From reviews:
"...a most impressive and insightful book that describes the rise of a particula... more From reviews:
"...a most impressive and insightful book that describes the rise of a particular kind of ‘‘rationality’’ during the Cold War years." (J. v. Dongen, Metascience 2014)
"This is not a detailed study of one discipline, institution, or historical figure; nor is it a survey across different, disconnected fields. Rather, it finds that a broad array of individuals, a handful of institutions, and different theoretical approaches to understanding rationality joined to form a robust historical phenomenon—something like an interdisciplinary Manhattan Project of the mind—that would probably never have existed were it not for the “extraordinary, and extraordinarily strange” (188) culture
of the Cold War. ... This is a story of intellectuals searching for rationality and, in the end, not finding it." (George Reisch, HOPOS: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science, 2014)
" ... authored by a dream team of historians of science and technology, describes a series of thought-engineering projects of mid-century grandiosity, including a scheme to reduce human interactions to code; a decision matrix to solve nuclear crises; and a program (actually implemented) to subject residents of Micronesia to a battery of Rorschach and other psychological tests." (J. M. Siracusa, American Historical Review, February 2015)
" ... a masterful intellectual history of efforts to define rationality in ways that would be useful in coping with the unprecedented dangers in a world armed with atomic weapons. The time span of approximately four decades covered in this study begins with the nuclear aacks on Japan in August 1945 that ended World War II and runs through the mid-1980s, as the Cold War was running down. e six authors include four science historians (Paul Erickson, Lorraine Daston, Rebecca Lemov, and Michael D. Gordin); one economist (Judy L. Klein); and one philosopher (omas Sturm). They are listed on the cover and title page not by seniority or alphabetical order but by a random drawing of their names." (Ole Holsti, H-Net-Reviews, February 2014)
"a weighty contribution to the history of Cold War thought. It
tracks the embrace of a peculiar yet ubiquitous style of thinking that the authors term 'cold war rationality.' ... This masterly book makes a crucial contribution to understanding of Cold War thought, opens many new avenues for further research, and raises important questions about the durability
of Cold War thinking in contemporary American social science." (J. Rohde, Journal of American History, 2014)
Book Abstract:
The Cold War provoked an intense debate about the nature of rationality among human scientists in the United States. Economists, political scientists, psychologists, philosophers, military strategists, mathematicians, and computer scientists sought ever more reliable rational safeguards to tame the arsenals of bombs and missiles ordered by the politicians, built by the physicists and engineers, and tended by the generals. Spanning the fields of operations research, game theory, rational choice theory, nuclear strategy, Bayesian decision theory, logic, experimental psychology, and straddling university campuses, think tanks, and government offices, the debates lead to a specific conception of rationality: rules of good reasoning were supposed to be formal, algorithmic, optimizing, and mechanical. Although the sharpest minds engaged in thinking about how to find the ideal norms of rationality, consensus eluded them. Every new formulation met with critique and paradoxes. What held the participants in the debate together were neither shared disciplinary assumptions nor unified political agendas nor methodological agreement, but rather a common challenge and the debate itself.
This book explores Kant's philosophy of the human sciences, their status, their relations and pro... more This book explores Kant's philosophy of the human sciences, their status, their relations and prospects. Contrary to widespread belief, he is not dogmatic about the question of whether these disciplines are proper sciences. It depends on whether we can rationally adjust assumptions about the methods, goals, and subject matter of these disciplines - and it has to be decided alongside of ongoing research. Kant applies these ideas especially in lectures on "pragmatic anthropology" given from 1772-1796. In doing so, he refines his conception of anthropology and clarifies its relation to physiology, psychology, history, and ethics. He also discusses then leading approaches in the human sciences, such as Wolffian psychology, Bonnet's attempt to explain the mind in terms of the brain, Hume's naturalism and Herder's historicism. Against this background, we can better assess Kant's view of the human being as a social and rational being, capable of creating its own laws of conduct. Kant moreover argues that and why we can view ourselves as free agents even from an empirical point of view. This is a fresh perspective on the human sciences - not only in the 18th century.
