Stuart Fraser
My research focusses on the potential for using existing buildings in New Zealand as tsunami vertical evacuation facilities. I'm particularly interested in the simulation of tsunami, transmission and response to warnings, and subsequent evacuation.
See also
https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Stuart_Fraser3
Address: Brighton, United Kingdom
See also
https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Stuart_Fraser3
Address: Brighton, United Kingdom
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Papers by Stuart Fraser
There were high levels of recall of hazard information among residents in Napier and although the results suggest a low level of information provision to visitors by the tourist industry, there is a high level of tsunami hazard awareness among both groups. There is a reasonably good understanding of potential tsunami arrival times, but an expectation that official tsunami warnings will be given via sirens or TV/radio in the case of local tsunami. Intended behaviour suggests that ground shaking might trigger appropriate earthquake response actions but people may not extend their actions to include appropriate tsunami evacuation response. Location at the time of the earthquake and gender influence respondents’ intention to evacuate and their intended travel mode. A moderate proportion of respondents stated that they would evacuate to high ground and some respondents identified their home or prominent locations in the city as intended evacuation destinations, despite those locations being within the tsunami hazard zone. Respondents were receptive to vertical evacuation as an alternative to high ground, but generally consider it a last resort and expressed concern about structural integrity and sufficient height.
Reconnaissance-level analysis of evacuation preparedness and actions related to thetsunami has been carried out using semi-structured interviews with local disaster prevention officials and emergency services officials. Interviews were carried out in Tarō Town, Kamaishi City, Ōfunato City (Iwate Prefecture) and Kesennuma City, Minami-Sanriku Town, Ishinomaki City and Natori City (Miyagi Prefecture). The interviews covered tsunami
awareness, observations and response to natural and informal warnings; style and derivation of evacuation maps; official warning timing and dynamics; evacuation timing, mechanisms and issues; and vertical evacuation buildings – availability, designation, public awareness, utilisation, relationship to maps, and post-event review. The report also presents examples of
hazard and evacuation maps and signs employed in the Tōhoku region.
Experiences in Tōhoku during this event are relevant to tsunami mitigation activities in the State of Washington and in New Zealand, which co-funded this research. These areas have
local earthquake and tsunami risk posed by the Cascadia Subduction Zone and the offshore Hikurangi subduction margin, respectively. This report provides recommendations for further
development of tsunami mitigation activities in these areas, based on findings from the interviews.
Overall there was a 96% survival rate of those living in the inundated area of the municipalities visited. This can be attributed to mostly effective education and evacuation procedures. Schools education, hazard maps and exercises appear to be the most common forms of education. Community involvement in planning of evacuation maps, routes and buildings is common, with many places conducting regular community-level exercises. Hazard and evacuation maps lacked consistency and both maps and safe locations were generally designed for a tsunami height that under-represented the worst case scenario.
The natural warning of long ground shaking (reported as more than two minutes, and often more than three) was widely agreed as enough by itself to have triggered evacuation. Sea walls reduced effective observation of the natural warning of unusual ocean behaviour in many places, and fostered a false sense of security in some locations.
Although an early warning system is often seen publicly as key infrastructure in enhancing tsunami resilience, the expectation of official warnings (and their content) may have slowed the time taken for people to initiate evacuation in Tōhoku, compared to if there had been total reliance on natural warnings. Exposure to previous false ‘major tsunami’ warnings apparently led to complacency in this event, despite this earthquake feeling much larger than anything previously experienced. The philosophy of tsunami tendenko was shown to be a positive education tool which promoted immediate self-evacuation and save many lives.
Peoples’ movements during and after evacuation reveal that many people died unnecessarily due to delayed evacuation or non-evacuation as a result of social or parental responsibility, lack of education or scepticism of warnings. Widespread use of motor vehicles caused traffic congestion in some areas, when walking, running or cycling would have been much more effective and saved lives.
Many people returned to the evacuation zone too early in some places because they had not seen the wave arrive at the expected time given in official warnings, or because they
expected no more waves to arrive. It is critical that people have the awareness that the first wave may come later than estimated by rapid scientific analysis, and the largest wave may
not be the first.
