Papers by Rikke Hostrup Haugbølle
Ræson, 2023
En ny rapport slår endegyldigt fast, at Tunesien ikke længere er et demokrati. Autokratiseringen ... more En ny rapport slår endegyldigt fast, at Tunesien ikke længere er et demokrati. Autokratiseringen af landet er i acceleration, men den tunesiske præsident Saied står samtidig over for det samme problem, der udløste regimeskiftet under Det Arabiske Forår: En kritisk økonomiske situation, der kun ser ud til at blive værre." Analyse af Rikke Hostrup Haugbølle .
Ræson, 2021
Set indefra, og især fra den brede, tunesiske befolkning, har det været
så som så med jubel over... more Set indefra, og især fra den brede, tunesiske befolkning, har det været
så som så med jubel over det, der er vundet siden Det Folkelige Oprør i 2010-2011. Halvvejs gennem 10 års- jubilæumsåret kom den såkaldte ’demokrati-proces’ også til en brat opbremsning. I juli fyrede den nuværende præsident Kaïs Saïed, der blev valgt ved et fair og demokratisk valg i efteråret 2019, premierministeren, sendte parlamentsmedlemmerne hjem, fratog dem deres immunitet, så de nu kunne retsforfølges, og spærrede parlamentsbygningen af ved hjælp fra sikkerhedsstyrkerne. Den folkevalgte forsamling var sat ud af spillet – eller ’frosset’, som man kaldte det i Tunesien. Derudover tildelte præsidenten sig selv retten til at bestemme alene per dekret, han satte en række fremtrædende personer i husarrest, placerede sikkerhedsstyrker foran det nationale TV- og radiohus og stormede den arabiske satellitkanal Al Jazeeras kontor og lukkede det.
Dermed forsøgte han at sikre sig, at det var ham, der styrede, hvilke nyheder og informationer, tuneserne fik. I første omgang proklamerede han, at det ville være gældende i en måned. Men i august 2021 meddelte Saïed så, at suspenderingen af parlamentet og de øvrige tiltag ville gælde
’foreløbigt’ – altså uden slutdato.
National Dialogue Handbook: Case Studies, Feb 1, 2017
On July 25, 2013 the drafting of a new constitution by the Tunisian Constitutional Assembly reach... more On July 25, 2013 the drafting of a new constitution by the Tunisian Constitutional Assembly reached a complete impasse, following the assassination of opposition politician Mohamed Brahmi that very day. Fears mounted that the fragile democratization process would come to a halt. In 2011, free and fair elections had brought the Islamist democratic party Ennahda to power, which had formed a government with two smaller opposition parties. Simultaneously, other " old " opposition forces underwent internal reforms and strengthened their position in the new political landscape. Instead of building strong coalitions, these " old " forces reactivated old struggles and disputes. Only in July 2013, during the critical moment, did the political forces realize that they needed to enter into negotiations and dialogue with each other to save the country. The so-called Quartet was formed, which managed to convince most parties represented in the National Constitutional Assembly to accept their road map and enter into negotiations focusing on three main issues: governmental, constitutional and electoral. The National Dialogue did not unfold as a well-planned process with a thought-through design, but rather was a response to an acute political crisis. Hence, the Tunisian National Dialogue served as an instrument for crisis management, implemented while the crisis was still unfolding. The Tunisian National Dialogue was an ad hoc process, with many actors engaged on different levels and several parts of the process taking place at the same time.