"From book reviews:
"... clearly a scholarly tour de force. At once both historical and critical in orientation, Sturm seeks to situate the development of Kant's pragmatic anthropology within the extensive eighteenth-century debate on the human sciences (here he focuses primarily on psychology, anthropology, and history) as well as to offer a qualified defense of the scientific integrity of Kant's project. ... Sturm's "Kant und die Wissenschaften vom Menschen" is the most extensive and informative investigation of the intellectual background of Kant's views on the human sciences with which I am familiar, and I recommend it to anyone who has serious interests in this important topic." (R. Louden, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, 2012)
„... an authoritative elaboration of (Kant’s) Vorlesungen über Anthropologie...“ (R. Pozzo, Isis, 2012)
"... in letzter Zeit kaum eine Dissertation vergleichbaren Niveaus... scheint mir dieses Buch für die fachphilosophische Forschung, insbesondere die Kantforschung unverzichtbar... Hier geht es um nichts weniger als die Frage, wie denn eine Wissenschaft vom Menschen „als frei handelndem Wesen“ ... möglich ist und welchen Charakter sie hat. ... Im Anschluss daran wäre tatsächlich zu hoffen, dass nicht nur Philosophen sein Buch lesen, sondern vor allem Psychologen, die sich dieser Aufgabe weitgehend entzogen haben." (P. Heintel, Kant-Studien, 2011)
"Sturm’s significant and stimulating contribution to the scholarship on Immanuel Kant’s account of the human sciences ... will greatly increase the reader’s understanding and appreciation of Kant’s philosophy of science. ... This book is directed not only to Kant scholars, but also to philosophers and historians of science. It also will prove useful to anthropologists, psychologists, and all scholars of the humanities who are interested in the philosophical and historical backgrounds of their subjects. ... Sturm achieves a thorough and well-structured analysis of Kant’s actual conception of anthropology. ... a most important contribution to the recent movement in Kant research focusing on the ‘empirical’ dimension of Kant’s works and particularly on his account of the empirical sciences of man." (K. Kraus, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 2011)
Contents:
Vorbemerkung vii
Analytisches Inhaltsverzeichnis x
Zur Zitierweise xiv
Zum Gebrauch der Nachschriften von Kants Vorlesungen über Anthropologie xvi
I. „Die am meisten vernachlässigte Wissenschaft" 1
II. Debatten über Psychologie und Anthropologie im 18. Jh. 37
III. Kants Begriff der Wissenschaft 123
IV. Die Kritik an der empirischen Psychologie 191
V. Die Kritik an der physiologischen Anthropologie 285
VI. Geschichte im 18. Jh.: Pragmatisch und philosophisch 335
VII. Die innere Systematizität der pragmatischen Anthropologie 407
VIII. Die äussere Systematizität der pragmatischen Anthropologie 521
This Analytical Contents of the book can be used to quickly find key topics, terms, and authors d... more This Analytical Contents of the book can be used to quickly find key topics, terms, and authors discussed.
(The link above provides a view of the contents and selections from the volume.)
This is a colle... more (The link above provides a view of the contents and selections from the volume.)
This is a collection of essays by the philosopher Lorenz Krüger (1932-1994). His premature death prevented many of his excellent papers from becoming recognized more widely. His writings are distinct in their combining of philosophy and its history with the history and philosophy of the sciences, culminating in his concept that philosophy should serve as a critical consciousness of a scientific "Lebenswelt".
We have collected some of his exemplary essays on Locke, Leibniz and Kant, on the unity of science and intertheoretic relations, explanation and reduction, causation and freedom, and realism and truth. Three systematic reflections on the relations between philosophy, the sciences, and their histories complete the volume.
A complete bibliography of his writings is included. Several essays appear here for the first time in English translation.
The volume should be useful especially for readers perplexed by the difficulty of working at the intersections of history and philosophy of science, philosophy and its history, and philosophy and the sciences.
This edited volume presents a collection of exemplary essays on how to study classical philosophi... more This edited volume presents a collection of exemplary essays on how to study classical philosophical texts. The chapters written by leading experts include, among other things, topics from Aristotle, Leibniz, Kant, Hegel, Wittgenstein, Heidegger, or Popper.
The chapter downloadable here is the preprint version of the introductory reflections on the issue of how one should define the very notion of a "classical work" in philosophy, and why we should study these. (Note: Through a mistake of the publisher, the published version represents Reinhard Brandt as co-author.)
THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science
I offer an analysis of the concept of scientific innovation. When research is innovated, highly n... more I offer an analysis of the concept of scientific innovation. When research is innovated, highly noveland usefulelements of investigation begin to spread through a scientific community, resulting from a process which is neither due to blind chance nor to necessity, but to a minimal use of rationality. This, however, leads to tension between two claims: (1) scientific innovation can be explained rationally; (2) no existing account of rationality explains scientific innovation. There are good reasons to maintain (1) and (2), but it is difficult for both claims to be accepted simultaneously by a rational subject.In particular, I argue that neither standard nor bounded theories of rationality can deliver a satisfactory explanation of scientific innovations.
... events". This would imply, in opposition to the tradition, the claim that there is no ca... more ... events". This would imply, in opposition to the tradition, the claim that there is no causation without indeterminism. Kriiger then turns to the problem of the apparent contradiction between causality and freedom of human action. ...
We argue that Kant&am... more We argue that Kant's views about consciousness, the mind-body problem and the status of psychology as a science all differ drastically from the way in which these topics are conjoined in present debates about the prominent idea of a science of consciousness. Kant never used the concept of consciousness in the now dominant sense of phenomenal qualia; his discussions of the mind-body problem center not on the reducibility of mental properties but of substances; and his views about the possibility of psychology as a science did not employ the requirement of a mechanistic explanation, but of a quantification of phenomena. This shows strikingly how deeply philosophical problems and conceptions can change even if they look similar on the surface.