The evacuation strategy in place at March 11th 2011 was appropriate in that it sent people to safe locations, used maps and community involvement and was regularly exercised in many
places. Some evacuation centres were not located far enough inland or on high enough ground because they were not designated using the worst-case tsunami inundation.
There was extensive effective use of both designated and informal vertical evacuation buildings. The most important considerations for effective use are sufficient height (in relation to expected inundation depth), reinforced concrete construction, community engagement, owner agreement, signage, 24-hour access and evacuee welfare. More than one building owner considered use of their building in evacuation as corporate social responsibility. To enhance evacuee safety it is prudent to minimise the opportunities for spilled accelerants such as oil, and debris such as logs in tsunami-prone locations."
SEE ALSO: Tsunami Vertical Evacuation Buildings - Lessons for International Preparedness Following the 2011 Great East Japan Tsunami, Journal of Disaster Research; http://www.fujipress.jp/finder/xslt.php?mode=present&inputfile=DSSTR000700070005.xml (requires free registration to access paper)
Keywords Great East Japan tsunami – Vertical evacuation – Field observations – Tsunami fragility – Flow velocity estimates – Damage scale
The present study succeeds in validating the approach by comparing outputs of the attenuation-rule based method against inundation and run-up data points surveyed following the Great East Japan Tsunami (11th March 2011). To validate the method, firstly the inundation height versus distance inland (according to the attenuation rules for overland flow from the coast and via rivers) is directly compared against the survey data points of inundation and run-up height. Secondly, GIS-calculated evacuation zones are developed for two contrasting study areas in Miyagi Prefecture, Tōhoku, Japan, representing coastal plain topography and a rias (drowned river valley) with harbour topography. These are then compared to the recorded survey data and satellite imagery indicating tsunami inundation extent at the same locations. The evacuation zones generated using the GIS-calculated attenuation rule successfully incorporate the zone of inundation due to the Great East Japan tsunami at both study areas, giving confidence that the method is suitable for derivation of indicative evacuation zones elsewhere.
centers were used for vertical evacuation places. The authors conducted field surveys to collect information on how
municipal offices had designated vertical evacuation places in Miyako, Kamaishi, Kesennuma, Minami-Sanriku,
Ishinomaki, and Natori cities and towns prior to this disaster, and how they were used in the event. Further, interview
surveys were conducted on emergency responses after the earthquake at some evacuation places in Natori city. It was
found that access to the roof floor and night time entry to the buildings, redundant tools to receive warning messages and
share communication, emergency stocks of water and food are crucial, and too much use of automobiles for evacuation
caused traffic congestion and delay of evacuation.
At least 143 people were killed in Samoa, 22 people in American Samoa and 7 people on Niuatoputapu, Tonga. The majority of the victims as reported by OCHA1, were from the most vulnerable group ‐ female, young and elderly. In Samoa, 310 people have been reported as injured, five are missing and about 3,200 people (640 families) have been left homeless in Samoa (OCHA). The hardest hit areas in Samoa were on the southeast coast of Upolu and the island of Manono. There was also minor damage reported in the northwest part of the main island and on the island of Savai'i.
Assessments by the Samoan Red Cross (SRC) indicated that 40 villages have been affected along the south‐eastern coast, with 20 villages completely destroyed by tsunami waves. The Government of Samoa (GoS) estimated the cost of damage to infrastructure, public and private properties at around Samoan WS$ 380 million (over £ 90 million).
The UK Earthquake Engineering Field Investigation Team (EEFIT) decided to mount a reconnaissance mission to the Samoa Islands following this earthquake and resulting tsunami, in particular to assess the effects of the tsunami. This report presents some of the preliminary findings of the team; further images from the EEFIT Team field mission are available on the Virtual Disaster Viewer (www.virtualdisasterviewer.com). This viewer development is an ongoing project supported by EEFIT and other International earthquake reconnaissance teams. It allows the visualisation of the geo‐referenced photos taken by the team, with pre‐ and post‐earthquake satellite images for the affected areas as well as mapped faults.
