The Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) was established in 2006 to support interventions of direct and immed... more The Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) was established in 2006 to support interventions of direct and immediate relevance to the peacebuilding process and contribute towards addressing critical gaps in that process, in particular in areas for which no other funding mechanism is available. The PBF had a difficult start, in no small measure because of the political demands from New York to disburse rapidly, before PBF systems were fully in place or recipients had a clear idea what the purposes of the fund were. Despite that, this review finds that lessons have been learned from these experiences and are being applied to subsequent PBF cases. This positive learning curve is reflected at headquarters level, especially within the Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO) as Fund Manager and the Multi- Donor Trust Fund Office (MDTF Office) as Fund Administrator, as well as at field level.
Even though the PBF is relatively new and it is not yet possible to assess the long- term impact of PBF activities, the review team finds that the Fund has succeeded in:
-promoting discussion and learning about peacebuilding issues in the -context of post- conflict situations; -promoting ongoing peacebuilding processes; and -fundraising.
At the same time, the Fund faces numerous challenges to the effective and efficient achievement of its objectives. These include strategic challenges, conflicting objectives and faulty assumptions, management challenges, issues surrounding PBF stakeholder roles and responsibilities, and operational challenges.
Pooled funding is increasingly seen as an important component of efforts to improve aid effective... more Pooled funding is increasingly seen as an important component of efforts to improve aid effectiveness by harmonising aid activities. This review was commissioned by the UNDG/ECHA Task Team on Financing for Transition to: a) clarify how pooled funds can contribute to aid effectiveness in post-conflict transition situations and through that to improved aid flows and 2) recommend improvements in current systems, procedures and policies to donors and agencies. This report examines 15 funds in some detail: United Nations (UN)- and World Bank- administered funds as well as funds managed by the private sector and/or bilateral donors. The review focuses on four issues relating to aid effectiveness: ownership, coordination, risk management and mitigation, and speed and flexibility of response. Drawing on the findings in each of these areas, the review team identifies a number of policy level considerations that should be taken into account when seeking to strengthen the aid effectiveness of pooled funding.
Pooled funding mechanisms can take many forms but as defined in the review‟s ToR, they all utilise donor contributions against a set of common objectives and activities approved by a joint governing mechanism. The review has identified four categories of funds (Box ES-1) based on their structure and the rules that govern their financing, with most of the funds surveyed falling into Categories II and III.
There is a significant difference in the governance structures of these categories of funds, with important implications for ownership and capacity building and hence aid effectiveness. National actors generally are not included in the decision-making bodies of Category I funds, although they may be part of priority setting exercises. In Category II, III and IV funds, national actors are included in decision-making structures (although the rapid response modalities of Category III and IV funds (for example, the Immediate Response Facility (IRF) of the PBF) are less participatory in that the fund Steering Committee tends to play no role in project development or approval). Similarly, the guiding strategies of Category I funds are developed primarily by the international community while national actors and strategies play a larger role in determining the guiding strategies of Category II, III and IV funds. (Disbursements from Category IV funds are based on projects/project portfolios, not strategies.)
Le Volet Gouvernance relatif aux thèmes dits transversaux ayant trait à l’obligation démocrati... more Le Volet Gouvernance relatif aux thèmes dits transversaux ayant trait à l’obligation démocratique de rendre compte est une des composantes du Programme du développement du secteur de la sécurité (DSS) présenté dans le Mémorandum d’Entente (MdE) signé en avril 2009 par la République du Burundi et le Royaume des Pays-Bas pour une période de huit ans. Démarré vers la fin de la phase 1 du Programme DSS en 2011, ledit Volet fait l’objet aujourd’hui d’une évaluation de ses réalisations pour mieux orienter dans la suite les activités développées dans ce cadre. Ses activités caractérisent bien la seconde phase du Programme DSS axé sur le développement structurel – et non opérationnel de la phase 1 – puisqu’elles visent le changement d’attitudes, de comportements et de gestion garants de la durabilité du Programme.
