Papers by Pamela Emanuelson
Contemporary Social Psychological Theories
The Blackwell Encyclopedia of Sociology
The Blackwell Encyclopedia of Sociology
Rationality and Society
This paper investigates two forms of property as a social phenomenon and finds the Property Right... more This paper investigates two forms of property as a social phenomenon and finds the Property Right Paradigm of economics to be wrongly conceived. Introducing new formulations for property reveals that private and communal property are frequently found together. When they are, as the scope of one increases the scope of the other shrinks. We examine how property rights are embedded in social exchange experiments. Calling on game theory, we find that communal property relations and private property relations contain exactly the same social dilemma. Furthermore, absent enforced rights, no property exists. Property comes to exist through socially producing its rights and we show that production must be coercive. We link our new theory of property to Robѐ’s analysis of property and power in contemporary society.
Contemporary Social Psychological Theories
The Blackwell Encyclopedia of Sociology, 2007
Social Evolution & History, 2015
Unlike previous theory that focused on external conditions to explain the rise of the state, this... more Unlike previous theory that focused on external conditions to explain the rise of the state, this paper proposes an explanation grounded in social structural dynamics. Like previous theory, we see the state as developing out of increasingly intense conflict, but here that conflict is traced, not to population pressure, but to instabilities of the status lineage structures of contending chiefdoms. The social structure of the state is seen as the outcome of strategies adopted to stabilize the chiefdom social structure. Explanations of prehistoric, historic and contemporary transformations have long been fundamental to the social sciences. Prominent among them is Carneiro's elegant and influential theory of the origin of the state, a theory that includes population pressure, circumscription and conflict as causes (Carneiro 1970, 1981, 1988, 1991, 1998, 2012a, 2012b). In circumscribed regions, population pressure sparks warfare between villages over land and, as that pressure increa...
Dutch Crossing: Journal of Low Countries Studies, 2016
Sociological Methodology, 2020
Many refinements of statistical design have been offered to solve the replication problem identif... more Many refinements of statistical design have been offered to solve the replication problem identified by the Open Science Collaboration and Camerer and colleagues. There are, however, two distinct kinds of experimentation: Fisher design and theory designed. Therefore, there are two kinds of replication. Only for the Fisher design does replication reproduce conditions of prior experiments in order to compare new with prior results, and only there has a replication problem been demonstrated. In contrast, replications for theory-designed experiments test experimental results against theoretical predictions, and only for theory-designed experiments can replication be extended broadly across the scope of a theory. The authors analyze the logic of the two types of experiments as well as hybrids that mix qualities of both.
Journal of Social Structure, 2019
In coercive relations, threats of negative sanctions extract valued positive sanctions from coerc... more In coercive relations, threats of negative sanctions extract valued positive sanctions from coercees. Only when coercion is direct, however, are the negative sanctions controlled by the coercer who benefits from the threats. Not previously investigated, indirect coercion relies on threats and negative sanctions that are external to the exploitative relation. We suggest that indirect coercion is ubiquitous. From their inception states have used the threat of external enemies to justify rulers’ increased powers and to provide a patina of legitimacy while, on a smaller scale, criminal organizations such as the mafia have long profited from offering protection. The purpose of this paper is to theoretically model and experimentally investigate indirect coercion and compare its effectiveness in extracting valued resources to that of direct coercion. Previous research has shown that all power structures, whether exchange, conflict or coercive, take two distinct forms, strong and weak. Ther...
Socius: Sociological Research for a Dynamic World, 2018
Status characteristics theory and elementary theory are applied to explain developments through t... more Status characteristics theory and elementary theory are applied to explain developments through three structural forms that chiefdoms are known to take. Theoretic models find that downward mobility inherent in the first form, the status-lineage structure, destabilizes its system of privilege. As a consequence, high-status actors are motivated to find mechanisms to preserve and enhance privilege. By engaging in hostile relations with other chiefdoms, high-status actors offer protection to low-status others from real or imagined threats. Through that protection, they gain tribute and support. The result is structural change from influence based on status to power exercised through indirect coercion, the second structural form. In settled societies, accumulation through war and selective redistribution contribute to separation of warrior and commoner rankings. That separation leads to the third structural form, direct coercive chiefdom.
Studies in Human Ecology and Adaptation, 2017
This paper explores how chiefdom and early state social structures resolve collective action prob... more This paper explores how chiefdom and early state social structures resolve collective action problems. Solutions to problems of collective action are twofold; incentive systems discourage free-riding and encourage individuals to act and organization combines individuals’ acts. Broadly stated, we argue that influence and power, once organized into the hands of one or a small subgroup of individuals, can be used to administer incentive systems that motivate others in the community to act. Those incentive systems, in turn, shape collective activities such as warfare and defense. Drawing on experimentally grounded theory in sociology, we model forms of social organization and discuss the relation of each to collective action. In particular, we argue that simple chiefdoms solve problems of collective action through the well-ordered influence relations in their status-lineage structures, while coercive chiefdoms, to the same purpose, exercise power through threat of force. As in coercive chiefdoms, early states solve collective action problems through coercive relations but, where chiefs coerce only directly, heads of territorial states use bureaucratic systems of administration to exercise coercive power over vast geographic and social distances.
With the aim of improving network exchange theory's precision and parsimony, I test three... more With the aim of improving network exchange theory's precision and parsimony, I test three alternative Network Exchange Models (GPI-R, GPI-RD and GPI-l*2) of identical scope. Previous analyses found GPI-RD's predictions the most precise, however, those analyses included only four networks. I analyze data for eight networks including old and new data for two previously studied networks, old data for one
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Papers by Pamela Emanuelson