This report represents the preliminary findings from the event and disseminates the factual findings from the mission, including photographs and other exhibits. Further research on the findings will be published in due course by EEFIT members in peer‐reviewed journals which may also compare these findings with observations from the 2004 Boxing Day Tsunami.
Bull Earthquake Eng (2013) 11:107–140 DOI 10.1007/s10518-012-9384-5
Keywords Christchurch · New Zealand · Earthquake · Reconnaissance · Survey · Landslides · Building damage · Liquefaction
ohoku and Kanto regions of Japan on 11th March 2011, causing tremendous casualties, massive damage to structures and infrastructure, and huge economic loss. This event has revealed weakness and vulnerability of urban cities and modern society in Japan, which were thought to be one of the most earthquake-prepared nations in the world. Nevertheless, recorded ground motion data from this event offer invaluable information and opportunity; their unique features include very strong short-period spectral content, long duration, and effects due to local asperities as well as direction of rupture/wave propagation. Aiming at gaining useful experience from this tragic event, Earthquake Engineering Field Investigation Team (EEFIT) organised and dispatched a team to the T¯ ohoku region of Japan. During the
EEFIT mission, ground shaking damage surveys were conducted in Sendai, Shirakawa, and Sukagawa,where the Japan Meteorological Agency intensity of 6+was observed and instru- mentally recorded ground motion datawere available. The damage survey results identify the key factors for severe shaking damage, such as insufficient lateral reinforcement and detailing in structural columns from structural capacity viewpoint and rich spectral content of ground shaking in the intermediate vibration period range from seismic demand viewpoint. Impor- tantly, inclusion of several ground motion parameters, such as nonlinear structural response, in shaking damage surveys, can improve the correlation of observed ground motion with shaking damage and therefore enhance existing indicators of potential damage.
Keywords 11th March 2011 Great East Japan (Tohoku) earthquake · Ground shaking damage · Ground motion characteristics · Long duration motion · Field investigation and observation
Bull Earthquake Eng (2013) 11:141–170 DOI 10.1007/s10518-012-9371-x
There were high levels of recall of hazard information among residents in Napier and although the results suggest a low level of information provision to visitors by the tourist industry, there is a high level of tsunami hazard awareness among both groups. There is a reasonably good understanding of potential tsunami arrival times, but an expectation that official tsunami warnings will be given via sirens or TV/radio in the case of local tsunami. Intended behaviour suggests that ground shaking might trigger appropriate earthquake response actions but people may not extend their actions to include appropriate tsunami evacuation response. Location at the time of the earthquake and gender influence respondents’ intention to evacuate and their intended travel mode. A moderate proportion of respondents stated that they would evacuate to high ground and some respondents identified their home or prominent locations in the city as intended evacuation destinations, despite those locations being within the tsunami hazard zone. Respondents were receptive to vertical evacuation as an alternative to high ground, but generally consider it a last resort and expressed concern about structural integrity and sufficient height.
Reconnaissance-level analysis of evacuation preparedness and actions related to thetsunami has been carried out using semi-structured interviews with local disaster prevention officials and emergency services officials. Interviews were carried out in Tarō Town, Kamaishi City, Ōfunato City (Iwate Prefecture) and Kesennuma City, Minami-Sanriku Town, Ishinomaki City and Natori City (Miyagi Prefecture). The interviews covered tsunami
awareness, observations and response to natural and informal warnings; style and derivation of evacuation maps; official warning timing and dynamics; evacuation timing, mechanisms and issues; and vertical evacuation buildings – availability, designation, public awareness, utilisation, relationship to maps, and post-event review. The report also presents examples of
hazard and evacuation maps and signs employed in the Tōhoku region.