What roles have instruments played in psychology and related disciplines? How have instruments af... more What roles have instruments played in psychology and related disciplines? How have instruments affected the dynamics of psychological research, with what possibilities and limits? What is the psychological instrument? This article provides a conceptual foundation for specific case studies concerning such questions. The discussion begins by challenging widely accepted assumptions about the subject and analyzing the general relations between scientific experimentation and the uses of instruments in psychology. Building on this analysis, a deliberately inclusive definition of what constitutes a psychological instrument is proposed. The discussion then takes up the relation between instrumentation and theories and differentiates in greater detail the roles instruments have had over the course of psychology's history. Finally, the authors offer an approach to evaluating the possibilities and limitations of instruments in psychology.
From reviews:
"...a most impressive and insightful book that describes the rise of a particula... more From reviews:
"...a most impressive and insightful book that describes the rise of a particular kind of ‘‘rationality’’ during the Cold War years." (J. v. Dongen, Metascience 2014)
"This is not a detailed study of one discipline, institution, or historical figure; nor is it a survey across different, disconnected fields. Rather, it finds that a broad array of individuals, a handful of institutions, and different theoretical approaches to understanding rationality joined to form a robust historical phenomenon—something like an interdisciplinary Manhattan Project of the mind—that would probably never have existed were it not for the “extraordinary, and extraordinarily strange” (188) culture
of the Cold War. ... This is a story of intellectuals searching for rationality and, in the end, not finding it." (George Reisch, HOPOS: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science, 2014)
" ... authored by a dream team of historians of science and technology, describes a series of thought-engineering projects of mid-century grandiosity, including a scheme to reduce human interactions to code; a decision matrix to solve nuclear crises; and a program (actually implemented) to subject residents of Micronesia to a battery of Rorschach and other psychological tests." (J. M. Siracusa, American Historical Review, February 2015)
" ... a masterful intellectual history of efforts to define rationality in ways that would be useful in coping with the unprecedented dangers in a world armed with atomic weapons. The time span of approximately four decades covered in this study begins with the nuclear aacks on Japan in August 1945 that ended World War II and runs through the mid-1980s, as the Cold War was running down. e six authors include four science historians (Paul Erickson, Lorraine Daston, Rebecca Lemov, and Michael D. Gordin); one economist (Judy L. Klein); and one philosopher (omas Sturm). They are listed on the cover and title page not by seniority or alphabetical order but by a random drawing of their names." (Ole Holsti, H-Net-Reviews, February 2014)
"a weighty contribution to the history of Cold War thought. It
tracks the embrace of a peculiar yet ubiquitous style of thinking that the authors term 'cold war rationality.' ... This masterly book makes a crucial contribution to understanding of Cold War thought, opens many new avenues for further research, and raises important questions about the durability
of Cold War thinking in contemporary American social science." (J. Rohde, Journal of American History, 2014)
Book Abstract:
The Cold War provoked an intense debate about the nature of rationality among human scientists in the United States. Economists, political scientists, psychologists, philosophers, military strategists, mathematicians, and computer scientists sought ever more reliable rational safeguards to tame the arsenals of bombs and missiles ordered by the politicians, built by the physicists and engineers, and tended by the generals. Spanning the fields of operations research, game theory, rational choice theory, nuclear strategy, Bayesian decision theory, logic, experimental psychology, and straddling university campuses, think tanks, and government offices, the debates lead to a specific conception of rationality: rules of good reasoning were supposed to be formal, algorithmic, optimizing, and mechanical. Although the sharpest minds engaged in thinking about how to find the ideal norms of rationality, consensus eluded them. Every new formulation met with critique and paradoxes. What held the participants in the debate together were neither shared disciplinary assumptions nor unified political agendas nor methodological agreement, but rather a common challenge and the debate itself.
This book explores Kant's philosophy of the human sciences, their status, their relations and pro... more This book explores Kant's philosophy of the human sciences, their status, their relations and prospects. Contrary to widespread belief, he is not dogmatic about the question of whether these disciplines are proper sciences. It depends on whether we can rationally adjust assumptions about the methods, goals, and subject matter of these disciplines - and it has to be decided alongside of ongoing research. Kant applies these ideas especially in lectures on "pragmatic anthropology" given from 1772-1796. In doing so, he refines his conception of anthropology and clarifies its relation to physiology, psychology, history, and ethics. He also discusses then leading approaches in the human sciences, such as Wolffian psychology, Bonnet's attempt to explain the mind in terms of the brain, Hume's naturalism and Herder's historicism. Against this background, we can better assess Kant's view of the human being as a social and rational being, capable of creating its own laws of conduct. Kant moreover argues that and why we can view ourselves as free agents even from an empirical point of view. This is a fresh perspective on the human sciences - not only in the 18th century.