La substance de l’évaluation du Volet Gouvernance du Programme DSS vient des échanges eus avec les acteurs étatiques et les acteurs non-étatiques du secteur de la sécurité sur le travail réalisé par ledit Volet ainsi que des documents clefs. L’évaluation menée touche plus le fonctionnement du Volet Gouvernance que les détails des projets exécutés. L’apport du Volet Gouvernance dans le développement de la RSS est assez appréciable. Cela dit, des défis sont encore à relever comme les limites de l’autorité civile de contrôle démocratique des CDS, le manque d’indépendance vis-à-vis des politiques, l’instrumentalisation de quelques éléments de ces corps et le besoin d’amélioration de la communication entre les CDS et les OSC.
Le besoin de contrôle démocratique des CDS appelle encore les mesures de renforcement de la transparence et de la redevabilité dans le secteur de la sécurité, notions nouvellement introduites dans la gestion de ces corps. Tant il est vrai que la sécurité est restée pendant longtemps comme une affaire réservée aux seules personnes en uniformes. Cette situation de fait explique la méfiance subsistante dans les relations entretenues par les CDS et les civils.
The Evaluation has identified seven areas on which the Danish government should focus attention i... more The Evaluation has identified seven areas on which the Danish government should focus attention in the coming three year period in order to enhance the performance of the Fund: 1) Deepening the Danish integrated approach to stabilisation; 2) Matching political ambition with human and financial resources; 3) Sharpening the PSF’s focus on key stabilisation issues; 4) Strengthening the PSF’s capacity for assessing context and developing theories of change as a basis for PSF programming and monitoring and evaluation; 5) Ensuring that the Fund’s comparative advantage is adequately reflected in programming; 6) Ensuring adequate flexibility in the use of PSF funding; and 7) Strengthening the management of the Fund to further enhance the effective and efficient use of PSF resources.
The Evaluation has made 16 recommendations to address these challenges, which can be found in the evaluation report. While it is ultimately the responsibility of the PSF stakeholders, including senior management at headquarters and embassies, under the leadership of the Inter-Ministerial Steering Committee (IMSC), to prioritise and respond to these recommendations, the Evaluation believes that there are seven recommendations that warrant immediate attention, which are outlined below.
Priority recommendations
In order to maximise the effectiveness of Danish support to stabilisation, it is essential that: 1) The IMSC strengthen its strategic guidance and oversight of the PSF; 2) The human and financial resources necessary to implement political ambitions are made available to the PSF; 3) PSF funding is adequately flexible; and 4) The management of the PSF is strengthened to further enhance the effective and efficient use of resources through improved monitoring and evaluation (M&E) and through attention to the choice and oversight of implementing partners.
Security sector reform (SSR) is increasingly put forward as a solution for a broad spectrum of Af... more Security sector reform (SSR) is increasingly put forward as a solution for a broad spectrum of African states facing security challenges. Yet, for a variety of reasons, there are relatively few examples of successful SSR implementation.
The case of Burundi's Security Sector Development (SSD) program, while still a work in progress, is noteworthy for having advanced both security sector effectiveness and democratic accountability since its inception in 2009. In this latest Africa Security Brief, "Lessons from Burundi's Security Sector Reform Process," Nicole Ball examines some of the challenges and accomplishments from the SSD experience thus far. Drawing on her years of practical analysis working with numerous SSR programs, Ball highlights insights from Burundi's SSD that can inform other African SSR initiatives. Key among these is the importance of navigating the politics of reform.
The authority granted by the United Nations Charter to use force to protect international peace a... more The authority granted by the United Nations Charter to use force to protect international peace and security has long lain dormant. The end of the Cold War, the genocides in Rwanda and Srebrenica and the 'Brahimi report' put discussions on the need for greater use of force on the UN's agenda in the early 2000s. Much has changed since, but in general the increased political willingness by UN member states to authorise the use of force has developed well ahead of their risk tolerance and matching capabilities. The recent experience of the Force Intervention Brigade in the UN's mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo is the latest occasion to trigger useful debate about the consequences of the UN mission mandates' progressive authorization of use of force and their increasingly robust application. Unfortunately, much of this debate takes greater use of force for granted, and focuses on the required political and capability improvements for improved effectiveness. Yet, there are three major risks associated with greater use of force as well. First, as the use of force will likely be selective and temporary, it risks reducing the UN's impartiality – with problematic consequences for its status as 'neutral broker'. Second, while the use of force can be a vital component of conflict resolution strategies, it also risks militarization if it is not accompanied by better political strategies and 'civilian capacities', such as stronger policing, intelligence and mediation. Third, greater use of force risks undermining missions' statebuilding tasks where force is applied on behalf of a state that is unwilling or unable to meet the internationally agreed standards of a sovereign government. A thoughtful debate on these issues needs to go hand in hand with any discussion of capability improvements.
