Paolo Bucci
Società Filosofica Italiana – "Biblioteca Filosofica"
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The discussion on the nature of space and time has accompanied Mach’s research from the very beginning, arriving at its most complete form in his 1905 work Knowledge and Error. Mach outlined a space and time theory divided into three «levels» – physiological, metric-geometric, and physical – characterized by a rigorously empirical approach with space and time presented as particular types of «sensations» resulting from biological adaptation processes. The Machian theory intends to account for the isotropic geometric space formation processes through psychological-genetic research, distinguishing them from the anisotropic ones in physiology. As an alternative to Newtonian theory, it also seeks to clarify the physical meaning of space and time, which are configured as types of relations of functional dependence between «elements». By highlighting the plurality of meanings inherent in space and time, the theory takes on particular importance in the debate around the relationship between «physical» and «psychic», between physics and psychology – with Mach among its key movers.
The essay discusses the relationship between Natorpian thought on the subject and method of «critical psychology» and the debate on the mathematization of psychic phenomena, which was widely discussed in the philosophical and scientific culture of the second half of the 19th century. In Natorp’s opinion, the objectification process of physical and mathematical sciences appears as an «infinite task», a procedure in which the «exact» determination of the phenomena finds an insuperable limit in the «inexact» nature of the sensation. Psychic phenomena, therefore, take form as «absolute data», moments in the flow of consciousness which, in their specific qualitative characteristics, are irreducible to physical-mathematical lawfulness and, for this reason, can be investigated using «critical psychology».
The paper is aimed at outlining the fundamental characters of the Husserlian theory of the eidetic intuition, bearing in mind the perspective of Logische Untersuchungen and Ideen I aimed at defining the internal structure of the acts of the eidetic intuition, as well as the perspective of a work such as Erfahrung und Urteil, where the issue related to the formation of ideal-abstract concepts is tackled from the standpoint of their relation with the empirical basis, given that the passage from «static phenomenology» to «genetic phenomenology» had already taken place. Husserl’s theory of the formation of «pure concepts » - at the core of which lies the notion of eidetic variation - besides constituting a considerable example of phenomenological understanding of idealization processes, shows several implications of a general nature regarding the phenomenological theory of objects, the correlation between a priori and experience and Husserl’s conception of the relationship between thought and language.
Natural philosophy, based on the neutral monism of the theory of elements, has a fundamental role in the scientific research and Ernst Mach’s epistemological reflection. It is a sort of «metatheory» that intervenes to solve problems regarding the relations between different fields of scientific knowledge, in particular, in the study of the relations between physical and psychic phenomena.
However, the theory of elements also interacts with some theories of Mach’s epistemology and, specifically, it is at the base of the critics of «metaphysical» causality notion, to which Mach opposes the theory of scientific explanation as functional dependence between variable elements.
The discussion on the nature of space and time has accompanied Mach’s research from the very beginning, arriving at its most complete form in his 1905 work Knowledge and Error. Mach outlined a space and time theory divided into three «levels» – physiological, metric-geometric, and physical – characterized by a rigorously empirical approach with space and time presented as particular types of «sensations» resulting from biological adaptation processes. The Machian theory intends to account for the isotropic geometric space formation processes through psychological-genetic research, distinguishing them from the anisotropic ones in physiology. As an alternative to Newtonian theory, it also seeks to clarify the physical meaning of space and time, which are configured as types of relations of functional dependence between «elements». By highlighting the plurality of meanings inherent in space and time, the theory takes on particular importance in the debate around the relationship between «physical» and «psychic», between physics and psychology – with Mach among its key movers.
The essay discusses the relationship between Natorpian thought on the subject and method of «critical psychology» and the debate on the mathematization of psychic phenomena, which was widely discussed in the philosophical and scientific culture of the second half of the 19th century. In Natorp’s opinion, the objectification process of physical and mathematical sciences appears as an «infinite task», a procedure in which the «exact» determination of the phenomena finds an insuperable limit in the «inexact» nature of the sensation. Psychic phenomena, therefore, take form as «absolute data», moments in the flow of consciousness which, in their specific qualitative characteristics, are irreducible to physical-mathematical lawfulness and, for this reason, can be investigated using «critical psychology».
The paper is aimed at outlining the fundamental characters of the Husserlian theory of the eidetic intuition, bearing in mind the perspective of Logische Untersuchungen and Ideen I aimed at defining the internal structure of the acts of the eidetic intuition, as well as the perspective of a work such as Erfahrung und Urteil, where the issue related to the formation of ideal-abstract concepts is tackled from the standpoint of their relation with the empirical basis, given that the passage from «static phenomenology» to «genetic phenomenology» had already taken place. Husserl’s theory of the formation of «pure concepts » - at the core of which lies the notion of eidetic variation - besides constituting a considerable example of phenomenological understanding of idealization processes, shows several implications of a general nature regarding the phenomenological theory of objects, the correlation between a priori and experience and Husserl’s conception of the relationship between thought and language.
Natural philosophy, based on the neutral monism of the theory of elements, has a fundamental role in the scientific research and Ernst Mach’s epistemological reflection. It is a sort of «metatheory» that intervenes to solve problems regarding the relations between different fields of scientific knowledge, in particular, in the study of the relations between physical and psychic phenomena.
However, the theory of elements also interacts with some theories of Mach’s epistemology and, specifically, it is at the base of the critics of «metaphysical» causality notion, to which Mach opposes the theory of scientific explanation as functional dependence between variable elements.
In the Prolegomena, the first volume of Logische Untersuchungen, Husserl tackles the Machian theory of science by elaborating a critique of the principle of economy, identified as a particular example of logical psychologism. The relation between Husserl and Mach, however, is not only of confrontational nature: the studies carried out by the Austrian physicist in the physiological and psychological ambit are of critical importance for understanding the origin of the phenomenological method. As acknowledged by the founder of phenomenology himself, the Machian methodological approach represents the starting point for elaborating the concept of phenomenological reduction. The essay aims to create a comparison between Husserl and Mach by highlighting, among the other things, the profound differences between Mach’s phenomenalism and phenomenology, which mainly pertain to topics of utmost importance, such as the conception of subjectivity and the theory of object. Such differences are referable to that which constitutes one of the main characteristics of phenomenology, that is, the argument against naturalistic reductionism.
The image of Galileo proposed by Ernst Mach in Mechanics has always been considered a paradigmatic example of the strictly positivistic interpretation of Galilean science, which views Galileo as being particularly attentive to the description of facts and not interested in theoretical elaboration. The purpose of this paper is to show how Mach’s interpretation, especially if evaluated in the light of a work such as Knowledge and Error, is in reality quite cogent and complex. In fact, it reflects an epistemology that, while undoubtedly presenting many aspects of an empiricist and phenomenalistic nature, is at the same time characterized by: (i) an emphasis on the processes of idealisation and abstraction involved in scientific investigation and therefore on the role of thought experiments, and (ii) by references to a holistic conception of the relationship between theory and experience.