"From book reviews:
"... clearly a scholarly tour de force. At once both historical and critical in orientation, Sturm seeks to situate the development of Kant's pragmatic anthropology within the extensive eighteenth-century debate on the human sciences (here he focuses primarily on psychology, anthropology, and history) as well as to offer a qualified defense of the scientific integrity of Kant's project. ... Sturm's "Kant und die Wissenschaften vom Menschen" is the most extensive and informative investigation of the intellectual background of Kant's views on the human sciences with which I am familiar, and I recommend it to anyone who has serious interests in this important topic." (R. Louden, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, 2012)
„... an authoritative elaboration of (Kant’s) Vorlesungen über Anthropologie...“ (R. Pozzo, Isis, 2012)
"... in letzter Zeit kaum eine Dissertation vergleichbaren Niveaus... scheint mir dieses Buch für die fachphilosophische Forschung, insbesondere die Kantforschung unverzichtbar... Hier geht es um nichts weniger als die Frage, wie denn eine Wissenschaft vom Menschen „als frei handelndem Wesen“ ... möglich ist und welchen Charakter sie hat. ... Im Anschluss daran wäre tatsächlich zu hoffen, dass nicht nur Philosophen sein Buch lesen, sondern vor allem Psychologen, die sich dieser Aufgabe weitgehend entzogen haben." (P. Heintel, Kant-Studien, 2011)
"Sturm’s significant and stimulating contribution to the scholarship on Immanuel Kant’s account of the human sciences ... will greatly increase the reader’s understanding and appreciation of Kant’s philosophy of science. ... This book is directed not only to Kant scholars, but also to philosophers and historians of science. It also will prove useful to anthropologists, psychologists, and all scholars of the humanities who are interested in the philosophical and historical backgrounds of their subjects. ... Sturm achieves a thorough and well-structured analysis of Kant’s actual conception of anthropology. ... a most important contribution to the recent movement in Kant research focusing on the ‘empirical’ dimension of Kant’s works and particularly on his account of the empirical sciences of man." (K. Kraus, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 2011)
Contents:
Vorbemerkung vii
Analytisches Inhaltsverzeichnis x
Zur Zitierweise xiv
Zum Gebrauch der Nachschriften von Kants Vorlesungen über Anthropologie xvi
I. „Die am meisten vernachlässigte Wissenschaft" 1
II. Debatten über Psychologie und Anthropologie im 18. Jh. 37
III. Kants Begriff der Wissenschaft 123
IV. Die Kritik an der empirischen Psychologie 191
V. Die Kritik an der physiologischen Anthropologie 285
VI. Geschichte im 18. Jh.: Pragmatisch und philosophisch 335
VII. Die innere Systematizität der pragmatischen Anthropologie 407
VIII. Die äussere Systematizität der pragmatischen Anthropologie 521
This Analytical Contents of the book can be used to quickly find key topics, terms, and authors d... more This Analytical Contents of the book can be used to quickly find key topics, terms, and authors discussed.
(The link above provides a view of the contents and selections from the volume.)
This is a colle... more (The link above provides a view of the contents and selections from the volume.)
This is a collection of essays by the philosopher Lorenz Krüger (1932-1994). His premature death prevented many of his excellent papers from becoming recognized more widely. His writings are distinct in their combining of philosophy and its history with the history and philosophy of the sciences, culminating in his concept that philosophy should serve as a critical consciousness of a scientific "Lebenswelt".
We have collected some of his exemplary essays on Locke, Leibniz and Kant, on the unity of science and intertheoretic relations, explanation and reduction, causation and freedom, and realism and truth. Three systematic reflections on the relations between philosophy, the sciences, and their histories complete the volume.
A complete bibliography of his writings is included. Several essays appear here for the first time in English translation.
The volume should be useful especially for readers perplexed by the difficulty of working at the intersections of history and philosophy of science, philosophy and its history, and philosophy and the sciences.
This edited volume presents a collection of exemplary essays on how to study classical philosophi... more This edited volume presents a collection of exemplary essays on how to study classical philosophical texts. The chapters written by leading experts include, among other things, topics from Aristotle, Leibniz, Kant, Hegel, Wittgenstein, Heidegger, or Popper.
The chapter downloadable here is the preprint version of the introductory reflections on the issue of how one should define the very notion of a "classical work" in philosophy, and why we should study these. (Note: Through a mistake of the publisher, the published version represents Reinhard Brandt as co-author.)
THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science
I offer an analysis of the concept of scientific innovation. When research is innovated, highly n... more I offer an analysis of the concept of scientific innovation. When research is innovated, highly noveland usefulelements of investigation begin to spread through a scientific community, resulting from a process which is neither due to blind chance nor to necessity, but to a minimal use of rationality. This, however, leads to tension between two claims: (1) scientific innovation can be explained rationally; (2) no existing account of rationality explains scientific innovation. There are good reasons to maintain (1) and (2), but it is difficult for both claims to be accepted simultaneously by a rational subject.In particular, I argue that neither standard nor bounded theories of rationality can deliver a satisfactory explanation of scientific innovations.
