money to buy a bus ticket, money to pay for a visa, or even a passport from a rich country: a citizen in Afghanistan, with a GDP-per-capita of roughly $500 a year, has a close to 0% chance of obtaining any visa to any wealthy country. Wealthy countries fear that those trying to enter from poor countries will try to stay, particularly if fleeing persecution. As a result, wealthy states ensure that those most eager to escape their homes are least able to do so (Betts 2021, Shachar 2009, Kaytaz 2016). Gillian Brock's recent book, Justice for People on the Move, is an incredibly detailed account of states' duties towards people seeking to move, people unable to move, 1 and people forced to move. She compellingly defends a broad range of claims, but here I focus on one in particular: states have a right to restrict immigration if and only if they sufficiently fulfil their human rights commitments. Human rights commitments refer to states' duties to protect the basic liberty, needs and civil rights of both their own citizens, and humans more generally: states must promote human rights globally and domestically in a range of spheres to have the specific right to control immigration. For example, states lack a right to control immigration if they fail to sufficiently fight global poverty and global warming.
Some policies are not politically feasible. In the context of refugees, many claim it is not poli... more Some policies are not politically feasible. In the context of refugees, many claim it is not politically feasible to start admitting significantly more refugees into wealthy countries. In particular, it is not feasible for advocates of refugees to successfully persuade policymakers to adopt such a policy. A recent book by Alexander Betts argues that advocates should instead focus on developing the economies of lower-income countries where most refugees reside. This review essay argues that current data does not yet establish whether Betts's approach is more feasible than increasing refugee admissions to wealthy states. There are good reasons to suppose increasing refugees’ admissions to wealthy states is politically feasible, if we account for the ways citizens in wealthy states are harmed when refugees are not admitted, and for the ways citizens are harmed when immigration enforcement prevents refugees from arriving. Drawing on recent books on immigration, this essay demonstrates that enforcement against refugees constrains citizens’ freedom, well-being, and ability to hold their government to account. Further research can establish if citizens’ interest in reducing enforcement can be translated into policy changes that significantly increase the number of refugees admitted. Such research is necessary before concluding that only helping refugees in lower-income countries is feasible.
There are more refugees than many states have a duty to accept. As a result, many states are perm... more There are more refugees than many states have a duty to accept. As a result, many states are permitted to accept only some refugees and not others. This raises the question of how states should select these refugees. I defend the claim that states should resettle the worst‐off refugees, and maximize the number of refugees gaining a sufficiently decent life. When resettling the worst off conflicts with maximising the number gaining a sufficiently decent life, states should select refugees to maximise aggregate benefits, with benefits holding greater weight the further refugees are from a sufficiency threshold. The only exception to this rule is when it entails wrongful discrimination, in which case states should only follow this rule if victims of discrimination benefit and consent to its implementation.
It is widely accepted that states have a right to control immigration, but must accept refugees a... more It is widely accepted that states have a right to control immigration, but must accept refugees at risk in their home countries. If this is true, perhaps states have a right to deport refugees once their lives are no longer at risk in their home countries. I raise three types of arguments against this claim, and in support of refugees' right to remain. Citizenship-based arguments hold that refugees have a right to obtain citizenship, and with citizenship comes the right to remain. Plans-based arguments hold that refugees have a right to plan their lives, and they will struggle to plan without the right to remain. Reciprocity-based arguments hold that refugees have a right to reciprocal relationships with citizens, far easier if they know they can remain. I reject the first two arguments, and defend the third.
States are increasingly paying other states to host refugees. For example, in 2010 the EU paid Li... more States are increasingly paying other states to host refugees. For example, in 2010 the EU paid Libya €50 million to continue hosting the refugees within its borders, and five years later Australia offered Cambodia $31.16 million to accept asylum seekers living in Naru. These exchanges, which I call 'refugees markets,' have faced criticism by philosophers. Some philosophers claim the markets fail to ensure true protection, and are demeaning, expressing just how much refugees are unwanted. In response, some have defended refugee markets, claiming they can ensure refugees have protection and are not demeaned. I argue that many markets do demean refugees, and therefore have moral costs, but can still be all-things-considered preferable to alternative schemes if they protect refugees more than these alternative schemes.
