Papers by Priyedarshi Jetli
Proceedings of the World Congress Aristotle 2400 Years, 2019
Aristotle demarcates two types of deduction: (1)
demonstrations, which proceed from premises
that... more Aristotle demarcates two types of deduction: (1)
demonstrations, which proceed from premises
that can be laid down as true; and (2) dialectic,
which proceeds from premises which are supposed
to be true but could have proceeded from
the contradictories of the premises as well. Dialectic
argumentation is what makes debates possible
and is central to all branches of philosophy.
The near consensus conception today is that
mathematical logic has replaced Aristotelian logic.
However, mathematical logic is the subclass of deductions,
which Aristotle would classify as demonstrations.
In alternative axiomatic systems,
demonstrations proceed from axioms that are laid
down as true. In this paper I argue that the other
subclass of deductions, that is, dialectic, is not subsumed
under mathematical logic precisely, because
it proceeds from premises that are not laid
down as true but supposed to be true and we could
well have started with their contradictories, supposing
them to be true. Hence, it is a mistake to
believe that the scope of mathematical logic includes
the scope of all logic. The scope of Aristotle’s
syllogistic logic, since it covers both demonstrations
and dialectic, is thereby broader and encompasses
all of deductive reasoning, not just
mathematical demonstrations.
ACPI Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2011
Try viewing the gargantuan Universe through it (zero); and you'll find everything beautifully in ... more Try viewing the gargantuan Universe through it (zero); and you'll find everything beautifully in focus; marvellously harmonious and synchronized like never before, (Parekh 2004, 124)
ACPI Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2011
RATIONALISM A few years ago in various temples it was reported that when Ganesh was offered milk ... more RATIONALISM A few years ago in various temples it was reported that when Ganesh was offered milk in a spoon he drank it. The next day the newspapers reported a debate between the 'believers' who had faith that Ganesh actually drank the milk and the 'rationalists' who claimed that the phenomenon could be explained because of atmospheric conditions. This is the common use of 'rationalism' as the view that every experience has a rational explanation as opposed to those who believe that some experiences are beyond explanation and must be accepted on faith alone. In this sense all sciences, and perhaps all disciplines are rationalist as they seek explanation about different domains of the world. Although the word 'rationalism' is derived from the Latin 'ratio' meaning reason, The Greek 'logos' is perhaps the root from which the centrality of reason has been dominant in philosophy. Hence,
IGNOU BA COURSE IN PHILOSOPHY, 2009
The main objective of this Unit is to give the students a critical appraisal of the tradition of ... more The main objective of this Unit is to give the students a critical appraisal of the tradition of Rationalism in Modern philosophy. Modern philosophy is both a continuation of and a breakaway from Medieval philosophy. Descartes (1596-1650) is commonly acknowledged as the founder of Modern philosophy. Descartes was also the first of the great Rationalist philosophers followed by Spinoza (1632-1677) and Leibniz (1646-1716). The common thread uniting the great rationalists is that they agreed that the foundations of knowledge are in pure reason alone and not in sense experience. Furthermore, all three of these philosophers were devout believers in God and in different ways their conceptions of God were central to their philosophy. Yet, there is a marked difference in their metaphysics. Descartes was a dualist who believed that mind and body are two distinct substances which interact with each other in the pineal gland. Spinoza was a monist who believed that there is only one type of reality so that mind and body are two aspects of the same reality. Leibniz was a pluralist who believed that the world is made up of immaterial monads and mind and body are simply different conglomerations of monads. Descartes' famous cogito has been under attack ever since Descartes came up with it. There has been criticism from orthodox Christians like Pascal who claim that Descartes is being anti-Christian by not beginning with the existence of God but by deriving it through inference from the cogito. There is criticism from empiricists as to why obvious empirical ideas such as my present sensation of white on the monitor screen is not a clear and distinct idea. Descartes seems to go against common sense to say that such ideas are not clear and distinct. There is criticism from contemporary philosophers like Ayer, who argue that Descartes' cogito begs the question, that is, it assumes that I exist and then says that I think therefore I exist. Hence, his argument is circular and not very convincing. Descartes' dualism has been under constant attack as it is argued that like things have like causes. How can mental phenomena then cause physical phenomena and vice versa? Contemporary philosophers also criticize Descartes' proofs for the existence of God arguing that the ontological argument begs the question, that is, it assumes the existence of God in order to prove the existence of
Handbook of Abductive Cognition
This article is mainly inspired by de Vignemont, Frédérique. 2014. ‘A Multimodal Conception of Bo... more This article is mainly inspired by de Vignemont, Frédérique. 2014. ‘A Multimodal Conception of Bodily Awareness’, Mind, 123: 989–1020. de Vignemont distinguishes between bodily senses and external senses. de Vignemont further claims that in a singular sense like vision other bodily or external senses are also involved. We argue that perhaps what is called 'consciousness' is simply multi-modal bodily awareness of the bodily senses.