... events". This would imply, in opposition to the tradition, the claim that there is no ca... more ... events". This would imply, in opposition to the tradition, the claim that there is no causation without indeterminism. Kriiger then turns to the problem of the apparent contradiction between causality and freedom of human action. ...
We argue that Kant&am... more We argue that Kant's views about consciousness, the mind-body problem and the status of psychology as a science all differ drastically from the way in which these topics are conjoined in present debates about the prominent idea of a science of consciousness. Kant never used the concept of consciousness in the now dominant sense of phenomenal qualia; his discussions of the mind-body problem center not on the reducibility of mental properties but of substances; and his views about the possibility of psychology as a science did not employ the requirement of a mechanistic explanation, but of a quantification of phenomena. This shows strikingly how deeply philosophical problems and conceptions can change even if they look similar on the surface.
What roles have instruments played in psychology and related disciplines? How have instruments af... more What roles have instruments played in psychology and related disciplines? How have instruments affected the dynamics of psychological research, with what possibilities and limits? What is the psychological instrument? This article provides a conceptual foundation for specific case studies concerning such questions. The discussion begins by challenging widely accepted assumptions about the subject and analyzing the general relations between scientific experimentation and the uses of instruments in psychology. Building on this analysis, a deliberately inclusive definition of what constitutes a psychological instrument is proposed. The discussion then takes up the relation between instrumentation and theories and differentiates in greater detail the roles instruments have had over the course of psychology's history. Finally, the authors offer an approach to evaluating the possibilities and limitations of instruments in psychology.
I argue, first, that the interpretation of Kant's works (as of any outstanding philosopher) canno... more I argue, first, that the interpretation of Kant's works (as of any outstanding philosopher) cannot avoid a critical assessment of his arguments and achievements; aiming at a "purely" historical interpretation is unreasonable. Second, I show that one should distinguish such critical assessment from discussions over Kant's significance for current philosophical debates. Kant's problems and agendas overlap only partially with our current ones, and an assessment of the continuing value of his arguments for our times must therefore take into account his and our agendas, problems, and methods, and reflect on their proximity or distance. This is only partially achieved in the works discussed in this essay review, which are: Dietmar H. Heidemann & Kristina Engelhard (Hg.): Warum Kant heute? Berlin: De Gruyter 2004. Otfried Höffe: Immanuel Kant. München: Beck, 6. Aufl. 2004 (1. Aufl. 1983). Heiner F. Klemme: Immanuel Kant. Frankfurt/M.: Campus 2004. Bernhard Thöle: „Immanuel Kant – Wie sind synthetische Urteile a priori möglich?“ In Ansgar Beckermann & Dominik Perler (Hg.): Klassiker der Philosophie heute. Stuttgart: Reclam 2004, S. 376-398. (In German.)
During the 18th century, analytic and synthetic methods—developed in ways that were influential i... more During the 18th century, analytic and synthetic methods—developed in ways that were influential in the natural sciences by Galileo, Descartes, Newton, and others—were transferred into disciplines concerned with the human subject. Among the most important proponents of this were David Hartley, Êtienne Bonnot de Condillac, and Charles Bonnet. However, critics such as Thomas Reid and Christian Gottfried Schütz raised objections to these methodological doctrines. By the end of the 18th century, appeals to this dual methodology and reflections concerning its potential and limits which had previously been more frequent, began to disappear from psychology and neurophysiology. I analyze the different versions of the methods as applied to the human sciences, as well as the main arguments brought to bear against them. In conclusion, I present some plausible explanations of why the methodological program did not achieve greater success. This contributes new aspects to the history of Newtonianism in these fields, and highlights both how multifaceted and how problematic the movement was.
When proponents of cognitive externalism (CE) have turned to empirical studies in cognitive scien... more When proponents of cognitive externalism (CE) have turned to empirical studies in cognitive science to put the framework to use, they have typically referred to perception, memory or motor coordination. Not much has been said about reasoning. One promising avenue to explore here is the theory of bounded rationality (BR). In this paper, we try to clarify the potential relationship between these two programs. We start by discussing Andy Clark’s interpretation of BR, which we find unconvincing in several respects. Next, we take a closer look at CE in order defend a version of it that stands against mainstream internalism without committing itself to constitutional claims about the mind. We then turn to analyze BR from the CE perspective. Finally, we argue that internalism about cognition cannot explain important aspects of the BR program.
When proponents of cognitive externalism(CE) turn to empirical studies in cognitive science to pu... more When proponents of cognitive externalism(CE) turn to empirical studies in cognitive science to put the framework to use and to assess its explanatory success, they typically refer to perception, memory, or motor coordination. In contrast, not much has been said about reasoning. One promising avenue to explore in this respect is the theory of bounded rationality (BR).To clarify the relationship betweenCE and BR,we criticize Andy Clark’s understanding of BR, as well as his claim that BR does not fit his version ofCE. We then propose and defend a version of CE—“scaffolded cognition”—that is not committed to constitutive claims about the mind, but still differs from mainstream internalism. Finally, we analyze BR from our own CE perspective, thereby clarifying its vague appeals to the environment, and argue that
cognitive internalism cannot explain important aspects of the BR program.