Middle East Report, 2012
On October 23, 2011, for the first time since independence in 1956, Tunisians were called to the ... more On October 23, 2011, for the first time since independence in 1956, Tunisians were called to the polls in free and transparent elections. They were to choose 217 members of a Constitutional Assembly that for a year would play a double role: drafting a new constitution and governing the country. For many Tunisians, as well as foreigners, the results were something of a surprise. First, the turnout was lower than expected, hovering just over 53 percent, despite serious efforts by the Electoral Commission to get out the vote. Many ordinary Tunisians, it appears, are skeptical of the political transformation in the country since the ouster of Zine El Abidine Ben Ali. Second, the victory of the Islamist party Ennahda was much larger than anticipated. Opinion surveys taken beforehand had predicted the party’s first-place finish, but with a vote oscillating between 20 and 28 percent of the total. In the end, Ennahda obtained 41.7 percent of the vote and, more significantly, won 89 seats in the Constitutional Assembly, by far the largest bloc. Third, secular and leftist parties put in a solid performance (though not up to expectations), but their divisions split the secular electorate. No party except Ennahda, therefore, garnered more than 8 percent of the ballot.
The Journal of North African Studies, 2015
This article analyses ‘new expressions of Islam’ in Tunisia before the popular uprising in 2010–2... more This article analyses ‘new expressions of Islam’ in Tunisia before the popular uprising in 2010–2011. It does so from an ethnographic approach through which the researcher follows people as they go about their daily lives. The four ‘new expressions’ which constitute the framework of the analysis are new in the sense that they have not been presented before, have a twist to them in either message or form, and have attracted very little attention from scholars both inside and outside Tunisia. The article concludes that Islam did not disappear in the decades under President Bourguiba and Ben Ali's rule, but shifted from the public to the private realm; that pictures, sounds, and changes in the physical surroundings created by the regimes within the area of Islam were important factors for peoples’ experience of being in society; that many Tunisians were searching for values which could counter other changes in society; and that society did not remain silent, passive, or immune to reforms launched by the regime, but reacted and responded in ways which were originally detached from the regime and politics.
Popular Protest in the New Middle East, 2014
This chapter examines the paradox of Tunisian Islamism benefiting from an uprising where Islamism... more This chapter examines the paradox of Tunisian Islamism benefiting from an uprising where Islamism, with its actors and slogans, was absent. The study focuses primarily on al-Nahda and explains the reasons for its success in the elections for the constitutional assembly in October 2011. It is argued that, paradoxically, such success owes much to the fact that its stances and political programmes do not seem very ‘Islamist’ in so far as they do not prioritise religion as the central element of policy-making and are rooted in an Islamic associational life that existed before the uprising. By focusing on this particular topic we move away from the debate on the authoritarianism of the regime and the reasons for its fall, opting to examine instead how Islam, which had been absent from public life in Tunisia for a long time, went through considerable changes as a means of promoting social mobilisation precisely through its individualisation and, almost, privatisation. The chapter explores the connections and linkages between al-Nahda the political party and Islamic associational life and personal piety to explain the party’s success in adopting what might be termed ‘post-Islamism’.
The Making of the Tunisian Revolution, 2013
Given these shortcomings [or existing theoretical 'takes' on the role of the media in the Tunisia... more Given these shortcomings [or existing theoretical 'takes' on the role of the media in the Tunisian uprising], then, how should we approach the role of the media in the Tunisian uprising? It seems necessary to raise questions that allow us to dig deeper into this issue and that can inform us more accurately about the role of the Tunisian media and about the broader conditions and developments prior to the uprising. Instead of asking, “Was it a Facebook Revolution?” the questions must be broadened to the following: What role did the internet and social media play? When? And how? Should the influence of satellite TV and especially Al-Jazeera be rejected? Did any other media play a role and if so what and how? Such questions are the point of departure
for the following analysis of the role of the media in the Tunisian uprising. The
chapter is divided into two major sections. The first section explores the historiography of various media reforms and initiatives that were carried out after Ben
Ali came to power in 1987. I discuss the impact that the introduction of these
media had on Tunisians. The mapping of the media ensemble reveals that while
the first media reforms leading to, among other things, the introduction of the
internet in Tunisia were part of a strategy of upgrading Tunisians’ skills, later
reforms were part of a strategy of upgrading the authoritarian regime. At any
rate, all the media reforms were factors that contributed, however indirectly, to
the fall of the regime. This becomes clear in the second section of the chapter
which explores the question of the role of the various media in the 2010–11
uprising. I do this through a comparative study of the Gafsa uprising in 2008
and the uprising in 2010–11. Although the two uprisings have many similarities,
they differ on one important point: the Gafsa uprising remained locally confined
while the 2010–11 uprising came to national and transnational attention. One
of the recent developments of the Tunisian media landscape is the introduction
in 2010 of wireless internet and new providers of cellphone services. This seems
to have played a decisive role in the first days of the uprisings in 2010, but was
unavailable in Gafsa in 2008.