Sometimes the majority of individuals accepting a service regret their decision, and we can predi... more Sometimes the majority of individuals accepting a service regret their decision, and we can predict that future recipients will feel similarly. For example, a hospital might learn that the majority of patients regret accepting a given medical intervention, and a UN agency might learn that most refugees it has helped repatriate regret returning home. I argue that agents providing services that lead to likely regret have one pro tanto reason to discontinue their services, and this reason is weighty if the service is epistemically transformative.
In April 1962 white segregationists paid money to African-Americans agreeing to leave New Orleans... more In April 1962 white segregationists paid money to African-Americans agreeing to leave New Orleans. In 2010 the British National Party proposed paying non-white migrants money to leave the United Kingdom. Five years later, a landlord in New York paid African-American tenants to vacate their apartments. This article considers when, if ever, it is morally permissible to pay minorities to leave. I argue that paying minorities to leave is demeaning towards recipients, and so wrong. Though the payments are wrong, it is not clear if they are impermissible, given the benefits for recipients. I argue that payments are impermissible if at least one of two conditions are met: the payments demean or harm other members of society who have not been paid to leave, or the payments are provided to recipients who have failed to give their valid consent to leave.
Over the past decade, millions of refugees have fled their countries of origin and asked for asyl... more Over the past decade, millions of refugees have fled their countries of origin and asked for asylum abroad. Some of these refugees do not receive asylum, but nor are they deported. Instead they are detained, or denied basic rights of residency, some forced into enclosed camps. Hoping to escape such conditions, they wish to return to unsafe countries, and ask for help from non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. In such cases, should NGOs and the UN assist refugees to return? Drawing on original data gathered in South Sudan, and existing data from around the world, I argue that they should assist with return if certain conditions are met. First, the UN and NGOs must try to put an end to coercive conditions before helping with return. Secondly, helping with return must not encourage the government to expand the use of coercive policies to encourage more to return. Finally, NGOs and the UN must ensure that refugees are fully informed of the risks of returning. Organizations must either conduct research in countries of origin or lobby the government to allow refugees to visit their countries of origin before making a final decision.
States are increasingly paying refugees to repatriate, hoping to decrease the number of refugees ... more States are increasingly paying refugees to repatriate, hoping to decrease the number of refugees residing within their borders. Drawing on in-depth interviews from East Africa, and data from Israeli Labour Statistics, I provide a description of such payment schemes, and consider whether they are morally permissible. In doing so, I address two types of cases. In the first type of case, governments pay refugees to repatriate to high-risk countries, never coercing them into returning. I argue that such payments are permissible if refugees'ʹ choices are voluntary, and states allow refugees to return to the host country in the event of an emergency. I then describe cases where states detain refugees, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) provide their own payments to refugees wishing to repatriate. In such cases, NGOs are only permitted to provide payments if the funds are sufficient to ensure post-return safety, and if providing payments does not reinforce the government's detention policy.
It is wrong to force refugees to return to the countries they fled from. It is similarly wrong, m... more It is wrong to force refugees to return to the countries they fled from. It is similarly wrong, many argue, to force migrants back to countries with life-‐‑ threatening conditions. I argue that it is additionally wrong to help such refugees and migrants voluntarily return whilst failing to inform them of the risks. Drawing on existing data, and original data from East Africa, I describe distinct types of cases where such a wrong arises. In "Misinformation Cases" officials tell refugees that it is safe to return, when it is not, and refugees return who otherwise would not have. In " Omission Cases" officials do not provide any information, true or false, on countries of origin, and refugees return but would not have, had they been better informed. In "Relevancy Cases" refugees are misinformed or uninformed, but would have returned even if better informed. In all of these cases, at least some state officials are blameworthy for their failure to inform refugees, and are engaging in a form of wrongful immigration control.