Uploads
Books by Thomas Sturm
"...a most impressive and insightful book that describes the rise of a particular kind of ‘‘rationality’’ during the Cold War years." (J. v. Dongen, Metascience 2014)
"This is not a detailed study of one discipline, institution, or historical figure; nor is it a survey across different, disconnected fields. Rather, it finds that a broad array of individuals, a handful of institutions, and different theoretical approaches to understanding rationality joined to form a robust historical phenomenon—something like an interdisciplinary Manhattan Project of the mind—that would probably never have existed were it not for the “extraordinary, and extraordinarily strange” (188) culture
of the Cold War. ... This is a story of intellectuals searching for rationality and, in the end, not finding it." (George Reisch, HOPOS: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science, 2014)
" ... authored by a dream team of historians of science and technology, describes a series of thought-engineering projects of mid-century grandiosity, including a scheme to reduce human interactions to code; a decision matrix to solve nuclear crises; and a program (actually implemented) to subject residents of Micronesia to a battery of Rorschach and other psychological tests." (J. M. Siracusa, American Historical Review, February 2015)
" ... a masterful intellectual history of efforts to define rationality in ways that would be useful in coping with the unprecedented dangers in a world armed with atomic weapons. The time span of approximately four decades covered in this study begins with the nuclear aacks on Japan in August 1945 that ended World War II and runs through the mid-1980s, as the Cold War was running down. e six authors include four science historians (Paul Erickson, Lorraine Daston, Rebecca Lemov, and Michael D. Gordin); one economist (Judy L. Klein); and one philosopher (omas Sturm). They are listed on the cover and title page not by seniority or alphabetical order but by a random drawing of their names." (Ole Holsti, H-Net-Reviews, February 2014)
"a weighty contribution to the history of Cold War thought. It
tracks the embrace of a peculiar yet ubiquitous style of thinking that the authors term 'cold war rationality.' ... This masterly book makes a crucial contribution to understanding of Cold War thought, opens many new avenues for further research, and raises important questions about the durability
of Cold War thinking in contemporary American social science." (J. Rohde, Journal of American History, 2014)
Book Abstract:
The Cold War provoked an intense debate about the nature of rationality among human scientists in the United States. Economists, political scientists, psychologists, philosophers, military strategists, mathematicians, and computer scientists sought ever more reliable rational safeguards to tame the arsenals of bombs and missiles ordered by the politicians, built by the physicists and engineers, and tended by the generals. Spanning the fields of operations research, game theory, rational choice theory, nuclear strategy, Bayesian decision theory, logic, experimental psychology, and straddling university campuses, think tanks, and government offices, the debates lead to a specific conception of rationality: rules of good reasoning were supposed to be formal, algorithmic, optimizing, and mechanical. Although the sharpest minds engaged in thinking about how to find the ideal norms of rationality, consensus eluded them. Every new formulation met with critique and paradoxes. What held the participants in the debate together were neither shared disciplinary assumptions nor unified political agendas nor methodological agreement, but rather a common challenge and the debate itself.
"From book reviews:
"... clearly a scholarly tour de force. At once both historical and critical in orientation, Sturm seeks to situate the development of Kant's pragmatic anthropology within the extensive eighteenth-century debate on the human sciences (here he focuses primarily on psychology, anthropology, and history) as well as to offer a qualified defense of the scientific integrity of Kant's project. ... Sturm's "Kant und die Wissenschaften vom Menschen" is the most extensive and informative investigation of the intellectual background of Kant's views on the human sciences with which I am familiar, and I recommend it to anyone who has serious interests in this important topic." (R. Louden, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, 2012)
„... an authoritative elaboration of (Kant’s) Vorlesungen über Anthropologie...“ (R. Pozzo, Isis, 2012)
"... in letzter Zeit kaum eine Dissertation vergleichbaren Niveaus... scheint mir dieses Buch für die fachphilosophische Forschung, insbesondere die Kantforschung unverzichtbar... Hier geht es um nichts weniger als die Frage, wie denn eine Wissenschaft vom Menschen „als frei handelndem Wesen“ ... möglich ist und welchen Charakter sie hat. ... Im Anschluss daran wäre tatsächlich zu hoffen, dass nicht nur Philosophen sein Buch lesen, sondern vor allem Psychologen, die sich dieser Aufgabe weitgehend entzogen haben." (P. Heintel, Kant-Studien, 2011)
"Sturm’s significant and stimulating contribution to the scholarship on Immanuel Kant’s account of the human sciences ... will greatly increase the reader’s understanding and appreciation of Kant’s philosophy of science. ... This book is directed not only to Kant scholars, but also to philosophers and historians of science. It also will prove useful to anthropologists, psychologists, and all scholars of the humanities who are interested in the philosophical and historical backgrounds of their subjects. ... Sturm achieves a thorough and well-structured analysis of Kant’s actual conception of anthropology. ... a most important contribution to the recent movement in Kant research focusing on the ‘empirical’ dimension of Kant’s works and particularly on his account of the empirical sciences of man." (K. Kraus, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 2011)