Journal of North African Studies, 2011
The concept of authoritarian upgrading introduced by Heydemann significantly contributes to expla... more The concept of authoritarian upgrading introduced by Heydemann significantly contributes to explain how Arab authoritarian rulers have been able to maintain their grip on power while introducing a number of liberal reforms. The media reform in Tunisia has been widely interpreted indeed as one of those liberal reforms implemented to give domestic and international constituencies the sentiment that genuine liberalisation is under way in the country and it has therefore been dismissed as a fac¸ade reform. While this interpretation contains a degree of validity, this paper challenges the notion that the reform is exclusively about authoritarian upgrading. Perhaps unwittingly, the reform has permitted the arrival on the media scene of new social voices and actors that never had the opportunity to discuss taboo topics and this transforms public debate. While political discussions were excluded and political pluralism absent, the new private media managed to challenge previously prevailing notions of national unity and homogeneity.
Udenrigs
Rikke Hostrup Haugbølle & Julie Pruzan-Jørgensen om Tunesiens vej mod demokrati efter en væltet r... more Rikke Hostrup Haugbølle & Julie Pruzan-Jørgensen om Tunesiens vej mod demokrati efter en væltet regering.
• Use as a point of departure the guide to the good story provided by the study when actors elabo... more • Use as a point of departure the guide to the good story provided by the study when actors elaborate their storytelling. • That the MFA uses the documentation sheet layout provided by the study, containing qualitative as well as quantitative measurement and documentation of dialogue under the 'dialogue objective'. In the concluding remarks the study points to the need for future studies of dialogue within other modalities than the partnership modality, the impact of the 'dialogue objective' and a closer study of dialogue under the reform objective. Finally, the study suggests a future reconsideration of the overall frame of the DAPP, establishing a more self-confident narrative about the Danish experience of dialogue which could inform EU foreign policy, and considering the potential of dialogic interaction with new and old drivers of transition and democratisation in the MENA region for future engagement with the area.
Http Dx Doi Org 10 1080 13629395 2012 694043, Jul 1, 2012
Rather than concentrating on potential explanations for the Tunisian uprising or focusing on the ... more Rather than concentrating on potential explanations for the Tunisian uprising or focusing on the future challenges the country has, this article looks back at the time of Ben Ali and the mythology that the regime created around political, economic and social development in Tunisia. The article argues that the authoritarian resilience paradigm and the democratization one tended to obscure the complexity of Tunisian society and how it reacted and adapted to the policies the regime implemented over the course of more than two ...
Udenrigs
Libyske regeringsrepræsentanter på rundrejse i EU sælger Libyen som mulighedernes land for invest... more Libyske regeringsrepræsentanter på rundrejse i EU sælger Libyen som mulighedernes land for investeringer, analyser peger optimistisk på økonomisk fremgang i landet, og EU-repræsentanter står i kø for at rose det gode samarbejde. Men økonomisk fremgang og politisk samarbejde gør det ikke alene.
The Journal of North African Studies
Babylon Nordic Journal of Middle East Studies
Den ideologi, der blev grundlaget for alt i det nye selvstændige Tunisien, videreføres af det sid... more Den ideologi, der blev grundlaget for alt i det nye selvstændige Tunisien, videreføres af det siddende regime i dag. Også på en række andre områder er Tunesien præget af den post-protektorate arv. En stor del af årsagen til, at såvel økonomiske som politiske reformer ikke har medført pluralisme og demokrati skal findes netop i det faværende opgør med denne post-protektorate arv.