Aid organisations spend considerable time lobbying for aid to be sent to refugees in poorer neigh... more Aid organisations spend considerable time lobbying for aid to be sent to refugees in poorer neighboring states, rather than campaigning for more refugees to be resettled to wealthy states. Lawmakers in wealthy countries similarly tend to focus on aiding refugees abroad, rather than resettling more refugees. One moral justification raised for focusing on aid rather than resettlement is that refugees prefer to remain in neighboring countries so that they can quickly repatriate when the time is safe. Yet, few have established what refugees' preferences actually are. Drawing upon an original dataset of a representative sample of Syrian refugees in Lebanon, we find that most prefer remaining to resettling when the details of resettlement are not clarified, but roughly half prefer to relocate if offered certain types of resettlement. We further argue that organisations and states have reason to account for whether preferences are "adaptive". Adaptive preferences arise when refugees prefer remaining in neighbouring countries only when relocating to other countries is not an option. We present a novel philosophical reason for not appealing to adaptive preferences as a justification for not resettling refugees. We further apply a novel experimental method for evaluating whether preferences are adaptive.
This article considers how much harm is justified in reaching a given immigration goal. Political... more This article considers how much harm is justified in reaching a given immigration goal. Political philosophers generally overlook this question, focusing on whether states have a right to exclude immigrants in general, rather than whether certain means of exclusion are justified. For example, even if excluding new migrants during a pandemic is justified, shooting at migrants attempting to enter is likely an unjustified means of exclusion. We argue that harm against migrants in immigration enforcement must be proportional. Whether harm is proportional is dependent on the level of harm migrants experience relative to the harm immigration control averts; whether migrants are forced to migrate; whether the harm against migrants is intended; and whether the harm is instigated directly by a state vs. a non-state actor. We demonstrate that these claims regarding enforcement have implications for justice in immigration currently overlooked. Moreover, these claims are supported in a sample of citizens of the UK and US, despite general opposition to increasing migration in both countries. Drawing on an original experiment focusing on enforcement, novel in evaluating whether the public's opinions are consistent with the requirements of immigration justice, we demonstrate that opinions on enforcement are consistent with sub-principles of proportionality we present.
It is commonly claimed that, when X coerces Y into consenting to Z φ-ing, Y’s consent is invalid,... more It is commonly claimed that, when X coerces Y into consenting to Z φ-ing, Y’s consent is invalid, and Z is only permitted to φ if this reduces harm or increases optionality for Y. This article demonstrates that Y’s consent in such cases is valid if Y is choosing between options that include all those Z has a duty to offer Y, and no autonomy-reducing options Z has a duty to not offer Y. When these conditions are met, Z acts permissibly in φ-ing even if φ-ing does not reduce harm for Y or increase Y’s optionality.
This article presents the case for granting permanent residency to those experiencing significant... more This article presents the case for granting permanent residency to those experiencing significant risks throughout the Covid-19 pandemic to increase citizens' safety. Increasing safety comes in many forms: directly, as when doctors, paramedics and nurses assist patients; and indirectly, as when farmworkers produce life-sustaining food, garbage collectors protect sanitation, and social workers respond to emergency calls. A range of such workers are owed gratitude-derived duties from citizens which are best fulfilled via permanent residency. I defend this claim first for authorised migrants, and then for unauthorised migrants whose presence citizens would consent to, if aware of the benefits they provide. Finally, I defend the claim that many frontline workers not owed gratitude are owed duties of justice, acquiring similar rights to permanent residency.