SUMMARY Security for people, communities and states is essential for sustainable development, dem... more SUMMARY Security for people, communities and states is essential for sustainable development, democratisation and conflict mitigation. Politicised, badly managed or ineffective security bodies and justice systems often create instability and insecurity, largely due to the lack of effective democratic systems. Strengthening democratic security-sector governance after conflict presents enormous challenges, particularly: (1) developing and implementing a legal framework consistent with international law and democratic practice; (2) developing effective, well-functioning civil management and oversight bodies; (3) developing viable, accountable and affordable security forces; (4) ensuring that the institutional culture of the security forces supports the legal framework, international law, good democratic practice and civil management and oversight bodies. Addressing these challenges requires professional security forces, capable civil authorities, rule of law and regional approaches. Reform activities should be guided by local ownership, sensitivity to the politics of reform, local capacity, local context and a comprehensive sector-wide framework. Local stakeholders must make hard decisions about priorities on the availability of domestic resources available and the costs and benefits of accepting external assistance.
Cambridge Journals Online (CJO) is the e-publishing service for over 270 journals published by Ca... more Cambridge Journals Online (CJO) is the e-publishing service for over 270 journals published by Cambridge University Press and is entirely developed and hosted in-house. The platform's powerful capacity and reliable performance are maintained by a combination of our own expertise ...
... Making peace work: The role of the international development community. Post a Comment. CONTR... more ... Making peace work: The role of the international development community. Post a Comment. CONTRIBUTORS: Author: Ball, Nicole. Author: Halevy, Tammy. PUBLISHER: Overseas Development Council (Washington, DC and Baltimore, MD). SERIES TITLE: YEAR: 1996. ... This report is out of print. The attached item is a summary of the main findings of the report.
Ids Bulletin-institute of Development Studies, 1985
SUMMARY While security expenditure — including both military spending and expenditures on paramil... more SUMMARY While security expenditure — including both military spending and expenditures on paramilitary forces — is not the sole cause of underdevelopment, most Third World countries would benefit by spending less on their security sectors. This article first examines some of the problems surrounding the collection of reliable security expenditure data. It then argues that the preponderance of salaries and other operating costs in Third World security budgets complicates efforts to obtain reductions in security spending and to translate such reductions into development.SOMMAIRELe secteur de la sécurité, le budget et le développementAlors que la dépense relative à la sécurité — les dépenses militaires et le dépenses sur les forces paramilitaires — n'est pas la seule cause de sous-développement, la plupart des pays du Tiers Monde bénéficieraient d'une réduction des dépenses dans le secteur de la sécurité. Cet article examine tout d'abord quelques problèmes entourant la collection d'information de dépenses de sécurité de source sure. II prouve ensuite que la prépondérance des salaires et d'autres coûts d'opération dans les budgets de sécurité du Tiers Monde complique les efforts pour obtenir des réductions dans les dépenses et de transférer ces réductions dans le développement.RESUMENEl sector seguridad, presupuesto y desarrolloLa mayoría de los países del Tercer Mundo se beneficiarían si gastaran menos en sus sectores de seguridad, aún cuando este gasto, incluyendo tanto el gasto militar como en fuerzas paramilitares, no sea la única causa del subdesarrollo. El artículo examina algunos de los problemas que existen en la colección de datos fidedignos sobre gastos de seguridad. Argumenta que la preponderancia de salarios y otros gastos operativos en los presupuestos de seguridad de los países del Tercer Mundo complica los esfuerzos desplegados para rebajar dichos gastos y para transferir tales fondos a proyectos de desarrollo.
... By the late-1990s, the World Bank concluded that, 'History has repeatedly shown that goo... more ... By the late-1990s, the World Bank concluded that, 'History has repeatedly shown that good government is ... it remains to be seen how rapidly Bank staff will adjust to playing a less directiverole. ... But it was also probably the case that a strong constituency for governance in general ...
The Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) was established in 2006 to support interventions of direct and immed... more The Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) was established in 2006 to support interventions of direct and immediate relevance to the peacebuilding process and contribute towards addressing critical gaps in that process, in particular in areas for which no other funding mechanism is available. The PBF had a difficult start, in no small measure because of the political demands from New York to disburse rapidly, before PBF systems were fully in place or recipients had a clear idea what the purposes of the fund were. Despite that, this review finds that lessons have been learned from these experiences and are being applied to subsequent PBF cases. This positive learning curve is reflected at headquarters level, especially within the Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO) as Fund Manager and the Multi- Donor Trust Fund Office (MDTF Office) as Fund Administrator, as well as at field level.
Even though the PBF is relatively new and it is not yet possible to assess the long- term impact of PBF activities, the review team finds that the Fund has succeeded in:
-promoting discussion and learning about peacebuilding issues in the -context of post- conflict situations; -promoting ongoing peacebuilding processes; and -fundraising.
At the same time, the Fund faces numerous challenges to the effective and efficient achievement of its objectives. These include strategic challenges, conflicting objectives and faulty assumptions, management challenges, issues surrounding PBF stakeholder roles and responsibilities, and operational challenges.
Pooled funding is increasingly seen as an important component of efforts to improve aid effective... more Pooled funding is increasingly seen as an important component of efforts to improve aid effectiveness by harmonising aid activities. This review was commissioned by the UNDG/ECHA Task Team on Financing for Transition to: a) clarify how pooled funds can contribute to aid effectiveness in post-conflict transition situations and through that to improved aid flows and 2) recommend improvements in current systems, procedures and policies to donors and agencies. This report examines 15 funds in some detail: United Nations (UN)- and World Bank- administered funds as well as funds managed by the private sector and/or bilateral donors. The review focuses on four issues relating to aid effectiveness: ownership, coordination, risk management and mitigation, and speed and flexibility of response. Drawing on the findings in each of these areas, the review team identifies a number of policy level considerations that should be taken into account when seeking to strengthen the aid effectiveness of pooled funding.
Pooled funding mechanisms can take many forms but as defined in the review‟s ToR, they all utilise donor contributions against a set of common objectives and activities approved by a joint governing mechanism. The review has identified four categories of funds (Box ES-1) based on their structure and the rules that govern their financing, with most of the funds surveyed falling into Categories II and III.
There is a significant difference in the governance structures of these categories of funds, with important implications for ownership and capacity building and hence aid effectiveness. National actors generally are not included in the decision-making bodies of Category I funds, although they may be part of priority setting exercises. In Category II, III and IV funds, national actors are included in decision-making structures (although the rapid response modalities of Category III and IV funds (for example, the Immediate Response Facility (IRF) of the PBF) are less participatory in that the fund Steering Committee tends to play no role in project development or approval). Similarly, the guiding strategies of Category I funds are developed primarily by the international community while national actors and strategies play a larger role in determining the guiding strategies of Category II, III and IV funds. (Disbursements from Category IV funds are based on projects/project portfolios, not strategies.)
Le Volet Gouvernance relatif aux thèmes dits transversaux ayant trait à l’obligation démocrati... more Le Volet Gouvernance relatif aux thèmes dits transversaux ayant trait à l’obligation démocratique de rendre compte est une des composantes du Programme du développement du secteur de la sécurité (DSS) présenté dans le Mémorandum d’Entente (MdE) signé en avril 2009 par la République du Burundi et le Royaume des Pays-Bas pour une période de huit ans. Démarré vers la fin de la phase 1 du Programme DSS en 2011, ledit Volet fait l’objet aujourd’hui d’une évaluation de ses réalisations pour mieux orienter dans la suite les activités développées dans ce cadre. Ses activités caractérisent bien la seconde phase du Programme DSS axé sur le développement structurel – et non opérationnel de la phase 1 – puisqu’elles visent le changement d’attitudes, de comportements et de gestion garants de la durabilité du Programme.