Babylon Nordic Journal of Middle East Studies
I 2003 lancerede Tunesiens præsident Ben Ali en liberalisering af medielandskabet, der betød at p... more I 2003 lancerede Tunesiens præsident Ben Ali en liberalisering af medielandskabet, der betød at private, tunesiske radio- og tv-stationer for første gang blev lanceret. En nærmere indsigt i disse nye medier viser blandt andet, at de blev lanceret for at sikre regimets magt.
Tidsskrift for Islamforskning, 2017
I stedet for et abstract er her begyndelsen på indledningen: Med lanceringen af den arabiske sate... more I stedet for et abstract er her begyndelsen på indledningen: Med lanceringen af den arabiske satellit TV-kanal al-Jazeera i 1996 og den første islamiske satellitkanal Iqra’ i 1998 samt internet og mobiltelefoner skabtes der arabiske offentligheder, hvor det på nye måder blev muligt for muslimer og arabere at kommunikere og interagere med hinanden på tværs af nationale grænser og ofte uden for regimernes agendaer. Over en lidt længere periode, siden 1970’erne, fandt forskellige former for islamisk vækkelse sted i den arabiske verden. Disse parallelle udviklinger – nye typer af medier, større mulighed for kommunikation og nye fortolkninger af islam – har været med til at ændre islamiske normer, udfordret politiske strategier og styrket nye og gamle identiteter i de arabiske lande. De over 700 nye arabiske og 47 islamiske satellitkanaler samt internet debatfora og sociale medier har spillet en væsentlig rolle i denne udvikling. (...)
Tidsskrift for Islamforskning, 2017
Tidsskrift for Islamforskning, 2017
In 2007 Tunisia’s first Islamic radio channel, Radio Zitouna, was launched. The year before, in 2... more In 2007 Tunisia’s first Islamic radio channel, Radio Zitouna, was launched. The year before, in 2006, a public expression of Islam by the population culminated when Ben Ali and his regime cracked down on women wearing the Islamic veil in public. Same year the regime caught an Islamist group planning an attack on strategic places and the president and therefore described by the regime as terrorists. With a point of departure in the theories presented by studies of the Arab authoritarian regimes it would be obvious to explain the launch of Radio Zitouna as a regime response to a threat against one of its power strongholds, Islam. However, this article widens the perspective of Radio Zitouna and includes other aspects than the relation between the radio station and the regime. Bases on analysis of a number of programmes broadcast from 2007 to 2009 and interviews with the staff at the radio station in 2009 and 2010 the article presents other contexts which do not only link to the curren...
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Papers by Rikke Hostrup Haugbølle
så som så med jubel over det, der er vundet siden Det Folkelige Oprør i 2010-2011. Halvvejs gennem 10 års- jubilæumsåret kom den såkaldte ’demokrati-proces’ også til en brat opbremsning. I juli fyrede den nuværende præsident Kaïs Saïed, der blev valgt ved et fair og demokratisk valg i efteråret 2019, premierministeren, sendte parlamentsmedlemmerne hjem, fratog dem deres immunitet, så de nu kunne retsforfølges, og spærrede parlamentsbygningen af ved hjælp fra sikkerhedsstyrkerne. Den folkevalgte forsamling var sat ud af spillet – eller ’frosset’, som man kaldte det i Tunesien. Derudover tildelte præsidenten sig selv retten til at bestemme alene per dekret, han satte en række fremtrædende personer i husarrest, placerede sikkerhedsstyrker foran det nationale TV- og radiohus og stormede den arabiske satellitkanal Al Jazeeras kontor og lukkede det.