Contents:
Vorbemerkung vii
Analytisches Inhaltsverzeichnis x
Zur Zitierweise xiv
Zum Gebrauch der Nachschriften von Kants Vorlesungen über Anthropologie xvi
I. „Die am meisten vernachlässigte Wissenschaft" 1
II. Debatten über Psychologie und Anthropologie im 18. Jh. 37
III. Kants Begriff der Wissenschaft 123
IV. Die Kritik an der empirischen Psychologie 191
V. Die Kritik an der physiologischen Anthropologie 285
VI. Geschichte im 18. Jh.: Pragmatisch und philosophisch 335
VII. Die innere Systematizität der pragmatischen Anthropologie 407
VIII. Die äussere Systematizität der pragmatischen Anthropologie 521
Literaturverzeichnis 597""
This is a collection of essays by the philosopher Lorenz Krüger (1932-1994). His premature death prevented many of his excellent papers from becoming recognized more widely. His writings are distinct in their combining of philosophy and its history with the history and philosophy of the sciences, culminating in his concept that philosophy should serve as a critical consciousness of a scientific "Lebenswelt".
We have collected some of his exemplary essays on Locke, Leibniz and Kant, on the unity of science and intertheoretic relations, explanation and reduction, causation and freedom, and realism and truth. Three systematic reflections on the relations between philosophy, the sciences, and their histories complete the volume.
A complete bibliography of his writings is included. Several essays appear here for the first time in English translation.
The volume should be useful especially for readers perplexed by the difficulty of working at the intersections of history and philosophy of science, philosophy and its history, and philosophy and the sciences.
The chapter downloadable here is the preprint version of the introductory reflections on the issue of how one should define the very notion of a "classical work" in philosophy, and why we should study these. (Note: Through a mistake of the publisher, the published version represents Reinhard Brandt as co-author.)
Papers by Thomas Sturm
"...a most impressive and insightful book that describes the rise of a particular kind of ‘‘rationality’’ during the Cold War years." (J. v. Dongen, Metascience 2014)
"This is not a detailed study of one discipline, institution, or historical figure; nor is it a survey across different, disconnected fields. Rather, it finds that a broad array of individuals, a handful of institutions, and different theoretical approaches to understanding rationality joined to form a robust historical phenomenon—something like an interdisciplinary Manhattan Project of the mind—that would probably never have existed were it not for the “extraordinary, and extraordinarily strange” (188) culture
of the Cold War. ... This is a story of intellectuals searching for rationality and, in the end, not finding it." (George Reisch, HOPOS: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science, 2014)
" ... authored by a dream team of historians of science and technology, describes a series of thought-engineering projects of mid-century grandiosity, including a scheme to reduce human interactions to code; a decision matrix to solve nuclear crises; and a program (actually implemented) to subject residents of Micronesia to a battery of Rorschach and other psychological tests." (J. M. Siracusa, American Historical Review, February 2015)
" ... a masterful intellectual history of efforts to define rationality in ways that would be useful in coping with the unprecedented dangers in a world armed with atomic weapons. The time span of approximately four decades covered in this study begins with the nuclear aacks on Japan in August 1945 that ended World War II and runs through the mid-1980s, as the Cold War was running down. e six authors include four science historians (Paul Erickson, Lorraine Daston, Rebecca Lemov, and Michael D. Gordin); one economist (Judy L. Klein); and one philosopher (omas Sturm). They are listed on the cover and title page not by seniority or alphabetical order but by a random drawing of their names." (Ole Holsti, H-Net-Reviews, February 2014)
"a weighty contribution to the history of Cold War thought. It
tracks the embrace of a peculiar yet ubiquitous style of thinking that the authors term 'cold war rationality.' ... This masterly book makes a crucial contribution to understanding of Cold War thought, opens many new avenues for further research, and raises important questions about the durability
of Cold War thinking in contemporary American social science." (J. Rohde, Journal of American History, 2014)
Book Abstract:
The Cold War provoked an intense debate about the nature of rationality among human scientists in the United States. Economists, political scientists, psychologists, philosophers, military strategists, mathematicians, and computer scientists sought ever more reliable rational safeguards to tame the arsenals of bombs and missiles ordered by the politicians, built by the physicists and engineers, and tended by the generals. Spanning the fields of operations research, game theory, rational choice theory, nuclear strategy, Bayesian decision theory, logic, experimental psychology, and straddling university campuses, think tanks, and government offices, the debates lead to a specific conception of rationality: rules of good reasoning were supposed to be formal, algorithmic, optimizing, and mechanical. Although the sharpest minds engaged in thinking about how to find the ideal norms of rationality, consensus eluded them. Every new formulation met with critique and paradoxes. What held the participants in the debate together were neither shared disciplinary assumptions nor unified political agendas nor methodological agreement, but rather a common challenge and the debate itself.