La substance de l’évaluation du Volet Gouvernance du Programme DSS vient des échanges eus avec les acteurs étatiques et les acteurs non-étatiques du secteur de la sécurité sur le travail réalisé par ledit Volet ainsi que des documents clefs. L’évaluation menée touche plus le fonctionnement du Volet Gouvernance que les détails des projets exécutés. L’apport du Volet Gouvernance dans le développement de la RSS est assez appréciable. Cela dit, des défis sont encore à relever comme les limites de l’autorité civile de contrôle démocratique des CDS, le manque d’indépendance vis-à-vis des politiques, l’instrumentalisation de quelques éléments de ces corps et le besoin d’amélioration de la communication entre les CDS et les OSC.
Le besoin de contrôle démocratique des CDS appelle encore les mesures de renforcement de la transparence et de la redevabilité dans le secteur de la sécurité, notions nouvellement introduites dans la gestion de ces corps. Tant il est vrai que la sécurité est restée pendant longtemps comme une affaire réservée aux seules personnes en uniformes. Cette situation de fait explique la méfiance subsistante dans les relations entretenues par les CDS et les civils.
The Evaluation has identified seven areas on which the Danish government should focus attention i... more The Evaluation has identified seven areas on which the Danish government should focus attention in the coming three year period in order to enhance the performance of the Fund: 1) Deepening the Danish integrated approach to stabilisation; 2) Matching political ambition with human and financial resources; 3) Sharpening the PSF’s focus on key stabilisation issues; 4) Strengthening the PSF’s capacity for assessing context and developing theories of change as a basis for PSF programming and monitoring and evaluation; 5) Ensuring that the Fund’s comparative advantage is adequately reflected in programming; 6) Ensuring adequate flexibility in the use of PSF funding; and 7) Strengthening the management of the Fund to further enhance the effective and efficient use of PSF resources.
The Evaluation has made 16 recommendations to address these challenges, which can be found in the evaluation report. While it is ultimately the responsibility of the PSF stakeholders, including senior management at headquarters and embassies, under the leadership of the Inter-Ministerial Steering Committee (IMSC), to prioritise and respond to these recommendations, the Evaluation believes that there are seven recommendations that warrant immediate attention, which are outlined below.
Priority recommendations
In order to maximise the effectiveness of Danish support to stabilisation, it is essential that: 1) The IMSC strengthen its strategic guidance and oversight of the PSF; 2) The human and financial resources necessary to implement political ambitions are made available to the PSF; 3) PSF funding is adequately flexible; and 4) The management of the PSF is strengthened to further enhance the effective and efficient use of resources through improved monitoring and evaluation (M&E) and through attention to the choice and oversight of implementing partners.
Security sector reform (SSR) is increasingly put forward as a solution for a broad spectrum of Af... more Security sector reform (SSR) is increasingly put forward as a solution for a broad spectrum of African states facing security challenges. Yet, for a variety of reasons, there are relatively few examples of successful SSR implementation.
The case of Burundi's Security Sector Development (SSD) program, while still a work in progress, is noteworthy for having advanced both security sector effectiveness and democratic accountability since its inception in 2009. In this latest Africa Security Brief, "Lessons from Burundi's Security Sector Reform Process," Nicole Ball examines some of the challenges and accomplishments from the SSD experience thus far. Drawing on her years of practical analysis working with numerous SSR programs, Ball highlights insights from Burundi's SSD that can inform other African SSR initiatives. Key among these is the importance of navigating the politics of reform.
The authority granted by the United Nations Charter to use force to protect international peace a... more The authority granted by the United Nations Charter to use force to protect international peace and security has long lain dormant. The end of the Cold War, the genocides in Rwanda and Srebrenica and the 'Brahimi report' put discussions on the need for greater use of force on the UN's agenda in the early 2000s. Much has changed since, but in general the increased political willingness by UN member states to authorise the use of force has developed well ahead of their risk tolerance and matching capabilities. The recent experience of the Force Intervention Brigade in the UN's mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo is the latest occasion to trigger useful debate about the consequences of the UN mission mandates' progressive authorization of use of force and their increasingly robust application. Unfortunately, much of this debate takes greater use of force for granted, and focuses on the required political and capability improvements for improved effectiveness. Yet, there are three major risks associated with greater use of force as well. First, as the use of force will likely be selective and temporary, it risks reducing the UN's impartiality – with problematic consequences for its status as 'neutral broker'. Second, while the use of force can be a vital component of conflict resolution strategies, it also risks militarization if it is not accompanied by better political strategies and 'civilian capacities', such as stronger policing, intelligence and mediation. Third, greater use of force risks undermining missions' statebuilding tasks where force is applied on behalf of a state that is unwilling or unable to meet the internationally agreed standards of a sovereign government. A thoughtful debate on these issues needs to go hand in hand with any discussion of capability improvements.
