Dans un contexte français marqué par le développement des barèmes judiciaires, cet article propos... more Dans un contexte français marqué par le développement des barèmes judiciaires, cet article propose une analyse économique de ces derniers, centrée sur les acteurs du litige : juges et justiciables. Après avoir présenté les différentes formes que pouvait prendre un barème judiciaire, l'article, qui prend appui sur une revue de littérature, met en évidence que les barèmes peuvent être envisagés comme des outils d'aide à la décision qui, en fournissant de l'information aux justiciables et en cadrant (plus ou moins fortement selon leur nature) le pouvoir discrétionnaire des juges, jouent un double rôle : incitatif et normatif. Barème-décision de justice-négociation-juge Guidelines: Decision-Making Tools for Litigants and Judges In a French context characterized by the development of judicial guidelines, we propose a review of the economic literature on guidelines focusing on the actors of litigation: judges and litigants. We identify two functions of guidelines, considered as decisionmaking tools that provide information to litigants and frame the discretionary power of judges (more or less strongly depending on their nature): incentive and normative. Guidelines-legal decision-making-negotiation-judge Classification JEL: K40, K41, K15 1. Cet article est issu d'une recherche qui a bénéficié du soutien de la Mission recherche Droit et Justice (Bourreau-Dubois et al. [2019]).
The aim of this note is to analyze to the extent to which causation requirement is consistent wit... more The aim of this note is to analyze to the extent to which causation requirement is consistent with the provision of efficient incentives to potential tortfeasors. Specifically, we study focus on the role of the well-known “but for” or “sine qua non” test. According to the “but for” test, an action is a “sine qua non” condition of an accident if, given the state of the world, the accident would not have occurred had another action been taken. Thus, the ”but for” test seems to isolate something we care a lot about in explaining events and in assessing responsability: the idea that the defendant’s act makes a difference. Reaching beyond the sole ”metaphysical” interest of this causation concept, the theoretical analysis developed in this paper investigates to what extent the “but for” causation requirement has a deterrence effect on the behavior of potential tortfeasors, particularly in situations where the tort system may provide sub-optimal incentives. Already Pigou (1920) emphasized...
Real world contracts often contain incentive clauses that fail to fully specify conditions trigge... more Real world contracts often contain incentive clauses that fail to fully specify conditions triggering payments, giving rise to legal disputes. When complete contract generate Pareto efficient allocations the L&E literature advocates that courts should fill in the missing clauses. This logic does not directly extend to environments with moral hazard, where complete contracts result in constrained efficient allocations. Despite this inefficiency we find that when agency and marginal agency costs are congruent, the legal system can do no better than guide its courts to complete contracts according to the parties' intentions.
We model the decision by two contestants to select one of two con ‡ict resolution forums in which... more We model the decision by two contestants to select one of two con ‡ict resolution forums in which to address their con…ct; alternative dispute resolution (ADR) or litigation. Given a forum, we represent the parties'behavior by a Tullock contest. Because of the additional constraints disputants face in courts, we assume that the cost structure of providing e¤ective legal arguments is higher under litigation. Paradoxically, litigation may be procedurally more e¢ cient in equilibrium. The …nal choice of the parties is based on their respective utility and we show that a tension may arise with procedural e¢ ciency. Finally, we also show that the timing of the decision of the con ‡ict resolution mechanism (before or after the con…ct arises) a¤ects the choices the parties make.
L’article analyse les principaux enjeux de la transformation numerique sur les activites juridiqu... more L’article analyse les principaux enjeux de la transformation numerique sur les activites juridiques et sur les professionnels du droit. Il s’agit a la fois de comprendre les effets sur la pratique juridique du fait de l’emergence d’une large gamme de nouveaux services et de reflechir aux conditions dans lesquelles ces nouveaux outils doivent etre utilises, s’agissant notamment de la collecte et du traitement des donnees judiciaires. L’intelligence artificielle est un outil a la disposition des juristes, qui doivent se l’approprier d’une maniere responsable.
