Den hebräischen Text aus Sefer_Yetzirah_Kaplan.pdf, (Seite 1 von 25 (1:1)) kopieren, und zwar 1) ... more Den hebräischen Text aus Sefer_Yetzirah_Kaplan.pdf, (Seite 1 von 25 (1:1)) kopieren, und zwar 1) die ganze erste Zeile (Text, d.h. nach dem ersten Doppelpunkt), dann ' … ' 2) dann ab inkl. dem vierten Wort der vorletzten Zeile bis zum Schluß Hier auf hebräisch: Sefer ha-Yetzirah With 32 mystical paths of Wisdom engraved Yah ... Whose name is Holy-... And He created His universe with three books (Sepharim), with text (Sepher) with number (Sephar) and with communication (Sippur). Sefer ha-Yetzirah * ___ ______ _____ Den hebräischen Text aus Sefer_Yetzirah_Kaplan.pdf, (z.B. Seite 2 oder3,4 etc. von 25 (1:2, 1:3 etc.) kopieren. Achtung: es handelt sich um die ersten 3 Worte der Abschnitte Preface I've written the essays presented in this book in the years 2011 to xxxx. But I followed the main ideas, which led to the central statements in these essays, already since the late eighties of the last century. And since I've made the experience, that some philosophers somehow seem to be forced to think, what they think, and even more so, how they think, with a degree of freedom much smaller than they think, I probably could trace the earliest indications of such thinking back much further. Some steps in the development, which led to these essays, can be examined in the appendices. Authors are no good commentators of their writings, and philosophers certainly are not the best interpreters of their works, but obviously many of them feel compelled to pretend it would be otherwise. A preface may be a good place to let one get away with such pretension. Thus, looking for some labels, one could say, that in particular in the third essay concerning information monism, we will find an attempt of meinongifying Spinoza and also a bit vice versa. The main topic of this essay is clarifying the notion of substance in the context of information monism. This will also have the integration of some results of-in particular-the first essay into a comprehensive conceptual scheme as a consequence. The second essay on 'Names and Objects' could go as an experiment of kryptonizing, pardon: kripkenizing, Super Quine. Seen from another angle this could also go as clarifying the notion of essence in the theory of objects or, from again a further angle, as a radical ingression from the side of the theory of objects into conventional semantics. The first essay, however, is … de profundis,-what for once should be read as 'up from gunk'. There I will try to overcome some seemingly unsurmountable difficulties in a literally 'fundamental' philosophy of everything. To attain that end some less philosophical considerations have also to be employed. One of the mentioned unsurmountable difficulties, usually not dicussed in the repective physical theories, is, what I've called 'the paradox of reductionism' (see also appendix NN, TowTu), i.e. the paradox, that the reductionist program necessarily seems doomed to fail in its zenith, since it impossibly can ultimately terminate.
In this paper I try to fortify the nominalistic objectology (cf. Meinong's 'Gegenstandsth... more In this paper I try to fortify the nominalistic objectology (cf. Meinong's 'Gegenstandstheorie') with essentialist means. This also is intended as a preparation for introducing Information Monism
In this paper I try to combine the objectology of Meinong with a neutral substance monism of the ... more In this paper I try to combine the objectology of Meinong with a neutral substance monism of the kind originally proposed by Spinoza (deus sive natura). Yet Spinoza was still stuck in the Cartesian paradigm and therefore rather gave a dual monism (extensio et intellectus) than a proper neutral monism. I propose that there are only two attributes of the one substance: existence and non-existence. Everything else is/are mere modes of them
In this paper I will combine ideas of Meinong's objectology with earlier ideas of ethereal or... more In this paper I will combine ideas of Meinong's objectology with earlier ideas of ethereal or intelligible gunk. I will try to make that useful for a better understanding of 'emergence'. I also spend some remarks on mathematical theorie
. In an earlier paper ‘The Topos of Emergence’ (‘TheTopos of Emrgence’, in: Boundaries - The Scie... more . In an earlier paper ‘The Topos of Emergence’ (‘TheTopos of Emrgence’, in: Boundaries - The Scientifc Aspects of ANPA 24, (ed. Keith G. Bowden), London 2003, pp 236 –250; cf.also:http://www.academia.edu/1549400/The_Topos_of_Emergence) I introduced a mathematical structure called the topos PrePhys consisting of an ever propagating emergent hierarchy made of a strict n-categorical unfolding of automorphic objects obAM .Later I came to the conclusion that this topos PrePhys perfectly matchs the concept of Gunk introduced under this name by DavidLewis. (cf. D.Lewis, Parts of Classes, Oxford, Cambridge (Mass.)1991, pp 19 –2
The aim of this paper is to provide a sketch of a bit more formal underpinning concerning the con... more The aim of this paper is to provide a sketch of a bit more formal underpinning concerning the conceptual intricacy of the notion of '(primordial) emergence' by applying category-and topostheoretical means. 1 This relates most directly to what had been called 'the mêontology of primordial emergence' in the corresponding paper "The Tower of Turtles" (see the "The Philosophical Aspects of ANPA 24"), namely the 'objects which are not intended entities'. A particularly interesting instance of such 'objects which are no entities' is the proposed mathematical structure from which in my understanding the most elementary (or fundamental) physical structure(s) have been emergent. 1 The idea of applying features of topos-theory as means for analyzing the concept of emergence and subsequently formulating a theory of emergence had-to my knowledge-for the first time been proposed in P.