Experiences in Tōhoku during this event are relevant to tsunami mitigation activities in the State of Washington and in New Zealand, which co-funded this research. These areas have
local earthquake and tsunami risk posed by the Cascadia Subduction Zone and the offshore Hikurangi subduction margin, respectively. This report provides recommendations for further
development of tsunami mitigation activities in these areas, based on findings from the interviews.
Overall there was a 96% survival rate of those living in the inundated area of the municipalities visited. This can be attributed to mostly effective education and evacuation procedures. Schools education, hazard maps and exercises appear to be the most common forms of education. Community involvement in planning of evacuation maps, routes and buildings is common, with many places conducting regular community-level exercises. Hazard and evacuation maps lacked consistency and both maps and safe locations were generally designed for a tsunami height that under-represented the worst case scenario.
The natural warning of long ground shaking (reported as more than two minutes, and often more than three) was widely agreed as enough by itself to have triggered evacuation. Sea walls reduced effective observation of the natural warning of unusual ocean behaviour in many places, and fostered a false sense of security in some locations.
Although an early warning system is often seen publicly as key infrastructure in enhancing tsunami resilience, the expectation of official warnings (and their content) may have slowed the time taken for people to initiate evacuation in Tōhoku, compared to if there had been total reliance on natural warnings. Exposure to previous false ‘major tsunami’ warnings apparently led to complacency in this event, despite this earthquake feeling much larger than anything previously experienced. The philosophy of tsunami tendenko was shown to be a positive education tool which promoted immediate self-evacuation and save many lives.
Peoples’ movements during and after evacuation reveal that many people died unnecessarily due to delayed evacuation or non-evacuation as a result of social or parental responsibility, lack of education or scepticism of warnings. Widespread use of motor vehicles caused traffic congestion in some areas, when walking, running or cycling would have been much more effective and saved lives.
Many people returned to the evacuation zone too early in some places because they had not seen the wave arrive at the expected time given in official warnings, or because they
expected no more waves to arrive. It is critical that people have the awareness that the first wave may come later than estimated by rapid scientific analysis, and the largest wave may
not be the first.
The evacuation strategy in place at March 11th 2011 was appropriate in that it sent people to safe locations, used maps and community involvement and was regularly exercised in many
places. Some evacuation centres were not located far enough inland or on high enough ground because they were not designated using the worst-case tsunami inundation.
There was extensive effective use of both designated and informal vertical evacuation buildings. The most important considerations for effective use are sufficient height (in relation to expected inundation depth), reinforced concrete construction, community engagement, owner agreement, signage, 24-hour access and evacuee welfare. More than one building owner considered use of their building in evacuation as corporate social responsibility. To enhance evacuee safety it is prudent to minimise the opportunities for spilled accelerants such as oil, and debris such as logs in tsunami-prone locations."
SEE ALSO: Tsunami Vertical Evacuation Buildings - Lessons for International Preparedness Following the 2011 Great East Japan Tsunami, Journal of Disaster Research; http://www.fujipress.jp/finder/xslt.php?mode=present&inputfile=DSSTR000700070005.xml (requires free registration to access paper)
Keywords Great East Japan tsunami – Vertical evacuation – Field observations – Tsunami fragility – Flow velocity estimates – Damage scale
The present study succeeds in validating the approach by comparing outputs of the attenuation-rule based method against inundation and run-up data points surveyed following the Great East Japan Tsunami (11th March 2011). To validate the method, firstly the inundation height versus distance inland (according to the attenuation rules for overland flow from the coast and via rivers) is directly compared against the survey data points of inundation and run-up height. Secondly, GIS-calculated evacuation zones are developed for two contrasting study areas in Miyagi Prefecture, Tōhoku, Japan, representing coastal plain topography and a rias (drowned river valley) with harbour topography. These are then compared to the recorded survey data and satellite imagery indicating tsunami inundation extent at the same locations. The evacuation zones generated using the GIS-calculated attenuation rule successfully incorporate the zone of inundation due to the Great East Japan tsunami at both study areas, giving confidence that the method is suitable for derivation of indicative evacuation zones elsewhere.
centers were used for vertical evacuation places. The authors conducted field surveys to collect information on how
municipal offices had designated vertical evacuation places in Miyako, Kamaishi, Kesennuma, Minami-Sanriku,
Ishinomaki, and Natori cities and towns prior to this disaster, and how they were used in the event. Further, interview
surveys were conducted on emergency responses after the earthquake at some evacuation places in Natori city. It was
found that access to the roof floor and night time entry to the buildings, redundant tools to receive warning messages and
share communication, emergency stocks of water and food are crucial, and too much use of automobiles for evacuation
caused traffic congestion and delay of evacuation.