"From book reviews:
"... clearly a scholarly tour de force. At once both historical and critical in orientation, Sturm seeks to situate the development of Kant's pragmatic anthropology within the extensive eighteenth-century debate on the human sciences (here he focuses primarily on psychology, anthropology, and history) as well as to offer a qualified defense of the scientific integrity of Kant's project. ... Sturm's "Kant und die Wissenschaften vom Menschen" is the most extensive and informative investigation of the intellectual background of Kant's views on the human sciences with which I am familiar, and I recommend it to anyone who has serious interests in this important topic." (R. Louden, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, 2012)
„... an authoritative elaboration of (Kant’s) Vorlesungen über Anthropologie...“ (R. Pozzo, Isis, 2012)
"... in letzter Zeit kaum eine Dissertation vergleichbaren Niveaus... scheint mir dieses Buch für die fachphilosophische Forschung, insbesondere die Kantforschung unverzichtbar... Hier geht es um nichts weniger als die Frage, wie denn eine Wissenschaft vom Menschen „als frei handelndem Wesen“ ... möglich ist und welchen Charakter sie hat. ... Im Anschluss daran wäre tatsächlich zu hoffen, dass nicht nur Philosophen sein Buch lesen, sondern vor allem Psychologen, die sich dieser Aufgabe weitgehend entzogen haben." (P. Heintel, Kant-Studien, 2011)
"Sturm’s significant and stimulating contribution to the scholarship on Immanuel Kant’s account of the human sciences ... will greatly increase the reader’s understanding and appreciation of Kant’s philosophy of science. ... This book is directed not only to Kant scholars, but also to philosophers and historians of science. It also will prove useful to anthropologists, psychologists, and all scholars of the humanities who are interested in the philosophical and historical backgrounds of their subjects. ... Sturm achieves a thorough and well-structured analysis of Kant’s actual conception of anthropology. ... a most important contribution to the recent movement in Kant research focusing on the ‘empirical’ dimension of Kant’s works and particularly on his account of the empirical sciences of man." (K. Kraus, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 2011)
Contents:
Vorbemerkung vii
Analytisches Inhaltsverzeichnis x
Zur Zitierweise xiv
Zum Gebrauch der Nachschriften von Kants Vorlesungen über Anthropologie xvi
I. „Die am meisten vernachlässigte Wissenschaft" 1
II. Debatten über Psychologie und Anthropologie im 18. Jh. 37
III. Kants Begriff der Wissenschaft 123
IV. Die Kritik an der empirischen Psychologie 191
V. Die Kritik an der physiologischen Anthropologie 285
VI. Geschichte im 18. Jh.: Pragmatisch und philosophisch 335
VII. Die innere Systematizität der pragmatischen Anthropologie 407
VIII. Die äussere Systematizität der pragmatischen Anthropologie 521
Literaturverzeichnis 597""
This is a collection of essays by the philosopher Lorenz Krüger (1932-1994). His premature death prevented many of his excellent papers from becoming recognized more widely. His writings are distinct in their combining of philosophy and its history with the history and philosophy of the sciences, culminating in his concept that philosophy should serve as a critical consciousness of a scientific "Lebenswelt".
We have collected some of his exemplary essays on Locke, Leibniz and Kant, on the unity of science and intertheoretic relations, explanation and reduction, causation and freedom, and realism and truth. Three systematic reflections on the relations between philosophy, the sciences, and their histories complete the volume.
A complete bibliography of his writings is included. Several essays appear here for the first time in English translation.
The volume should be useful especially for readers perplexed by the difficulty of working at the intersections of history and philosophy of science, philosophy and its history, and philosophy and the sciences.
The chapter downloadable here is the preprint version of the introductory reflections on the issue of how one should define the very notion of a "classical work" in philosophy, and why we should study these. (Note: Through a mistake of the publisher, the published version represents Reinhard Brandt as co-author.)
Dietmar H. Heidemann & Kristina Engelhard (Hg.): Warum Kant heute? Berlin: De Gruyter 2004.
Otfried Höffe: Immanuel Kant. München: Beck, 6. Aufl. 2004 (1. Aufl. 1983).
Heiner F. Klemme: Immanuel Kant. Frankfurt/M.: Campus 2004.
Bernhard Thöle: „Immanuel Kant – Wie sind synthetische Urteile a priori möglich?“ In Ansgar Beckermann & Dominik Perler (Hg.): Klassiker der Philosophie heute. Stuttgart: Reclam 2004, S. 376-398.
(In German.)
cognitive internalism cannot explain important aspects of the BR program.