Pfeils vorgestellt werden, die auf moglichen Implikationen des Kontiguumbegriffs beruht, wie ihn ... more Pfeils vorgestellt werden, die auf moglichen Implikationen des Kontiguumbegriffs beruht, wie ihn Leibniz in mehreren Arbeiten zu den Grundlagen der Dynamik entwickelt hat. Wesentlich sind dabei wechselseitige thematische Bezuge seiner Theoria Motus Abstracti und seines Dialogs Pacidius Philalethi. Aus der von Leibniz durchgefuhrten Analyse des Kontiguums als einer Voraussetzung der Moglichkeit von Bewegung ergibt sich, das das (scheinbar zwischen Kontinuum und Diskretheit angesiedelte) Kontiguum - in heutiger Terminologie - nicht durch solche Merkmale wie Machtigkeit oder Dichte bestimmt werden kann, sondern vielmehr eine besondere (topologische) Zusammenhangsstruktur aufweisen mus. In der Arbeit wird gezeigt, das die dynamisch begrundeten Anforderungen an eine solche Zusammenhangsstruktur von geeigneten topologischen Modellen einer Kette erfullt werden.
In this paper we will give a sketch of a categorically version of particular mereological structu... more In this paper we will give a sketch of a categorically version of particular mereological structures. I.e. we will follow the example of F.W.Lawvere's "An elementary theory of the category of sets" 1 where he introduced a categorised version of set theory.
The aim of this paper is to provide a sketch of a bit more formal underpinning concerning the con... more The aim of this paper is to provide a sketch of a bit more formal underpinning concerning the conceptual intricacy of the notion of '(primordial) emergence' by applying category- and topos- theoretical means. 1 This relates most directly to what had been called 'the meontology of primordial emergence' in the corresponding paper "The Tower of Turtles" (see the "The Philosophical Aspects of ANPA 24"), namely the 'objects which are not intended entities'. A particularly interesting instance of such 'objects which are no entities' is the proposed mathematical structure from which in my understanding the most elementary (or fundamental) physical structure(s) have been emergent.
A quantum information interpretation of QM based on the Holographic Principle and related to the ... more A quantum information interpretation of QM based on the Holographic Principle and related to the Horava Witten model of M-cosmology and the ensuing AdS/CFT duality will be proposed. This interpretation resumes the central idea of the relative state interpretation of H. Everett namely, that the wave function (of the universe) designates a fundamental reality. Yet it sharply differs from B. DeWitt's (Many Worlds) version of the original relative state interpretation and it has a different understanding of what makes up that fundamental reality. Bringing together features of the Holographic Principle and such of M-cosmology the basic assumption of the proposed quantum information interpretation is, that the observed universe should be seen as the 3+1 dim surface 'part' of a not observed 4+1 dim bulk 'part', where the wave function of the universe eventually relates to the entire combined system. The bulk space then can provide the (hitherto not located) 'storage dump' for the (informational equivalent of the) not observed quantum states. A further result of these considerations is, that the quantum theoretical feature of duality, which once had been introduced by Einstein in his work on the nature of 'Lichtquanten', is seen-yet closely together with the feature of yet again 'concealing' these dualities-as the very essence of QM. The implicit connection of interpretative and cosmological aspects made by the quantum information interpretation then reinforces again what from their respectively very different angles already had been claimed by the relative state interpretation as well as D. Bohm's holistic interpretation of QM namely, that an appropriate interpretation of QM has a) in the perspective of the relative state interpretation directly to relate to the wave function of the universe or b) in the perspective of the holistic interpretation to the universe as a whole. These different perspectives are normally not seen as being directed to the same picture. Changing this perception is one purpose of this paper.