SUMMARY Security for people, communities and states is essential for sustainable development, dem... more SUMMARY Security for people, communities and states is essential for sustainable development, democratisation and conflict mitigation. Politicised, badly managed or ineffective security bodies and justice systems often create instability and insecurity, largely due to the lack of effective democratic systems. Strengthening democratic security-sector governance after conflict presents enormous challenges, particularly: (1) developing and implementing a legal framework consistent with international law and democratic practice; (2) developing effective, well-functioning civil management and oversight bodies; (3) developing viable, accountable and affordable security forces; (4) ensuring that the institutional culture of the security forces supports the legal framework, international law, good democratic practice and civil management and oversight bodies. Addressing these challenges requires professional security forces, capable civil authorities, rule of law and regional approaches. Reform activities should be guided by local ownership, sensitivity to the politics of reform, local capacity, local context and a comprehensive sector-wide framework. Local stakeholders must make hard decisions about priorities on the availability of domestic resources available and the costs and benefits of accepting external assistance.
Cambridge Journals Online (CJO) is the e-publishing service for over 270 journals published by Ca... more Cambridge Journals Online (CJO) is the e-publishing service for over 270 journals published by Cambridge University Press and is entirely developed and hosted in-house. The platform's powerful capacity and reliable performance are maintained by a combination of our own expertise ...
... Making peace work: The role of the international development community. Post a Comment. CONTR... more ... Making peace work: The role of the international development community. Post a Comment. CONTRIBUTORS: Author: Ball, Nicole. Author: Halevy, Tammy. PUBLISHER: Overseas Development Council (Washington, DC and Baltimore, MD). SERIES TITLE: YEAR: 1996. ... This report is out of print. The attached item is a summary of the main findings of the report.
Ids Bulletin-institute of Development Studies, 1985
SUMMARY While security expenditure — including both military spending and expenditures on paramil... more SUMMARY While security expenditure — including both military spending and expenditures on paramilitary forces — is not the sole cause of underdevelopment, most Third World countries would benefit by spending less on their security sectors. This article first examines some of the problems surrounding the collection of reliable security expenditure data. It then argues that the preponderance of salaries and other operating costs in Third World security budgets complicates efforts to obtain reductions in security spending and to translate such reductions into development.SOMMAIRELe secteur de la sécurité, le budget et le développementAlors que la dépense relative à la sécurité — les dépenses militaires et le dépenses sur les forces paramilitaires — n'est pas la seule cause de sous-développement, la plupart des pays du Tiers Monde bénéficieraient d'une réduction des dépenses dans le secteur de la sécurité. Cet article examine tout d'abord quelques problèmes entourant la collection d'information de dépenses de sécurité de source sure. II prouve ensuite que la prépondérance des salaires et d'autres coûts d'opération dans les budgets de sécurité du Tiers Monde complique les efforts pour obtenir des réductions dans les dépenses et de transférer ces réductions dans le développement.RESUMENEl sector seguridad, presupuesto y desarrolloLa mayoría de los países del Tercer Mundo se beneficiarían si gastaran menos en sus sectores de seguridad, aún cuando este gasto, incluyendo tanto el gasto militar como en fuerzas paramilitares, no sea la única causa del subdesarrollo. El artículo examina algunos de los problemas que existen en la colección de datos fidedignos sobre gastos de seguridad. Argumenta que la preponderancia de salarios y otros gastos operativos en los presupuestos de seguridad de los países del Tercer Mundo complica los esfuerzos desplegados para rebajar dichos gastos y para transferir tales fondos a proyectos de desarrollo.