Moving is hard. Moving to a new neighbourhood, city or country is difficult without money to buy ... more Moving is hard. Moving to a new neighbourhood, city or country is difficult without money to buy a bus ticket, money to pay for a visa, or even a passport from a rich country: a citizen in Afghanistan, with a GDP-per-capita of roughly $500 a year, has a close to 0% chance of obtaining any visa to any wealthy country. Wealthy countries fear that those trying to enter from poor countries will try to stay, particularly if fleeing persecution. As a result, wealthy states ensure that those most eager to escape their homes are least able to do so (Betts 2021, Shachar 2009, Kaytaz 2016). Gillian Brock's recent book, Justice for People on the Move, is an incredibly detailed account of states' duties towards people seeking to move, people unable to move, 1 and people forced to move. She compellingly defends a broad range of claims, but here I focus on one in particular: states have a right to restrict immigration if and only if they sufficiently fulfil their human rights commitments. Human rights commitments refer to states' duties to protect the basic liberty, needs and civil rights of both their own citizens, and humans more generally: states must promote human rights globally and domestically in a range of spheres to have the specific right to control immigration. For example, states lack a right to control immigration if they fail to sufficiently fight global poverty and global warming.
Some policies are not politically feasible. In the context of refugees, many claim it is not poli... more Some policies are not politically feasible. In the context of refugees, many claim it is not politically feasible to start admitting significantly more refugees into wealthy countries. In particular, it is not feasible for advocates of refugees to successfully persuade policymakers to adopt such a policy. A recent book by Alexander Betts argues that advocates should instead focus on developing the economies of lower-income countries where most refugees reside. This review essay argues that current data does not yet establish whether Betts's approach is more feasible than increasing refugee admissions to wealthy states. There are good reasons to suppose increasing refugees’ admissions to wealthy states is politically feasible, if we account for the ways citizens in wealthy states are harmed when refugees are not admitted, and for the ways citizens are harmed when immigration enforcement prevents refugees from arriving. Drawing on recent books on immigration, this essay demonstrates that enforcement against refugees constrains citizens’ freedom, well-being, and ability to hold their government to account. Further research can establish if citizens’ interest in reducing enforcement can be translated into policy changes that significantly increase the number of refugees admitted. Such research is necessary before concluding that only helping refugees in lower-income countries is feasible.
There are more refugees than many states have a duty to accept. As a result, many states are perm... more There are more refugees than many states have a duty to accept. As a result, many states are permitted to accept only some refugees and not others. This raises the question of how states should select these refugees. I defend the claim that states should resettle the worst‐off refugees, and maximize the number of refugees gaining a sufficiently decent life. When resettling the worst off conflicts with maximising the number gaining a sufficiently decent life, states should select refugees to maximise aggregate benefits, with benefits holding greater weight the further refugees are from a sufficiency threshold. The only exception to this rule is when it entails wrongful discrimination, in which case states should only follow this rule if victims of discrimination benefit and consent to its implementation.
It is widely accepted that states have a right to control immigration, but must accept refugees a... more It is widely accepted that states have a right to control immigration, but must accept refugees at risk in their home countries. If this is true, perhaps states have a right to deport refugees once their lives are no longer at risk in their home countries. I raise three types of arguments against this claim, and in support of refugees' right to remain. Citizenship-based arguments hold that refugees have a right to obtain citizenship, and with citizenship comes the right to remain. Plans-based arguments hold that refugees have a right to plan their lives, and they will struggle to plan without the right to remain. Reciprocity-based arguments hold that refugees have a right to reciprocal relationships with citizens, far easier if they know they can remain. I reject the first two arguments, and defend the third.
States are increasingly paying other states to host refugees. For example, in 2010 the EU paid Li... more States are increasingly paying other states to host refugees. For example, in 2010 the EU paid Libya €50 million to continue hosting the refugees within its borders, and five years later Australia offered Cambodia $31.16 million to accept asylum seekers living in Naru. These exchanges, which I call 'refugees markets,' have faced criticism by philosophers. Some philosophers claim the markets fail to ensure true protection, and are demeaning, expressing just how much refugees are unwanted. In response, some have defended refugee markets, claiming they can ensure refugees have protection and are not demeaned. I argue that many markets do demean refugees, and therefore have moral costs, but can still be all-things-considered preferable to alternative schemes if they protect refugees more than these alternative schemes.