This paper investigates a new dataset of franchise networks in nine countries in order to assess ... more This paper investigates a new dataset of franchise networks in nine countries in order to assess whether and to what extent do institutions influence the practice of franchising. Our regressions relate the structure of franchise networks (the rate of franchised units as opposed to corporate units) to individual parameters supposed to reflect the extent of moral hazards on the franchisor's and franchisee's sides and, more specifically, to various institutional parameters of the franchisor's country, namely, the legal tradition, the level of procedural formalism, the constraints imposed by labour regulation and the effectiveness of trademark protection. While agency theory parameters seem to perform rather badly in this international setting, institutions such as trademark protection and labour regulation have more explanatory power: greater trademark protection encourages franchising and the impact of labour regulation is mostly positive, depending on the type of labour regulation that is being considered. The effect of legal tradition and formalism seems negligible once these parameters are taken in.
Tous droits réservés pour tous pays. La reproduction ou représentation de cet article, notamment ... more Tous droits réservés pour tous pays. La reproduction ou représentation de cet article, notamment par photocopie, n'est autorisée que dans les limites des conditions générales d'utilisation du site ou, le cas échéant, des conditions générales de la licence souscrite par votre établissement. Toute autre reproduction ou représentation, en tout ou partie, sous quelque forme et de quelque manière que ce soit, est interdite sauf accord préalable et écrit de l'éditeur, en dehors des cas prévus par la législation en vigueur en France. Il est précisé que son stockage dans une base de données est également interdit.
We consider four essential modalities of assuring trade: namely, the use of self-governance struc... more We consider four essential modalities of assuring trade: namely, the use of self-governance structures, reputation entrepreneurs, national courts and arbitration. We offer several implications from the comparison of these governance structures. First, self-governance and reputation entrepreneurs may seek to limit their member’s access to formal court enforcement. Second, in addition to being an enforcer of contracts, courts also operate as reputation propagators as because of their public quality and formal, generally discoverable, records. Third, a key function of modern arbitration is its ability to separate enforcement of awards from reputation. Given that type 1 and 2 errors are prone to occur, traders who receive negative judgments in court may lose much more than what the adjudicator orders them to pay. By maintaining confidentiality in arbitral awards, traders are more able to defend their claims without excessive risk to their reputations. Additional implications of the inte...
According to Posner, the economic approach has both positive and normative components. The positi... more According to Posner, the economic approach has both positive and normative components. The positive approach attempts to explain legal rules and outcomes as they are. These explanations essentially seek to determine whether legal doctrines are efficient. The normative approach provides a standard for both judges and legislators. Posner’s fundamental positive claim is that common law doctrines are generally efficient. The central hypothesis of the positive economic analysis of law is that Anglo-American judges maximize social wealth through the common law process by fashioning rules that promote efficiency. He argues that by transforming inefficient rules into efficient ones, judges realize the « essential nature of the common law ».
We present an analysis of the degree of legal centralization in a setting where people are averse... more We present an analysis of the degree of legal centralization in a setting where people are averse to inequality before the law. In this approach inspired by Tocqueville, the degree of legal centralization is determined by striking a balance between equality before the law and attention to local needs. We show that there is a threshold which is such that when the intensity of aversion to inequality before the law is below this threshold legal decentralization is preferred to legal centralization (and conversely). We also show that the optimal way to balance the desire for local adjustments and national uniformity is not an intermediate degree of centralization but to have nationally uniform rules that can be adapted by judges. We rely on these results to provide an analytical narrative to the abrupt change from legal diversity to full legal centralization and uniformization around the time of the French Revolution in 1789. JEL Classification: K40, N40.
We develop a model of venal judicial offices, i.e., sales of public positions in the judicial sec... more We develop a model of venal judicial offices, i.e., sales of public positions in the judicial sector, which were used extensively in France (and many other European countries) during the 17th and 18th centuries, and which led to vastly improved French State capacity despite limited opportunities to raise taxes and to borrow. In this model, venality provides financial resources for the ruler, at the cost of less control over judicial decisions. We rely on this model to provide an analytic narrative of the rise and the decline of venality in Old Regime France. JEL Classification Numbers : JEL Classification: K40, N40. *We thank Claudine Desrieux, Michael Faure, David Le Bris, Peter Leeson, Marie Obidzinski, Gabrielle Smart, Giovanni Battista Ramello and Mehrdad Vahabi for helpful comment on previous versions of this work. †Université Panthéon-Assas, Paris II, CRED, EA 7321, 21 Rue Valette 75005 PARIS, [email protected]. ‡Université Panthéon-Assas, Paris II, CRED, EA 7321, 2...