There is a misconception that Poincaré's conventionalism has been refuted because Euclide... more There is a misconception that Poincaré's conventionalism has been refuted because Euclidean geometry is no longer the only correct geometry. But this is precisely why it has not been refuted as Poincaré himself was one of the founders of non-Euclidean geometries.
<jats:p>I argue for the possibility of knowledge by invention whch is neither á priori nor ... more <jats:p>I argue for the possibility of knowledge by invention whch is neither á priori nor á posteriori. My conception of knowledge by invention evolves from Poincaré's conventionalism, but unlike Poincaré's conventions, propositions known by invention have a truth value. An individuating criteria for this type of knowledge is conjectured. The proposition known through invention is: gounded historically in the discipline to which it belongs; a result of the careful, sincere and objective quest and effort of the knower; chosen freely by the inventer or knower; and, private in its invention but public once invented. I extend knowledge by invention to include the knowledge of the invented proposition by those who do not invent it but accept it as a convention for good reasons. Finally, knowledge by invention combined with a revisionist, Platonist definition of knowledge as actively justified true belief provides a pedagogical model reviving the proactive spirit of the Socratic method with an emphasis on invention and activity and a de-emphasis on information gathering and passivity.</jats:p>
Spanda-Karikas is one of the important works of Kashmir Saivism. Modern scientists have discovere... more Spanda-Karikas is one of the important works of Kashmir Saivism. Modern scientists have discovered that the world was created from the vibration of the first explosion and that the universe is still expanding. This paper points out the parallels between modern physics and spanda principles. They will particularly look at the parallels between spanda principles to particle physics, quantum mechanics, theory of relativity and string theory. It is there opinion that presentday science and engineering students should be able to work quantitatively with the concepts of modern physics and Spanda Shastra.
Poincaré was indeed the grand epistemologist of mathematics. This book is based on his philosophh... more Poincaré was indeed the grand epistemologist of mathematics. This book is based on his philosophhical writings from 1902 to 1912 and it clears a lot of oversimplifications of his conventionalism and adds the depth of his dimension of universalism to uncover Poincaré as the grand epistemologist of mathematics.
This article is mainly inspired by de Vignemont, Frédérique. 2014. ‘A Multimodal Conception of Bo... more This article is mainly inspired by de Vignemont, Frédérique. 2014. ‘A Multimodal Conception of Bodily Awareness’, Mind, 123: 989–1020. de Vignemont distinguishes between bodily senses and external senses. de Vignemont further claims that in a singular sense like vision other bodily or external senses are also involved. We argue that perhaps what is called &#39;consciousness&#39; is simply multi-modal bodily awareness of the bodily senses.
First, 'Is Justified True Belief Knowledge' is imprecise but Gettier is explicit that 'know' is a... more First, 'Is Justified True Belief Knowledge' is imprecise but Gettier is explicit that 'know' is analysed as the definiendum is 'S knows that P'. Second, Gettier does not misrepresent (a) as Plato's definition as the expressions used are 'Plato considers' and 'seems to accept'. Third, Gettier is not mistaken to apply Plato's definition to propositions since propositional knowledge is a species of Plato's definition. Fourth, for Plato true belief temporally precedes an account. 'Jones owns a Ford' is never a true opinion, hence no account for it can be given. The counterexample is reconstructed with temporality built into it. Fifth, Gettier does not fail to establish the equivalence of 'believe', 'accepts' and 'sure' in the three versions as this is implicitly established in the shifts made in the paper. Sixth, 'entails' logically is used only when the entailing proposition is true, but in the counterexamples a false proposition is taken to imply a true one. 'Entail' is to be taken in the ordinary sense of implies. Seventh, in Case I, the implication is preserved with the proper representation: (Gj & Tj) (y)[Gy (y=j)], which implies (x){(Gx & Tx) (y)[Gy (y=x)]}'. Eighth, The counterexample is reworked to avoid the objection that justification for p and justification for q may not be sufficient justification for 'p & q'.
Abduction* is the genus with deduction and induction as species. Modus tollens is backward reason... more Abduction* is the genus with deduction and induction as species. Modus tollens is backward reasoning as an unknown proposition is inferred from a known proposition. Reductio ad absurdum is abductive because the conclusion is inferred by deriving a contradiction from an assumption. Inductive reasoning from effect to cause is also backward reasoning. But abduction* consists of forward reasoning as well. The generic structure of abductive* argumentation is universal among all cultures, occupations and disciplines.
Abduction* is the genus with deduction and induction as species. Modus tollens is backward reason... more Abduction* is the genus with deduction and induction as species. Modus tollens is backward reasoning as an unknown proposition is inferred from a known proposition. Reductio ad absurdum is abductive because the conclusion is inferred by deriving a contradiction from an assumption. Inductive reasoning from effect to cause is also backward reasoning. But abduction* consists of forward reasoning as well. The generic structure of abductive* argumentation is universal among all cultures, occupations and disciplines.