... By the late-1990s, the World Bank concluded that, 'History has repeatedly shown that goo... more ... By the late-1990s, the World Bank concluded that, 'History has repeatedly shown that good government is ... it remains to be seen how rapidly Bank staff will adjust to playing a less directiverole. ... But it was also probably the case that a strong constituency for governance in general ...
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Papers by Nicole Ball
Even though the PBF is relatively new and it is not yet possible to assess the long- term impact of PBF activities, the review team finds that the Fund has succeeded in:
-promoting discussion and learning about peacebuilding issues in the -context of post- conflict situations;
-promoting ongoing peacebuilding processes; and
-fundraising.
At the same time, the Fund faces numerous challenges to the effective and efficient achievement of its objectives. These include strategic challenges, conflicting objectives and faulty assumptions, management challenges, issues surrounding PBF stakeholder roles and responsibilities, and operational challenges.
Pooled funding mechanisms can take many forms but as defined in the review‟s ToR, they all utilise donor contributions against a set of common objectives and activities approved by a joint governing mechanism. The review has identified four categories of funds (Box ES-1) based on their structure and the rules that govern their financing, with most of the funds surveyed falling into Categories II and III.
There is a significant difference in the governance structures of these categories of funds, with important implications for ownership and capacity building and hence aid effectiveness. National actors generally are not included in the decision-making bodies of Category I funds, although they may be part of priority setting exercises. In Category II, III and IV funds, national actors are included in decision-making structures (although the rapid response modalities of Category III and IV funds (for example, the Immediate Response Facility (IRF) of the PBF) are less participatory in that the fund Steering Committee tends to play no role in project development or approval). Similarly, the guiding strategies of Category I funds are developed primarily by the international community while national actors and strategies play a larger role in determining the guiding strategies of Category II, III and IV funds. (Disbursements from Category IV funds are based on projects/project portfolios, not strategies.)
La substance de l’évaluation du Volet Gouvernance du Programme DSS vient des échanges eus avec les acteurs étatiques et les acteurs non-étatiques du secteur de la sécurité sur le travail réalisé par ledit Volet ainsi que des documents clefs. L’évaluation menée touche plus le fonctionnement du Volet Gouvernance que les détails des projets exécutés. L’apport du Volet Gouvernance dans le développement de la RSS est assez appréciable. Cela dit, des défis sont encore à relever comme les limites de l’autorité civile de contrôle démocratique des CDS, le manque d’indépendance vis-à-vis des politiques, l’instrumentalisation de quelques éléments de ces corps et le besoin d’amélioration de la communication entre les CDS et les OSC.
Le besoin de contrôle démocratique des CDS appelle encore les mesures de renforcement de la transparence et de la redevabilité dans le secteur de la sécurité, notions nouvellement introduites dans la gestion de ces corps. Tant il est vrai que la sécurité est restée pendant longtemps comme une affaire réservée aux seules personnes en uniformes. Cette situation de fait explique la méfiance subsistante dans les relations entretenues par les CDS et les civils.
use of PSF resources.
The Evaluation has made 16 recommendations to address these challenges, which can be found in the evaluation report. While it is ultimately the responsibility of the PSF stakeholders, including senior management at headquarters and embassies, under the leadership of the Inter-Ministerial Steering Committee (IMSC), to prioritise and respond to these recommendations, the Evaluation believes that there are seven recommendations that warrant immediate attention, which are outlined below.
Priority recommendations
In order to maximise the effectiveness of Danish support to stabilisation, it is essential that: 1) The IMSC strengthen its strategic guidance and oversight of the PSF; 2) The human and financial resources necessary to implement political ambitions are made available to the PSF; 3) PSF funding is adequately flexible; and 4) The management of the PSF is strengthened to further enhance the effective and efficient use of resources through improved monitoring and evaluation (M&E) and through attention to the choice and oversight of implementing partners.
The case of Burundi's Security Sector Development (SSD) program, while still a work in progress, is noteworthy for having advanced both security sector effectiveness and democratic accountability since its inception in 2009. In this latest Africa Security Brief, "Lessons from Burundi's Security Sector Reform Process," Nicole Ball examines some of the challenges and accomplishments from the SSD experience thus far. Drawing on her years of practical analysis working with numerous SSR programs, Ball highlights insights from Burundi's SSD that can inform other African SSR initiatives. Key among these is the importance of navigating the politics of reform.