In this paper I will discuss the philosophical topic of emer- gence and reduction(ism). The motiv... more In this paper I will discuss the philosophical topic of emer- gence and reduction(ism). The motivation behind that is to try to overcome an inherent vagueness of the reductionist program which most obstinately shows up at the primordial emergence, namely that of the intended elementary ontological structure(s) of the universe itself. I propose that for overcoming the alleged nearly paradoxical situation of reductionism with respect to primordial emergence one has to put the attached problems in a rigorously emergence-theoretical perspective. Thus I will also come to some uncommon ontological results, e.g. the postulate of objects which are no intended entities (and no mere ideas or fictitious concepts either) and by this to the postulate that the most fundamental physical structure(s) have to be seen as being emergent from a rigorously non-physical, i.e. an entirely mathematical structure.
In this paper I will discuss the philosophical topic of emergence and reduction(ism). The motivat... more In this paper I will discuss the philosophical topic of emergence and reduction(ism). The motivation behind that is to try to overcome an inherent vagueness of the reductionist program which most obstinately shows up at the primordial emergence, namely that of the intended elementary ontological structure(s) of the universe itself. I propose that for overcoming the alleged nearly paradoxical situation of reductionism with respect to primordial emergence one has to put the attached problems in a rigorously emergence-theoretical perspective. Thus I will also come to some uncommon ontological results, e.g. the postulate of objects which are no intended entities (and no mere ideas or fictitious concepts either) and by this to the postulate that the most fundamental physical structure(s) have to be seen as being emergent from a rigorously non-physical, i.e. an entirely mathematical structure. Physica ergo ... desinit in geometriam, nec ante ullum phaenomenon penitus in corporibus intelli...
A quantum information interpretation of QM based on the Holographic Principle and related to the ... more A quantum information interpretation of QM based on the Holographic Principle and related to the Horava Witten model of M-cosmology and the ensuing AdS/CFT duality will be proposed. This interpretation resumes the central idea of the relative state interpretation of H. Everett namely, that the wave function (of the universe) designates a fundamental reality. Yet it sharply differs from B. DeWitt's (Many Worlds) version of the original relative state interpretation and it has a different understanding of what makes up that fundamental reality. Bringing together features of the Holographic Principle and such of M-cosmology the basic assumption of the proposed quantum information interpretation is, that the observed universe should be seen as the 3+1 dim surface 'part' of a not observed 4+1 dim bulk 'part', where the wave function of the universe eventually relates to the entire combined system. The bulk space then can provide the (hitherto not located) 'storage dump' for the (informational equivalent of the) not observed quantum states. A further result of these considerations is, that the quantum theoretical feature of duality, which once had been introduced by Einstein in his work on the nature of 'Lichtquanten', is seen-yet closely together with the feature of yet again 'concealing' these dualities-as the very essence of QM. The implicit connection of interpretative and cosmological aspects made by the quantum information interpretation then reinforces again what from their respectively very different angles already had been claimed by the relative state interpretation as well as D. Bohm's holistic interpretation of QM namely, that an appropriate interpretation of QM has a) in the perspective of the relative state interpretation directly to relate to the wave function of the universe or b) in the perspective of the holistic interpretation to the universe as a whole. These different perspectives are normally not seen as being directed to the same picture. Changing this perception is one purpose of this paper.
In this paper we will give a sketch of a categorically version of particular mereological structu... more In this paper we will give a sketch of a categorically version of particular mereological structures. I.e. we will follow the example of F.W.Lawvere's "An elementary theory of the category of sets" 1 where he introduced a categorised version of set theory.