Dermed forsøgte han at sikre sig, at det var ham, der styrede, hvilke nyheder og informationer, tuneserne fik. I første omgang proklamerede han, at det ville være gældende i en måned. Men i august 2021 meddelte Saïed så, at suspenderingen af parlamentet og de øvrige tiltag ville gælde
’foreløbigt’ – altså uden slutdato.
for the following analysis of the role of the media in the Tunisian uprising. The
chapter is divided into two major sections. The first section explores the historiography of various media reforms and initiatives that were carried out after Ben
Ali came to power in 1987. I discuss the impact that the introduction of these
media had on Tunisians. The mapping of the media ensemble reveals that while
the first media reforms leading to, among other things, the introduction of the
internet in Tunisia were part of a strategy of upgrading Tunisians’ skills, later
reforms were part of a strategy of upgrading the authoritarian regime. At any
rate, all the media reforms were factors that contributed, however indirectly, to
the fall of the regime. This becomes clear in the second section of the chapter
which explores the question of the role of the various media in the 2010–11
uprising. I do this through a comparative study of the Gafsa uprising in 2008
and the uprising in 2010–11. Although the two uprisings have many similarities,
they differ on one important point: the Gafsa uprising remained locally confined
while the 2010–11 uprising came to national and transnational attention. One
of the recent developments of the Tunisian media landscape is the introduction
in 2010 of wireless internet and new providers of cellphone services. This seems
to have played a decisive role in the first days of the uprisings in 2010, but was
unavailable in Gafsa in 2008.
så som så med jubel over det, der er vundet siden Det Folkelige Oprør i 2010-2011. Halvvejs gennem 10 års- jubilæumsåret kom den såkaldte ’demokrati-proces’ også til en brat opbremsning. I juli fyrede den nuværende præsident Kaïs Saïed, der blev valgt ved et fair og demokratisk valg i efteråret 2019, premierministeren, sendte parlamentsmedlemmerne hjem, fratog dem deres immunitet, så de nu kunne retsforfølges, og spærrede parlamentsbygningen af ved hjælp fra sikkerhedsstyrkerne. Den folkevalgte forsamling var sat ud af spillet – eller ’frosset’, som man kaldte det i Tunesien. Derudover tildelte præsidenten sig selv retten til at bestemme alene per dekret, han satte en række fremtrædende personer i husarrest, placerede sikkerhedsstyrker foran det nationale TV- og radiohus og stormede den arabiske satellitkanal Al Jazeeras kontor og lukkede det.
Dermed forsøgte han at sikre sig, at det var ham, der styrede, hvilke nyheder og informationer, tuneserne fik. I første omgang proklamerede han, at det ville være gældende i en måned. Men i august 2021 meddelte Saïed så, at suspenderingen af parlamentet og de øvrige tiltag ville gælde
’foreløbigt’ – altså uden slutdato.
for the following analysis of the role of the media in the Tunisian uprising. The
chapter is divided into two major sections. The first section explores the historiography of various media reforms and initiatives that were carried out after Ben
Ali came to power in 1987. I discuss the impact that the introduction of these
media had on Tunisians. The mapping of the media ensemble reveals that while
the first media reforms leading to, among other things, the introduction of the
internet in Tunisia were part of a strategy of upgrading Tunisians’ skills, later
reforms were part of a strategy of upgrading the authoritarian regime. At any
rate, all the media reforms were factors that contributed, however indirectly, to
the fall of the regime. This becomes clear in the second section of the chapter
which explores the question of the role of the various media in the 2010–11
uprising. I do this through a comparative study of the Gafsa uprising in 2008
and the uprising in 2010–11. Although the two uprisings have many similarities,
they differ on one important point: the Gafsa uprising remained locally confined
while the 2010–11 uprising came to national and transnational attention. One
of the recent developments of the Tunisian media landscape is the introduction
in 2010 of wireless internet and new providers of cellphone services. This seems
to have played a decisive role in the first days of the uprisings in 2010, but was
unavailable in Gafsa in 2008.