Dans un contexte français marqué par le développement des barèmes judiciaires, cet article propos... more Dans un contexte français marqué par le développement des barèmes judiciaires, cet article propose une analyse économique de ces derniers, centrée sur les acteurs du litige : juges et justiciables. Après avoir présenté les différentes formes que pouvait prendre un barème judiciaire, l'article, qui prend appui sur une revue de littérature, met en évidence que les barèmes peuvent être envisagés comme des outils d'aide à la décision qui, en fournissant de l'information aux justiciables et en cadrant (plus ou moins fortement selon leur nature) le pouvoir discrétionnaire des juges, jouent un double rôle : incitatif et normatif. Barème-décision de justice-négociation-juge Guidelines: Decision-Making Tools for Litigants and Judges In a French context characterized by the development of judicial guidelines, we propose a review of the economic literature on guidelines focusing on the actors of litigation: judges and litigants. We identify two functions of guidelines, considered as decisionmaking tools that provide information to litigants and frame the discretionary power of judges (more or less strongly depending on their nature): incentive and normative. Guidelines-legal decision-making-negotiation-judge Classification JEL: K40, K41, K15 1. Cet article est issu d'une recherche qui a bénéficié du soutien de la Mission recherche Droit et Justice (Bourreau-Dubois et al. [2019]).
The aim of this note is to analyze to the extent to which causation requirement is consistent wit... more The aim of this note is to analyze to the extent to which causation requirement is consistent with the provision of efficient incentives to potential tortfeasors. Specifically, we study focus on the role of the well-known “but for” or “sine qua non” test. According to the “but for” test, an action is a “sine qua non” condition of an accident if, given the state of the world, the accident would not have occurred had another action been taken. Thus, the ”but for” test seems to isolate something we care a lot about in explaining events and in assessing responsability: the idea that the defendant’s act makes a difference. Reaching beyond the sole ”metaphysical” interest of this causation concept, the theoretical analysis developed in this paper investigates to what extent the “but for” causation requirement has a deterrence effect on the behavior of potential tortfeasors, particularly in situations where the tort system may provide sub-optimal incentives. Already Pigou (1920) emphasized...
Real world contracts often contain incentive clauses that fail to fully specify conditions trigge... more Real world contracts often contain incentive clauses that fail to fully specify conditions triggering payments, giving rise to legal disputes. When complete contract generate Pareto efficient allocations the L&E literature advocates that courts should fill in the missing clauses. This logic does not directly extend to environments with moral hazard, where complete contracts result in constrained efficient allocations. Despite this inefficiency we find that when agency and marginal agency costs are congruent, the legal system can do no better than guide its courts to complete contracts according to the parties' intentions.
We model the decision by two contestants to select one of two con ‡ict resolution forums in which... more We model the decision by two contestants to select one of two con ‡ict resolution forums in which to address their con…ct; alternative dispute resolution (ADR) or litigation. Given a forum, we represent the parties'behavior by a Tullock contest. Because of the additional constraints disputants face in courts, we assume that the cost structure of providing e¤ective legal arguments is higher under litigation. Paradoxically, litigation may be procedurally more e¢ cient in equilibrium. The …nal choice of the parties is based on their respective utility and we show that a tension may arise with procedural e¢ ciency. Finally, we also show that the timing of the decision of the con ‡ict resolution mechanism (before or after the con…ct arises) a¤ects the choices the parties make.
L’article analyse les principaux enjeux de la transformation numerique sur les activites juridiqu... more L’article analyse les principaux enjeux de la transformation numerique sur les activites juridiques et sur les professionnels du droit. Il s’agit a la fois de comprendre les effets sur la pratique juridique du fait de l’emergence d’une large gamme de nouveaux services et de reflechir aux conditions dans lesquelles ces nouveaux outils doivent etre utilises, s’agissant notamment de la collecte et du traitement des donnees judiciaires. L’intelligence artificielle est un outil a la disposition des juristes, qui doivent se l’approprier d’une maniere responsable.