Den hebräischen Text aus Sefer_Yetzirah_Kaplan.pdf, (Seite 1 von 25 (1:1)) kopieren, und zwar 1) ... more Den hebräischen Text aus Sefer_Yetzirah_Kaplan.pdf, (Seite 1 von 25 (1:1)) kopieren, und zwar 1) die ganze erste Zeile (Text, d.h. nach dem ersten Doppelpunkt), dann ' … ' 2) dann ab inkl. dem vierten Wort der vorletzten Zeile bis zum Schluß Hier auf hebräisch: Sefer ha-Yetzirah With 32 mystical paths of Wisdom engraved Yah ... Whose name is Holy-... And He created His universe with three books (Sepharim), with text (Sepher) with number (Sephar) and with communication (Sippur). Sefer ha-Yetzirah * ___ ______ _____ Den hebräischen Text aus Sefer_Yetzirah_Kaplan.pdf, (z.B. Seite 2 oder3,4 etc. von 25 (1:2, 1:3 etc.) kopieren. Achtung: es handelt sich um die ersten 3 Worte der Abschnitte Preface I've written the essays presented in this book in the years 2011 to xxxx. But I followed the main ideas, which led to the central statements in these essays, already since the late eighties of the last century. And since I've made the experience, that some philosophers somehow seem to be forced to think, what they think, and even more so, how they think, with a degree of freedom much smaller than they think, I probably could trace the earliest indications of such thinking back much further. Some steps in the development, which led to these essays, can be examined in the appendices. Authors are no good commentators of their writings, and philosophers certainly are not the best interpreters of their works, but obviously many of them feel compelled to pretend it would be otherwise. A preface may be a good place to let one get away with such pretension. Thus, looking for some labels, one could say, that in particular in the third essay concerning information monism, we will find an attempt of meinongifying Spinoza and also a bit vice versa. The main topic of this essay is clarifying the notion of substance in the context of information monism. This will also have the integration of some results of-in particular-the first essay into a comprehensive conceptual scheme as a consequence. The second essay on 'Names and Objects' could go as an experiment of kryptonizing, pardon: kripkenizing, Super Quine. Seen from another angle this could also go as clarifying the notion of essence in the theory of objects or, from again a further angle, as a radical ingression from the side of the theory of objects into conventional semantics. The first essay, however, is … de profundis,-what for once should be read as 'up from gunk'. There I will try to overcome some seemingly unsurmountable difficulties in a literally 'fundamental' philosophy of everything. To attain that end some less philosophical considerations have also to be employed. One of the mentioned unsurmountable difficulties, usually not dicussed in the repective physical theories, is, what I've called 'the paradox of reductionism' (see also appendix NN, TowTu), i.e. the paradox, that the reductionist program necessarily seems doomed to fail in its zenith, since it impossibly can ultimately terminate.
In this paper I try to fortify the nominalistic objectology (cf. Meinong's 'Gegenstandsth... more In this paper I try to fortify the nominalistic objectology (cf. Meinong's 'Gegenstandstheorie') with essentialist means. This also is intended as a preparation for introducing Information Monism
In this paper I try to combine the objectology of Meinong with a neutral substance monism of the ... more In this paper I try to combine the objectology of Meinong with a neutral substance monism of the kind originally proposed by Spinoza (deus sive natura). Yet Spinoza was still stuck in the Cartesian paradigm and therefore rather gave a dual monism (extensio et intellectus) than a proper neutral monism. I propose that there are only two attributes of the one substance: existence and non-existence. Everything else is/are mere modes of them
In this paper I will combine ideas of Meinong's objectology with earlier ideas of ethereal or... more In this paper I will combine ideas of Meinong's objectology with earlier ideas of ethereal or intelligible gunk. I will try to make that useful for a better understanding of 'emergence'. I also spend some remarks on mathematical theorie
. In an earlier paper ‘The Topos of Emergence’ (‘TheTopos of Emrgence’, in: Boundaries - The Scie... more . In an earlier paper ‘The Topos of Emergence’ (‘TheTopos of Emrgence’, in: Boundaries - The Scientifc Aspects of ANPA 24, (ed. Keith G. Bowden), London 2003, pp 236 –250; cf.also:http://www.academia.edu/1549400/The_Topos_of_Emergence) I introduced a mathematical structure called the topos PrePhys consisting of an ever propagating emergent hierarchy made of a strict n-categorical unfolding of automorphic objects obAM .Later I came to the conclusion that this topos PrePhys perfectly matchs the concept of Gunk introduced under this name by DavidLewis. (cf. D.Lewis, Parts of Classes, Oxford, Cambridge (Mass.)1991, pp 19 –2
The aim of this paper is to provide a sketch of a bit more formal underpinning concerning the con... more The aim of this paper is to provide a sketch of a bit more formal underpinning concerning the conceptual intricacy of the notion of '(primordial) emergence' by applying category-and topostheoretical means. 1 This relates most directly to what had been called 'the mêontology of primordial emergence' in the corresponding paper "The Tower of Turtles" (see the "The Philosophical Aspects of ANPA 24"), namely the 'objects which are not intended entities'. A particularly interesting instance of such 'objects which are no entities' is the proposed mathematical structure from which in my understanding the most elementary (or fundamental) physical structure(s) have been emergent. 1 The idea of applying features of topos-theory as means for analyzing the concept of emergence and subsequently formulating a theory of emergence had-to my knowledge-for the first time been proposed in P.