Even though the PBF is relatively new and it is not yet possible to assess the long- term impact of PBF activities, the review team finds that the Fund has succeeded in:
-promoting discussion and learning about peacebuilding issues in the -context of post- conflict situations;
-promoting ongoing peacebuilding processes; and
-fundraising.
At the same time, the Fund faces numerous challenges to the effective and efficient achievement of its objectives. These include strategic challenges, conflicting objectives and faulty assumptions, management challenges, issues surrounding PBF stakeholder roles and responsibilities, and operational challenges.
Pooled funding mechanisms can take many forms but as defined in the review‟s ToR, they all utilise donor contributions against a set of common objectives and activities approved by a joint governing mechanism. The review has identified four categories of funds (Box ES-1) based on their structure and the rules that govern their financing, with most of the funds surveyed falling into Categories II and III.
There is a significant difference in the governance structures of these categories of funds, with important implications for ownership and capacity building and hence aid effectiveness. National actors generally are not included in the decision-making bodies of Category I funds, although they may be part of priority setting exercises. In Category II, III and IV funds, national actors are included in decision-making structures (although the rapid response modalities of Category III and IV funds (for example, the Immediate Response Facility (IRF) of the PBF) are less participatory in that the fund Steering Committee tends to play no role in project development or approval). Similarly, the guiding strategies of Category I funds are developed primarily by the international community while national actors and strategies play a larger role in determining the guiding strategies of Category II, III and IV funds. (Disbursements from Category IV funds are based on projects/project portfolios, not strategies.)
La substance de l’évaluation du Volet Gouvernance du Programme DSS vient des échanges eus avec les acteurs étatiques et les acteurs non-étatiques du secteur de la sécurité sur le travail réalisé par ledit Volet ainsi que des documents clefs. L’évaluation menée touche plus le fonctionnement du Volet Gouvernance que les détails des projets exécutés. L’apport du Volet Gouvernance dans le développement de la RSS est assez appréciable. Cela dit, des défis sont encore à relever comme les limites de l’autorité civile de contrôle démocratique des CDS, le manque d’indépendance vis-à-vis des politiques, l’instrumentalisation de quelques éléments de ces corps et le besoin d’amélioration de la communication entre les CDS et les OSC.
Le besoin de contrôle démocratique des CDS appelle encore les mesures de renforcement de la transparence et de la redevabilité dans le secteur de la sécurité, notions nouvellement introduites dans la gestion de ces corps. Tant il est vrai que la sécurité est restée pendant longtemps comme une affaire réservée aux seules personnes en uniformes. Cette situation de fait explique la méfiance subsistante dans les relations entretenues par les CDS et les civils.
use of PSF resources.
The Evaluation has made 16 recommendations to address these challenges, which can be found in the evaluation report. While it is ultimately the responsibility of the PSF stakeholders, including senior management at headquarters and embassies, under the leadership of the Inter-Ministerial Steering Committee (IMSC), to prioritise and respond to these recommendations, the Evaluation believes that there are seven recommendations that warrant immediate attention, which are outlined below.
Priority recommendations
In order to maximise the effectiveness of Danish support to stabilisation, it is essential that: 1) The IMSC strengthen its strategic guidance and oversight of the PSF; 2) The human and financial resources necessary to implement political ambitions are made available to the PSF; 3) PSF funding is adequately flexible; and 4) The management of the PSF is strengthened to further enhance the effective and efficient use of resources through improved monitoring and evaluation (M&E) and through attention to the choice and oversight of implementing partners.
The case of Burundi's Security Sector Development (SSD) program, while still a work in progress, is noteworthy for having advanced both security sector effectiveness and democratic accountability since its inception in 2009. In this latest Africa Security Brief, "Lessons from Burundi's Security Sector Reform Process," Nicole Ball examines some of the challenges and accomplishments from the SSD experience thus far. Drawing on her years of practical analysis working with numerous SSR programs, Ball highlights insights from Burundi's SSD that can inform other African SSR initiatives. Key among these is the importance of navigating the politics of reform.