At least 143 people were killed in Samoa, 22 people in American Samoa and 7 people on Niuatoputapu, Tonga. The majority of the victims as reported by OCHA1, were from the most vulnerable group ‐ female, young and elderly. In Samoa, 310 people have been reported as injured, five are missing and about 3,200 people (640 families) have been left homeless in Samoa (OCHA). The hardest hit areas in Samoa were on the southeast coast of Upolu and the island of Manono. There was also minor damage reported in the northwest part of the main island and on the island of Savai'i.
Assessments by the Samoan Red Cross (SRC) indicated that 40 villages have been affected along the south‐eastern coast, with 20 villages completely destroyed by tsunami waves. The Government of Samoa (GoS) estimated the cost of damage to infrastructure, public and private properties at around Samoan WS$ 380 million (over £ 90 million).
The UK Earthquake Engineering Field Investigation Team (EEFIT) decided to mount a reconnaissance mission to the Samoa Islands following this earthquake and resulting tsunami, in particular to assess the effects of the tsunami. This report presents some of the preliminary findings of the team; further images from the EEFIT Team field mission are available on the Virtual Disaster Viewer (www.virtualdisasterviewer.com). This viewer development is an ongoing project supported by EEFIT and other International earthquake reconnaissance teams. It allows the visualisation of the geo‐referenced photos taken by the team, with pre‐ and post‐earthquake satellite images for the affected areas as well as mapped faults.
This report represents the preliminary findings from the event and disseminates the factual findings from the mission, including photographs and other exhibits. Further research on the findings will be published in due course by EEFIT members in peer‐reviewed journals which may also compare these findings with observations from the 2004 Boxing Day Tsunami.
Bull Earthquake Eng (2013) 11:107–140 DOI 10.1007/s10518-012-9384-5
Keywords Christchurch · New Zealand · Earthquake · Reconnaissance · Survey · Landslides · Building damage · Liquefaction
ohoku and Kanto regions of Japan on 11th March 2011, causing tremendous casualties, massive damage to structures and infrastructure, and huge economic loss. This event has revealed weakness and vulnerability of urban cities and modern society in Japan, which were thought to be one of the most earthquake-prepared nations in the world. Nevertheless, recorded ground motion data from this event offer invaluable information and opportunity; their unique features include very strong short-period spectral content, long duration, and effects due to local asperities as well as direction of rupture/wave propagation. Aiming at gaining useful experience from this tragic event, Earthquake Engineering Field Investigation Team (EEFIT) organised and dispatched a team to the T¯ ohoku region of Japan. During the
EEFIT mission, ground shaking damage surveys were conducted in Sendai, Shirakawa, and Sukagawa,where the Japan Meteorological Agency intensity of 6+was observed and instru- mentally recorded ground motion datawere available. The damage survey results identify the key factors for severe shaking damage, such as insufficient lateral reinforcement and detailing in structural columns from structural capacity viewpoint and rich spectral content of ground shaking in the intermediate vibration period range from seismic demand viewpoint. Impor- tantly, inclusion of several ground motion parameters, such as nonlinear structural response, in shaking damage surveys, can improve the correlation of observed ground motion with shaking damage and therefore enhance existing indicators of potential damage.
Keywords 11th March 2011 Great East Japan (Tohoku) earthquake · Ground shaking damage · Ground motion characteristics · Long duration motion · Field investigation and observation
Bull Earthquake Eng (2013) 11:141–170 DOI 10.1007/s10518-012-9371-x