Pfeils vorgestellt werden, die auf moglichen Implikationen des Kontiguumbegriffs beruht, wie ihn ... more Pfeils vorgestellt werden, die auf moglichen Implikationen des Kontiguumbegriffs beruht, wie ihn Leibniz in mehreren Arbeiten zu den Grundlagen der Dynamik entwickelt hat. Wesentlich sind dabei wechselseitige thematische Bezuge seiner Theoria Motus Abstracti und seines Dialogs Pacidius Philalethi. Aus der von Leibniz durchgefuhrten Analyse des Kontiguums als einer Voraussetzung der Moglichkeit von Bewegung ergibt sich, das das (scheinbar zwischen Kontinuum und Diskretheit angesiedelte) Kontiguum - in heutiger Terminologie - nicht durch solche Merkmale wie Machtigkeit oder Dichte bestimmt werden kann, sondern vielmehr eine besondere (topologische) Zusammenhangsstruktur aufweisen mus. In der Arbeit wird gezeigt, das die dynamisch begrundeten Anforderungen an eine solche Zusammenhangsstruktur von geeigneten topologischen Modellen einer Kette erfullt werden.
In this paper we will give a sketch of a categorically version of particular mereological structu... more In this paper we will give a sketch of a categorically version of particular mereological structures. I.e. we will follow the example of F.W.Lawvere's "An elementary theory of the category of sets" 1 where he introduced a categorised version of set theory.
The aim of this paper is to provide a sketch of a bit more formal underpinning concerning the con... more The aim of this paper is to provide a sketch of a bit more formal underpinning concerning the conceptual intricacy of the notion of '(primordial) emergence' by applying category- and topos- theoretical means. 1 This relates most directly to what had been called 'the meontology of primordial emergence' in the corresponding paper "The Tower of Turtles" (see the "The Philosophical Aspects of ANPA 24"), namely the 'objects which are not intended entities'. A particularly interesting instance of such 'objects which are no entities' is the proposed mathematical structure from which in my understanding the most elementary (or fundamental) physical structure(s) have been emergent.
A quantum information interpretation of QM based on the Holographic Principle and related to the ... more A quantum information interpretation of QM based on the Holographic Principle and related to the Horava Witten model of M-cosmology and the ensuing AdS/CFT duality will be proposed. This interpretation resumes the central idea of the relative state interpretation of H. Everett namely, that the wave function (of the universe) designates a fundamental reality. Yet it sharply differs from B. DeWitt's (Many Worlds) version of the original relative state interpretation and it has a different understanding of what makes up that fundamental reality. Bringing together features of the Holographic Principle and such of M-cosmology the basic assumption of the proposed quantum information interpretation is, that the observed universe should be seen as the 3+1 dim surface 'part' of a not observed 4+1 dim bulk 'part', where the wave function of the universe eventually relates to the entire combined system. The bulk space then can provide the (hitherto not located) 'storage dump' for the (informational equivalent of the) not observed quantum states. A further result of these considerations is, that the quantum theoretical feature of duality, which once had been introduced by Einstein in his work on the nature of 'Lichtquanten', is seen-yet closely together with the feature of yet again 'concealing' these dualities-as the very essence of QM. The implicit connection of interpretative and cosmological aspects made by the quantum information interpretation then reinforces again what from their respectively very different angles already had been claimed by the relative state interpretation as well as D. Bohm's holistic interpretation of QM namely, that an appropriate interpretation of QM has a) in the perspective of the relative state interpretation directly to relate to the wave function of the universe or b) in the perspective of the holistic interpretation to the universe as a whole. These different perspectives are normally not seen as being directed to the same picture. Changing this perception is one purpose of this paper.
In this paper I will discuss the philosophical topic of emer- gence and reduction(ism). The motiv... more In this paper I will discuss the philosophical topic of emer- gence and reduction(ism). The motivation behind that is to try to overcome an inherent vagueness of the reductionist program which most obstinately shows up at the primordial emergence, namely that of the intended elementary ontological structure(s) of the universe itself. I propose that for overcoming the alleged nearly paradoxical situation of reductionism with respect to primordial emergence one has to put the attached problems in a rigorously emergence-theoretical perspective. Thus I will also come to some uncommon ontological results, e.g. the postulate of objects which are no intended entities (and no mere ideas or fictitious concepts either) and by this to the postulate that the most fundamental physical structure(s) have to be seen as being emergent from a rigorously non-physical, i.e. an entirely mathematical structure.