This paper investigates a new dataset of franchise networks in nine countries in order to assess ... more This paper investigates a new dataset of franchise networks in nine countries in order to assess whether and to what extent do institutions influence the practice of franchising. Our regressions relate the structure of franchise networks (the rate of franchised units as opposed to corporate units) to individual parameters supposed to reflect the extent of moral hazards on the franchisor's and franchisee's sides and, more specifically, to various institutional parameters of the franchisor's country, namely, the legal tradition, the level of procedural formalism, the constraints imposed by labour regulation and the effectiveness of trademark protection. While agency theory parameters seem to perform rather badly in this international setting, institutions such as trademark protection and labour regulation have more explanatory power: greater trademark protection encourages franchising and the impact of labour regulation is mostly positive, depending on the type of labour regulation that is being considered. The effect of legal tradition and formalism seems negligible once these parameters are taken in.
Tous droits réservés pour tous pays. La reproduction ou représentation de cet article, notamment ... more Tous droits réservés pour tous pays. La reproduction ou représentation de cet article, notamment par photocopie, n'est autorisée que dans les limites des conditions générales d'utilisation du site ou, le cas échéant, des conditions générales de la licence souscrite par votre établissement. Toute autre reproduction ou représentation, en tout ou partie, sous quelque forme et de quelque manière que ce soit, est interdite sauf accord préalable et écrit de l'éditeur, en dehors des cas prévus par la législation en vigueur en France. Il est précisé que son stockage dans une base de données est également interdit.
We consider four essential modalities of assuring trade: namely, the use of self-governance struc... more We consider four essential modalities of assuring trade: namely, the use of self-governance structures, reputation entrepreneurs, national courts and arbitration. We offer several implications from the comparison of these governance structures. First, self-governance and reputation entrepreneurs may seek to limit their member’s access to formal court enforcement. Second, in addition to being an enforcer of contracts, courts also operate as reputation propagators as because of their public quality and formal, generally discoverable, records. Third, a key function of modern arbitration is its ability to separate enforcement of awards from reputation. Given that type 1 and 2 errors are prone to occur, traders who receive negative judgments in court may lose much more than what the adjudicator orders them to pay. By maintaining confidentiality in arbitral awards, traders are more able to defend their claims without excessive risk to their reputations. Additional implications of the inte...
According to Posner, the economic approach has both positive and normative components. The positi... more According to Posner, the economic approach has both positive and normative components. The positive approach attempts to explain legal rules and outcomes as they are. These explanations essentially seek to determine whether legal doctrines are efficient. The normative approach provides a standard for both judges and legislators. Posner’s fundamental positive claim is that common law doctrines are generally efficient. The central hypothesis of the positive economic analysis of law is that Anglo-American judges maximize social wealth through the common law process by fashioning rules that promote efficiency. He argues that by transforming inefficient rules into efficient ones, judges realize the « essential nature of the common law ».
We present an analysis of the degree of legal centralization in a setting where people are averse... more We present an analysis of the degree of legal centralization in a setting where people are averse to inequality before the law. In this approach inspired by Tocqueville, the degree of legal centralization is determined by striking a balance between equality before the law and attention to local needs. We show that there is a threshold which is such that when the intensity of aversion to inequality before the law is below this threshold legal decentralization is preferred to legal centralization (and conversely). We also show that the optimal way to balance the desire for local adjustments and national uniformity is not an intermediate degree of centralization but to have nationally uniform rules that can be adapted by judges. We rely on these results to provide an analytical narrative to the abrupt change from legal diversity to full legal centralization and uniformization around the time of the French Revolution in 1789. JEL Classification: K40, N40.
We develop a model of venal judicial offices, i.e., sales of public positions in the judicial sec... more We develop a model of venal judicial offices, i.e., sales of public positions in the judicial sector, which were used extensively in France (and many other European countries) during the 17th and 18th centuries, and which led to vastly improved French State capacity despite limited opportunities to raise taxes and to borrow. In this model, venality provides financial resources for the ruler, at the cost of less control over judicial decisions. We rely on this model to provide an analytic narrative of the rise and the decline of venality in Old Regime France. JEL Classification Numbers : JEL Classification: K40, N40. *We thank Claudine Desrieux, Michael Faure, David Le Bris, Peter Leeson, Marie Obidzinski, Gabrielle Smart, Giovanni Battista Ramello and Mehrdad Vahabi for helpful comment on previous versions of this work. †Université Panthéon-Assas, Paris II, CRED, EA 7321, 21 Rue Valette 75005 PARIS, [email protected]. ‡Université Panthéon-Assas, Paris II, CRED, EA 7321, 2...
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