Studies in Applied Philosophy, Epistemology and Rational Ethics, 2016
I am working with the notion of knowing as a process. Hence, ‘know’ is defined as:
‘S knows that ... more I am working with the notion of knowing as a process. Hence, ‘know’ is defined as:
‘S knows that p’ at tn = (1) S is knowinga from t1–tn and (2) S knowsr p at tn =def.
(i) S believes that p at t1, t2,…., tn;
(ii) S sincerely performs the activity of justification of p from t1 to tn;
(iii) that p is true at tn.
With this definition, we can now define ‘knows that one knows’ in two stages:
I. S knows that S knows that p = (1) S is knowinga from from tn+1–tn+j and (2) S knowsr at tn+j that S knows that p at tn.
II. S knows that S knows that p =def.
(i) S believes at tn+1, at tn+2,…., at tn+j, that S is knowinga that S t1;
(ii) S is justified in believing that p at tn; and
(iii) that p is true at tn.
S knows that ‘S knows that p’ =def.
(i) S believes that S knows that p;
(ii) S is justified in believing that S knows that p;
(iii) ‘S knows that p’ is true; and
(iv) S is justified in believing that S is justified in believing that p.
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Papers by Priyedarshi Jetli
demonstrations, which proceed from premises
that can be laid down as true; and (2) dialectic,
which proceeds from premises which are supposed
to be true but could have proceeded from
the contradictories of the premises as well. Dialectic
argumentation is what makes debates possible
and is central to all branches of philosophy.
The near consensus conception today is that
mathematical logic has replaced Aristotelian logic.
However, mathematical logic is the subclass of deductions,
which Aristotle would classify as demonstrations.
In alternative axiomatic systems,
demonstrations proceed from axioms that are laid
down as true. In this paper I argue that the other
subclass of deductions, that is, dialectic, is not subsumed
under mathematical logic precisely, because
it proceeds from premises that are not laid
down as true but supposed to be true and we could
well have started with their contradictories, supposing
them to be true. Hence, it is a mistake to
believe that the scope of mathematical logic includes
the scope of all logic. The scope of Aristotle’s
syllogistic logic, since it covers both demonstrations
and dialectic, is thereby broader and encompasses
all of deductive reasoning, not just
mathematical demonstrations.
‘S knows that p’ at tn = (1) S is knowinga from t1–tn and (2) S knowsr p at tn =def.
(i) S believes that p at t1, t2,…., tn;
(ii) S sincerely performs the activity of justification of p from t1 to tn;
(iii) that p is true at tn.
With this definition, we can now define ‘knows that one knows’ in two stages:
I. S knows that S knows that p = (1) S is knowinga from from tn+1–tn+j and (2) S knowsr at tn+j that S knows that p at tn.
II. S knows that S knows that p =def.
(i) S believes at tn+1, at tn+2,…., at tn+j, that S is knowinga that S t1;
(ii) S is justified in believing that p at tn; and
(iii) that p is true at tn.
S knows that ‘S knows that p’ =def.
(i) S believes that S knows that p;
(ii) S is justified in believing that S knows that p;
(iii) ‘S knows that p’ is true; and
(iv) S is justified in believing that S is justified in believing that p.
demonstrations, which proceed from premises
that can be laid down as true; and (2) dialectic,
which proceeds from premises which are supposed
to be true but could have proceeded from
the contradictories of the premises as well. Dialectic
argumentation is what makes debates possible
and is central to all branches of philosophy.
The near consensus conception today is that
mathematical logic has replaced Aristotelian logic.
However, mathematical logic is the subclass of deductions,
which Aristotle would classify as demonstrations.
In alternative axiomatic systems,
demonstrations proceed from axioms that are laid
down as true. In this paper I argue that the other
subclass of deductions, that is, dialectic, is not subsumed
under mathematical logic precisely, because
it proceeds from premises that are not laid
down as true but supposed to be true and we could
well have started with their contradictories, supposing
them to be true. Hence, it is a mistake to
believe that the scope of mathematical logic includes
the scope of all logic. The scope of Aristotle’s
syllogistic logic, since it covers both demonstrations
and dialectic, is thereby broader and encompasses
all of deductive reasoning, not just
mathematical demonstrations.
‘S knows that p’ at tn = (1) S is knowinga from t1–tn and (2) S knowsr p at tn =def.
(i) S believes that p at t1, t2,…., tn;
(ii) S sincerely performs the activity of justification of p from t1 to tn;
(iii) that p is true at tn.
With this definition, we can now define ‘knows that one knows’ in two stages:
I. S knows that S knows that p = (1) S is knowinga from from tn+1–tn+j and (2) S knowsr at tn+j that S knows that p at tn.
II. S knows that S knows that p =def.
(i) S believes at tn+1, at tn+2,…., at tn+j, that S is knowinga that S t1;
(ii) S is justified in believing that p at tn; and
(iii) that p is true at tn.
S knows that ‘S knows that p’ =def.
(i) S believes that S knows that p;
(ii) S is justified in believing that S knows that p;
(iii) ‘S knows that p’ is true; and
(iv) S is justified in believing that S is justified in believing that p.