In this paper I will discuss the philosophical topic of emergence and reduction(ism). The motivat... more In this paper I will discuss the philosophical topic of emergence and reduction(ism). The motivation behind that is to try to overcome an inherent vagueness of the reductionist program which most obstinately shows up at the primordial emergence, namely that of the intended elementary ontological structure(s) of the universe itself. I propose that for overcoming the alleged nearly paradoxical situation of reductionism with respect to primordial emergence one has to put the attached problems in a rigorously emergence-theoretical perspective. Thus I will also come to some uncommon ontological results, e.g. the postulate of objects which are no intended entities (and no mere ideas or fictitious concepts either) and by this to the postulate that the most fundamental physical structure(s) have to be seen as being emergent from a rigorously non-physical, i.e. an entirely mathematical structure. Physica ergo ... desinit in geometriam, nec ante ullum phaenomenon penitus in corporibus intelli...
A quantum information interpretation of QM based on the Holographic Principle and related to the ... more A quantum information interpretation of QM based on the Holographic Principle and related to the Horava Witten model of M-cosmology and the ensuing AdS/CFT duality will be proposed. This interpretation resumes the central idea of the relative state interpretation of H. Everett namely, that the wave function (of the universe) designates a fundamental reality. Yet it sharply differs from B. DeWitt's (Many Worlds) version of the original relative state interpretation and it has a different understanding of what makes up that fundamental reality. Bringing together features of the Holographic Principle and such of M-cosmology the basic assumption of the proposed quantum information interpretation is, that the observed universe should be seen as the 3+1 dim surface 'part' of a not observed 4+1 dim bulk 'part', where the wave function of the universe eventually relates to the entire combined system. The bulk space then can provide the (hitherto not located) 'storage dump' for the (informational equivalent of the) not observed quantum states. A further result of these considerations is, that the quantum theoretical feature of duality, which once had been introduced by Einstein in his work on the nature of 'Lichtquanten', is seen-yet closely together with the feature of yet again 'concealing' these dualities-as the very essence of QM. The implicit connection of interpretative and cosmological aspects made by the quantum information interpretation then reinforces again what from their respectively very different angles already had been claimed by the relative state interpretation as well as D. Bohm's holistic interpretation of QM namely, that an appropriate interpretation of QM has a) in the perspective of the relative state interpretation directly to relate to the wave function of the universe or b) in the perspective of the holistic interpretation to the universe as a whole. These different perspectives are normally not seen as being directed to the same picture. Changing this perception is one purpose of this paper.
In this paper we will give a sketch of a categorically version of particular mereological structu... more In this paper we will give a sketch of a categorically version of particular mereological structures. I.e. we will follow the example of F.W.Lawvere's "An elementary theory of the category of sets" 1 where he introduced a categorised version of set theory.
This sketch of a perhaps future 'Elementary Theory of the Category of Mereological Sums (includin... more This sketch of a perhaps future 'Elementary Theory of the Category of Mereological Sums (including Mereological Wholes and Parts)' relates to my previous papers "The Topos of Emergence" and "Intelligible Gunk". I assert that for successfully categorizing Mereology one has to start with a specific setting of gunk.
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Papers by Dan Kurth
'Names and Objects' (cf. http://www.academia.edu/4310705/Names_and_Objects_-_Outlines_of_an_Essentialist_Nominalism), and
'Information Monism' (cf. http://www.academia.edu/4310969/Information_Monism_-_and_its_Concepts_of_Substance_Attributes_and_Emergent_Modes).
In this introduction also some light shall be shed on the mutual dependence and interrelatedness of these mentioned papers. It also includes a hefty attack on Russell's 'On Denotation' with respect to his alleged refutation of Meinong's Gegenstandstheorie (objectology aka theory of objects)."
'Names and Objects' (cf. http://www.academia.edu/4310705/Names_and_Objects_-_Outlines_of_an_Essentialist_Nominalism), and
'Information Monism' (cf. http://www.academia.edu/4310969/Information_Monism_-_and_its_Concepts_of_Substance_Attributes_and_Emergent_Modes).
In this introduction also some light shall be shed on the mutual dependence and interrelatedness of these mentioned papers. It also includes a hefty attack on Russell's 'On Denotation' with respect to his alleged refutation of Meinong's Gegenstandstheorie (objectology aka theory of objects)."