Sometimes the majority of individuals accepting a service regret their decision, and we can predi... more Sometimes the majority of individuals accepting a service regret their decision, and we can predict that future recipients will feel similarly. For example, a hospital might learn that the majority of patients regret accepting a given medical intervention, and a UN agency might learn that most refugees it has helped repatriate regret returning home. I argue that agents providing services that lead to likely regret have one pro tanto reason to discontinue their services, and this reason is weighty if the service is epistemically transformative.
In April 1962 white segregationists paid money to African-Americans agreeing to leave New Orleans... more In April 1962 white segregationists paid money to African-Americans agreeing to leave New Orleans. In 2010 the British National Party proposed paying non-white migrants money to leave the United Kingdom. Five years later, a landlord in New York paid African-American tenants to vacate their apartments. This article considers when, if ever, it is morally permissible to pay minorities to leave. I argue that paying minorities to leave is demeaning towards recipients, and so wrong. Though the payments are wrong, it is not clear if they are impermissible, given the benefits for recipients. I argue that payments are impermissible if at least one of two conditions are met: the payments demean or harm other members of society who have not been paid to leave, or the payments are provided to recipients who have failed to give their valid consent to leave.
Over the past decade, millions of refugees have fled their countries of origin and asked for asyl... more Over the past decade, millions of refugees have fled their countries of origin and asked for asylum abroad. Some of these refugees do not receive asylum, but nor are they deported. Instead they are detained, or denied basic rights of residency, some forced into enclosed camps. Hoping to escape such conditions, they wish to return to unsafe countries, and ask for help from non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. In such cases, should NGOs and the UN assist refugees to return? Drawing on original data gathered in South Sudan, and existing data from around the world, I argue that they should assist with return if certain conditions are met. First, the UN and NGOs must try to put an end to coercive conditions before helping with return. Secondly, helping with return must not encourage the government to expand the use of coercive policies to encourage more to return. Finally, NGOs and the UN must ensure that refugees are fully informed of the risks of returning. Organizations must either conduct research in countries of origin or lobby the government to allow refugees to visit their countries of origin before making a final decision.
States are increasingly paying refugees to repatriate, hoping to decrease the number of refugees ... more States are increasingly paying refugees to repatriate, hoping to decrease the number of refugees residing within their borders. Drawing on in-depth interviews from East Africa, and data from Israeli Labour Statistics, I provide a description of such payment schemes, and consider whether they are morally permissible. In doing so, I address two types of cases. In the first type of case, governments pay refugees to repatriate to high-risk countries, never coercing them into returning. I argue that such payments are permissible if refugees'ʹ choices are voluntary, and states allow refugees to return to the host country in the event of an emergency. I then describe cases where states detain refugees, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) provide their own payments to refugees wishing to repatriate. In such cases, NGOs are only permitted to provide payments if the funds are sufficient to ensure post-return safety, and if providing payments does not reinforce the government's detention policy.
It is wrong to force refugees to return to the countries they fled from. It is similarly wrong, m... more It is wrong to force refugees to return to the countries they fled from. It is similarly wrong, many argue, to force migrants back to countries with life-‐‑ threatening conditions. I argue that it is additionally wrong to help such refugees and migrants voluntarily return whilst failing to inform them of the risks. Drawing on existing data, and original data from East Africa, I describe distinct types of cases where such a wrong arises. In "Misinformation Cases" officials tell refugees that it is safe to return, when it is not, and refugees return who otherwise would not have. In " Omission Cases" officials do not provide any information, true or false, on countries of origin, and refugees return but would not have, had they been better informed. In "Relevancy Cases" refugees are misinformed or uninformed, but would have returned even if better informed. In all of these cases, at least some state officials are blameworthy for their failure to inform refugees, and are engaging in a form of wrongful immigration control.
Uploads
Papers by Mollie Gerver